We continue with our discussion of Spinoza, focussing on his arguments in Ethics II concerning the parallel structure of mind and body. One important question raised here is how to understand the relationship between Spinoza’s so-called “parallelism” (or better: “identity-theory”) and his view of the intelligibility of nature. Is his parallelism a result of his commitment to the intelligibility of nature, or part of what drives that position?
Readings
- Spinoza: Ethics II
- Focus on the definitions, axioms, and E2p1-13 up until the excursis starting on p. 125. Resume at E2p28 until the end of bk. II.
Recommended
- Della Rocca: Spinoza, ch. 3
- Della Rocca: “Interpreting Spinoza: The Real is the Rational”
- Garber: “Superheroes in the History of Philosophy: Spinoza, Super-Rationalist”
- Garrett: “Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”
- Hübner: “Spinoza on the Limits of Explanation”
- Hübner: “Spinoza’s Parallelism Doctrine & Metaphysical Sympathy”
- Renz: The Explicability of Experience, ch. 6