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General editor's preface

Schopenhauer is one of the great original writers of the nineteenth century, and a unique voice in the history of thought. His central concept of the will leads him to regard human beings as striving irrationally and suffering in a world that has no purpose, a condition redeemed by the elevation of aesthetic consciousness and finally overcome by the will's self-denial and a mystical vision of the self as one with the world as a whole. He is in some ways the most progressive post-Kantian, an atheist with profound ideas about the human essence and the meaning of existence which point forward to Nietzsche, Freud, and existentialism. He was also the first major Western thinker to seek a synthesis with Eastern thought. Yet at the same time he undertakes an ambitious global metaphysics of a conservative, more or less pre-Kantian kind, and is driven by a Platonic vision of escape from empirical reality into a realm of higher knowledge.

Schopenhauer was born in 1788, and by 1809 had gone against his family's expectations of a career as a merchant and embarked on a university career. He completed his doctoral dissertation *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* in 1813, then spent several years in intensive preparation of what became the major work of his life, *The World as Will and Representation*, which was published at the end of 1818, with 1819 on the title page. Shortly afterwards his academic career suffered a setback when his only attempt at a lecture course ended in failure. Thereafter Schopenhauer adopted a stance of intellectual self-sufficiency and antagonism towards university philosophy, for which he was repaid by a singular lack of reaction to his writings. In 1836 he published *On Will in Nature*, an attempt to corroborate his metaphysics with findings from the sciences, and in 1841 two self-standing essays on free will and moral philosophy, entitled *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. A large supplementary second volume to *The World as Will and Representation* appeared in 1844, accompanied by a revised version of the original which now appeared as Volume 1; then in 1851 another two-volume work, *Parerga*

and Paralipomena, a collection of essays and observations. Only in the 1850s did serious interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy begin, with a favourable review appearing in an English journal and a few European universities offering courses on his work. In this final decade before his death in 1860 he published a third edition of *The World as Will and Representation* and a second edition of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. After Schopenhauer's death his follower Julius Frauenstädt produced the first six-volume edition of his works in 1873, providing the basis for many subsequent German editions up to the *Sämtliche Werke* edited by Arthur Hübscher, which we use as the basis for our translations in the present edition.

Though Schopenhauer's life and the genesis of his philosophy belong to the early part of the nineteenth century, it is the latter half of the century that provides the context for his widespread reception and influence. In 1877 he was described by Wilhelm Wundt as 'the born leader of non-academic philosophy in Germany', and in that period many artists and intellectuals, prominent among them Richard Wagner, worked under the influence of his works. The single most important philosophical influence was on Nietzsche, who was in critical dialogue throughout his career with his 'great teacher Schopenhauer'. But many aspects of the period resonate with Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory, his pessimism, his championing of the *Upanishads* and Buddhism, and his theory of the self and the world as embodied striving.

Over the last three decades interest in Schopenhauer in the English-speaking world has been growing again, with a good number of monographs, translations, and collections of articles appearing, where before there were very few. More general trends in the study of the history of philosophy have played a part here. There has recently been a dramatic rise in philosophical interest in the period that immediately follows Kant (including the German Idealists and Romanticism), and the greater centrality now accorded to Nietzsche's philosophy has provided further motivation for attending to Schopenhauer. Yet until now there has been no complete English edition of his works. The present six-volume series of Schopenhauer's published works aims to provide an up-to-date, reliable English translation that reflects the literary style of the original while maintaining linguistic accuracy and consistency over his philosophical vocabulary.

Almost all the English translations of Schopenhauer in use until now, published though they are by several different publishers, stem from a single translator, the remarkable E. F. J. Payne. These translations, which were done in the 1950s and 1960s, have stood the test of time quite well

and performed a fine service in transmitting Schopenhauer to an English-speaking audience. Payne's single-handed achievement is all the greater given that he was not a philosopher or an academic, but a former military man who became a dedicated enthusiast. His translations are readable and lively and convey a distinct authorial voice. However, the case for new translations rests partly on the fact that Payne has a tendency towards circumlocution rather than directness and is often not as scrupulous as we might wish in translating philosophical vocabulary, partly on the fact that recent scholarship has probed many parts of Schopenhauer's thought with far greater precision than was known in Payne's day, and partly on the simple thought that after half a century of reading Schopenhauer almost solely through one translator, and with a wider and more demanding audience established, a change of voice is in order.

In the present edition the translators have striven to keep a tighter rein on philosophical terminology, especially that which is familiar from the study of Kant – though we should be on our guard here, for Schopenhauer's use of a Kantian word does not permit us to infer that he uses it in a sense Kant would have approved of. We have included explanatory introductions to each volume, and other aids to the reader: footnotes explaining some of Schopenhauer's original German vocabulary, a glossary of names to assist with his voluminous literary and philosophical references, a chronology of his life, and a bibliography of German texts, existing English translations, and selected further reading. We also give a breakdown of all passages that were added or altered by Schopenhauer in different editions of his works, especially noteworthy being the changes made to his earliest publications, *On the Fourfold Root* and the single-volume first edition of *The World as Will and Representation*. A further novel feature of this edition is our treatment of the many extracts Schopenhauer quotes in languages other than German. Our guiding policy here is, as far as possible, to translate material in any language into English. The reader will therefore not be detained by scanning through passages in other languages and having to resort to footnote translations. Nevertheless, the virtuoso manner in which Schopenhauer blends Latin, Greek, French, Italian, and Spanish extracts with his own prose style is not entirely lost, since we have used footnotes to give all the original passages in full.

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Editorial notes and references

Three kinds of notes occur in the translation:

(1) Footnotes marked with asterisks (*, **, and so on) are Schopenhauer's own notes.
(2) Footnotes marked with small letters (a, b, c) are editorial notes. These either give information about the original wording in Schopenhauer's text (in German or other languages), or provide additional editorial information. All (and only) such *additional* information is enclosed in brackets []. All footnote material *not* in brackets consists of words from the original text.
(3) Endnotes marked with numerals 1, 2, 3. The endnotes for each work, given at the end of the individual work, indicate variations between the different texts of the works.

Schopenhauer's works are referred to by the following abbreviations. In each instance, we give reference to the Hübscher volume and page. We give page references to those Cambridge editions published as of the date of the present volume: *BM* and *FW* are found in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (2009) and *WWR 1* (2010). The Hübscher page numbers can be used to locate passages in future volumes of the Cambridge edition:

Hübscher *SW* 1–7	*Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), Vols. 1–7.
BM	*On the Basis of Morals* [*Über die Grundlage der Moral*].
FR	*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* [*Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*].
FW	*On the Freedom of the Will* [*Über die Freiheit des Willens*].

PP 1, 2	*Parerga and Paralipomena* [*Parerga und Paralipomena*], Vols. 1 and 2.
VC	*On Vision and Colours* [*Über das Sehn und die Farben*].
WN	*On Will in Nature* [*Über den Willen in der Natur*].
WWR 1, 2	*The World as Will and Representation* [*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*], Vols. 1 and 2.

Unpublished writings by Schopenhauer are referred to thus:

GB	*Gesammelte Briefe*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978).
HN 1–5	*Der handschriftliche Nachlaß*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Frankfurt-am-Main: Kramer, 1970), Vols. 1–5.
MR 1–4	*Manuscript Remains*, ed. Arthur Hübscher, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Berg, 1988), Vols. 1–4 [a translation of *HN*, Vols. 1–4].

Passages in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* are referred by the standard method, using A and B marginal numbers corresponding to the first and second editions of the work. Other writings by Kant are referred to by volume and page number of the monumental '*Akademie*' edition (Berlin: Georg Reimer/Walter de Gruyter, 1900–), in the form Ak. 4: 397. References to works of Plato and Aristotle use the standard marginal annotations.

Introduction

ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

Genesis of the work

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason began life as Schopenhauer's dissertation. In his dissertation, Schopenhauer begins with a general statement of the principle of sufficient reason: 'nothing is without a ground for its being rather than not being.' Schopenhauer argues that the principle is derived from *four* different ground-consequent relations, what he calls the four 'roots' of the principle. He argues that previous philosophers recognized and conflated *two* of these roots: that in order for a proposition to be true it must have a reason and that any alteration of a real object must have a cause. The former Schopenhauer called 'the principle of sufficient reason of knowing' and the latter he called 'the principle of sufficient reason of becoming'. Schopenhauer argues for recognition of two more roots that he refers to as 'the principle of sufficient reason of being' and 'the principle of sufficient reason of acting'. Schopenhauer believed that were philosophers carefully to specify to which of the four different forms of the principle of sufficient reason they refer, they would be spared a great deal of confusion.

Schopenhauer had planned to submit the dissertation to the University of Berlin for his doctorate in philosophy. Instead he sent it to the University of Jena. His change of plan was a function of circumstance. After two years at the University of Göttingen, he switched his allegiance from medicine to philosophy due to the influence of his first philosophy professor, Gottlob Ernst Schulze. In 1811 Schopenhauer enrolled at Berlin, drawn there with the hope that in Johann Gottlieb Fichte he would hear a great philosopher. But after his *a priori* veneration for Fichte had turn to disdain, and after fearing that Berlin would be attacked by Napoleon, in May 1813 he fled to Weimar, and then travelled south to the small town of Rudolstadt, where

he laboured on his dissertation from July to the end of September. Fearing that sending his dissertation to Berlin could make it a casualty of the war, on 24 September he sent it to the nearby University of Jena, after paying the required examination fee.

The letter, composed in Latin, accompanying his dissertation, composed in German, is surprisingly uncharacteristic for a philosopher whose typical voice was confident, even sometimes arrogant about the quality of his work. After providing the dean of the philosophy faculty, Heinrich Carl Eichstädt, with a description of his academic preparation, he requested that Jena's 'sagacious' faculty advise him whether they found anything unclear, rambling, untrue, or even offensive in his work. In matters of philosophy, he continued, it was not wise to 'rely on one's own judgement', and he explained that in Rudolstadt he had no philosophically learned friends to review his manuscript. He was also particularly keen to know whether anyone had anticipated his criticisms of Kant's proof of the law of causality, since he lacked access to a good library.[1] Eichstädt quickly circulated a letter announcing the dissertation while mentioning that its author was son of 'the well-known authoress, Frau Hofrätin Schopenhauer'. On 2 October 1813, Schopenhauer was awarded his degree *in absentia*, with the distinction *magna cum laude.*

Despite the conciliatory tone of Schopenhauer's communications with the faculty at Jena, in a more characteristic move, the young philosopher was simultaneously arranging to have 500 copies of the work published,[2] and the work was out by the end of October. Unfortunately, the published dissertation earned, at best, lukewarm reviews.[3] Indeed, the most stinging might have come from the young man's mother, who asked sarcastically whether his book was for pharmacists. Schopenhauer retorted that his work would still find readers when not even a single copy of her writings could be found in a junk yard. Undaunted, Johanna Schopenhauer spat back, 'Of yours the entire printing will still be available'.[4]

[1] *GB* 3–5, letter to Eichstädt, 22 September 1813

[2] *GB* 3, letter to Friedrich Justin Bertuch, 15 September 1813

[3] *On the Fourfold Root* received three reviews, one by his first professor of philosophy at Göttingen, Gottlob Ernst Schulze, in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, No. 70, 30 April 1814, pp. 701–3; another in the *Neue theologische Annalen*, 1814, Vol. 1, Marburg and Frankfurt-am-Main, 11 June 1814, and a third by M.A. [Georg Michael Klein], *Jenaische Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung vom Jahre 1814*, Vol. 3, Nos. 123–124, July 1814, pp. 33–42, all reprinted in *Fünftes Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft*, 1916

[4] Reported by Wilhelm Gwinner, *Gespräche* (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog, 1971), p. 17

Differences between editions

Thirty-four years, 1813 to 1847, lapsed between the two editions of Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophic first-born, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. At nearly sixty, Schopenhauer understated the substantive changes between the editions. He claimed that it was his intent 'to deal with my youthful self indulgently, and as far as it is ever possible, to let him have his say', but to 'cut him off' when he said something 'incorrect or superfluous'. Although in this way Schopenhauer allowed that the later edition corrected errors and deleted superfluous material, to the older philosopher the most significant difference between the two editions was a matter of voice. 'The sensitive reader', he claimed, 'will certainly never be in doubt whether he hears the cadence of the old or the young man'. He characterizes the voice of the 1813 version as an 'unassuming tone' born of a young man who is 'still naïve enough to believe quite seriously that all those who occupy themselves with philosophy could have nothing to do with anything else but the truth'. This youthful voice he contrasts with that of 'the firm, but at times somewhat acerbic voice of the old man who finally had to discover what a noble society of tradespeople and submissive sycophants he has fallen among and what they aimed at' (p. 3). Certainly there are noticeable changes of voice between the two editions. For example, in § 10 of the 1854 edition, Schopenhauer changes the young man's critique of Christian Wolff from 'I don't understand' to the straightforward claim that Wolff made 'a mistake' (p. 24). It is apparent that as a young man Schopenhauer's deference was intentional. In § 46 of the 1813 dissertation, Schopenhauer praised Schelling for providing an illuminating account of Kant's distinction between the intelligible and empirical character and the relation between freedom and nature. Yet his marginal notes in Schelling's text are bluntly critical. In this passage, Schelling did not refer to Kant by name, but to idealism. Schopenhauer's marginal notation in his copy of Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften* (1809) scolds, 'Kant, you unseemly scoundrel'.[5] In 1854, the entire section, § 46, is eliminated. Nevertheless, in no other book did he delete so much of the original, and nowhere else would he make such substantive philosophical changes.

Yet these changes to *On the Fourfold Root* were made relatively late in Schopenhauer's philosophical career, and they were prompted by the significant development of a philosophic train of thought, first articulated

[5] *HN* 5, 147 (later Schopenhauer will suggest that Schelling tried to pass off Kant's work as his own; see *FW*, 97 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 83)

in his principal work, *The World as Will and Representation* (1819), and further developed in *On Will in Nature* (1836) and the second edition of his principal work (1844). This development placed the first edition of *On the Fourfold Root* in a curious relation to his principal work, for in the 'Preface to the first edition' of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer makes three imposing demands on readers seeking to truly understand his philosophy. The second of these demands was that his readers study the introduction or propaedeutic to this work, *On the Fourfold Root*.[6] He claims that readers will only be able to engage in his novel way of philosophizing by knowing what this principle is, what it signifies, and the limits of its validity. Not only would his readers learn that the world exists only as a result of this principle, but they would also realize that this principle is the form of any object and that all objects are conditioned by the subject.

Yet when Schopenhauer issued this demand in 1818, he was a much different philosopher than the younger dissertator of 1813. He was more philosophically mature, and he had revised his understanding of the significance of Kant's philosophy. Consequently in the first preface to his principal work, he forewarns his readers that he could now provide a better presentation of the subject matter of his dissertation because he could clarify many of the ideas that resulted from his excessive preoccupation with the Kantian philosophy, particularly his uncritical employment of Kant's pure categories of the understanding and Kant's views of the inner sense and the outer sense. Schopenhauer explains that these Kantian ideas were only secondary concerns, so he had not thought about them deeply. With no sense of the burden he is about to impose on his readers, he then casually mentions that, after they become acquainted with his principal work, correction of these wayward passages will come automatically to readers' minds.

Schopenhauer's remarks concerning the means by which he would clarify his dissertation only hint at the changes he would make twenty-nine years after those mentioned in the first edition of his principal work. Between the time of the two editions of *On the Fourfold Root*, he had discovered the first edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in which he found a

[6] Schopenhauer also included in this demand reading the first chapter of *On Vision and Colours*. His first demand was to read the book twice, and the third was to be thoroughly acquainted with Kant's philosophy; Schopenhauer also mentioned that spending some time in the school of the divine Plato and familiarity with the *Upanishads*, would serve as means to make readers more receptive to his thought (due to Plato) and so that what he had to say would not sound foreign or inimical (due to the *Upanishads*), see *WWR* 1, 6–9 (Hübscher *SW* 2, VIII–XIII)

greater commitment to idealism and fewer contradictions than in its second edition. He had also rehearsed for the first time his physiological arguments for the intellectual nature of intuition in his *On Vision and Colours*, and he had discussed how his philosophy was corroborated by the sciences in *On Will in Nature*. He had also published his ethics in the 'narrower sense' in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, and he had more than doubled the length of *The World as Will and Representation* in its second edition by including a second volume of essays that supplemented his discussions in the single-volume first edition.[7] Consequentially, the second edition of *On the Fourfold Root* is a work dramatically unlike what Schopenhauer envisioned, even if 'clarified', when he wrote the 1819 introduction, and the work now serves as an introduction to his principal work in a way that does not require readers to correct wayward discussions themselves.

There are obvious differences between the two editions. In the Hübscher *Sämtliche Werke*, both editions have eight chapters, and whereas the earlier version had fifty-nine sections, the second has fifty-two. Yet the second edition runs to some sixty-seven pages longer than the first. While some materials from omitted sections find their place in the second edition, other sections, §§ 15, 17, 22, 46, 49, 50, 51, and 56, virtually disappear.[8] He adds a new section (§ 12) on Hume, but still does not add Fichte to the section on 'Kant and his School' (§ 13). But unlike in his dissertation, where Fichte is never mentioned, he now freely abuses his former teacher, as he does his *bête noire*, Hegel, who was also ignored in the dissertation.[9] Indeed, he includes unrestrained complaints against his contemporaries and even blames Kant for setting the stage for the wild flights into 'Cloudcuckooland' made by post-Kantians (p. 107). He cuts his only quotation from Goethe, but adds two more and denounces the reception of Goethe's colour theory. He adds references to Eastern philosophy and religion, and he adds references to relevant supporting discussions found in his other books. To further indicate his allegiance to Kant, he replaces the word 'metaphysical' with 'transcendental'.

The dissertator, however, is a philosopher of his times. Like the German Idealists, Schopenhauer is convinced that Kant's great unknown, the thing

[7] See *WWR* 2, ch. 47 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 679) where he claims that *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* has dealt with 'morality in the narrower sense' of the term

[8] See 'Collation of the two editions', p. lxvii

[9] It appears that Schopenhauer had borrowed a copy of Hegel's *Science of Logic* when he was writing his dissertation, but claimed not to have read it; see *GB* 6, letter to Carl Friedrich Frommann, 4 November 1813

in itself, is the weak point of the critical philosophy.[10] At Göttingen he had been instructed by the author of *Aenesidemus* (1792), Gottlob Ernst Schulze, who argued that by viewing things in themselves as the cause of empirical intuitions, Kant had employed the concept of causality transcendently, that is, Kant had applied the concept beyond the bounds of all possible experience. His Berlin professor Fichte had also considered the very idea of the thing in itself to be nonsense. So it is not surprising that in his early reflections on Kant, he would eschew the thing in itself, and that he would proudly state in his dissertation that 'our investigation does not rigidify in a thing in itself' (see p. 184). By the time of his principal work, however, Schopenhauer adopts Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves, chides the German Idealists for abandoning it, and considers this distinction to be Kant's 'greatest merit'.[11]

Just as Schopenhauer reversed his stance toward the thing in itself long before the second edition of *On the Fourfold Root*, the same was true of his early commitment to the function of Kant's twelve pure categories of the understanding in the intuition of the external world. To be sure, the dissertator was breaking free of the Kantian paradigm in which the perception of the external world was the result of a synthesis of sensory intuitions via the pure categories of the understanding. For example, the younger philosopher writes 'I agree with Kant that the law of causality in connection with the other categories, thus generally with the understanding, makes possible the totality of objective cognition that we call experience . . . Except that, according to my view, the understanding does this only by unifying time and space through its categories, not through mere categories alone' (see p. 166). Schopenhauer struggles to describe this unity or synthesis as an unconscious, immediate inference while he views Kant as describing it as involving mediated inferences:

> Through the category of causality we originally cognize the object as *actual,* i.e. *acting* on us. That we are not conscious of this inference presents us with no difficulty: we are never conscious of the inference from the colour of the body to its shape. Moreover, it is no inference of reason, no combining of judgments: we have nothing to do with the concept of the category, but with the category itself. The category itself leads immediately from the effect to the cause; therefore, we are as little conscious of its function as that of the other categories, since precisely through these categories our consciousness changes from dull sensation

[10] Schopenhauer calls the thing in itself the weak point of Kant's philosophy in a early note where he also writes 'the thing in itself – is = 0', see *MR* 1, 290ff. (*HN* 2, 266)

[11] See *WWR 1*, 444 (Hübscher *SW 2*, 494). This remark dates from the first edition

to intuition. I would like to give the name of *inference of understanding* to this inference. It is a type of inference that is not mediated through any abstract concept. (see p. 168)

Three years later, in *On Vision and Colours,* he would abandon this view in his analysis of the intellectual nature of intuition. He would also argue in his principal work that one of Kant's gravest mistakes was not to distinguish sufficiently between 'intuitive cognition' and 'abstract, discursive cognition'.[12] The understanding is now no longer the faculty of concepts in any sense for Schopenhauer; only reason is the faculty of concepts and of inferences. Reason, therefore, plays no role in the cognition of natural objects. He notes that non-human animals are incapable of formulating concepts but, just like humans, they are aware of a world of spatio-temporal objects, standing in causal relations. For this reason Schopenhauer attributes understanding to animals, but he follows the long-standing philosophical tradition of not attributing reason to them. Yet Schopenhauer differs from Kant, who views the faculty of reason as conferring a dignity to humans, making humans morally considerable and animals not. To Schopenhauer, animals share the same essence as humans: they are also will; they also suffer; and they are also morally considerable.

To accommodate his new insights, Schopenhauer made the appropriate changes in the second edition. So he carefully notes in the second edition that bodily sensations are the data for the application of the law of causality, but the body itself does not present objects. The sole function of the understanding, or 'intellect', becomes the immediate, intuitive apprehension of causal connections between objects. And Schopenhauer jettisons what he calls 'the complicated clockwork of the twelve Kantian categories' (p. 76). He also drops the reference to the body as the 'immediate object', not simply to remove obscuring jargon to which the dissertator was inclined, but to denote that sensations are not objects.[13]

In addition to eliminating vestiges of the Kantian account of cognition of the external world, Schopenhauer also had to rid the dissertation of views that were inconsistent with the metaphysics developed in *The World as Will and Representation*. This was especially true of his early view that will functioned causally. Consequently § 47 of the first edition, 'Causality of Will on Cognition', becomes § 44 in the second, and it receives the new title, 'Influence of Will on Cognition'. The initial sentence is transformed from 'The will not only causally affects the immediate object' to 'the

[12] See *WWR* 1, 503 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 562ff.) [13] See § 22 and n. 64

influence that will exercises on cognition is not based on causality'. The reason for this change is straightforward. The cognizing and willing subjects are identical, which absolutely rules out any causal relation between them. Schopenhauer had also argued in *The World as Will and Representation* that the body and will are identical.[14] Therefore there is no causality between will and body, which are one and the same. Moreover, because causality functions only in the world as representation, within the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, and will is outside the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, there can be no causal relation between will and representation. So in the second edition, Schopenhauer also omits § 46, 'Motive, Decisions, Empirical and Intelligible Character', eliminating a discussion of how 'the decision appears to be related to the subject of willing, and appears to be the point of contact between the unknowable subject of will (lying outside of time) and motives (lying in time)' (p. 187).[15] Even in the first edition, however, Schopenhauer realized that he could not be speaking literally about the relation of the intelligible and empirical characters: 'Perhaps I could better indicate what is meant, although also figuratively, if I call it [the intelligible character] a universal act of will lying outside of time, of which all temporal acts are only the emergence, the appearance' (ibid.). He would use this metaphor elsewhere.[16]

The Second Edition

The alterations Schopenhauer's dissertation underwent in the second edition formed it into the proper introduction to his principal work, as did his elaborations on a number of his earlier views. To be sure, it retains its original structure, except that he adds a preface to the second edition. In his statement of method in the first chapter, he still evokes 'Plato, the divine' and the 'amazing Kant' (p. 1). He argues that the method of philosophy – indeed, the method of all knowledge – must comply with two laws: the law of homogeneity and the law of specification. The former requires that we note similarities among things, uniting them into species, and species into genera, until we subsume all under some all-encompassing concept. The latter principle moves the consideration in the reverse direction. The

[14] See *WWR* 1, 127 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 122ff.)

[15] Schopenhauer also observes here that Kant's concept of the intelligible character is more correctly called 'unintelligible', and he compliments Schelling's exposition of Kant's position

[16] For Schopenhauer's discussion of the metaphorical use of the term 'universal act of will lying outside of time', see *GB* 237, letter to Johann August Becker, 21 September 1844

law of specification recognizes genera under this all-embracing concept of family, then species in the genera, and the individual in the species. He agrees with Kant. Both laws are transcendental *a priori* principles of reason, and as such nature must conform to them. The significance of the principle of sufficient reason remains the same: it is 'the mother of all sciences', since the principle is that which structures a mere aggregate of facts into a coherent body of knowledge, one in which a particular finding follows from another as its grounds. The principle is also that which always permits us to ask 'why'. Later, he makes his infamous statement that the principle of sufficient reason is 'the principle of all explanation' (p. 148). He still employs Christian Wolff's statement of the principle of sufficient reason as its most general expression: *Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit*, 'Nothing is without a reason why it is rather than it is not' (p. 10). Schopenhauer will argue, however, that the Wolffian formula is simply an abstraction, following the law of homogeneity, derived from four different relations, each of which is based on a synthetic *a priori* law, the so-called fourfold roots of the principle of sufficient reason, the subjects of the fourth to the seventh chapters.[17]

In the second chapter, ranging from Plato through Kant and his school, Schopenhauer surveys the philosophical literature on his subject, finding that previous philosophers failed to distinguish clearly among the various forms of the principle and only gradually and confusedly recognized two expressions of the principle, namely, that in order for a proposition to be true it must have a reason and that any alteration of a real object must have a cause. The former Schopenhauer would designate as 'the principle of sufficient reason of knowing' and the latter as 'law of causality', to which he also will refer as 'the principle of sufficient reason of becoming' (p. 38). Whereas in the dissertation Schopenhauer claimed that the principle of sufficient reason itself can not be proven, and he claims that to ask for a 'why' for this principle is to ask a question that cannot be answered, in the second edition he drops the last claim and provides a dialectical proof. To demand a proof for the principle is already to assume it to be true and to do so is to require 'a proof for the right to require a proof' (p. 28).

In the third chapter, Schopenhauer introduces the basis on which he develops the four 'roots' of the principle of sufficient reason. He does so on the basis of that which he viewed as the first, universal, and essential condition for all cognition: the correlativity of subject and object. Our cognizing consciousness, our sensibility, understanding, and reason, divides

[17] See p. 31

into subject and object. All experience, any cognition, and any awareness require the experiencer and the experienced, the cognizer and the cognized, the subject of awareness and the object of awareness. The subject is never the object or the object the subject. By observing different objects of awareness, different sorts of representations, Schopenhauer develops four classes of objects, and the four 'roots' of the principle of sufficient reason. It is useful to examine how Schopenhauer sees the principle of sufficient reason governing different species of a ground-consequent relation.

Principle of sufficient reason of becoming

The fourth chapter of *On the Fourfold Root* focuses on the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, or the law of causality, the form of the principle that governs intuitive, complete, empirical representations. The sum total of these intuitive representations constitutes empirical reality. In brief, Schopenhauer calls the class of objects governed by this form of the principle of sufficient reason 'real objects', and this principle governs alterations of states of things and not things themselves. He states this principle as: 'If a new state of one or more real objects appears, then there must be another, previous state from which the new one follows according to a rule, i.e. as often as the first exists, every time. Such a sequence is called a *consequence*, the first state a *cause*, the second an *effect*' (p. 38). Since the principle of sufficient reason is the source of all necessity, Schopenhauer attributes a type of necessity to each of its expressions. In this case of the law of causality, the form of necessity is 'physical necessity', that is, once the cause appears, the effect cannot fail to appear (p. 146).

The fourth chapter is the chapter that received the most extensive revisions in the second edition. Schopenhauer had to carefully cut elements that reflected his earlier uncritical acceptance of Kant's account of the empirical intuition of objects that constitute the external world. It contains nine sections in each edition (17–25 in the second, 18–26 in the first), but its length more than doubles, despite dropping § 22 'Mental images and dreams. Fantasy' in the second edition. This expansion is not due simply to his adding criticisms directed at his contemporaries and citing ancestors of his views, but is due primarily to his significantly expanding the section on 'Principle of sufficient reason of becoming'[18] and by his adding § 21 'Apriority of the concept of causality – Intellectual basis of empirical intuition. – The understanding', where Schopenhauer elaborates

[18] Originally this was § 23 in the first edition, § 20 in the second

on the physiological arguments for the intellectual nature of intuition, first stated in *On Vision and Colours*. It is in § 21 that Schopenhauer clearly and emphatically articulates the intellectual nature of intuition, arguing that 'the understanding first creates and produces this objective external world from the raw stuff of a few sensations in the sense organs' (p. 52). Moreover, since sensation is, for Schopenhauer, 'a completely subjective process internal to the organism because it is beneath the skin' (p. 79), he believes that he maintains Kant's fundamental idealistic insight and avoids the Achilles' heel of Kant's philosophy, namely, applying the law of causality in transcendent fashion by positing things in themselves as the cause of sensation.[19]

§ 23 'Disputation of the proof of the apriority of the concept of causality advanced by Kant', expands on materials provided in § 24 of the dissertation.[20] Here Schopenhauer criticizes Kant's argument in the infamous 'Second analogy'[21] where Kant attempts to show the *a priori* status and necessity of the law of causality from the fact that it is required to recognize an objective succession of representations, in contrast to a mere subjective succession of alterations. To represent a subjective sequence, Kant introduces the example of a house surveyed visually from top to bottom, and to illustrate an objective sequence, an example of observing a ship moving steadily downstream. Kant claims that the former has no necessary ordering, and the latter an irreversible and necessary ordering, and that this distinction could not be made if alteration were not an instance of an effect following a cause. Schopenhauer objects. Kant forgets that both examples deal with states of affairs in which objects change in regard to one another. The observer of the ship is stationary, whereas in the example of the house, the subject's eyes move and, given this movement, the sequence is just as irreversible as that of the ship. Had the observer the power to move the ship like that of moving the eyes, the course of the ship would be reversible. In either case, the cognition of the house, or the movement of the ship, is an event governed by causal laws. Events can succeed in an objective sequence without the former event causing the latter, such as a roof tile striking you as you happen to leave your house. Here it is not your leaving the house that is the cause of your being struck (unless, perhaps, you slammed the

[19] Schopenhauer refers to the Achilles' heel of Kant's philosophy in *PP* 1, § 13 (Hübscher *SW 5*, 95)

[20] In the dissertation the title of § 24 was 'Disputation of Kant's proof of this principle and assertion of a new proof with the same purport'. Schopenhauer's new proof is based on the 'unshakeable certainty' we attribute to the law of causality; see p. 86. In the second edition Schopenhauer claims that § 21 has provided the proof, which this unshakeable certainty merely confirms

[21] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A189/B232–A 211/B256

door too hard), but the sequence is objective. Or consider the sequence of notes in a piece of music. This sequence is not determined by the listener, but is an objective sequence that is such that the earlier note is not the cause of the latter. Schopenhauer concludes that the apprehension of objective sequences is direct and does not require inferring it from causal laws, and suggests that since we are aware of countless objective temporal sequences, if every one of these successions had to be based on knowledge of causal laws determining these sequences, we would have to be omniscient.[22]

Principle of sufficient reason of knowing

The fifth chapter deals with the second class of objects for the subject, which is concepts or abstract representations, and Schopenhauer refers to the ability to formulate concepts as the faculty of reason, a faculty restricted to human beings. The job of reason is to abstract concepts from intuitive representations, and concepts are meaningful only insofar as they can be traced back to empirical intuitions. And although he promised a new explanation of reason in his dissertation, it was not until the second edition that he would include § 34 'Reason', a section that tripled the length of this chapter. Yet instead of augmenting his earlier views and teasing out new insights, he used this section to vent his frustrations at being ignored for more than thirty years. Here he reviles his contemporaries for the wild flights of reason developed in their philosophy, for portraying this faculty as having some privileged access to the absolute, to the supersensible via some invented ability like 'intellectual intuition' (p. 116). Despite his esteem for Kant, he pins the blame here on Kant's view of practical reason and his supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative.[23] By setting practical reason as the means for justifying metaphysical beliefs about freedom, the soul, and God, Kant had emboldened others to transform theoretical reason into the source of knowledge of such things, even though Kant himself had denied it such extraordinary powers. If practical reason could justify such beliefs, if it could become the source of moral laws *a priori*, it was a small step to view theoretical reason as having the capacity to grasp the object for which Kant said it longed, the unconditional. Schopenhauer sneers that 'If it is thus taught that we possess a faculty for cognition which is immediate, material (i.e. providing the matter, not merely the form), and supersensible (i.e. leading beyond all possibility of experience), a faculty expressly intended for metaphysical

[22] See p. 88 [23] See p. 113

insight, one inherent in us for such a purpose, and that this faculty comprises *our reason* – then I must be so impolite as to call it a bare-faced lie' (p. 109). This barefaced lie he then traced to what he regarded as Jacobi's perversion of Kant and to the development of Fichte's, Schelling's, and Hegel's philosophies:

> For fifty years, so-called German philosophy based itself on such a completely fictitious faculty, snatched out of thin air: first as the free construction and projection of the absolute I and its emanations into the not-I; then as the intellectual intuition of absolute identity, or indifference, and its evolutions into nature, or of the origin of God out of his dark ground, or groundlessness, *à la* Jakob Böhme; finally as the pure self-thinking of the absolute idea and the theatre of the ballet of the self-movement of concepts; and all the while still as immediate apprehension of the divine, the supersensible, of holiness, of fineness, truthfulness, goodness – and whatever other 'nesses' may be desirable – or even a mere presentiment, *Ahnen* . . . of all that splendidness.' (p. 116)

Yet Schopenhauer's treatment of the principle of sufficient reason of knowing remains the same as in the dissertation. Reason combines concepts into judgments, and no judgement is intrinsically true; its truth is based on something else. He states this form of the principle of sufficient reason as 'If a judgement would express *knowledge*, it must have a sufficient ground, and on account of this property it receives the predicate *true. Truth* is thus the relation of a judgement to something distinct from it which is called its ground, and as we will soon see, even admits of a significant variety of forms' (p. 100). He then recognizes four ways by which a judgement is grounded in something other than itself, and, thus, four kinds of truths: logical, empirical, transcendental, and metalogical. Just as he holds that the principle of sufficient reason of becoming articulates physical necessity, which is primarily the inevitability of an effect from a cause, this form of the principle of sufficient reason deals with 'logical necessity', the necessity of a true proposition following from a ground.

Schopenhauer's account of the four types of truths is brief and somewhat perfunctory, tending to be driven by neatly drawn systematic considerations. A judgement or proposition is logically or formally true if it is based simply on conceptual relations with another proposition. Thus the proposition 'No P is S' is logically true because it immediately follows from converting the proposition 'No S is P'. A proposition, however, can also be materially true if it is inferred from a proposition with material content: an example of such a proposition is 'No cats are insects', which follows from the proposition 'No insects are cats'. In his analysis of logical truth, Schopenhauer privileges classical Aristotelian categorical logic, 'the whole

science of syllogisms', as stating the sum total of rules for applying the principle of sufficient reason to judgments, as formulating the canon of logical truth. Consequently, Schopenhauer recognizes that arguing, concluding, and inferring were the proper functions of the faculty of reason and that failure to reason in a way consistent with the rules of syllogistic reasoning demonstrates a defect in one's reason.[24]

Schopenhauer's account of empirical truth contains no examples of empirically true propositions. It is likely that he thought no examples were necessary. A proposition, he claims, is empirically true if it is grounded in experience. Since an empirically true proposition is not true by virtue of conceptual relations, it is materially true. (The proposition, 'The cat is on the mat', is true if only if, in fact, there is a cat on the mat.) Transcendentally true propositions, conversely, are those propositions that are grounded on the *a priori* forms of intuition; that is, those founded in the faculty of the understanding or pure sensibility. For example, the judgement 'two straight lines do not enclose a space' is grounded in the *a priori* form of space; '$3 \times 7 = 21$', is grounded in the *a priori* form of time; 'Nothing happens without a cause' is based on the *a priori* law of causality. Lastly, a proposition is metalogically true if it is grounded in the 'laws of thought', that is, in the law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, or the principle of sufficient reason of knowing itself. By discovering that it is impossible to think contrary to these laws, we recognize through reason that metalogical truths are conditions of the possibility of all thinking; 'we then find that to think contrary to them is of as little avail as it is to move our limbs against the direction of their joints' (p. 104). For example, Schopenhauer claims that the proposition, 'matter is permanent', is a metalogical truth, because we cannot think of matter as arising or passing away.

Principle of sufficient reason of being

The sixth chapter is Schopenhauer's analysis of the third class of objects, pure or non-empirical intuitions of space and time, and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing these objects, which he calls the principle of sufficient reason of being. This chapter received few alterations. Other than systematically substituting 'transcendental' for 'metaphysical',

[24] In the Preface to *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, 17 (Hübscher *SW* 4, xxff.) Schopenhauer criticized Hegel's 'lack of understanding' by citing an example from the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophic Sciences* that illustrated Hegel's inability to reason properly through syllogisms

he remained faithful to his original commitment to Kant's intuitionalist philosophy of mathematics, relating mathematical concepts to the pure forms of sensibility, that is, to space and time. Specifically, he held that space and time could be objects of non-empirical or *a priori* intuitions that enable us to know their nature better than considerations provided by either the understanding or reason. Kant, he argues, also held the thesis that the relations of position in space and succession in time are made intelligible only by means of intuition, 'by explaining that the difference between the right and left glove absolutely cannot be made intelligible any other way than by means of intuition' (p. 124).

As Schopenhauer had already argued in his earlier analysis of the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, space and time are the *a priori* forms of sensibility. As such space and time are transcendentally ideal, because they are subjectively imposed frameworks in which we must perceive the world. Yet, space and time are empirically real, since we intuit them as objective structures of experience, existing, as it were, independently of our consciousness. Schopenhauer holds that intuitions of space and time are pure or non-empirical, unlike our intuitions of real objects, our experience of spatio-temporal particulars like tables and chairs, which (as intuitive representations) are perceived *a posteriori*. Like both Kant and Newton, he accepts the claim that space and time are particular and, like Kant, he argues that space and time are constituted in such a way that every point determines and is determined by every other point. This relationship, he claimed, is called 'position' in space and 'succession' in time. The principle of sufficient reason of being states, therefore, that 'parts of space and time determine one another' (*ibid.*).

Following the lead of Kant, Schopenhauer claims that arithmetic is associated with the experience of sequential order in time, such as when we count a series of numbers in sequence. Each number presupposes the preceding numbers as the ground of its being. Employing Kant's infamous example of '7 + 5 = 12', Schopenhauer rejects Herder's view that it is an identity statement. Rather, an identity statement would be '12 = 12'. Instead, '7 + 5 = 12' is a synthetic *a priori* judgement, just as Kant maintained, because it is non-empirical, necessarily true, and informative: the concepts of 7 and 5 do not contain, as it were, the concept 12, as in an analytical statement, 'All bodies are extended', where the concept 'body' contains that of 'extension', and which says no more than 'All bodies are bodies'. He argues that, unlike arithmetic, geometry deals with the non-empirical intuition of space, and as such, every part of space determines and is determined by every other part. Thus the proposition that 'a triangle

with two equal angles has equal subtending sides' is something that can be grasped by intuition. Euclid's demonstration of the same, Schopenhauer maintains, simply provides the grounds for the truth of a judgement and fails to provide deep insight into spatial relationships and 'the feeling is similar to that which is produced when someone pulls a rabbit out of a hat, and we cannot understand how the trick works' (p. 128). Like all products of reason, Euclidean geometry lacks intuition's rich ability to apprehend the world.

Principle of sufficient reason of acting

The seventh chapter, Schopenhauer's analysis of the principle of sufficient reason of acting or 'the law of motivation', received significant alterations in order to accommodate his metaphysics of will. Schopenhauer holds that the class of objects governed by this principle is unique, since it is a class with a single member for each person, the subject of willing, which is cognized only in time (p. 140). After reiterating his hallmark claim that the subject of cognition is never an object of cognition, Schopenhauer asserts that the subjects of cognition and willing are identical. The identity of the subjects of cognition and willing is something 'immediately given', and this identity is denoted by the word 'I'.[25] This identity is inexplicable, eluding all forms of the principle of sufficient reason, whose scope of application is confined to objects of cognition. Retaining a remark from the dissertation, Schopenhauer writes, 'But whoever truly realizes the inexplicability of this identity will with me call it the miracle *par excellence*' (p. 136). A short five years later, he claims that *The World as Will and Representation* is 'to some degree, an explanation of this [miracle]'.[26]

Schopenhauer also recognizes another 'miracle *par excellence*' in the first edition of his principal work, a miracle that he did not state in either edition of *On the Fourfold Root*. The statement of this 'miracle' moved him to acknowledge a new variety of truth that extended his classification beyond logical, empirical, transcendental, and metalogical truths. This new truth, that one's body and will are identical, he called the '*philosophical truth par excellence*'.[27] In 1813, however, he was not prepared to acknowledge this truth, just as he was unwilling to give any credence to Kant's notion of the

[25] In the dissertation, Schopenhauer argued that this insight is not gleaned via a Schellingian intellectual intuition; see this text, n. 125 and Hübscher *SW* 3, 70

[26] *WWR* 1, 126 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 121). This remark dates from the first edition

[27] *WWR* 1, 127 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 122)

thing in itself. This truth would lead him to argue against the traditional thesis that volitions are prior to and causally produced bodily movements. Willing and acting are one and the same, he held, and we only distinguish between the two in reflection: 'Every true act of his will is immediately and inevitably a movement of his body as well . . . An act of will and an act of the body are not two different states cognized objectively, linked together in a causal chain, they do not stand in a relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same thing, only given in two entirely different ways: in one case immediately and in the other case to the understanding in intuition.'[28]

In his dissertation, Schopenhauer does not recognize the identity of willing and acting: '*Acting* is not willing, but the effect of willing when it becomes causal' (p. 185). Desires are also not instances of willing, unless they cause an action. Rather in the dissertation, the cause of an action is a decision, something imparting causality to a particular desire. Schopenhauer provides the following account of an action: 'If a person P performed action A, then P had a motive M to do A, and M is a desire to do A, one that was prompted by decision D to do A.' Here Schopenhauer views the decision as making desire causally effective and a matter of willing. In this early theory of action, he also views the decision itself as an expression of a person's character, and to provide more content to this account, Schopenhauer employs Kant's distinction between a person's empirical and intelligible characters. The empirical character is expressed as the general pattern of a person's behaviour, and this character is discovered by reflecting on the sum total of a person's actions. Schopenhauer argues, moreover, that the unity and unalterability of a person's conduct suggests that it is the appearance of something completely unknowable, lying outside of time; that it points to, as it were, a permanent state of the subject of willing. But after making this remark, Schopenhauer explains why he said 'as it were', pointing out that 'state' and 'permanent' have application only within the temporal framework; technically there is no means of speaking about anything outside of time. For this reason, he also writes in a parenthetical remark that Kant's intelligible character might 'more be called unintelligible' (p. 188).

Although Schopenhauer would later regard Kant's distinction between the empirical and intelligible characters to be as significant as his distinction between appearances and things in themselves, in eliminating § 46 'Motive, decisions, empirical and intelligible character' from the second edition

[28] *WWR* 1, 124–5 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 119)

of *On the Fourfold Root*, Schopenhauer carefully removed any passages inconsistent with his claim that willing and acting are identical.[29] Changing the title of his earlier § 47, 'Causality of the will on cognition', to § 44 'Influence of will on cognition', he claims that 'The influence that will exercises on cognition is not based on causality, strictly speaking, but on the identity of the cognizing with the willing subject' (p. 138). Whereas in the first edition he had said that willing itself is given immediately to our inner sense and is impossible to define or describe, in the second he notes that 'Precisely because the subject of willing is immediately given in self-consciousness, what willing is cannot be further defined or described; moreover, it is the most immediate of all of our cognitions, and indeed, the fact that it is immediate must ultimately cast light on all remaining cognitions, which are mediated' (p. 136). By 1847, however, he had long known that this immediate awareness is the key for his viewing will as the essence of all appearances.

In light of these changes, Schopenhauer also revised the earlier theory of action. To articulate his mature view, he directs his readers to his prize essay, 'On the freedom of the human will', where he had directly integrated motives into a general account of the types of causality expressed within the world as appearance.[30] Everything in the world, he argues, follows from a sufficient ground and, among different types of beings, different causal relations prevail. Among lifeless or inorganic beings, the specific causal relationship is between a physical, mechanical, or chemical cause and some effect. Among living beings, in plants, stimuli, such as water, heat, and light, lead to a response such as growth, and in animals, both human and non-human, the causal relation is motivation, which leads to a willed action, causality functioning through cognition. In any change, moreover, there are two necessary factors. There is some original and inherent force attributed to the being upon which some causal influence is exercised, and there is some cause that occasions the manifestation of the force. He also holds that these forces are outside the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, underlying as it were, all causal relationships, but not subject to it. Gravity, electricity, and magnetism are the types of forces prevailing in non-living beings and these types of causes he calls 'causes in the narrowest sense'. Vital force is that which is expressed in plant life, and stimulus is the

[29] See *WWR* 1, 535 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 599), where Schopenhauer says that Kant's discussion of the opposition between the intelligible and empirical characters is 'one of the most excellent things anyone has ever said'

[30] He does this in § 20 of the second edition (p. 49)

type of cause prevailing therein. Lastly, character is the force in animal life, and the types of causes operating therein are motives. Consequently, an action becomes the manifestation of an animal's character in reaction to a motive. All forces, including the human character, represent the endpoints of explanation:

> Now just as this is the case with causes in the narrowest sense and with stimuli, it is no less the case with *motives* – given that motivation is not essentially different from causality, but merely a kind of it, namely causality that proceeds through the medium of cognition. So here too the cause calls forth only the manifestation of a force that is not to be traced back further to causes, and is consequently not to be further explained – a force, which is here called *will*.[31]

Despite the significant alterations found in his second account of the fourth form of the principle of sufficient reason, Schopenhauer uses in both editions the same thin argument for the *a priori* nature of the principle of sufficient reason of acting, the so-called 'law of motivation':

> With every observed decision of others, as well as our own, we regard ourselves as justified in asking, 'Why?'; i.e. we presume it to be necessary that there was something preceding it, from which it followed, which we call the ground, or more precisely, the motive for the action now resulting. It is as inconceivable that there can be an action without a motive as that there can be movement of an inanimate body without a push or pull. (pp. 136–7)

By also claiming that '*motivation is causality seen from within*', Schopenhauer directly relates the law of motivation to the law of causality, and he calls this insight 'the cornerstone of my whole metaphysics' (p. 138).

General remarks and results

The eighth chapter concludes both editions of *On the Fourfold Root*. In the second edition, however, Schopenhauer drops § 50 'Transition', § 51 'Other principles of the division of the four types of grounds', § 56 'Confirmation from languages', and § 58 'Apology concerning imagination and reason'. He adds a new § 49 'Necessity', in which he argues that the principle of sufficient reason is the basis of all necessity: 'For *necessity* has no other genuine and clear sense than the inevitability of the consequent when the ground is posited. Therefore any necessity is *conditioned*; thus, absolute, i.e. unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms [*contradictio in adjecto*]. For *being necessary* can never mean anything other than following

[31] *FW*, 67–8 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 47)

from a given ground' (p. 146). In this section he describes the type of necessity expressed by each of the four specific instances of the principle of sufficient reason, namely, physical necessity expressed by the law of causality, logical necessity expressed by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, mathematical necessity expressed by the principle of sufficient reason of being and, expressed by the law of motivation,

> moral necessity, according to which any human being, and even any animal, upon the appearance of a motive, must carry out the only action which is in conformity with his innate and inalterable character, which action now follows as inevitably as any other effect from a cause, even if it is not as easy to predict as anything else because of the difficulty of fathoming and completely knowing the individual empirical character and its allotted sphere of knowledge. (p. 147)

As the first section of this chapter, he adds from the first edition the old § 52 'The systematic order', but numbered now as § 46.

Just as he had arranged *The World as Will and Representation* for ease of comprehension, instead of by systematic order, he also does so with *On the Fourfold Root.* He claims that had he presented the subject systematically, he would have discussed the principle of sufficient reason of being first, beginning with its application to time, because time is the simplest scheme for all remaining forms of the principle. Next, he would have considered its application to space, and with this, the 'law of causality'; next the law of motivation; and finally the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, which deals with 'representations of representations' or concepts (p. 143).[32]

Schopenhauer concludes both editions with a statement of the work's two main results, ending with an appeal to both of the laws of homogeneity and specification, the beginning points of his reflection. He identifies as the first result the finding that the principle of sufficient reason is the general expression for four different ground and consequent relations, each of which rests on different *a priori* principles. The law of homogeneity requires the assumption that these four principles, which are discovered through the law of specification, have a common root and a single common expression; namely, that nothing is without a ground or reason for why it is rather than it is not. This common expression, moreover, signifies the unity of the cognitive faculty. The second result is closely related to the first. The four specific forms of the principle of sufficient reason, which arise from a single characteristic of consciousness, expressed in faculties of sensibility,

[32] In this section Schopenhauer dropped his recommendation that this treatise needed to be read twice to understand it, a remark that he had first used concerning the first edition of his principal work, see *WWR* 1, 6 (Hübscher *SW* 2, viii)

understanding and reason, do not license speaking of a ground *per se*, as something pure and simple.

Schopenhauer finds the first result to entail that when philosophers base some claim on the principle of sufficient reason, they should specify the type of ground they mean. Not to do so only leads to confusion. Even Kant was not immune to such confusion, and he ignored his own profound insight that 'the contingency of things is *itself only phenomenal* and can lead to no other than the empirical regress that determines phenomena', by referring to the thing in itself variously, as the 'ground', 'reason', and 'intelligible cause' of phenomena (p. 151). Schopenhauer adds that anyone familiar with more recent philosophy knows that philosophers after Kant have followed Kant in these excesses, employing the concepts of the ground and consequent, *principium* and *principatum*, in a fully transcendent sense, speaking about something that is beyond the bounds of all possible experience. He explains that the principle of sufficient reason only applies *in* the world, i.e. within the totality of all possible experience and *to* the world, which Plato recognized as that which is forever coming to be and perishing, but never really being at all, the world which Christianity appropriately referred to as the temporal.

Schopenhauer relates the second result to the first. Showing that the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason stem from our cognitive capacities and that they can be summarized as a single principle, does not entail that this principle refers to some simple, single, absolute ground. To think that this follows would be like thinking that there is something like a triangle in general, something over and above equilateral, isosceles, or scalene triangles. Although one can formulate the concept of a ground in general, just as one conceptualizes a triangle in general, there are no possible objects denoted by these concepts, which are simply empty abstractions produced by discursive thought. To think otherwise is to be a realist, falsely believing that all concepts denote objects. In this matter, Schopenhauer declared allegiance with the nominalists: these concepts have no objective reference and exist only as names.

ON VISION AND COLOURS

Genesis of the work

Had it not been for his deep reverence for Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, it is unlikely that Schopenhauer would have written *On Vision and Colours.* He stood in awe of Goethe, who was frequently a participant at Johanna

Schopenhauer's tea parties in Weimar. Perhaps due to Schopenhauer's mother's warning him about her quarrelsome and moody son, Goethe virtually ignored Schopenhauer's attendance at these parties. But in the late autumn of 1813, Goethe made a point of thanking Schopenhauer for sending him a copy of *On the Fourfold Root*, and he congratulated the philosopher for receiving his PhD. Goethe's cordiality toward the newly minted Doctor of Philosophy is likely to have resulted from the former's sense of affinity of thought, one that could prove useful for promoting his own poorly received colour theory. Schopenhauer had argued in his dissertation that geometrical proofs lacked the type of conviction provided by intuition (p. 128). Goethe was also sceptical of the purely conceptual, favouring the intuitive. He sensed a potential ally for his own colour theory, which was articulated in *On the Theory of Colours* (1810), a work in which he took considerable pride. Schopenhauer and Goethe met at least seven times from 29 November 1813 through 3 April 1814 to discuss colour theory and other topics. Many years later, Schopenhauer would introduce himself, in English, to the British translator of Goethe's *On the Theory of Colours*, Charles Lock Eastlake, as 'Goethes [*sic*] personal scholar and first publicly avowed proselyte [for Goethe's colour theory]. In the year 1813 and 14 he instructed me personally, and exhibited the more compound and difficult experiments himself to me.'[33]

Schopenhauer, however, was no simple proselyte, and Goethe sensed Schopenhauer's character after a few meetings, penning the following lines with Schopenhauer in mind: 'I would like to bear the teacher's burden still longer/If only pupils did not at once become teachers.'[34] Later Goethe would consider Schopenhauer an opponent of his colour theory: 'Dr Schopenhauer is a significant thinker whom I induced to take up my theory of colours . . . This young man, proceeding from my perspective, has become my opponent.'[35] Nevertheless, throughout his life Schopenhauer

[33] Schopenhauer, *GB* 191, letter to Charles Lock Eastlake (1841). Schopenhauer also tried unsuccessfully to convince Eastlake to translate *On Vision and Colours*

[34] 'Lähmung', in *Goethes Gedichte*, Pt. 2 (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1815), p. 199. Schopenhauer viewed these verses as venting Goethe's ill humour, which he claimed was provoked by the poet's recognition that Schopenhauer's colour theory was an advancement over his own; see *On Vision and Colours*, p. 211. Out of respect for Goethe, Schopenhauer added this remark in the second edition of *On Vision and Colours*, well after Goethe's death

[35] *GB* 499, Goethe's letter to Christoph Friedrich Ludwig Schultz, 6 July 1816. Schopenhauer became aware of this remark and was surprised at Goethe's judgement, writing that Goethe, 'called me an opponent of his colour theory, while I, forty years ago and twenty-two years after his death, stood there completely all alone and held up high the standard of his colour theory, shouting "you ass, he is correct,"' *GB* 330, and p. 210

promoted Goethe's colour theory, and Schopenhauer would continue to decry what he saw as the unfair and scandalous treatment of his hero's work.

After he had tried and failed to gain Goethe's blessings for his work and his aid in securing a publisher, Schopenhauer's essay on colour theory appeared in May 1816. An anonymous, negative review appeared in the *Leipziger Litteratur-Zeitung,* a journal that had negatively reviewed Goethe's *On the Theory of Colours* a few years earlier.[36] Two years later Schopenhauer would compare the effect caused by the essay to that of tossing a rock into a bog – no ripples.[37]

Although *On Vision and Colours* failed to gain recognition as 'the first theory of colour, the first in the history of science', Schopenhauer's confidence in the truth of his theory never wavered.[38] Years later, after his academic career had failed, and all of his earlier works were ignored, he attempted to appeal to readers outside of Germany by publishing a Latin recast of his colour theory as '*Commentatio exponens Theoriam Colorum Physiologicam eandemque primariam*', which appeared in Vol. 3 of *Scriptores Ophthalmologici minores*, edited by the Berlin *Privatdozent,* Justus Wilhelm Martin Radius. Yet this attempt to gain a hearing from the broader, learned world was like a rock that had completely missed the bog. There were no ripples; not even the dull plunk of a negative review. Yet Schopenhauer still would try. In 1851 he published the Goethean-titled essay 'On the Theory of Colours', in the second volume of *Parerga and Paralipomena*, and thirty-eight years after the first edition, he published the second edition of *On Vision and Colours* with the same Leipzig publisher, Johann Friedrich Hartknoch. Like the first edition, this new edition attracted a single review. This time the review was highly favourable, because it was authored by Schopenhauer's devoted follower and editor of his first collected works, Julius Frauenstädt.[39]

Differences between editions

The differences between the two editions of *On Vision and Colours* are relatively minor. As was his practice for all new editions of his books, Schopenhauer adds a preface to the second edition, and he also includes references to supporting discussions in his other works. He makes changes in his vocabulary for greater precision. Whereas he wrote of the 'activity

[36] The anonymous review appeared in the *Leipziger Litteratur-Zeitung*, 14 July 1817, pp. 1425–8. It is reprinted in the *Fünftes Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft* (1916), pp. 187–92

[37] See *GB* 35, letter to Goethe, 23 June 1818

[38] *GB* 20, letter to Goethe, 11 November 1815

[39] The review appeared in *Blätter für litterarische Unterhaltung*, 1855, No. 37

of the eye' in the first edition, this is changed in the second to 'activity of the retina'. He also removes needlessly obscuring jargon. Just as he had changed 'the immediate object' to 'the body' in the second edition of *On the Fourfold Root*, he does likewise in this essay. He also notes that in the first chapter, 'On vision', his account of cognition 'is aphoristic and in a simple outline' (p. 212), and that a comprehensive account is to be found in the second edition of *On the Fourfold Root.* He drops from the same passage the worry that without familiarity with that work, 'many will believe that for cognition I posit that the object is related to the subject as cause is to effect, an opinion that appears to me just as confused as the opposite, which makes the subject of cognition the cause of the object, and is the most recent form of idealism' (p. 289). And if this was an oblique reference to Fichte, he adds a reference to Schelling in the second edition to clarify his earlier reference to the abuses the concept of polarity received in the natural philosophy 'of recent times' (p. 237). He drops the original and brief § 7, 'A Comparison', where he compares Chladni's acoustic figures to his account of the qualitatively divided activity of the eye.

Schopenhauer also removes citations to outdated scientific works and adds those to more recent works. He speaks more frankly about his differences with Goethe, but quietly removes a topic about which they had disagreed, the origin of violet. And if Schopenhauer writes more frankly about Goethe's colour theory in the second edition, he also adds more praise for his mentor's work and decries its continuing neglect, something he predicts will be an embarrassment to his age, saying that 'the day of justice for Goethe's colour theory cannot be held off' (p. 286).

The Second Edition

The 'Preface to the Second Edition' of *On Vision and Colours* is typical of those Schopenhauer composed for the new editions of his books. He notes that after forty years his faith in the truth of his original views is not simply unshaken, but better grounded through years of reflection. He chides his contemporaries for taking so long to require a new edition of his work. Just as he had in the 'Preface to the Second Edition' of *On the Fourfold Root*, he refers to the two voices expressed in this new edition, that of the younger man and that of the older, a difference he believes sensitive readers should clearly discern. He mentions that he has not simply omitted material incidental to the subject, but has in fact improved the essay through his additions. Oddly, in a preface written so many years after the first edition, he mentions that while he wrote the essay in 1815, it did not appear until

Easter 1816; a delay he attributes to Goethe's taking the manuscript on his tour of the Rhine. Schopenhauer does not explain the significance of this remark, nor does he reveal that during this time he was corresponding with Goethe, a correspondence which, along with the manuscript of *On Vision and Colours*, convinced the elder that the young man had become his opponent.

In the Preface Schopenhauer also announces his support of Goethe's colour theory, claiming that he is just as prepared 'to teach Goethean colour theory among Newtonians, as . . . to teach ascetic morals among modern Protestants, Jews, and optimists' (p. 202). This work is more natural science than philosophy, and so he feels compelled to state the philosophical significance of the essay. The subjective nature of colour supports Kant's transcendental idealism and helps demonstrate the naïve realism of 'some chemists and physiologists [who] quite seriously imagine that they are able to explain the being of things thoroughly without any transcendental philosophy' (p. 203). Lastly, he refers to the Latin work on colour theory and why he published 'On the Theory of Colour' in *Parerga and Paralipomena*, some passages from which he also includes in this essay.[40]

The introduction announces that *On Vision and Colours* presents a new theory of colour. Schopenhauer makes it clear that the consideration of physiological colours, 'the appearances of colour that pertain only to the eye', is his main concern, and he highlights his tremendous debt to Goethe (pp. 207–8). He credits Goethe both for showing problems with Newton's view, thus paving the way to Schopenhauer's own theory, and for assembling a rich set of data about colours, material which became data for Schopenhauer's colour theory. Although Goethe had assembled a systematic presentation of facts, Schopenhauer observes that

> all facts standing apart from a definite range of the realm of experience, even if they are completely associated, are not truly a science until knowledge of their innermost essence has united them under a general concept that comprises and contains everything that can be found only in those facts, a concept to which there are other subordinate concepts, by means of which one can immediately arrive at knowledge and a determination of each individual fact. (p. 208)[41]

[40] Schopenhauer also mentions that in a second edition of *Parerga and Paralipomena* he would remove these passages. Schopenhauer, however, did not live long enough to publish a second edition of that work

[41] Schopenhauer told Goethe that he had provided a theory to complete Goethe's set of facts in a letter; see *GB* 19, letter to Goethe, 11 November 1815. In his 1841 letter to Eastlake, Schopenhauer wrote that his theory of physiological colours 'would be true even if Goethe was wrong: it does not depend on his position', *ibid.*, 192

Schopenhauer mentions a remark that he thought might have caused Goethe to consider him to be his opponent; 'in particular we will encounter a point at which Goethe, who on the whole was perfectly correct, still erred, and Newton, who on the whole was completely wrong, pronounced the truth to a certain extent – although actually more in words than in sense, and even not entirely so' (p. 210). The issue concerned the production of white from colours, the topic of § 10 in the second chapter. Lastly, the introduction sets the stage for the chapter on vision, where his intent is to show that colours are not intrinsic properties of objects, but pertain to the perceiver alone. In this regard, Schopenhauer calls colours 'subjective', belonging to the perceiver and not 'objective', belonging to the object of experience. As he notes at the end of the first chapter, 'colour is and remains an affection of the eye: the object is intuited merely as its cause: but the colour itself is only the effect, a state brought about in the eye, and as such it is independent of the object' (p. 224).

In the second edition, Schopenhauer makes it clear that he now considers the chapter 'On vision' to be but a 'forerunner' to his work in § 21 of *On the Fourfold Root*. Indeed, Schopenhauer calls his work in this chapter fragmentary and incomplete, and he refers his readers to *On the Fourfold Root* to supplement his analysis of vision as he does to other supporting discussions in *The World as Will and Representation* and *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics.* Thus he claims that treatment of vision occurs in this essay primarily to bring his reader to 'the genuine conviction that colours, which appear to him to clothe objects, are entirely in his eyes alone' (p. 211). In this chapter Schopenhauer also makes his characteristic distinctions among sensibility, understanding, and reason. He claims, too, that the intuition of objects comprising the external world is a function of the understanding, mounting this argument on the considerable differences between sensations and the apprehension of an external world in which spatio-temporal objects stand in causal relations to other similar objects.

Schopenhauer had more formal training in the sciences, especially in biology, than he had in philosophy, and so he often describes his theory in physiological terms. The result of this is that at times he combines his transcendental standpoint with an empirical materialist standpoint: 'For intuition, i.e. the apprehension of an objective material world filling space in its three dimensions, arises through the understanding, for the understanding, in the understanding, which like the forms of space and time lying at its basis, is the function of the brain' (p. 224). He also writes about the optical nerve being influenced by light and the nerve of the Labyrinth and of the Cochlea receiving vibrations of air, as if there is some

external source of sensations. This tendency to combine a transcendental with an empirical, materialist account of cognition is characteristic of Schopenhauer, especially when the point is not to establish the *a priori* nature of the forms of cognition, but to explain straightforwardly the perception of objects. Indeed, Schopenhauer even describes how young infants begin to make sense out of sensations, which he views as learning to apprehend the external world:

> In the first weeks of life the child receives sensations with all senses, but it intuits nothing, it apprehends nothing; therefore, it stares stupidly at the world. Soon, however, it begins to learn how to use the understanding and to apply the law of causality, of which it is aware prior to all experience, and to connect it with the forms of all cognition, space and time, which are likewise given *a priori*; thus it moves from sensation to intuition, to apprehension; and henceforth it gazes on the world with clever, intelligent eyes. (p. 215)

Moreover, because Schopenhauer concentrates on 'physiological colours', in distinction to chemical and physical colours, his analysis of colours centres on the activity of the retina.

From an account of the development of the apprehension of an external world, Schopenhauer moves to a discussion of a number of examples illustrating the difference between illusion and error, which he views as resulting either from abnormal conditions of the senses or from non-typical presentations of sensory data. He views illusion as a function of the understanding and error as a function of reason. He provides an example. Looking at an object cross-eyed or touching a ball with the middle finger crossed over the index finger produce in the first case the apprehension of two objects and in the second double touch, the apprehension of two balls. Reason can explain the deception, but it nevertheless persists:

> Such an illusion can certainly be accounted for by reason, but not done away with for the understanding, which is non-rational precisely because it is pure understanding. Here is what I mean: with such an illusion, intentionally brought about, we *know* very well, in the abstract [*in abstracto*] or for *reason*, that, e.g. only *one* object is present, although with crossed eyes and crossed fingers, we see and touch two, or we know that two are present although we see only *one*; however, despite this abstract cognition the illusion itself still remains in place. For understanding and sensibility are intractable to principles of reason, i.e. simply non-rational. (p. 220)

Just as, for Schopenhauer, the intuition of the external world is a function of the brain, so, too, he considers colours as functions of a thin nerve

membrane at the back of the eye, the retina, the modified activities of which are the colours that appear to clothe objects:

> If the understanding transforms sensation into intuition, then of course this effect is referred to and assigned a cause, and light and colour are attributed to the body producing the effect as qualities, i.e. types of effect. The body is still recognized only as that which brought forth this effect. 'The body is red' means that in the eyes it produces the colour red. Generally, 'to be' is synonymous with 'to act': thus even in German, very strikingly and with unconscious profundity, everything that *is* is called *actual* [*wirklich*], i.e., acting. (p. 224)

The chapter 'On colours' begins by announcing the subjective turn of Schopenhauer's colour theory. He attributes a failing to Goethe and Newton, both of whom proceeded from the objective side. A thorough account of colour, Schopenhauer argues, must proceed from the idea that lightness, darkness, and colour are in the strictest sense immediately-felt modifications of the retina and as such are physiological phenomena. Only by investigating the effect can one derive data for the discovery of the cause, and only by considering colour as a specific sensation in the eye, can one discover data to assess Goethe's and Newton's objective theories of colour, an assessment that Schopenhauer uses to speak favourably of Goethe's and not Newton's theory:

> Consistent with all of this, one will find that my theory, which considers colour only in itself, . . . already provides data *a priori* for an assessment of Newtonian and Goethean theory of colour as objective, i.e., the theory of external causes that excite such sensation in the eye; and from this it will result that everything speaks for the Goethean theory and against the Newtonian. – Thus only after consideration of colour as such, i.e., as a specific sensation in the eye, can we undertake the completely different consideration of the external causes of those particular modifications of the sensation of light, i.e., the consideration of those colours which Goethe quite correctly divided into physical and chemical. (p. 226)

Yet this statement in favour of Goethe belies the way that Schopenhauer's subjective turn radically distanced his view from that of his mentor. Goethe viewed white or light and black or darkness as primary phenomena – in Schopenhauer's term, *Urphänomene*, 'urphenomena', phenomena that served to explain all colour phenomena but which themselves were not capable of further explanation. Colours themselves were something shadow-like or cloudy, a σκιερόν (*skieron*). Aware that a mixture of black and white produced gray, Goethe argued that with the aid of a turbid medium, such as fog, smoke, clouds, flint glass, or the like, the interplay of polarities of light and darkness produced colour phenomena. Gazing at

darkness through a turbid medium with a light source before it produced blue; whereas, looking at a turbid medium with a light source behind it yielded yellow. From the intensification of these opposites, blue and yellow, all other colours are derived, Goethe held, through their union. From these grounds, Goethe's theory recognized six primary colours, compared to Newton's seven, with the intensification of blue yielding reddish blue, its intensification in turn yielding purple, and the intensification of yellow yielding yellowish red, while the union of yellow and blue produced green.[42]

Schopenhauer had problems with Goethe's realism, which led Goethe to view light and darkness as urphenomena. Consequently Schopenhauer provides a grounding explanation of Goethe's alleged urphenomena by turning to physiological colours and the seeing eye. Lightness or white, darkness or black, and colours are modifications of the eye. Lightness or white is the full activity of the retina. Darkness or black is the inactivity of the retina; whereas, colour is the qualitatively divided activity of the retina. Consequently, 'The true urphenomenon is only the retina's organic capacity to divide the activity of its nerves into two qualitatively opposed halves, now equal, now unequal, and have them come to the fore successively' (pp. 269–70). Thus Schopenhauer reduces Goethe's urphenomena to that which merely stimulates the division of the retina's activity.

Schopenhauer's theory deviates from Goethe's doctrines in another significant way: Schopenhauer also accuses Goethe of the same failing as Newton. Both Goethe and Newton concentrate on the cause of the sensation of colour without examining its effect, that is, colour as a physiological phenomenon. Newton did so by viewing colours as epiphenomena, subjective correlates of the mechanical properties of light rays, and Goethe did so by focusing on the role of physical media as light moved from its source to the seeing eye. Although Schopenhauer accepts Goethe's claims that white light is homogeneous, that there are six and not seven primary colours, and that colour necessarily includes darkness, he also agrees with Newton's claim that colour is a divisional process. To be sure, by claiming that colour is a divisional process of the retina, Schopenhauer

[42] Schopenhauer recognizes that, as seen in a colour sphere, colours shade imperceptibly into one another, entailing an infinite number of colours. He claims that this provides no difficulty for his theory, because the activity of the retina is likewise infinitely divisible. The six primary colours, yellow, violet, orange, blue, green, and red, take pride of place in his theory because it is 'simply through the rational, readily comprehensible ratio, expressible in prime numbers, into which the activity of the retina divides itself that the three pairs of colours especially distinguish themselves, and for this reason these colours are always and everywhere designated by particular names, but beyond this there is no other reason, since otherwise they have no priority over the others' (p. 266)

denies that it is a divisional process of light rays (as Newton held), but this concession did little to brighten Goethe's attitude to his student's theory. This was especially the case given Schopenhauer's claim that white can be produced by colours, and his subsequent claim that Goethe's unconditional denial of the production of white from colours was due to the fact that 'he constantly had erroneous Newtonian theory in mind, and against this theory he correctly maintained that the aggregate of colours does not lead to light since each colour is related to both darkness and light' (p. 251).[43]

Schopenhauer attributes considerable significance to his ability to show that colours can be described in terms of definite numerical fractions, and it is this innovation that allows him to demonstrate the production of white from colours. By viewing colour as the qualitatively divided activity of the retina, with black or the inactivity of the retina equalling zero, and white or the full activity of the retina equalling one, Schopenhauer claims that one of the primary colours and its complementary colour equals one or white. In his letter to Eastlake, Schopenhauer emphasized the significance of this discovery:

> if, bearing in mind the numerical *fractions* (of the activity of the Retina) by which I express the 6 chief colours; You contemplate these colours singly, then You will find that only by this, and by no other theory upon earth, You come to understand the peculiar sensation, which every colour produces in your eye, and thereby get an insight into the very essence of every colour, and of colour in general. Likewise my theory alone gives the true sense in which the notion of *complementary* colours is to be taken, viz: as having no reference to *light*, *but to the Retina*, and not being a redintegration [*sic*] of white light, but of the full action of the Retina, by which every colour undergoes a *bipartition*
>
> either in yellow and violet
> $\frac{3}{4}$ $\frac{1}{4}$
> or in orange and blue
> $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{1}{3}$
> or in red and green
> $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$
> This is in short the great mystery.[44]

[43] Also see *GB* 19–20, letter to Goethe, 11 November 1815. Schopenhauer would later agree with Goethe on the production of violet, and in the second edition of *On Vision and Colours*, he lists the limitations he placed on the concept of polarity and the production of white from colours as his differences from Goethe; see p. 278

[44] *GB* 192, letter to Eastlake (1841), written in English

Schopenhauer closes the essay with § 14 'Some Additions to Goethe's Theory of the Origin of the Physical Colours', where he delivers what the title suggests. He continues to decry the plagiarism of his work by Professor Rosas, whom he had already condemned earlier, and he complains about the lack of reception of his and Goethe's colour theory by his contemporaries. He praises Goethe and condemns Newton, prophesying the ultimate success of the former and the decline of the latter, something that expresses one of Schopenhauer's fundamental articles of faith, namely, that ultimately the truth will be recognized: 'Meanwhile, the day of justice for Goethe's colour theory cannot be held off, and then once again the saying of *Helvétius* will be affirmed: "merit is like powder, the more it is compacted, the stronger the explosion" . . . and then the drama, so frequently repeated in the history of literature, will be performed anew and brought to its conclusion' (p. 286).[45]

The place of On Vision and Colours in Schopenhauer's oeuvre

Schopenhauer was ambivalent about the relationship between *On Vision and Colours* and his philosophical works. In 'Preface to the First Edition' of *The World as Will and Representation*, he required his readers to study the first chapter 'On vision', saying that it would have been given word for word in his principal work, had he not been disinclined to repeat himself.[46] But by the time of the second edition of *On the Fourfold Root*, this reading was no longer required. He included in the second edition § 21, 'Apriority of the concept of causality. – Intellectual basis of empirical intuition – The understanding', an elaboration of the physiological arguments for the intellectual nature of intuition first given in 'On vision'.[47]

Schopenhauer was also inclined to advise his acquaintances concerning the best way to read his books in order to fully grasp his philosophy. He was also fond of saying that a fundamental understanding of his philosophy required reading every line he wrote.[48] Yet he told one of his early followers,

[45] Earlier, however, he also claimed that Goethe failed to understand certain phenomena discovered later in his life, because he was too old and had begun to babble, see p. 285

[46] See *WWR* 1, 8 (Hübscher *SW* 2, xi)

[47] At p. 212 Schopenhauer states that 'On vision' provides the precursor of the arguments given 'most comprehensively, amply, and completely in the second edition of my treatise *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, § 21'

[48] See, for example, *WWR* 2, ch. 40 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 527) and *GB* 274, letter to Ernst Otto Lindner, 5 January 1852

Ernst Otto Lindner, that *On Vision and Colours* was not required reading, but that it was simply good to read with his other books.[49] Toward the end of his life, however, when Schopenhauer approached the publisher of *The World as Will and Representation*, F. A. Brockhaus, about the prospects of a collected edition of his works, he included *On Vision and Colours* as part of the edition.[50] Still later, however, when he drafted the content for a collected edition, he excluded the essay, saying, 'The theory of colours is on its own'.[51]

Despite Schopenhauer's ambivalence, *On Vision and Colours* is an important contribution to colour theory from an idealistic point of view. It also casts light on Schopenhauer's philosophical development. The first chapter, 'On vision', presents for the first time Schopenhauer's physiological arguments for the intellectual nature of perception; it illustrates his understanding of theory construction, as he sought to give theoretical grounding to Goethe's colour theory. Moreover, it can serve as a means for more deeply understanding the way Schopenhauer distinguished philosophy from the natural sciences. It records for the first time, Schopenhauer's use of the term 'urphenomenon', a concept that would play a vital role in his ethics and in his statement of philosophical methodology.[52]

ON WILL IN NATURE

Genesis of the work

Had *The World as Will and Representation* gained a readership sufficient to justify a second edition, it is unlikely that this work would have appeared. Immediately after Schopenhauer's principal work appeared in December 1818, he anticipated that a second edition would be required ten years afterwards. But when he contacted his publisher, almost ten years to the date of the publication of his principal work, his hopes were dashed. He was told that out of the original printing of 750 copies 150 remained on the shelves and it could not be determined how many copies were sold, because a considerable number had been scrapped.[53] A second edition was out of the question. Schopenhauer would blame this failure on the prevailing 'Hegel*gloria*' of the time.[54]

[49] See *GB* 274, letter to Ernst Otto Lindner, 5 January 1852

[50] See *GB* 433, letter to F. A. Brockhaus, 8 August 1858

[51] *MR* 4, 392 (*HN* 4, 2, 33)

[52] See, for example, *BM* 245 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 260ff.)

[53] See *GB* 108, letter to F. A. Brockhaus, 24 November 1828 and *GB* 517, letter to Schopenhauer, 29 November 1828

[54] See *GB* 260, letter to Johann Eduard Erdmann, 9 April 1851

Yet Schopenhauer had been assiduously preparing for this second edition, and he had been focusing specifically on how the natural sciences confirmed his philosophy. To draw a readership sufficient to justify a new edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer decided to publish his observations on the natural sciences. The subtitle of *On Will in Nature* reveals his strategy: *A Discussion of the Corroboration that the Author's Philosophy has Received from the Empirical Sciences Since Its Appearance*. By demonstrating how the sciences confirmed his philosophy, he hoped that which had been confirmed would be read. Unable to convince the publisher of his principal work, F. A. Brockhaus, to accept *On Will in Nature*, Schopenhauer managed to convince the Frankfurt publisher Siegmund Schmerber to publish 500 copies of *On Will in Nature*, and it appeared in March 1836. Schopenhauer waived his author's honorarium for the book.

Schopenhauer's strategy failed. Initially *On Will in Nature* drew a single, unfavourable, review, signed simply 'H', in the *Repertorium der gesammten deutschen Litteratur*, 1836.

The reviewer, later a professor of philosophy in Leipzig, one Gustav Hartenstein, was a former student of one of Schopenhauer's critics, Johann Friedrich Herbart. Hartenstein shared his teacher's assessment of Schopenhauer's philosophy, namely, that Schopenhauer's fundamental ideas could already be found in Fichte and Schelling. Hartenstein also successfully predicted that this small work on the philosophy of nature would fail to draw an audience to Schopenhauer's principal work. Five years later, a negative review of this book and *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* appeared in the *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* (July 1841). The anonymous reviewer, '*Spiritus asper*', was none other than Friedrich Wilhelm Carové, Hegel's former *Repetent*, or teaching assistant, at Berlin.

Differences between editions

Of the three works found in this volume, *On Will in Nature* received the least alteration from its first edition. As Schopenhauer mentions in the Preface, written for the second edition (1854), he found little to retract from the first edition. The reason for this is somewhat straightforward. Unlike *On the Fourfold Root* and *On Vision and Colours*, *On Will in Nature* appeared well after he had set the basic ideas of his philosophy in *The World as Will and Representation.* Moreover, *On Will in Nature* was intended to demonstrate how the empirical sciences confirmed his metaphysics. It was also written after the critical reviews of his principal work, where recurrent themes were that his philosophy merely was an epigone of that of Fichte

and Schelling, that his metaphysics was fraught with contradictions, and that the ascetic results of his ethics were paradoxical. While Schopenhauer never directly addressed the first two of these criticisms and only briefly addressed the last in the first edition of *On Will in Nature*, he also composed this work with those criticisms in mind.

The most dramatic alteration in the second edition concerns his use of passages drawn from two books by Joachim Dietrich Brandis, a physician to the King of Denmark and once a professor at Kiel. Schopenhauer considered Brandis' work a significant confirmation of his metaphysics, because Brandis recognized an unconscious will as the primary source for all vital functions. Schopenhauer thought himself justified in claiming Brandis' works as confirmation of his philosophy, since at the time of the first edition he thought that Brandis was unfamiliar with his philosophy. But long before the second edition, he discovered that Brandis actually had owned his principal work. So instead of omitting his citations of Brandis, he retained most of them, using this as an opportunity to berate Brandis for plagiarism and to bemoan the reception of his own thought, believing that 'The unwarranted obscurity that an author such as I have endured for a long time emboldens such people to appropriate the fundamental ideas of such authors without naming them' (p. 335).[55]

Most of the changes between editions involve eliminating some outdated sources and adding references to some new sources. One of the more significant of the updating of sources is a lengthy footnote in the chapter 'Sinology', in which he lists the literature on Buddhism that he owned and with which he was familiar.[56]

The second edition

The second edition includes a Preface of the sort found in those of Schopenhauer's other books that received a new edition after the dawn of his fame in the 1850s. He gives thanks for the opportunity to improve the work, berates his contemporaries – especially for their lack of knowledge of Kant, accusing them of philosophizing as if the *Critique of Pure Reason* was written and remained on the moon. He decries the realism and materialism of

[55] After this remark, Schopenhauer again proceeded to criticize Anton Rosas for plagiarizing from *On Vision and Colours*

[56] A comparison of this note with the original from the first edition, along with the alterations made in this chapter, contributes to the understanding of Schopenhauer's reception of Eastern thought and of the formative role it played in the development of his philosophy

the men of the 'crucible and retort', noting that 'one can be a consummate zoologist and be able to rattle off all sixty species of monkeys, and yet, if one has learned nothing more than, perhaps, his catechism, taken on the whole he is an ignoramus, to be counted among the rabble' (p. 306). He announces 'depressing news' for philosophy professors; namely, that their Caspar Hauser, 'whom for nearly forty years they so carefully shut off from light and air, so securely walled up that no sound could betray his existence to the world – their Caspar Hauser has escaped! has escaped and is on the loose – Some even believe he is a prince' (p. 307). Schopenhauer then immediately follows with a line Nietzsche would mock, '*legor et legar*' [I am read and I will be read].[57]

Although the Preface is rather standard fare for prefaces to new editions, it differs from those others in that Schopenhauer provides a concise description of the content of the book, and attributes a special significance to the work itself:

> For proceeding from the purely empirical, from the observations of unprejudiced scientists who follow the path of their particular science, I immediately arrive here at the core of my metaphysics, indicating the points of contact of this metaphysics with the natural sciences, and thus providing, as it were, an arithmetic proof of my fundamental dogma, which in this way is grounded more specifically and in more detail, just as it is understood more clearly, more comprehensibly, and more precisely than anywhere else. (p. 305)

Other than altering his first footnote and adding a quote from Kant, Schopenhauer leaves the 'Introduction' unchanged in the second edition. Schopenhauer is keen to distance himself from Schelling and Fichte, to both of whom he refers. And, for the first time in his writings, he publicly berates Hegel in unrestrained terms, referring to Hegel's philosophy of 'absolute nonsense' and recommending as a crest for Hegel's work a cuttlefish enveloped by a dense cloud of ink, with the motto 'protected by my obscurity' (p. 328).

To distance himself from Schelling and Fichte in particular, Schopenhauer asserts that the end point of scientific explanations of the world discovered just 'what my theory has presented as the metaphysical point from which experience in general is to be explained' (p. 323). To distance himself further from Fichte and Schelling, he also emphasizes his commitment to Kant's distinction between appearance and the thing in itself, a distinction that Schopenhauer claims is equivalent to his distinction

[57] In *Ecce Homo*, 'Why I Write such Good Books', Nietzsche wrote 'My triumph is precisely the opposite of Schopenhauer's: I say "*non legor, non legar*" [I am not read and I will not be read]'

between representation and will. He then makes several of his most distinctive philosophical claims. He notes that Kant had considered the thing in itself to be absolutely unknowable:

> I say [that the thing in itself] is nothing other than that with which we are immediately acquainted and precisely intimate, that which we find in our innermost selves as *will*; that accordingly, far from being, as all previous philosophers assumed, inseparable from and even a mere result of *cognition* (which is completely secondary and of later origin), this *will* is fundamentally different from and fully independent of cognition and so can even exist and express itself apart from cognition in all of nature, from the animal on down, which really is the case; indeed, that this will, the only thing in itself, the only truly real thing, the only original and metaphysical thing in a world where everything else is only appearance, i.e., mere representation, gives to everything . . . the power by means of which it can exist and have effect. (p. 324)

Schopenhauer argues that the voluntary actions of animals, even the organic drives of living bodies, even the nature and form of their bodies, even the vegetative growth of plants, and even gravity itself – indeed every original force manifest in chemical and physical appearances – are all absolutely identical with that we find in ourselves as will. In *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer had argued that will was the substratum of all natural phenomena. In his principal work, he rejects solipsism, which he calls 'theoretical egoism',[58] the view that one is the only real being. Then by mounting a grand cosmic analogy, he extends the concept of will to all representations other than those of our bodies. However, just as he had done in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, in *On Will in Nature* Schopenhauer follows what he calls 'an analytical path', one that proceeds from facts or particulars to universal or theoretical propositions. He does so by appealing to *a posteriori* sources to show that the natural sciences confirm his metaphysics of will.[59]

Strictly speaking the first four chapters constitute the confirmation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics by the natural sciences. Schopenhauer's analysis in these chapters follows the hierarchical ontology he saw expressed in nature, a hierarchy that is based on the degree to which will is expressed or manifest in a kind of intuitive representation. He does so in this work in just the reverse order of that given in his principal work. In *The World*

[58] *WWR* 1, § 18 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 124ff.)

[59] For Schopenhauer's distinction between the analytic and synthetic methods, see *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, 5 (Hübscher *SW* 4, v) and *WWR* 2, ch. 12 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 133)

as Will and Representation, after mounting his cosmic analogy extending the will to all intuitive representations, Schopenhauer immediately considered the least clear and most universally expressed objectivations[60] of will (natural forces, such as gravity, fluidity, electricity, and the like) and concluded his analysis with human beings, whose behaviours most clearly and distinctly express will. In contrast, in *On Will in Nature* he begins with the most complex and sophisticated beings in this hierarchy, human beings and animals, viewing them from the interior as it were, from their physiological processes, moving then to their exterior, anatomy, then to the physiology of plants, and lastly to inorganic nature. So Schopenhauer's first four chapters move from 'Physiology and pathology', to 'Comparative anatomy', to 'Plant physiology', and finally to 'Physical astronomy'. In each chapter Schopenhauer attempts to demonstrate that 'unbiased empiricists', unfamiliar with his philosophy, develop explanations of natural phenomena, and that these scientists' explanations, in either a prescient manner or through direct appeal to will, develop views that receive a more fundamental and comprehensive explanation through his metaphysics.

It is in 'Physiology and pathology' that Schopenhauer berates Brandis for appropriating his work, but he still uses the work of Brandis, as well as that of Treviranus, Meckel, Burdach, and others, to show that will is the agent in both voluntary and involuntary bodily functions. Thereby, Schopenhauer ultimately claims that an unconscious will is the source of all vital functions. It is within this chapter that Schopenhauer highlights what he refers to as the fundamental feature of his philosophy, one that distinguishes his view from all hitherto existing philosophies, namely, the complete separation of the will from cognition. All philosophers prior to him, Schopenhauer asserts, viewed will as either conditioned by or as a function of an intellect (p. 339).

In 'Comparative anatomy' Schopenhauer argues that the physical structures of animals are spatial objectivations of their wills, that is, the spatio-temporal appearance of an animal's will as an organic body. As he puts it:

I have said that just as each individual momentary act of will presents itself at once, immediately, and inevitably in the external intuition of the body as an

[60] In *WWR* 2, ch. 20 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 277) Schopenhauer defines 'objectivation' [*Objektivation*] as the thing in itself presenting itself in the real corporeal world, that is, an intuitive representation or an object of our consciousness of other things. If this objectivation were eliminated, Schopenhauer claims, the thing in itself would remain

action of it, so every animal's collective willing, the totality of all its strivings, must have its true image in the entire body itself, in the nature of its organism, and there must be the most precise agreement between the ends of its will in general and the means that its organization provides for achieving these ends. (p. 351)

In this chapter Schopenhauer praises Lamarck's claim that the body is the physical concatenation of an animal's needs and desires, an animal's will, but he rejects Lamarck's thesis that an animal's physical characteristics are formed by its adaption to its external environment. Schopenhauer argues that the development of characteristics necessary for a species' survival could not happen through the gradual development of originally insignificant traits over generations without the species becoming extinct. He diagnoses the problem of Lamarck's view as a symptom of the backward state of philosophy in France. Lamarck could only view animal bodies as things in themselves and therefore could only conceive of the development of species in both space and time because, like other French thinkers of his time, Lamarck was influenced by Locke and Condillac's realism and he was ignorant of Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time. By viewing will as 'metaphysical', as non-spatial and non-temporal, Schopenhauer contends that we can understand that the shape and physical organization of an animal is determined by its will according to the environment in which it had to live. So Schopenhauer observes that 'Thus young bucks, rams, and calves butt with just their bare heads before they have horns; the young boar charges, tossing its head around while it still lacks the tusks which correspond to the intended effect; in contrast, it does not use the little teeth which it already has in its mouth with which it could actually bite. Thus its way of defending itself is not directed by an existing weapon, but the opposite' (pp. 357–8). By observing the suitability of animals to their form of life, by drawing upon teleologically suggestive features of animal life and its relationship to the environment, Schopenhauer finds a purposiveness operating in nature as will moves blindly to its own ends. This view, he argues, had led many others to falsely view nature as the work of a will guided by an intellect distinct from nature, that is, God, a view resulting in part from the discredited belief that willing was a function of the intellect.

In light of his criticisms of the philosophically backward state of the French, it is curious that in 'Plant physiology' to show that what lives and sprouts forth in vegetative nature is will unguided by intellect, Schopenhauer primarily draws on the work of a French botanist, Georges Cuvier. This chapter, however, also contains Schopenhauer's attempts to connect

the realist–objective standpoint of natural science, which takes the world and natural beings as given, with Kant's 'subjective' and idealistic standpoint, which finds the world dependent on the intellect. In its argument that the intellect itself presupposes nature, since the intellect can only result as a development of nature to the level of animal life, Schopenhauer's account goes full circle. The object presupposes the subject, the subject the object. He also interprets the relation of Kant's philosophy to Locke's in a way that will later support his claim that his philosophy is a continuation of a line of thought originating in Locke and mediated by Kant.[61] Consequently Schopenhauer contends that Locke had demonstrated that to know things in themselves through things as they appear one must remove the contributions of our sensory functions, the so-called 'secondary qualities', colours, odours, warmth, tastes, and sounds, and he contends that Kant had more profoundly demonstrated that one had also to remove contributions of 'brain functions', Locke's so-called 'primary qualities', solidity, extension, figure, and mobility (p. 382). Schopenhauer claims that he has completed this line of thought by showing that what remains after these 'deductions' is will. In this chapter Schopenhauer also claims that 'I have shown how among living and cognizing beings the motive and the act of will, the representing and willing, split apart more and more distinctly and separate from one another the higher one ascends on the scale of being' (p. 394).

Schopenhauer attributes great significance to the next chapter, 'Physical astronomy'. He recommends elsewhere that anyone who wishes to investigate his philosophy thoroughly and seriously must first take this chapter into consideration, since he had shown here with greater distinctness than anywhere else in his writings the transition from appearance to the thing in itself.[62] In this chapter, by appealing to the British astronomer Sir John Herschel, who considered gravity to be the expression of a will, he attempts to demonstrate that what is active in natural forces is that which we discover in ourselves as will. Yet Schopenhauer contends that Herschel's insight was partially obscured by his failure to overcome the prevailing prejudice that will is a function of intellect. Consequently Schopenhauer argues that Herschel could not fully appreciate the implications of his own insight.[63]

[61] See *PP* 1, § 12 (Hübscher *SW* 5, 87)

[62] See *WWR* 2, ch. 28, 'On the Ability to Know the Thing in Itself' (Hübscher *SW* 3, 213). Most of Schopenhauer's commentators, however, tend not heed this advice

[63] Schopenhauer chides one of Herschel's reviewers for rejecting Herschel's view, because it was clear that the astronomer was not attributing this will to God; see p. 390

To begin to motivate the transition from appearances to thing in itself, Schopenhauer begins with our knowledge of the world. He contends that our understanding of nature is clearest and most certain in the *a priori* sciences, such as arithmetic, geometry, and logic, since these sciences deal with the *a priori* forms of cognition. Yet once we attend to anything with a trace of empirical content, which increases as we move upward in the hierarchy of nature, our understanding of phenomena decreases, and our explanations are less complete, and we develop an increasing recognition of an unknown *x* in nature. So when we attend to the case of one ball striking another, we have the most adequate comprehension of a causal relationship, knowing that the struck ball receives as much motion as the striking ball loses. Still, even here, there is something mysterious in this process, namely, the possibility of transmission of motion from one ball to the other. In more complex relationships in the inorganic realm, there is a more pronounced heterogeneity between cause and effect and a greater incommensurability between them; e.g. the same increase in heat melts wax and hardens clay. Once we begin to consider living beings, plants and animals, causality appears as stimulus in the former and motive in the latter. Here the scheme of cause and effect still applies, yet there is no qualitative similarity between cause and effect and no quantitative relationship, something that becomes obvious with the behaviour of human beings who, as possessing the faculty of reason, can have abstract concepts as their motives. Throw water on a fire and the flame is extinguished; throw it on a plant, it may be stimulated to grow or to rot; throw it on a dog and it may flee or attack; throw it on a human, and who knows what will result. To Schopenhauer, in humans such a disjunction between cause and effect appears almost miraculous:

> The separation between cause and effect has become so great, and compared to cause, effect has grown so great, that to the uneducated, since absolutely no cause appears to be present, the act of will seems to depend on nothing, to be groundless, i.e., free. For this reason, if we reflectively view the movements of our body from the outside, they present themselves as something that just happens without cause, i.e., actually as a miracle. (p. 397)

Consequently it looks as if, in the highest stage of nature, in human behaviour, the intelligibility of causality has forsaken us.

As he had done in *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer appeals to the experience of our body as both representation and will as the key for understanding nature. Thus he shifts from cognition directed outwards, from the outer sense, to cognition directed inward, to the inner sense, a move in which, only in our case, the judge of nature is akin to that which is judged. Through the inner sense, introspection,

we discover will as the agent expressed in the movements of our bodies, a discovery that reveals the same agent expressed in all of nature. In other words we recognize that our inner essence is that unknown *x* expressed in nature. Consequently Schopenhauer claims that to have this insight, 'two originally different sources of our cognition, the outer and the inner, must be connected through reflection'. Only through this connection is 'the interior of nature . . . disclosed to our intellect . . . and the secret that philosophy has so long sought is revealed' (p. 398).[64] That is, 'if we carry out the unification . . . of external and internal cognition at the point where they contact, then despite all accidental differences, we recognize two identities, one of causality with itself at all levels, and the other of what was formerly the unknown *x* (i.e., natural forces and phenomena of life) with will in us . . . This is (say what you will!) the foundation of true philosophy' (pp. 398–9).

Schopenhauer argues that wherever there is causality there is will, and will never acts without causality. In claiming this, Schopenhauer does not mean that the will is the cause of events. Rather he means that the agency discovered by the inner sense is the agency viewed by the outer sense. Just as our bodies are representation viewed from one direction and will viewed from another, causality and will are two aspects of the same thing. So he views himself overturning another philosophical error, that of believing that where there is causality, there is no will, and where there is will, there is no causality. It is easy to fall into this error, he contends, since causality and will are recognized in two different ways; causality through the outer sense and will through the inner, and the clearer the one, the more obscure the other. But as Kant taught, Schopenhauer continues, causality is nothing but the *a priori* knowable form of the understanding, the essence of the world, of representation, and as he has shown, the other side of the world is will, the thing in itself.

The next three chapters of *On Will in Nature* turn to other empirical sources to confirm Schopenhauer's philosophy. In 'Linguistics', he notes the tendencies in various languages to attribute a will to various natural processes, viewing such tendencies as receiving a grounding explanation in his thought. The lengthiest chapter, 'Animal magnetism and magic', signifies

[64] Schopenhauer's metaphysics aims at providing the correct explanation of 'experience as a whole', and he claims that the source of metaphysical knowledge is both inner and outer experience. He holds that by connecting outer with inner experience correctly, through making the latter the key to the former, one obtains metaphysical knowledge; see *WWR* 2, ch. 17 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 201), where he also claims that this was done in 'Physical astronomy'

Schopenhauer's edacious curiosity and his willingness to explore phenomena generally neglected by philosophers. Aspiring to produce a metaphysics that explains the totality of experience, he could not ignore animal magnetism, sympathetic cures, telekinesis, clairvoyance, and magic, phenomena with lengthy, multicultural histories. By recognizing a metaphysical *nexus* behind the physical *nexus*, Schopenhauer attempts to show how his philosophy supplies a metaphysical explanation for the superstitious explanations provided by some practitioners and theorists of such arcane arts. 'Sinology' details some of the affinities Schopenhauer sees between his philosophy and Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, and in a lengthy footnote he mentions many of the sources that helped form his views concerning Buddhism. Schopenhauer, who delighted in mentioning earlier thinkers who anticipated his views, concludes the chapter by arguing that his fundamental idea was developed independently from the thought of the Chinese scholar Choo-foo-tze, who held that 'the mind of Heaven is deducible from what is the Will of mankind' (p. 438). It is curious to note that Schopenhauer seldom took such trouble to show that he developed his thought independently.[65]

Schopenhauer pledges in the 'Introduction' that he will only discuss his metaphysics and not other areas of his philosophy. The penultimate chapter, 'Reference to ethics', does not technically violate this pledge, since his metaphysics is an ethics in an expanded sense of the term. Indeed, he even claims a 'much greater right than Spinoza to call my metaphysics "ethics"' (p. 442). The basis of this claim lies in his subordination of the physical order of things to a moral order, something made possible by showing that the force expressed in nature, will, has aseity, and so will meets the requirements of morality – freedom and responsibility for the nature of the world.[66] He concludes this chapter by noting that the ascetic results of his ethics appear paradoxical to the 'Protestant mind', but would appear orthodox to the Eastern mind, and he pledges his fidelity to speaking the truth even if such talk does not please the world. The theme of this commitment to the truth and the lack of any such commitments by his contemporaries is the theme of his wonderfully written final chapter, 'Conclusion'.

[65] Schopenhauer also argued that he developed the main tenets of his philosophy independently from Fichte, Schelling, and Buddhism

[66] In *PP* 1, the Introduction to 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life' (Hübscher *SW* 5, 333), Schopenhauer states that his philosophy culminates in a 'metaphysical–ethical' standpoint, and in a note from 1813, he promises to develop a philosophy that is to be a metaphysics and ethics in one, see *MR* 1, 59 (*HN* 1, 55)

The place of On Will in Nature in Schopenhauer's oeuvre

On Will in Nature is interrelated with much of Schopenhauer's other work. Schopenhauer himself recognized this interconnectedness. In chapter 18 of the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, where he notes the great significance for his philosophy of *On Will in Nature*, Schopenhauer calls this small book the essential supplement to the second book of his principal work.[67] Yet other connections are significant as well. For example, to fully appreciate even *On Will in Nature*, it is necessary to read both the second book of his principal work and its supplementary essays in its second volume. Then, too, chapter 6 of the second volume of *Parerga and Paralipomena*, 'On Philosophy and the Natural Sciences', in which Schopenhauer advances some scientific hypotheses himself, discusses some additional scientific corroborations of his philosophy, supplementing his discussions of the natural sciences.

[67] *WWR* 2, ch. 38 (Hübscher *SW* 3, p. 213)

Notes on text and translation

GERMAN EDITION

The present translations are based on the German edition of Schopenhauer's works, as edited by Arthur Hübscher, *Sämtliche Werke* (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988). *On the Fourfold Root* and *On Vision and Colours* are found in Vol. 1, and *On Will in Nature* in Vol. 4. Page numbers of the Hübscher edition are given in the margins of the translation. Hübscher's definitive edition follows the first complete edition compiled by Julius Frauenstädt in 1873, with revisions taking account of numerous later editorial interventions. A paperback edition of the Hübscher edition, but using Roman type and fewer editorial notes, is the so-called *Zürcher Ausgabe*, *Werke in zehn Bänden* (Zurich: Diogenes, 1977), in which *On the Fourfold Root* and *On Will in Nature* appear in Vol. 5. However, the Zürcher edition does not include *On Vision and Colours*. (Those wishing to read the German text of these works that Schopenhauer himself last issued should consult Ludger Lütkehaus (ed.), *Arthur Schopenhauers Werke in fünf Bänden. Nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand* (Zurich: Haffmans, 1988).) Arguments for using Hübscher as the basis for translation are given by Richard Aquila in his 'Introduction' to Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Presentation*, Vol. 1 (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), xli–xlii. Long recognized as the standard German source in the field, the Hübscher collected works have served Schopenhauer studies for decades. The Hübscher edition is based on the first collected works of Schopenhauer, edited by Schopenhauer's friend and literary executor, Julius Frauenstädt (1873), but the Hübscher collected works benefit from over 100 years of textual and philological criticism. Vol. 7 of the 1988 edition of the *Sämtliche Werke* completes and corrects some of Schopenhauer's citations and identifies authors and other figures now obscured by time. In preparing these translations, we consulted both Hübscher's editorial notes as well as those of Paul Deussen (ed.), *Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke* (Munich: R. Piper, 1911–42).

VOCABULARY

The editorial footnotes give terms from the German when these may be helpful for understanding a particular passage. We discuss here choices of English terms for significant items in Schopenhauer's vocabulary. We translate the term *Vorstellung*, when used to indicate an object for a subject, as 'representation'.[a] As Schopenhauer put in a letter to Frauenstädt, 'object and representation are the same'.[b] This choice is discussed in Janaway's translation of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, p. 41 of the first volume of the Cambridge edition to appear.

At times Schopenhauer's philosophy uses the term *Wille* in a variety of different ways – sometimes as the individual's will as expressed in his or her actions; sometimes for the non-empirical, but individual character (i.e. 'my will'); sometimes for will as thing in itself; sometimes as the world as a whole; sometimes for what Schopenhauer calls 'one side' of the world, in contrast to 'representation'. To avoid a reification, in our translation of *On Will in Nature* we most often omit the definite article before the noun 'will', and we especially follow this practice any time Schopenhauer is referring to will in contrast to representation. The verb *wollen* is translated as 'to will' (except in non-technical contexts where 'to want' is more appropriate) and *das Wollen* as 'willing'. *Wünschen* is 'to wish' (sometimes 'to desire'), *willkürlich* 'voluntary'.

Although Schopenhauer is not as consistent as translators might prefer, he distinguished between *Erkenntniß* and *Wissen*, viewing the latter as a species of the former. Schopenhauer claims that *Erkenntniß* is common to human beings and other animals, but that non-human animals have only an intuitive, immediate, and non-conceptual understanding of the world. Non-human animals, Schopenhauer claims, lack the human capacity for an abstract, conceptual, and mediate kind of *Erkenntniß*, a capacity he calls *Wissen*. Therefore, in contexts in which the terms are significant to or presuppose Schopenhauer's epistemology or philosophy of mind, we translate *Erkenntniß* as 'cognition', but *Wissen* as 'knowledge'. However, in contexts in which Schopenhauer uses *Erkennen* to designate the result of some rational conceptual process, we translate *Erkennen* as 'knowledge' or 'knowing'. For this reason, we have translated *Satz vom zureichenden Grunde des Erkennen* as 'principle of sufficient reason of knowing',[c] since, in highlighting the function of reason in the cognitive processes,

[a] See, e.g., *WWR* 1, 24–7 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 5–7) [b] *GB* 284, 12 July 1852
[c] In this rendering, we follow the translations of Payne (1974) and White (1997)

Schopenhauer is discussing the principle that governs the various sorts of truth relationships between judgments and their grounds. The verb *erkennen* we generally translate as 'to cognize' or 'to recognize'.[a]

Schopenhauer also claims that conceptual thought, reasoning, the type of cognition unique to humans, contains only what immediate cognition already contains, but is abstracted from the particular and rich content of immediate cognition. Schopenhauer uses the Kantian terms *Sinnlichkeit*, *Verstand*, *Vernunft,* and *Begriff* (translated here as 'sensibility', 'understanding', 'reason', and 'concept'), but he does so to present a theory of cognition markedly different from Kant's. 'Intuition' is therefore to be understood as a term of art referring to an awareness of objects in space and time through the senses; and we translate *anschaulich* as 'intuitive', *Anschauung* as 'intuition' and *anschauen* as 'to intuit'. We have reserved the term 'perception' for *Wahrnehmung*.

We translate *Grund* in the title, *Der Satz vom zureichenden Grunde* as 'principle of sufficient reason' simply because this is a more readily recognizable set phrase in English. We also translate *Grund* as 'reason' when referring to any one of the four principles of sufficient reason or to anything grounded in a proposition. When the sense of *Grund* is more broadly causal or applied to something other than logical necessity, we use *ground.*

We usually translate *Erscheinung* as 'appearance', except when Schopenhauer uses the term to indicate a non-philosophical sense, that is, when the distinction between 'appearance' and 'thing in itself' is not strictly relevant. The coinage 'urphenomenon' translates the German *urphänomen*. In both German and English, the prefix *ur-* occurs in other combinations to indicate something primordial, primitive, original – something as a source, something non-derivative. The prefix is used here to indicate more specifically a source from which related phenomena are derived, but which is itself not derivable from or explicable by other physical phenomena. The translators recognize this term as a coinage, although perhaps not without precedent.

Our work has benefited from previous English translations, in particular those of Madam Karl Hillebrand (Jessie Taylor), E. J. F. Payne, and F. C. White. In addition, we consulted Urs App's synoptic edition of Schopenhauer's 'Sinology' essay. David Simmons, of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Wisconsin–Whitewater, has been helpful with obscure German terms and even some of Schopenhauer's

[a] See Zöller's discussion in *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (1999), xxxviii–xxxix

coinages. Then, too, Richard Larson occasionally made useful suggestions on the translation.

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STYLE, SYNTAX, AND PUNCTUATION

Schopenhauer's syntax varies greatly. Schopenhauer's prose can range from a crisp statement of but five words, to lengthy and complicated structures of more than two hundred words. Because Schopenhauer himself was aware of the sometimes unorthodox nature of his writing, having claimed that this was a function of his thinking,[a] we have attempted to approximate the original, so as to allow our readers something of the experience of Schopenhauer's prose. To this end, we have retained his paragraph structure. Where practicable, we have also sought not to sacrifice literalness for readability. However, since readers of current English are generally more accustomed to syntax of more limited range than that of Schopenhauer's German, and since English is generally not inflected for gender, but relies more on syntactic order, we have often had to approximate syntax and sometimes to supply the referent noun or noun phrase where Schopenhauer used a pronoun.

Schopenhauer sometimes punctuated in ways different from present-day conventions. We have retained, for example, Schopenhauer's use of the dash (–), most often between sentences. Schopenhauer often uses the dash between sentences, in very few instances within sentences, rarely for emphasis (the common practice today), and even to indicate omissions within quotations (a function nowadays of the ellipsis). In a few instances, for the sake of clarity, we have added dashes to offset elements of a sentence

[a] See, e.g., *GB* 203, letter to F. A. Brockhaus of 7 September 1843 and *GB* 377, letter to Frauenstädt of 24 November 1855

or to reflect Schopenhauer's emphasis. We have also followed Schopenhauer's use of abbreviations and in a few instances his non-standard punctuation. We also follow Schopenhauer's curious practice of sometime italicizing proper names.

SCHOPENHAUER'S USE OF OTHER LANGUAGES

A polyglot, Schopenhauer frequently cites authors in classical and modern languages. We translate the majority of such passages in the text, providing the original, as Schopenhauer cited it, in footnotes. In a few instances we preserve a Latin term in the text, where Schopenhauer uses it as a term of art. Whereas Schopenhauer sometimes cites Greek with diacritical marks, sometimes without, we provide diacriticals in all instances. Often when citing Greek authors, Schopenhauer provides his own Latin translation, which we give along with the Greek in the footnotes.

Chronology

1788	Arthur Schopenhauer born on 22 February in the city of Danzig (now Gdansk), the son of the Hanseatic merchant Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer and Johanna Schopenhauer, née Trosiener
1793	Danzig is annexed by the Prussians. The Schopenhauer family moves to Hamburg
1797	His sister Adele is born. Schopenhauer begins a two-year stay in Le Havre with the family of one of his father's business partners
1799	Returns to Hamburg, and attends a private school for the next four years
1803–4	Agrees to enter career as a merchant and as a reward is taken by his parents on a tour of Europe (Holland, England, France, Switzerland, Austria). From June to September 1803 is a boarder in Thomas Lancaster's school in Wimbledon
1804	Is apprenticed to two Hanseatic merchants in Hamburg
1805	His father dies, probably by suicide
1806	Johanna Schopenhauer moves with Adele to Weimar, where she establishes herself as a popular novelist and literary hostess
1807	Schopenhauer abandons his commercial career for an academic one. Enters Gotha Gymnasium and then receives private tuition in Weimar
1809	Studies science and then philosophy (especially Plato and Kant) at the University of Göttingen
1811	Studies science and philosophy at the University of Berlin. Attends the lectures of Fichte and Schleiermacher
1813–14	Lives in Rudolstadt, writing his doctoral dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which is

	accepted by the University of Jena and published in 1813. Conversations with Goethe on colour and vision
1814	Begins reading a translation of the *Upanishads*. Stays with his mother in Weimar, but breaks with her permanently after a final quarrel. Lives in Dresden until 1818
1814–18	Works on *The World as Will and Representation*
1816	Publishes *On Vision and Colours*
1818	March: completion of *The World as Will and Representation*, published by Brockhaus at the end of the year, with '1819' on title page
1818–19	Travels in Italy (Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice) and returns to Dresden
1819	Is appointed as unsalaried lecturer (*Privatdozent*) at the University of Berlin
1820	Gives his only course of lectures, which is poorly attended
1822–3	Travels again to Italy (Milan, Florence, Venice). Returns from Italy to live in Munich. Is ill and depressed
1824	Lives in Bad Gastein, Mannheim, and Dresden. Proposes to translate Hume's works on religion into German, but does not find a publisher
1826	Returns to Berlin
1829–30	Plans to translate Kant into English, without success; publishes *Commentatio exponens Theoriam Colorum Physiologicam, eandemque primariam, Auctore Arthurio Schopenhauero*
1831	Leaves Berlin because of the cholera epidemic. Moves to Frankfurt-am-Main
1831–2	Lives temporarily in Mannheim
1833	Settles in Frankfurt, where he remains for the rest of his life
1836	Publishes *On Will in Nature*
1838	His mother dies
1839	Enters competition set by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and wins prize with his essay *On the Freedom of the Will*
1840	Submits *On the Basis of Morals* in a competition set by the Royal Danish Society of Sciences, and is not awarded a prize
1841	*On the Freedom of the Will* and *On the Basis of Morals* published under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*

1844	Publishes second, revised edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, adding a second volume consisting of fifty essays elaborating on ideas discussed in the first volume
1847	Publishes second, revised edition of *On the Fourfold Root*
1851	Publishes *Parerga and Paralipomena* in two volumes
1853	An article on his philosophy by J. Oxenford in *Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review* marks the beginning of his belated recognition
1854	Publishes second editions of *On Will in Nature* and *On Vision and Colours*. Julius Frauenstädt publishes *Letters on Schopenhauer's Philosophy*
1857	Schopenhauer's philosophy taught at Bonn University
1858	Declines invitation to be a member of Berlin Royal Academy
1859	Publishes third edition of *The World as Will and Representation*
1860	Publishes second edition of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. Dies on 21 September in Frankfurt-am-Main

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ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON – 1813

ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON – 1847

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

A Philosophical Treatise

by

Arthur Schopenhauer

Second, Quite Improved and Considerably Enlarged Edition[1]

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως, ῥίζωμά τ᾽ ἔχουσαν.

['By the one who bestows on our mind the number four, fount and root of ever-flowing creation.': Pythagorean oath]

Preface V

This treatise in elementary philosophy, which first appeared in the year 1813, when I had gained my doctorate with it, has since become the underpinnings of my whole system. For this reason it cannot be allowed to remain out of print, as has been the case for four years, without my knowing it.

However, to send such a youthful work into the world again now with all its flaws and faults seems to me to be irresponsible. For I am aware that the time in which I will no longer be able to emend it cannot be very far distant, but with time the period of my real effectiveness will first appear, and that it will be a long period I am consoled by a firm trust in Seneca's promise: 'although envy imposed silence on everyone living with you, they will come who will judge without offence and without partiality'[a] (*Letters* 79). I have, therefore, as far as it is possible, helped the present youthful work and given the brevity and uncertainty of life, I must even regard it as a special good fortune that it has been granted me in my sixtieth year still to correct that which I had written in my twenty-sixth.

But now, in doing so, it has been my plan to deal with my youthful self VI
indulgently, and as far as it is ever possible, to let him have his say and to speak freely. But where he advanced something incorrect or superfluous, or even omitted the best part, I have had to cut him off, and this has often enough been the case, so that perhaps many will get the same impression as when an old man reads a young man's book aloud, but often puts it down in order to indulge his own digressions on the theme.

It is easy to foresee that a composition of this sort, improved after so long a time, could never again achieve the unity and finish that belongs to one that is a harmonious whole. Even in style and execution, such an unmistakable difference will make itself palpable that the sensitive reader will certainly never be in doubt whether he hears the cadence of the old or

[a] *etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit; venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia judicent* (*Ep*[*istles*] 79[, 17])

the young man. For certainly there is a distant interval between the mild, unassuming tone of the young man, who advances his subject confidently because he is still naïve enough to believe quite seriously that all those who occupy themselves with philosophy could have nothing to do with anything else but the truth, and that, as a result, they would welcome anyone who furthers this – and the firm, but at times somewhat acerbic voice of the old man who finally had to discover what a noble society of tradespeople and submissive sycophants he has fallen among and what they aimed at. Indeed, if at times indignation now gushes from all his pores, then the reasonable reader would not blame him; for has the result not already taught the reader what happens when there is always talk of striving for truth, but eyes are always fixed on the intentions of supreme
VII authorities, and when, conversely, 'a god can be made of anything'[a] has also been extended to great philosophers and, thus, a clumsy charlatan like Hegel is confidently branded as such? German philosophy is precisely so, laden with contempt, mocked abroad, rejected by honest sciences – like a strumpet who, for filthy lucre, yesterday gave herself up to one, today to another; and the minds of the contemporary generation of scholars are jumbled by Hegelian nonsense: incapable of thought, coarse and stupefied, they become the prey of the vulgar materialism that has crept out of the Basilisk's egg. Good luck! I return to my subject.

One will thus have to be content with the disparity of the tone since here I could not append the later additions separately as I have done with my principal work; so it does not matter what I had written in my twenty-sixth year and what in my sixtieth; rather, it only matters that one wants to get one's bearings, to gain a firm footing and become clear about the fundamental concepts of all philosophizing and to receive in these few sheets a small book through which one is able to learn something sound, solid, and true; and this, I hope, will be the case. With the expansion that many parts have now received, a compendious theory of the entire cognitive faculty has even come about, in that the theory always proceeds only from the principle of reason,[b] advances the subject from a new and peculiar direction, but then, is enlarged by the first book of the *World as Will and Representation*, along with the relevant chapters of the second volume, and by my 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy'.

Frankfurt-am-Main in September 1847.

[a] *e quovis ligno fit Mercurius* [lit.: 'a Mercury can be made of whatever wood']
[b] *Satz vom Grunde* [i.e. principle of sufficient reason]

Contents

FIRST CHAPTER 1

Introduction

§ 1

THE METHOD

Plato, the divine, and the amazing Kant unify their impressive voices in the recommendation of a rule for the method of all philosophizing, and indeed of all knowledge in general.*,[2] They say that one should comply with two laws equally, that of *homogeneity* and that of *specification*, but not the one to the detriment of the other. The law of *homogeneity* enjoins us through attention to the similarities and correspondences among things, to comprehend species, and to unify these into genera, and these into families until we at last arrive at the supreme, all-encompassing concept.[3] Since this law is a transcendental one, essential to our reason, it presupposes that nature is in agreement with it, which presupposition is expressed in the old rule: 'entities are not to be multiplied without necessity'.[a] – In contrast, Kant expresses the law of *specification* as: 'the varieties of entities are not to be diminished rashly.'[b] It demands that we clearly distinguish among genera unified under an all-encompassing concept of a family and again among the higher and lower species comprehended under these 2
genera, guarding against making any kind of leap by directly subsuming the lower species, or even the completely individual, under the concept of a family, while any concept of a family is still capable of a classification into sub-classes and yet none reaches down to mere intuition.[c] Kant teaches

* Plato, *Philebus*, pp. 219–223 [16c–18d]. *Politicus* [*Statesman*] 62–63. *Phaedrus* 361–363, edn [published at] Bipontium [1781–7]. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic

[a] *entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda* [*Critique of Pure Reason* A652/B680. For a discussion of the origin of this rule, see Guyer and Wood, p. 749, n. 116]

[b] *entium varietates non temere esse minuendas* [*Critique of Pure Reason* A656/B684]

[c] *Anschauung*

that both laws are transcendental *a priori* principles of reason[a] postulating correspondence between things and the laws themselves, and Plato seems to express the same in his own way, as he says these rules, to which all sciences are indebted for their origin, were tossed down to us from the seat of the gods along with the fire of Prometheus.

§ 2

ITS APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE

I find the latter of these laws, such a powerful recommendation notwithstanding, applied too seldom to a fundamental principle[b] of all cognition,[c] *the principle of sufficient reason*. For although it has for a long time been frequently put in a general form, nonetheless, no one has distinguished among its highly differing applications, in each of which it acquires another meaning, and which, therefore, reveal its origin from differing cognitive powers.[4] However, applying the principle of homogeneity, while neglecting its opposite, has bred many persistent errors, particularly in the observation of our powers of mind; whereas, applying the law of specification has brought about the greatest and most important advances – a comparison of Kantian philosophy with all earlier philosophy teaches this. I may be permitted to quote a passage in which Kant recommends the application of the law of specification to the sources of our cognition, since it justifies my present effort. 'It is of the utmost importance to isolate cognitions that differ from one another in their species and origin, and carefully to avoid mixing them up together with others with which they are usually connected in their use.
3 What chemists do in analysing matter, what mathematicians do in their pure theory of magnitude, the philosopher is even more obliged to do, so that he can securely determine the proper value and influence of the advantage that a special kind of cognition has over the aimless use of the understanding.' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, the Doctrine of Method, 3rd Section.)[d]

§ 3

ADVANTAGE OF THIS INQUIRY[5]

Should I succeed in showing that the principle that constitutes the subject of this inquiry derives not immediately from *one*, but above all from

[a] *Grundsätze der Vernunft* [b] *einen Hauptgrundsatz* [c] *Erkenntniß* [d] [A842/B870]

differing basic cognitions of our mind, then it will follow that the necessity that it entails as a firmly-established *a priori* principle likewise is not *one* and everywhere *the same*, but just as various as the sources of the principle itself. Then, however, anyone who grounds[a] a conclusion on the principle has the obligation to determine precisely which of the different necessities that lie at the basis of the principle supported his conclusion, and he should indicate as much with a specific name (which I will propose). I hope that thereby something will be gained for clarity and precision in philosophizing, and I consider it an unavoidably necessary prerequisite for philosophy to attain the greatest possible intelligibility, through precise determination of the meaning of any expression, so as to protect us from error and intentional deception and make any knowledge gained in the domain of philosophy a secure possession rather than one that can be torn away from us by a misunderstanding or ambiguity discovered later.[6] Above all the genuine philosopher will generally seek lucidity and clarity and will always strive not to be like a turbid, raging, rain-swollen stream, but much more like a Swiss lake, which, in its peacefulness, combines great depth with a great clarity that just reveals its great depth.[7] Clarity is the good faith of philosophers,[b] Vauvenargues has said. Conversely the fraudulent philosopher will certainly not seek to conceal his thoughts through words, according to Talleyrand's maxim,[c] but will seek to conceal his deficiency of thought and to shift onto the reader's conscience the unintelligibility of 4
his philosopheme, which grows out of the obscurity of his own thought. This explains why, in some writings, e.g. those of Schelling,[8] the didactic tone so frequently turns into the reproachful; indeed, the readers are often reproached in advance, in anticipation of their incompetence.

§ 4

IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

It is extremely great, so it may be called the basis of all science.[9] *Science* specifically means a *system* of findings,[d] i.e., a unity of connected findings in opposition to a mere aggregate of the same.[10] But what else than the

[a] *gründet* [b] *La clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes* [*Réflexions et Maximes,* 729]
[c] [The maxim is *l'homme a reçu la parole pour pouvoir cacher sa pensée*: 'Humans have received speech in order to conceal their thoughts.' *Mémoires*, Paris, 1842, 4. 447; letter of Talleyrand to the Spanish diplomat Izquierdo]
[d] *Erkenntnissen*

principle of sufficient reason connects members of a system? The very thing that distinguishes any science from a mere aggregate is that each of a science's findings follows from another as its ground. Therefore, Plato already says, 'For true opinions are not worth much until someone binds them through reasoning'.[a] *Meno* p. 385 Bip.[11] – Moreover almost all sciences contain[12] knowledge[b] of causes from which effects can be determined and likewise other findings of the necessities of the consequent[c] from grounds, as they will be presented in our later observation; which Aristotle already expressed in the words 'all knowledge which is rational or somewhat partakes of the rational concerns causes and principles'.[d] *Metaphysics* v, 1.[13] – Since it is now the presupposition that we always make *a priori*[14] that everything has a reason[e] which justifies our everywhere asking why, so this 'why' may be called the mother of all sciences.

§ 5

THE PRINCIPLE ITSELF

Later it will be shown that the principle of sufficient reason is a common
5 expression of many findings given *a priori*. Provisionally, it must meanwhile be put forth in some kind of formula. I choose the Wolffian as the most general: *Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit*.[f] Nothing is without a reason why it is.

[a] καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαι εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τίς αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ·(*etiam opiniones verae non multi pretii sunt, donec quis illas ratiocinatione a causis ducta liget*). [Schopenhauer cites the Bipontium edn, summarizing here Socrates' remarks at 97e–98a]

[b] *Kenntnisse* [c] *Folgen*

[d] πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητική, ἢ καὶ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας, περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστι (*omnis intellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo intellectu participans, circa causas et principia est*) [1025b6]

[e] *Grund*

[f] ['Nothing is without a reason why it is rather than is not.' Wolff, *Philosophia prima*, *sive Ontologia*, rev. edn, Frankfurt, 1736, section 70, p. 47]

Survey of what is most important in previous teachings about the principle of sufficient reason

§ 6

FIRST STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO MEANINGS OF THE SAME

A more or less exactly determined abstract expression for such a fundamental principle[a] of all cognition[b] must also have been found very early; thus, it would be difficult and, moreover, not of great interest, to demonstrate where such a one first occurs.[15] Plato and Aristotle still do not formally advance it as a fundamental principle;[c] however, they more frequently express it as a self-evident truth. So *Plato* says, with a naïveté that seems to contrast with the critical investigation of modern times as the state of innocence contrasts with knowledge of good and evil: 'it is necessary that all which occurs, occurs with a cause, for how could it occur without a cause?' *Philebus* p. 240 Bip.[d] and again in the *Timaeus* (p. 302) 'everything that occurs must necessarily occur through some cause, since it is impossible for something to occur without a cause'.[e] – *Plutarch*, at the close of his book, *On Fate*,[f] cites among the fundamental principles of the Stoics: 'the most important and first appears to be that nothing occurs without a 7
cause, but everything according to preceding causes.'[g,16]

[a] *Ur-Grundsatz* [b] *Erkenntniß* [c] *Hauptgrundsatz*

[d] Ἀναγκαῖον πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι· πῶς γὰρ ἄν χωρὶς τούτων γίγνοιτο; (*necesse est, quaecunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri: quomodo enim absque ea fierent?*) [26e]

[e] πᾶν δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν. (*quidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa necessario gignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, impossibile est.*) [28a]

[f] *de fato*

[g] μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε, τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας. (*maxime id primum esse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis antegressis.*) [ch. 11, p. 574E]

In the *Posterior Analytics* I, 2, *Aristotle* to some extent states the principle of reason in the words: 'we think we understand a thing perfectly whenever we think we know the cause by which the thing is, that it is really the cause of that thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be otherwise.'[a] In his *Metaphysics* Book IV, ch. 1, he already give a classification of the different forms of grounds,[b] or rather the principles, ἀρχαί, of which he accepts eight forms, though the classification is neither thorough nor precise enough. However, he says here perfectly correctly: 'now it is common to all principles that they are the first thing through which anything is, or occurs, or is known.'[c] In the following chapter he distinguishes sundry forms of causes, although along with some superficiality and confusion.[17] However, better than there, he states four types of causes[d] in the *Posterior Analytics* II, 11: 'there are four causes: the first is that which is the essence of a thing; the second is that by which it must necessarily be; the third is that which first puts it in motion; the fourth is its purpose.'[e] Now this is the origin of the classification of the causes[f] generally accepted by the Scholastics into material, formal, efficient and final causes;[g] as these, then, are to be seen in Suárez's *Metaphysical Disputations*,[h] this true compendium of Scholasticism, disp. 12, sect. 2 and 3. But even *Hobbes* (*On the Body*,[i] p. II, ch. 10, § 7) still cites it and explains it. – This classification is again to be found in Aristotle and even somewhat more detailed and clear: namely *Metaphysics* I, 3. And in the book *On Sleep and Sleeplessness*,[j] ch. 2, it is briefly cited. – However, concerning the highly important distinction between the cognitive ground[k] and cause, even Aristotle reveals an idea[l] of the subject
8 to a certain degree insofar as in the *Posterior Analytics* I, 13, he expressly proves that knowing and demonstrating *that* something is, is very different

[a] ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτο ἄλλως εἶναι. (*Scire autem putamus unamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus causam cognoscere, propter quam res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nec posse eam aliter se habere.*) [*Posterior Analytics* 71b9 abbreviated]

[b] *Gründe*

[c] πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι, ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ γιγνώσκεται (*omnibus igitur principiis commune est, esse primum, unde aut est, aut fit, aut cognoscitur*) [*Metaphysics* 1013a17]

[d] *Gründe*

[e] αἰτίαι δὲ τέσσαρες· μία μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· μία δὲ τό τινων ὄντων, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο εἶναι· ἑτέρα δὲ, ἥ τι πρῶτον ἐκίνησε· τετάρτη δὲ, τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα (*causae autem quatuor sunt: una quae explicat quid res sit; altera, quam, si quaedam sint, necesse est esse; tertia, quae quid primum movit; quarta id, cujus gratia*) [*Posterior Analytics* 94a21]

[f] *causarum* [g] *causas materiales, formales, efficientes et finales*

[h] *Suarii disputationibus metaphysicis* [i] *de corpore* [j] *de somno et vigilia*

[k] *Erkenntnißgrund* [l] *Begriff*

from knowing and demonstrating *why* it is: what he presents as the latter is knowledge of the cause,[a] as the former, the cognitive ground. But he does not attain a completely clear consciousness of the distinction; otherwise, he would have adhered to and observed it in the remainder of his writings. This, however, is certainly not the case, for even as in the passages alluded to above, where he aims to distinguish the various forms of grounds, the most essential distinction that is being considered in this chapter never again occurs to him, and concerning this, he generally uses the word *cause*[b] for any ground, of whatever type it be, but indeed he even quite frequently calls the cognitive ground, the premises of a conclusion, a cause,[c] so, e.g., *Metaphysics* IV, 18; *Rhetoric* II, 21; *On Plants* I, p. 816,[d] and especially *Posterior Analytics.* I, 2, where precisely the premises of a conclusion are called causes of the conclusion.[e] But if one refers to two related concepts by the same word, then this is a sign that one does not know their distinction or adhere to it, since accidental homonymy of widely differing things is something else entirely. At its most striking, this error comes to light in his description of the sophism of treating what is not a cause as a cause[f] in the book *On Sophistical Refutations*, ch. 5. By αἴτιον here he always understands only the ground of proof,[g] the premises, in other words a cognitive ground. The sophism consists in one's quite correctly proving something to be impossible; however, the sophism certainly does not have any bearing on the proposition[h] disputed by it, which one nevertheless alleges to have demolished. Thus it is not at all a question of physical causes. Except the use of the word αἴτιον has carried so much weight among logicians of modern times that they simply maintain it in their presentations of *fallaciarum extra dictionem*[i] always explaining the *fallacia non causae ut causa*[j] as a specification[k] of a physical cause, which it is not: so, e.g., Reimarus, G.E. Schulze, Fries and all whom I have come across: I found this sophism first correctly presented in Twesten's *Logic*.[l] Also, as a rule, in other scientific works and dissertations, the interpolation of a false 9
cause is designated through the charge *fallacia non causae ut causa*.

Of these, among the ancients *Sextus Empiricus* affords us a striking example of the mingling and confusion of the logical law of the cognitive ground with the transcendental natural law of cause and effect. Specifically

[a] *Erkenntniß der Ursache* [b] αἴτιον [c] αἴτιας
[d] *de plantis* I p. 816 (ed. Berol) [e] αἰτίαι τοῦ συμπεράσματος
[f] *non causae ut causa*, παρὰ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον, . . . *de sophisticis elenchis* ch. 5 [167b21]
[g] *Beweisgrund* [h] *Satz* [i] [fallacies that do not depend on words]
[j] [fallacy of treating what is not cause as a cause] [k] *Angabe*
[l] [*Grundriß der analytischen Logik; für seine Vorlesungen entworfen*. Kiel: Schwers Witwe, 1834]

in the 9th book *Against the Mathematicians*;[a] thus in the book *Against Physics*[b] § 204, he attempts to prove the law of causality and says: One who asserts that there is no cause (αἴτια) has either no cause (αἴτια) to assert this or he has one. In the first case his assertion is no truer than its opposite: in the second, precisely by his assertion he establishes that there are causes.

Hence we see that the ancients still did not attain a clear distinction between the requirement for a cognitive ground for establishing a judgement and that of a cause for the occurrence of a real event. – As for the Scholastics later, the law of causality was for them just an axiom, which was exalted beyond all investigation: 'we do not inquire if there is a cause, since nothing is more certain in and of itself'[c] says Suárez, disp. 12, sect. 1. In doing so they held fast to the Aristotelian classification of causes; in contrast, as far as I know, they also did not attain consciousness of the necessary distinction in question here.[18]

§ 7

DESCARTES[d]

For in this regard we even find our excellent Descartes, the instigator of subjective investigation and in this the father of modern philosophy, still gripped by confusions which can scarcely be explained, and we will soon see to what serious and deplorable results this has led metaphysics.[19] In *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Axiom 1 of the 'Reply to the Second Objection', he says, 'nothing exists of which it could not be asked from which cause it exists. This can even be asked concerning God, not as if he requires some sort of cause in order to exist, but because the immensity of his nature is *the cause or the reason* because of which he requires no cause in order to exist'.[e] He should have said, the immensity of God is a cognitive ground from which it follows that God requires no cause. However, he mingles the two, and one sees that he is not clearly aware of the great distinction between cause and cognitive ground.[20] But actually it is intent that falsifies insight[f] for him. For here, where the causal law[g] requires a

[a] *adversus Mathematicos* [b] *ad. physicos*
[c] *non inquirimus an causa sit, quia nihil est per se notius* [d] *Cartesius*
[e] *responsio ad secundas objectiones in meditationes de prima philosophia, axioma* 1: *Nulla res existit, de qua non possit quaeri, quaenam sit causa, cur existat. Hoc enim de ipso Deo quaeri potest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat, sed quia ipsa ejus naturae immensitas est* causa sive ratio, *propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum*. [emphasis is Schopenhauer's]
[f] *die Absicht, welche . . . die Einsicht verfälscht* [g] *Kausalitätsgesetz*

cause, instead of this he inserts a *cognitive ground* because such a ground, in turn, leads to nothing further than a ground, and through this axiom he paves the way to the *ontological proof* for the existence of God, the proof he discovered after *Anselm* had only provided an introduction to it in a general way. For immediately after the axioms, of which that cited was the first, this ontological proof is now put forth formally and quite seriously; indeed, this proof is actually already expressed in this axiom, at least as implicit in it as is the chick in an egg long brooded. Thus, while all other things require a cause for their existence, for the God who is placed on the ladder of the cosmological proof the immensity[a] implicit in his own concept is sufficient; or, as the proof itself expresses it: 'in the concept of the supremely perfect being his existence is necessarily contained.'[b] Thus this is the conjurer's trick,[c] for the sake of which the *confusion of the two foremost meanings of the principle of reason*, with which Aristotle was already familiar, is at once used 'to the greater glory of God.'[d]

Considered in the light of day and impartially, this famous ontological proof is now actually a most beloved piece of nonsense. That is, at any opportunity, someone contrives a concept assembled out of all sorts of predicates, taking care, however, that among these, either plainly and nakedly, or, as is more decorous, wrapped up in another predicate, e.g., 'perfection', 'immensity',[e] or something of the sort, there is also a predicate of reality or of existence. As is well known, from a given concept one can extract all of its essential predicates, i.e., those implicit in it, and just so one can also extract the essential predicates of these predicates by means of pure analytical judgement. These predicates, as a result, have *logical* truth, 11
i.e., have their cognitive ground in the given concept. Now accordingly, anyone can also fetch the predicate of reality or existence from his arbitrarily contrived concept, and therefore there is now supposed to be an object corresponding to the concept, independent of it, existing in actuality![f]

> If the thought were not so confounded acute
> One might be tempted to call it extraordinarily stupid.[g]

Moreover, the simple answer to such an ontological demonstration is: 'it all depends on where you have gotten your concept: if it is drawn from

[a] *immensitas*
[b] *In conceptu entis summe perfecti existentia necessaria continetur* [paraphrasing *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Axiom X of the 'Reply to the Second Objection']
[c] *tour de passe-passe* [d] *ad majorem Dei gloriam* [e] *perfectio*, *immensitas* [f] *Wirklichkeit*
[g] [Friedrich Schiller, *Wallenstein*, 'The Piccolomini', II, 7]

experience, fine,[a] since its object exists and requires no further proof; in contrast, if it is hatched from your own half-brain,[b] then all its predicates will not help it: it is just a figment of your imagination,'[c] Except that theology, in order to gain a foothold in the quite foreign area of philosophy, where it would like to be, had to resort to proofs of this sort, provoking a very unfavourable prejudice against its pretensions. – But oh! for the prophetic wisdom of Aristotle! He had never heard anything of the ontological proof, but as if he saw into the night of the coming dark ages, caught sight of that scholastic trickery and wanted to block its path, he carefully demonstrates, in the 7th chapter of the 2nd book of the *Posterior Analytics*, that the definition of a thing and the proof of its existence are two different and eternally separated things, since through the one we experience *what* is meant, but through the other that such a thing exists: and like an oracle of the future, he pronounces the sentence: 'since being is not a genus, it is not the essence of anything.'[d] That means, 'existence[e] can never belong to essence; being[f] can never belong to the essence of a thing'. – How much to the contrary Mr *von Schelling* venerates the ontological proof is to be seen from his long note, p. 132 of the first volume of his *Philosophical Writings*[g] of 1809. But we can see something even more instructive in this: specifically how an impudent, cocky gasbag[h] is sufficient to blow sand in Germans' eyes. But that even such a thoroughly contemptible fellow as *Hegel*, whose
12 whole philosophastry[i] was a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof, wanted to defend this against Kant's critique, is an alliance of which the ontological proof itself would be ashamed, regardless of how shame is otherwise of little concern to it. – It is just not to be expected that I would speak with respect of people who have brought philosophy into disdain.

§ 8

SPINOZA

Although Spinoza's philosophy consists mainly in the negation of the twofold dualism advanced by his teacher, Descartes, namely, between God and

[a] *à la bonne heure* [b] *sinciput* [c] *Hirngespinst*
[d] τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί· οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν (*esse autem nullius rei essentia est, quandoquidem ens non est genus*) [92b13]
[e] *Existenz* [f] *Daseyn* [g] *philosophischen Schriften* [Landschut: Philip Krüll]
[h] *dreistes, vornehmthuendes Schwadroniren* [i] *Philosophasterei*

world and between soul and body, he remains completely true to him in the above-mentioned confusion and mixture of the relationship between the cognitive ground and consequent with that between cause and effect; indeed, wherever possible, he sought from the same confusion and mixture to draw for his metaphysics an even greater advantage than his teacher had drawn for his own, since the indicated confusion became the basis of his whole pantheism.

For all his essential predicates are contained implicitly[a] in one concept; therefore, they can be developed explicitly[b] through mere analytic judgements: the sum of this is his definition. This definition is, therefore, different from the concept itself not in content, but only in form, since the definition consists of judgements, all of which are thought along with[c] the concept and, therefore, have their cognitive ground in the concept insofar as they state its essence. Accordingly, these judgements can be seen as the consequents of that concept, as it is their ground. This relation of a concept to the judgements that are grounded in it, and that can be developed analytically from it, is now exactly the relation that Spinoza's so-called God has to the world, or, more correctly, that the one and only substance has to its numberless accidents. ('God, or the substance consisting of infinite attributes.' *Ethics* I, prop. II. – 'God or all the attributes of God.'[d]) It is thus the relation of the *cognitive ground* to its consequent; whereas, *actual* theism (that of Spinoza is merely nominal) accepts the relation of the *cause* to the effect in which the ground remains different and separate from the 13
consequent, not, as in this case, according to the mere method of consideration,[e] but essentially and actually, thus, in itself and always. For it is such a cause of the world, with the addition of personality, that the word God, used in all honesty, indicates. In contrast, a God without personality is a contradiction in terms.[f] However, since Spinoza now also wanted to retain the word God for substance in the relations he put forth, and since he even expressly called this substance the *cause* of the world, he could only bring this about by completely mixing up these two relations, and as a result also the principle of the cognitive ground with that of causality. To give evidence of this, I call attention to the following passage among

[a] *implicite* [b] *explicite* [c] *mitgedacht*

[d] *Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis. Eth*[*ica*] I. pr[oposition] II. – *Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa* [*Ethica* I. proposition 19]

[e] *Betrachtungsart*

[f] [*contradictio in adjecto*, a term of art for Schopenhauer, is an attribution of a quality to a noun such that the attributed quality contradicts the meaning of the noun. Rhetorically, this is usually an oxymoron or paradox, such as the ever-tasty 'jumbo shrimp']

countless others. 'It is to be noted that for everything that exists a definite *cause* necessarily exists by which the thing exists. And it is to be noted that this cause, because that thing exists, must either be comprehended in the existing thing's own nature and *definition* (since it specifically belongs to the nature itself of the thing to exist), or that it must be given as something *outside* of itself.'[a] (*Ethics* I, prop. 8, n. 2.) In the latter case, he means an efficient cause as is shown from what follows; whereas, in the former he means a mere cognitive ground; however, he identifies both and thereby prepares the way for his intent to identify God with the world: everywhere his trick is to confuse a cognitive ground lying within a given concept with a cause operating[b] externally, and to conflate these, and he learned it from Descartes. As evidence of this confusion, I quote the following passages. 'From the necessity of the divine nature, everything that can fall under infinite intellect must follow.' (*Ethics* I, prop. 16.)[c] At the same time, however, everywhere he calls God the cause of the world. 'Everything that exists, expresses the power of God who is the *cause* of all things',[d] *ibid.* prop. 36, proof. – 'God is the immanent *cause* of all things, but not the transient',[e] *ibid.* prop. 18. – 'God is the *efficient cause* not only of things existing, but also of the essence of things',[f] *ibid.* prop. 25. – [21] It says in *Ethics* III, prop. 1, proof, 'From any given *idea* some *effect* must necessarily follow'.[g] And *ibid.* prop. 4, 'Nothing can be destroyed, unless it be from an external cause. –
14 Proof: The *definition* of anything affirms its essence (essence, nature as distinct from "*existentia*", existence[h]) and does not negate it; in other words, it maintains the essence of the thing and does not deny it. If, therefore, we attend to the thing itself and not to external causes, we can see nothing in it that would be able to destroy it.'[i] This means: because a concept can

[a] *Notandum, dari necessario uniuscujusque rei existentis certam aliquam* causam*, propter quam existit. Et* [*Denique*] *notandum, hanc causam, propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et* definitione *rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere), vel debere* extra *ipsam dari* [emphasis is Schopenhauer's]

[b] *wirkenden*

[c] *Ex necessitate divinae naturae omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, sequi debent* [abbreviated]

[d] *Quidquid existit Dei potentiam, quae omnium rerum* causa *est, exprimit* [emphasis is Schopenhauer's in this and the following three quotations]

[e] *Deus est omnium rerum* causa *immanens, non vero transiens*

[f] *Deus non tantum est* causa efficiens *rerum existentiae, sed etiam essentiae*

[g] *ex data quacunque* idea *aliquis* effectus *necessario sequi debet*

[h] (*Wesen, Beschaffenheit zum Unterschied von* existentia*, Daseyn*) [parenthesis is Schopenhauer's]

[i] *Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui. – Demonstr.*: Definitio *cuiuscunque rei ipsius essentiam . . . affirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere* [emphasis is Schopenhauer's]

contain nothing that contradicts its definition, i.e., the sum of its predicates, it also cannot contain anything which could become the cause of its destruction. However, this view will lead at its height to the somewhat lengthy 2nd demonstration of the 11th proposition, in which the cause, which could destroy or annihilate,[a] is mixed up with a contradiction which its definition would contain and which for that reason would annihilate it. The need to confound cause and cognitive ground becomes so urgent here that Spinoza never allows himself to say only 'cause'[b] or even 'reason'[c] but each time is compelled to put 'reason or cause',[d] which therefore occurs eight times on a single page in order to cover the fraud. Descartes had done the same in the axiom cited above.

So, then, Spinoza's pantheism is actually only the *realization* of Descartes's ontological proof. First he adopts Descartes's onto-theological[e] principle, cited above: 'the immensity of God's nature is the *cause or the reason* because of which he requires no cause in order to exist';[f] instead, in place of 'God',[g] he always says (in the beginning) 'substance',[h] and now he concludes: 'the essence of substance necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature; therefore, substance must be the *cause of itself*.'[i] (*Ethics* 1, prop. 7.) Thus, by the same argument with which Descartes had proved the existence of God, he proves the absolutely necessary existence of the world – which, thus, requires no God. He does this still more clearly in the 2nd note to the 8th proposition: 'Since existence appertains to the nature of substance, its definition must necessarily involve existence, and, consequently, from its definition alone existence must be inferred.'[j] This substance, however, as is well known, is the world. – In the same sense the demonstration for prop. 24 says: 'For that which of its nature, considered in itself alone (i.e. the definition), involves existence, is the *causa sui*.'

That which Descartes had asserted only *ideally*, only *subjectively*, i.e. only for us, only for the benefit of *knowledge*,[k] namely for the proof of the existence of God, Spinoza took as *real* and *objective*, as the actual relation of God to the world. For Descartes, existence[l] lies in the *concept* of God, and

[a] *aufheben* [b] *causa* [c] *ratio* [d] *ratio seu causa* [e] *ontotheologischen*

[f] *ipsa naturae Dei immensitas est* causa sive ratio*, propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum* [emphasis is Schopenhauer's]

[g] *Deus* [h] *substantia*

[i] *substantiae essentia necessario involvit existentiam: ergo erit substantia* causa sui. (*Eth*[*ica*], p[art] 1, prop[osition] 7 [paraphrased]) [Hereafter we follow Schopenhauer in using the Latin, *causa sui*]

[j] *Quoniam ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere, debet eius definitio necessariam existentiam involvere et consequenter ex sola eius definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi*

[k] *Erkenntniß* [l] *Existenz*

thus becomes an argument for his actual being;[a] for Spinoza, God himself is put in the world. Consequently, what for Descartes was merely a cognitive ground, Spinoza makes into a ground of reality: Descartes had taught in his ontological proof that God's existence[b] follows from his essence,[c] so Spinoza makes of it the *causa sui* and brashly opens his *Ethics* with: 'by that which is *causa sui*, I mean that of which the essence (concept) involves existence'[d] – deaf to Aristotle's shouting to him: 'existence does not belong to the essence of anything!'[e] Well, here we have the most obvious confusion of cognitive ground with cause. And if the Neo-Spinozists (Schellingites, Hegelians, etc.), as it is their custom to take words for thoughts, often indulge in pretentious, devout admiration of this *causa sui*, for my part I see in *causa sui* only a contradiction in terms,[f] a before that is an after, an audacious decree, to cut off the endless causal chain, indeed, an analogy to that Austrian who, unable to reach high enough to fasten the clasp on his tightly-strapped Shako, stood on a chair. The true emblem of *causa sui* is Baron Münchhausen, who, clamping his legs around his horse as it sinks in the water, pulls his pigtail up over his head and raises himself and the horse into the heights; under this emblem, put: *causa sui*.

In conclusion, cast a glance at proposition 16 of the first book of the *Ethics*, where from the ground that 'from the given definition of anything the intellect concludes further properties which in fact necessarily follow from this definition'[g] is inferred: 'from the necessity of the divine nature (i.e. taken to be real) infinite things must follow in infinite ways';[h] thus indisputably this God bears a relation to the world as that of a concept to its definition. Nevertheless the corollary is directly connected: 'God is the *efficient cause* of all things.'[i] The confusion of the cognitive ground with cause cannot be taken farther, and it could not have more significant results than here. But this indicates the importance of the theme of the present essay.

16 To these errors from two great minds of the past, stemming from a lack of clarity of thought, in our day Mr von Schelling has added a little epilogue, taking the trouble to provide the third step for the existing climax. Where

[a] *Daseyn* [b] *existentia* [c] *essentia*

[d] *per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia* (Begriff) *involvit existentiam* [part I, definition I]

[e] τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί [f] *contradictio in adjecto*

[g] *ex data cuiuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quae revera ex eadem necessario sequuntur*

[h] *ex necessitate divinae naturae* (*d.h. real genommen*) *infinita infinitis modis sequi debent.* [parenthesis is Schopenhauer's]

[i] *Deum omnium rerum esse* causam efficientem

Descartes had met this demand for the inexorable causal law that had driven his God into a corner by substituting a cognitive ground for the required cause, in order to settle the matter; and where Spinoza had made of this an actual cause, and thus, *causa sui*, whereby for him God became the world; so Mr von Schelling (in his essay on human freedom[a]) separated the ground from the consequent in God himself; thus, he consolidated the matter all the better by raising it to a real and incarnate hypostasis of the ground and its consequent, and acquainted us with something 'that is in God not he himself, but his ground, as a primordial ground,[b] or rather, *abyss*'.[c] This is truly precious.[d] – Moreover it is well enough known today that he took the whole fable from Jakob Böhme's *A Fundamental Statement Concerning the Earthly and Heavenly Mystery*;[e] but it appears not to be known where Jakob Böhme himself took the matter from, and thus where the abyss has its origin; therefore, I take the liberty to mention it. It is the βυθός, i.e., *abyssus*, *vorago*, the bottomless depth, abyss, of the Valentinians (a heretical sect of the second century), which abyss impregnated its consubstantial silence that then bore understanding and the world, as Irenaeus reported in *Against Heresies* Book 1, ch. 1 in the following words: 'For they say that in those unseen heights which have no name, there is a pre-existing, perfect Aeon; this they also call fore-rule, forefather, and the *abyss* . . . they say that being incomprehensible and invisible, eternal and unborn, he has existed during endless aeons in the deepest calmness and tranquillity, and that coexisting with him was Understanding, which they also called Grace and Silence. This *abyss* thought to put forth from himself the beginning of all things and to lay that offshoot (which he had resolved to put forth) like a seed into the coexisting Silence, as it were into a womb. Now this Silence, being thus impregnated, and having conceived, gave birth to Understanding, a 17
being which was like and equal to its creator and alone able to comprehend the greatness of its father. This understanding they also called the only-begotten and beginning of everything.'[f] Jakob Böhme must somehow have

[a] *Abhandlung von der menschlichen Freiheit* [*Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* (1809)]

[b] *Urgrund* [c] *Ungrund* [d] *Hoc quidem vere palmarium est*

[e] [*Mysterium Pansophicum oder*] *Gründlichem Bericht vom irdischen und himmlischen Mysterio* [1620]

[f] Λέγουσι γάρ τινα εἶναι ἐν ἀοράτοις καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις ὑψώμασι τέλειον Αἰῶνα προόντα· τοῦτον δὲ καὶ προαρχήν, καὶ προπάτορα, καὶ βυθὸν καλοῦσιν . . . ἀπάρχοντα δὲ αὐτὸν ἀχώρητον καὶ ἀόρατον, ἀΐδιον τε καὶ ἀγέννητον, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἠρεμίᾳ πολλῇ γεγονέναι ἐν ἀπείροις αἰῶσι χρόνων. Συνυπάρχειν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἔννοιαν, ἣν δὲ καὶ Χάριν, καὶ Σιγὴν ὀνομάζουσι· καὶ ἐννοηθῆναί ποτε ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ προβαλέσθαι τὸν βυλὸν τοῦτον ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων, καὶ καθάπερ σπέρμα τὴν προβολὴν ταύτην (ἣν προβαλέσθαι ἐνενοήθη) καθέσθαι, ὡς ἐν μήτρᾳ

become aware of this from the history of heresies, and from his hands Mr von Schelling has accepted it credulously.[22]

§ 9

LEIBNIZ[a]

Leibniz first put forth the principle of reason formally as a fundamental principle[b] of all cognition and science. He proclaimed it very pompously in many passages in his works, thereby even putting on airs about it, and portraying himself as if he were the first one to discover it; however, he knew nothing further to say about it, except that anything and everything must always have a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, which must have been quite well known to the world before him. In doing so, he occasionally indicated the distinction between the two fundamental meanings[c] of the principle, but did not expressly emphasize it, nor even clearly discuss it elsewhere. The main passage is in his *Principles of Philosophy*[d]
18 § 32, and a bit better in the French edition under the title *Monadology*: 'by virtue of the principle of sufficient reason we accept that no fact can be true or actual, no judgement correct, without having sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise'[e] – to which is to be compared the *Theodicy*, § 44 and the 5th letter to Clarke, § 125.[23]

τῇ συνυπαρχούσῃ ἑαυτῷ Σιγῇ. Ταύτην δὲ, ὑποδεξαμένην τὸ σπέρμα τοῦτο καὶ ἐγκύμονα γενομένην, ἀποκυῆσαι Νοῦν, ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἴσον τῷ προβαλόντι, καὶ μόνον χωροῦντα τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Πατρός. Τὸν δὲ νοῦν τοῦτον καὶ μονογενῆ καλοῦσι, καὶ ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων. (*Dicunt enim esse quendam in sublimitatibus illis, quae nec oculis cerni, nec nominari possunt, perfectum Aeonem praeexistentem, quem et proarchen, et propatorem, et Bythum vocant. Eum autem, quum incomprehensibilis et invisibilis, sempiternus idem et ingenitus esset, infinitis temporum seculis in summa quiete ac tranquillitate fuisse. Unâ etiam cum eo Cogitationem exstitisse, quam et Gratiam et Silentium (Sigen) nuncupant. Hunc porro Bythum in animum aliquando induxisse, rerum omnium initium proferre, atque hanc, quam in animum induxerat, productionem, in Sigen (silentium) quae unâ cum eo erat, non secus atque in vulvam demisisse. Hanc vero, suscepto hoc semine, praegnantem effectam peperisse Intellectum, parenti suo parem et aequalem, atque ita comparatum, ut solus paternae magnitudinis capax esset. Atque hunc Intellectum et Monogenem et Patrem et principium omnium rerum appellant*)

[a] [Schopenhauer's spelling: 'Leibnitz']
[b] *einen Hauptgrundsatz*
[c] *Hauptbedeutungen*
[d] *principiis philosophiae*
[e] *en vertu du principe de la raison suffisante nous considérons qu'aucun fait ne sauroit se trouver vrai ou existant, aucune énonciation véritable, sans qu'il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement*

§ 10

WOLFF[a]

Wolff is thus the first who expressly separated the two main meanings of our fundamental principle and discussed their distinction.[24] Nevertheless, he still does not advance the principle of sufficient reason in logic, as is now done, but in his *Ontology.*[b] In fact, in § 71 he insists that one not confuse the principle of sufficient reason of cognition with that of cause and effect, but here he still does not clearly define the distinction and causes confusion himself, for even here in the chapter 'On sufficient reason,'[c] §§ 70, 74, 75, 77, as evidence for the 'principle of sufficient reason'[d] he cites examples of cause and effect and motive and action, which, if he wanted to make this distinction, should have been cited in the chapter 'On Causes'[e] of the same work. Now in this chapter he again cites quite similar examples and again advances here the 'principle of cognition'[f] (§ 876), which, as has already been dealt with above, certainly does not belong here; however, it serves to point to the precise and clear distinction of the principle of cognition from the law of causality which then follows §§ 881–884.[25] 'That is called a principle', he further says here, 'which contains in itself the reason for something else', and he distinguishes three forms of the same, namely: 1) *principle of becoming* (cause), which he defines as '*the reason for the actuality of another*; e.g. if a stone becomes warm, then fire or the sun's rays are the reason for the warmth in the stone.'[g] – 2) '*principle of being*', which he defines: 'the reason for the possibility of something else: in the same example, the reason for the possibility that the stone can accept warmth is in the essence or mode of composition of the stone'.[h] This latter seems to me to be an inadmissible idea.[i,26] As Kant has shown sufficiently, possibility in general[27] is correspondence with the conditions of all experience known 19
to us *a priori*.[j] From this we know, with reference to Wolff's example of the stone, that alterations as effects of causes are possible, i.e., that one state can follow from another if the former state contains the conditions for the latter.

[a] [Schopenhauer's spelling: '*Wolf*']
[b] *Ontologie* [*Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia*, rev. edn, Frankfurt, 1736]
[c] *de ratione sufficiente* [d] *principium rationis sufficientis*
[e] *de causis* [f] *principium cognoscendi*
[g] principium fiendi (*causa*) . . . *ratio actualitatis alterius; e.gr. si lapis calescit, ignis aut radii solares sunt rationes, cur calor lapidi insit*
[h] principium essendi . . . *ratio possibilitatis alterius: in eodem exemplo, ratio possibilitatis, cur lapis calorem recipere possit, est in essentia seu modo compositionis lapidis*
[i] *Begriff* [j] *uns a priori bewußten Bedingung aller Erfahrung*

We find here as an effect the state of the stone's being warm, and as cause the preceding state of the stone's finite[a] capacity for heat and its contact with free heat. Now that Wolff wants to call the first-mentioned property[b] of this state 'principle of being' and the second 'principle of becoming'[c] is due to a mistake, originating in the fact that for the stone's part, the conditions are more enduring and thus can wait longer for the others.[28] That the stone is such as it is, is of such chemical property as to bring with it a given amount of specific heat, that is, a capacity for heat that stands in inverse relation to its specific heat, is, just as much as its coming into contact with free heat, a result of a chain of previous causes, all of them 'principles of becoming;' however, the coincidence of both circumstances constitutes first of all the state, which, as cause, occasions[d] the warming, as effect. Hence, there is no room for Wolff's 'principle of being' which I thus do not acknowledge, and about which I have been somewhat detailed here partly because I will use the term with a completely different meaning below, and partly because the discussion requires that one make the true sense of the causal law comprehensible.[29] 3) Wolff then distinguishes *principle of cognition*,[e] as we have said, and under 'cause'[f] he further cites 'impulsive cause, or reason determining will'.[g]

§ 11

PHILOSOPHERS BETWEEN WOLFF AND KANT

In his *Metaphysics,*[h] §§ 20–24 and §§ 306–313, *Baumgarten* repeats the Wolffian distinctions.

In his *Theory of Reason*[i] § 81, *Reimarus* distinguishes between 1) *inner ground*, his explanation of which agrees with Wolff's 'ground of being',[j] though it would hold of the 'cognitive ground'[k] if he did not transfer to things what only applies to concepts; and 2) *external ground*, i.e., 'cause'.[l] – In § 120ff. he correctly defines 'cognitive ground' as a condition

[a] *endlich* [b] *Beschaffenheit* [c] *principium essendi . . . principium fiendi*
[d] *bedingt* [e] *principium cognoscendi* [f] *causa*
[g] *causa impulsiva, sive ratio voluntatem determinans* [*Ontologia*, section 940]
[h] *Metaphysica* [Halae Magdeburgicae: Carol. Herman. Hemmerde, 1757]
[i] *Vernunftlehre* [*Die Vernunftlehre als eine Anweisung zum richtingen Gebrauch der Venunft in der Erkenntniß der Wahrheit, aus zwoen ganz natürlichen Regeln der Einstimmung und des Widerspruchs hergeleitet*. 5 edn, Hamburg: Bohn, 1790]
[j] *ratio essendi* [k] *ratio cognoscendi* [l] *causa*

of evidence:[a] but in § 125, in an example, he still confuses it with cause.[30]

In the *New Organon*,[b] *Lambert* no longer mentions the Woffian distinctions, but shows in an example that he distinguishes between cognitive ground and cause, specifically in Vol. I, § 572, where he says that God is the 'principle of being'[c] of truths, and truths are 'principles of cognition' of God.[d]

In *Aphorisms*[e] § 868, *Platner* says, 'What within the representation[f] is called the ground and consequent (*principium cognoscendi, ratio – rationatum*) is in reality cause and effect (*causa efficiens – effectus*). Any cause is the cognitive ground; any effect, the cognitive consequent.'[g] Thus he supposes[h] that cause and effect are that which in reality correspond to the concepts of ground and consequent in thinking, that the former are related to the latter somewhat as substance and accident are to subject and predicate or as the quality of an object is related to our sensation[i] of it, etc. I consider it to be superfluous to refute this opinion, since anyone can easily see that the relation of ground and consequent is something completely different from a cognition of effect and cause in judgements, although in some cases cognition of a cause can, as such, also be the ground of a judgement that states the effect.

§ 12

HUME[31]

Until this serious thinker, no one had doubted the following. First, and before all things in heaven and on earth, is the principle of sufficient reason, specifically as the law of causality. For it is an eternal truth;[j] i.e., it is in and for itself,[k] superior to gods and fate; in contrast, everything else (e.g. the mind[l] that thinks the principle of reason, no less than the whole world and even whatever may be the cause of this world, such as atoms, motion, a 21
creator, etc.) exists only in accordance with and by means of this principle.

[a] *Bedingung der Aussage*
[b] *Neues Organon,* [*oder Gedanken über die Forschung und Bezeichung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein*, 2 vols. Leipzig: J. Wendler, 1764]
[c] *principium essendi* [d] *principia cognoscendi*
[e] [*Philosophische*] *Aphorismen,* [*nebst einigen Anleitungen zur philosophischen Geschichte*], Pts. I & II, Leipzig: Schwickert, (I) 1776; (II) 1782]
[f] *Vorstellung* [g] *Erkenntnißfolge* [h] *meint* [i] *Empfindung*
[j] *veritas aeterna* [k] *er selbst ist an und für sich* [l] *Verstand*

Hume was the first to whom it occurred to ask from whence this law of causality has its authority and to demand its credentials. His result is well known: that causality is nothing more than an empirically perceived *temporal sequence* of things and states to which we have become accustomed. Anyone immediately perceives the falsity of this, and it is also not difficult to refute. But the merit lay in the question itself: the question became the impetus and the starting point for *Kant's* profound investigations leading to transcendental idealism, from which proceeds the conviction that the world, as a whole, is as dependent upon us as we are, individually, on it – an incomparably more profoundly conceived and well-founded idealism than that which had existed earlier, which was principally Berkeley's. For since Kant demonstrated the transcendental principles as such, by means of which we can determine something about objects and their possibility *a priori*, i.e. *prior* to all experience, he proved that these things cannot exist independent of our cognition, just as they present themselves to us. The resemblance of such a world with that of a dream is apparent.

§ 13

KANT AND HIS SCHOOL

The main passage in *Kant* on the principle of sufficient reason is in the minor work 'On a discovery according to which any new critique of pure reason has been made superfluous',[a] and especially in the first section of this work, under A. In this work, Kant insists on the distinction between the logical (formal) principle of cognition, 'every proposition must have its ground', and the transcendental (material) principle, 'everything must have its ground', as he polemicizes against *Eberhard*, who wanted to make the two identical. – After I produce the only correct proof, in a separate section,[b] I will later criticize his proof of the *a priority* and thus the transcendentality of the causal law.

22 Following these precedents, the distinction between cognitive ground and cause is determined rather precisely in many textbooks on logic that the Kantian school has produced, e.g., the ones[32] by Hoffbauer, Maaß, Jakob, Kiesewetter, and others. Kiesewetter in particular quite sufficiently provides the distinction in his *Logic* (Vol. 1, p. 16) in this way: 'A logical

[a] *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*durch eine ältere*] *entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* [Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1790]

[b] *Paragraphen*

ground (cognitive ground) is not to be confused with the real ground (cause). The principle of sufficient reason belongs to logic; the principle of causality to metaphysics.' P. 60: 'The former is the principle of thinking; the latter of experience. Cause concerns actual things; logical ground, only representations.'

Kant's opponents insist all the more on this distinction. In his *Logic*, § 19, remark 1, and § 63, *G. E. Schulze* complains about the confusion of the principle of sufficient reason with that of causality. In his *Logic*, pp. 20–1, *Salomon Maimon* complains that much has been said of sufficient reason without explaining what is understood by it, and in the Preface, p. XXIV, he reproaches Kant for deriving the principle of causality from the logical form of the hypothetical judgement.

In his 'Letters on Spinoza's Doctrine'[a] *F. H. Jacobi* says that from the confounding of the concept of ground with that of cause arose a delusion that has become the source of various false speculations, and in his own way he indicates the distinction between the two. However, as is usual with him, one finds here more smug semantic trickery[b] than serious philosophizing.

Finally from 'Aphorisms towards the Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature',[c] § 184, which opens the first issue of the first volume of Marcus and Schelling's *Yearbooks of Medicine*,[d] one can see how Mr *von Schelling* distinguishes ground from cause. From this same source one can also learn that gravity is the *ground* and light the *cause* of things – which I merely cite as a curiosity since, besides, such frivolous day-to-day chatter[e] deserves no place among the beliefs of serious and honest researchers.[33]

§ 14

ON THE PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLE 23

We should also note that it has often been attempted in vain to prove the principle of sufficient reason in general, mostly without precisely determining what meaning it is taken to have. E.g. Wolff, in *Ontology* § 70, a proof which Baumgarten repeats in his *Metaphysics* § 20. It would also be superfluous to repeat it and to refute it here, since it is obvious that

[a] *Briefen über die Lehre des Spinoza* [*Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn.* (1785, 1789)]
[b] *Spiel mit Phrasen* [c] *Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie*
[d] *Jahrbücher der Medicin* [*als Wissenschaft*] [Tübingen: J.G. Cotta, 1806]
[e] *leichtfertiges In-den-Tag-hinein-Schwätzen*

it rests on word-play. Platner in *Aphorisms* § 828, Jakob in his *Logic and Metaphysics* (p. 38, 1794)[a] have attempted other proofs in which it is very easy to recognize their circularity.[b] Kant's proof, as has already been said, will be discussed later. Since through this treatise I hope to point out the different laws of our cognitive faculty, the common expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason, it will follow as a matter of course that the general principle is not to be proved; rather, what Aristotle said applies to all of these proofs (with the exception of the Kantian, as one which is directed not to its validity, but rather to the *a priority* of the law of causality[34]): 'they seek a reason for that which has no reason; for the starting point of demonstration is not a demonstration', *Metaphysics* III, 6[c] – compare *Posterior Analytics* I, 3.[d,35] For every proof is a reduction of the doubtful to that which is acknowledged, and if we also always require a proof of the latter, whatever it be, then we will ultimately arrive at propositions that are certain,[e] that express forms and laws, and so, the conditions of all thinking and knowing. Hence all thinking and knowing consist in the application of these propositions, so that certainty is nothing more than an agreement with them, and, consequently, their own certainty cannot be ascertained in turn from other propositions. In the 5th chapter we will discuss the nature[f] of the truth of such propositions.

Besides, to seek a proof for the principle of reason in particular is a special kind of wrongheadedness which indicates a lack of soundness.[g] For every proof is a demonstration of the ground for an expressed judgement,
24 which in exactly this way obtains the predicate *true*. The principle of reason expresses exactly this requirement for a ground for any judgement. Now whoever requires a proof, i.e., the demonstration of a ground for it, in doing so presupposes it as already true, indeed, supports his requirement on exactly this presupposition. Thus he falls into this circle: he requires a proof for the right to require a proof.[36]

[a] [Ernst Platner *Philosophische Aphorismen* (*Philosophical Aphorisms*), 1776–82; Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, perhaps *Grundriß der allgemeinen Logik* (*Outline of General Logic*), 1788, as Hübscher indicates in *HN* 5, 76, entry 276]

[b] *Cirkel*

[c] λόγον ζητοῦσι ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος· ἀποδείξεως γὰρ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι (*rationem eorum quaerunt, quorum non est ratio: demonstrationis enim principium non est demonstratio*) [*Metaphysics* 1011a12]

[d] [72b 20] [e] *gewisse Sätze* [f] *Art* [g] *Besonnenheit*

Inadequacy of previous accounts[a] *and sketch of a new one*

§ 15

CASES THAT ARE NOT INCLUDED AMONG THE PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED MEANINGS OF THE PRINCIPLE

From the summary given in the previous chapter, it follows as a general result that two applications of the principle of sufficient reason have been distinguished, although at first gradually and surprisingly late, and not without frequent encounters anew with confusions and mistakes. The one application is to judgements that, in order to be true, always must have a reason,[b] and the other is to alterations of real objects that always must have a cause.[c] We see that in both cases the principle of sufficient reason justifies the question *why*, and this property is essential to it. But are all cases in which we are justified in asking why included under these two relations? Suppose I ask, why are the three sides of this triangle equal? Then the answer is: because the angles are equal. Now is the equality of the angles the cause of the equality of the sides? No, since here the question is not of alteration and, thus, not of an effect that must have a cause. – Is it mere cognitive ground? No, since the equality of the angles is not mere proof of the equality of the sides, not mere ground of a judgement; indeed, from mere concepts it is never to be understood that because the angles are equal, the sides too must be equal, since the concept of the 26
equality of the angles does not contain that of the equality of the sides. Thus here there is no connection between concepts or judgements, but between sides and angles. The equality of the angles is not *immediately* the ground for the *cognition* of the equality of the sides, but only *mediately*, in that it is the ground of something's *being so*[d] – here of the sides' being equal; thus, the angles being equal, the sides must be equal. Here there is a

[a] *Darstellung* [b] *Grund* [c] *Ursache* [d] *So-seyns*

necessary connection between the angles and the sides, not immediately a necessary connection of two judgements. – Or again, when I ask why, indeed, 'that which is not done, can be done', but 'that which is done' never 'can be undone'[a] (hence, why actually the past is absolutely irrevocable, the future inexorable), so this too cannot be demonstrated purely logically by means of mere concepts. And it is not just a matter of causality, since this governs only *events* in time, never time itself. It is not through causality, but rather immediately, as through its mere existence, that the present hour, commencing inexorably, has tossed the passing hour into the bottomless abyss of the past and made it eternally nothing. This cannot be understood through mere concepts, nor clarified through them; rather, we recognize it quite immediately and intuitively,[b] just as we recognize the distinction between right and left and all that depends on this, e.g., that the left glove does not fit the right hand.[37]

Thus, since not all cases in which the principle of sufficient reason finds application can be reduced to logical ground and consequent and to cause and effect, so in this classification the law of specification must not have been satisfied. However, the law of homogeneity requires us to assume that those cases cannot differ infinitely, but must be reducible to certain species. Now before I attempt this classification, it is necessary to determine what in all cases is specific to the principle of sufficient reason as its special character, because the concept of the genus must be determined before the concept of the species.[38]

27

§ 16

THE ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON[39]

Our cognizing consciousness, appearing as outer and inner sensibility[c] *(receptivity), as understanding*[d] *and reason,*[e] *divides into subject and object and comprises nothing else. To be object for the subject and to be our representation are the same. All of our representations are objects for the subject, and all objects for the subject are our representations. Now, however, it occurs that all of our representations stand to one another in a connection that is governed by laws*[f] *and of a form determinable* a priori*, by means of which connection nothing existing of itself and independently, likewise nothing existing in isolation and apart, can be an object for us.* It is this connection that the

[a] *infecta facta . . . facta infecta fieri possunt* [Plautus *Aulularia* IV, 10, 15]
[b] *intuitiv* [c] *Sinnlichkeit* [d] *Verstand* [e] *Vernunft* [f] *gesetzmäßigen*

principle of sufficient reason expresses in its generality.[a] Now although (as we can already infer from the previous discussion) this connection assumes different forms according to the different kinds of objects, and the principle of reason in turn modifies its expression to indicate these forms, yet the connection always retains something common to all the forms, which our principle, conceived generally and abstractly, expresses. Therefore, it is these relations that lie at the basis of the principle (and which are to be more closely demonstrated in what follows) that I have called the root of the principle of sufficient reason. Now upon closer observation we see that in accordance with the laws of homogeneity and specification, these relations separate into definite species, quite different from one another, whose number can be reduced to *four* since the number agrees with the *four classes* into which everything is divided that can become an object for us, thus all of our representations. These classes will be advanced and discussed in the next four chapters.

In each of them we will see the principle of sufficient reason appear in a different form, yet we will see it everywhere show itself, by its admitting the expression given above, to be the same principle and as having sprung from the root presented here.[40]

[a] *Allgemeinheit*

On the first class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing in it

§ 17

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THIS CLASS OF OBJECTS

The first class of possible objects of our faculty of representation is that of *intuitive*, *complete*, *empirical* representations. They are *intuitive* in contrast to those which are merely thought, that is, to abstract concepts; *complete* insofar as, following Kant's distinction, they contain not merely what is formal, but also what is material in appearances; *empirical*, partly insofar as they proceed not merely from connection of thought, but have their origin in an excitation[a] of sensation[b] in our sensitive[c] body to which they constantly refer as evidence of their reality, partly because in accordance with the laws of space, time, and causality in union, they are connected in that complex, without beginning or end, that constitutes our *empirical reality*. However, since, according to the result of the Kantian teaching, this empirical reality does not annul[d] its *transcendental ideality*, they are considered merely as representations here where the concern is the formal elements of cognition.[41]

§ 18 29

OUTLINE OF A TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL REALITY[42]

The forms of these representations are those of the inner and outer senses, *time* and *space*. But only as *filled* are they *perceivable*.[e] Their *perceptibility* is *matter*, to which I will return later, in § 21.[43]

If time were the only form of these representations, then there would be no *simultaneity*[f] and therefore nothing *persistent*[g] and no *duration*.[h] For

[a] *Anregung* [b] *Empfindung* [c] *sensitiven* [d] *aufhebt* [e] *wahrnehmbar*
[f] *Zugleichseyn* [g] *Beharrliches* [h] *Dauer*

time is perceived[44] only insofar as it is filled, and its course is perceived only through the *change*[a] in that which fills it. Therefore the *persistence* of an object is recognized only through contrast with the *change* of other objects that are *simultaneous*. But the representation of *simultaneity* is not possible in mere time; rather, it depends for its other half on the representation of *space* because in mere time everything is *one after another*,[b] but in space, *side by side*:[c] thus this representation of simultaneity first arises through the unity of time and space.[45]

If, in contrast, space were the only form of representation of this class, then there would be no *change*,[46] since change or alteration is *succession*[d] of states, and *succession* is possible only through time. Therefore, time can also be defined as the possibility of opposite determinations of the same thing.

Thus we see that the two forms of empirical representations, although they have in common infinite divisibility and infinite extension, as is well known, still are fundamentally different, so that what is essential in the *one* in the *other* has absolutely no meaning: alongside one another has no meaning in time, after one another has none in space. However, empirical representations belonging to the law-governed complex of reality appear in both forms simultaneously, and an *intimate unity* of both is even the condition of reality, which, as it were, proceeds from them as a product proceeds from its factors.[47] What creates this *union* is the understanding, which, by means of its special function, combines those heterogenous
30 forms of sensibility so that from their mutual interpenetration (although just for the understanding itself) *empirical reality* arises as a totality of representations,[e] constructing a complex held together by the forms of the principle of reason, although with problematic limits. All of the individual representations which belong to this class are a part of this complete representation, and since they are determined in this class according to the laws we know *a priori*, they assume their places in this complex, in which, therefore, countless objects exist *simultaneously* because in it, despite the ceaselessness of time, substance, i.e., matter, persists, and despite the rigid immutability of space, matter's conditions change. Thus, in brief, in this complex this entire, objective, real world exists for us. In *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, § 4 (or first edn. pp. 12ff.), the reader interested in an exposition of the analysis of empirical reality (given here only in outline) will find a closer discussion of the way to make that unity, and through it the world of experience, occur through the function of the understanding.

[a] *Wechsel* [b] *nach einander* [c] *neben einander* [d] *Succession* [e] *Gesammtvorstellung*

The 4th chapter of the 2nd volume, and attentive consideration of the table of 'Praedicabilia *a priori* of time, of space, and of matter' is also recommended and will be essential assistance, for it makes especially clear how the counterparts of space and time balance themselves out in matter as their product, presenting themselves in the form of causality.

The function of the understanding which constitutes the basis of empirical reality should immediately be explained in detail; only beforehand the most immediate objections must be set aside through a few accompanying explanations which the basic idealistic view adhered to here could encounter.[48]

§ 19

IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF REPRESENTATIONS[49]

Now, however, even though the understanding unifies the forms of the inner and outer sense for the representation of matter and thus that of a persisting external world,[50] the subject *immediately* cognizes only through the *inner sense*, while the outer sense is the object of the inner, and the inner 31
sense in turn perceives the perceptions of the outer. Thus, with regard to the *immediate presence* of representations in its consciousness, the subject remains subordinate[a] to the conditions of *time* alone as the form of the *inner sense.*[*] So only *one* clear representation can be present to the subject at one time, although this representation can be very complicated. That representations are *immediately present* means: they are not only the unification of time and space, which the understanding (an intuitive[b] faculty, as we shall soon see) puts forth for the total representation[c] of empirical reality, but they become cognized as representations of the inner sense only in time and, indeed, at the neutral point between the two divergent directions of time, which is called the *present*. The condition, touched upon in the preceding sections, for the immediate presence of a representation of this class is its causal influence on our senses, hence on our body, which itself belongs to objects of this class, and thus is subjected to the law of causality governing in it, as is to be discussed shortly. Since for this reason, following the laws of the inner as well as the outer world, the subject cannot remain with any *one* representation, then, there is no

[*] Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, [The Transcendental] Doctrine of Elements, Sect. II, 'Conclusions from these concepts', b and c; p. 33 in the first edition; p. 49 in the fifth [A33/B49]

[a] *unterworfen* [b] *intuitives* [c] *Gesammtvorstellung*

simultaneity in mere time; thus, any representation will always disappear, driven out in turn by another, following an order not determinable *a priori*, but depending on circumstances soon to be mentioned. Moreover, that fantasy[a] and dreams reproduce the immediate presence of representations is a well-known fact, the discussion of which, however, does not belong here, but in empirical psychology. Despite the ephemerality and the isolated nature[b] of representations with respect to their immediate presence in the consciousness of the subject, the subject nonetheless has the representation of an all-comprehensive complex of reality, as I have described above, because of the function of the understanding. And so with respect to this opposition, representations have been taken for something completely different insofar as they belong to this complex[51] from the way
32 they are taken insofar as they are immediately present to consciousness. In the former capacity they are called *real things*, but only in the latter are they called representations *par excellence*.[c] This view of the matter, which is common, is called *realism*, as is well known. With the appearance of modern philosophy *idealism* has set itself in opposition to it and has increasingly won the day. First advocated by Malebranche and Berkeley, it was raised to a higher power by Kant, to transcendental idealism, which made conceivable the coexistence of the empirical reality of things with their transcendental ideality, and accordingly, Kant says this, among other things, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: 'I understand by transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that we are to regard them altogether as mere representations and not as things in themselves.' And again in the remark: 'space itself is nothing other than representation; consequently, only what is contained in space must be contained in the representation, and there is even nothing in space except that which is actually represented in it.' ('Critique of the 4th Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology', pp. 369 and 375 of the first edn.[d]) Finally in the 'Observation' appended to the same chapter, he says: 'if I were to remove the thinking subject, the whole physical world falls away, as this is nothing other than appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a type of its representations.'[e] In India, in Brahmanism as well as in Buddhism, idealism is even the doctrine of folk religion; only in Europe is it paradoxical, as a result of the essentially and inevitably realistic fundamental view of Judaism. But realism overlooks[52] the fact that the so-called being of these real things *is absolutely nothing else than their being represented*;[f] or, if one insists in calling only that which is

[a] *Phantasie* [b] *Vereinzelung* [c] κατ' ἐξοχήν [d] [A369 and A375]
[e] [A383] [f] *Vorgestelltwerden*

in the immediate present of the subject's consciousness an actual[a] representation, then it is just an ability to be represented potentially.[b] Realism overlooks the fact that the object no longer remains object apart from its reference[c] to the subject, and that, if one takes this away or abstracts from it, all objective existence is also immediately nullified.[53] *Leibniz*, who indeed felt the object's being conditioned by the subject, and who was nonetheless unable to free himself from the thought of objects existing in themselves[d] independent of their reference to the subject, i.e., of their *being represented*, 33
first assumed a world quite identical to and running parallel to the world of representation, a world which, however, was not directly bound with the other, but only externally, by means of a pre-established harmony[e] – apparently the most superfluous thing in the world since it itself never occurs in perception, and it takes its own path apart from the quite identical world of representation. But then again, when he wanted more closely to determine the essence of things objectively existing in and of themselves, he came upon the necessity of explaining the objects in themselves as subjects (monads[f]), and in this way he gave the most eloquent proof that our consciousness (insofar as it is something which merely cognizes, and is thus within the limits of the intellect, i.e., the apparatus for the representing the world) can find nothing beyond the subject and object, that which represents and the representation;[54] and thus, if we have abstracted from the objective existence of an object[g] (from its being represented), i.e., if we have nullified it as such, and we still want to posit something, we will meet up with absolutely nothing other than *the subject.* But conversely, if we want to abstract from the subjective existence of the subject[h] and still have something left over, the converse case occurs, which develops into *materialism*.

Spinoza, who never came to understand the matter and, therefore, did not arrive at clear conceptions, had nevertheless understood[55] very well the necessary relation between object and subject which is so essential to them that it is the very condition of their conceivability, and therefore he had depicted them as an identity in the single existing substance between that which knows and that which is extended.[56]

Note: Given the opportunity of the principal discussion of this section, I note that, if in the course of this treatise, in order to be brief and easily understood, I make use of the expression *real objects*, nothing is to be understood by this other

[a] κατ' ἐντελέχειαν [b] κατὰ δύναμιν [c] *Beziehung*
[d] *eines Seyns an sich der Objekte* [e] *harmonia praestabilita* [f] *monades*
[g] *Objectseyn . . . eines Objects* [h] *Subjektseyn . . . des Subjekts*

than just connected, intuitive representations creating the complex of empirical reality that, in itself, always remains ideal.[57]

34 § 20

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON OF BECOMING[58]

In the present class of objects for the subject, the principle of sufficient reason appears as[59] *the law of causality*, and as such I call it the *principle of sufficient reason of becoming*, *principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*. All objects that present themselves in the totality of representations that constitutes the complex of empirical reality[a] are, as regards the appearance and disappearance of their states, interconnected through this principle and thus in the direction of the course of time.[60] This principle is as follows. If a new state of one or more real objects appears, then there must be another, previous state from which the new one follows according to a rule,[b] i.e., as often as the first exists, every time. Such a sequence is called a *consequence*,[c] the first state a *cause*, the second an *effect*. E.g.: if a body ignites, then this state of burning must be preceded by 1) a state of affinity to oxygen, 2) a state of contact with oxygen, 3) a state of a certain temperature. For the ignition must follow immediately, as soon as the first state was at hand, but this ignition has occurred just now, so the first state could not always have been present; rather, it must have appeared just now. This appearance is called an *alteration*. Therefore, the law of causality stands in exclusive relation to *alterations* and always affects only these. With its appearance, every effect is an *alteration*, and just because it did not appear earlier, it provides unerring proof of another *alteration* preceding it, which, in relation to it, is called *cause*; but this last, in relation to a third *alteration* that again necessarily precedes it, is called *effect*. This is the chain of causality; it is necessarily without beginning. Accordingly, any state that occurs has followed from a preceding alteration: e.g. as in our example above when free heat is applied to a body from which an increase of temperature had to follow, this application of heat is again occasioned
35 by a preceding alteration, e.g., the sun's rays falling on a burning lens, this perhaps by a cloud's moving away from the direction of the sun, this by wind, this by uneven density of air, this by other states, and so on to infinity.[d] When all determining factors,[e] except *one*, obtain for the

[a] *erfahrungsmäßigen Realität* [b] *regelmäßig* [c] *Erfolgen*
[d] *in infinitum* [e] *Bestimmungen*

occurrence of a new state, this *one* – if it appears just now, that is, last – will be called cause *par excellence*.[a] Indeed, this is correct insofar as by that is meant the final alteration, the one which is certainly decisive. Except that it is the last to appear, one determining factor of the causal state has no advantage over any others in identifying the causal connections of things in general. In the example just mentioned, the cloud's moving away is indeed to be called the cause of the ignition insofar as it occurs later than the burning lens being directed at the object; however, this could have occurred later than the cloud's moving away, and the addition of oxygen could have occurred even later than this: in that respect, such chance determinations of time[b] have decided which is the cause. On the contrary, if we consider more accurately, we find that the *entire state* is the cause of what results, and it is essentially indifferent in which order in time[c] its determining factors have come together. Consequently with regard to a given, individual case, the determining factor of a state which occurs last may be called the cause *par excellence*[d] because it completes the number of necessary[e] conditions; that is, its occurrence is the decisive alteration. However, for universal[f] considerations, only the *entire* state leading to the occurrence of the state following it can be considered the cause. But the various, individual determining factors, which, taken together, just complete and comprise the cause, can be called the causal moments[g] or even the *conditions*, and thus the cause can be divided into these. In contrast, it is completely false for the objects, but not the state, to be called the cause: e.g. in the case just mentioned some would call the burning lens the cause of the ignition, others the cloud, others the sun, others oxygen, arbitrarily, according to their preference. But there is absolutely no sense in saying that an object is the cause of another, first of all because objects contain not merely form and quality, but also *matter*, but this neither arises nor 36
perishes; and because the law of causality refers exclusively to *alterations*, i.e., to the appearance and disappearance of states in time, as this law regulates the very relation in regard to which the earlier is called *cause*, the later *effect*, and their necessary connection *consequence.*

I refer the reflective reader here to the explanation that I have provided in *The World as Will and Representation* Vol. 2, chap. 4, especially pp. 42ff.[h] For it is of the greatest importance that there be completely distinct and firm concepts of the true and actual meaning of the causal law as well as the range of its application, and above all, that it be clearly recognized that the

[a] κατ' ἐξοχήν [b] *zufällige Zeitbestimmungen* [c] *Zeitfolge* [d] κατ' ἐξοχήν
[e] *erforderlichen* [f] *allgemeine* [g] *Momente* [h] [Hübscher *SW* 3, 46ff.]

causal law solely and exclusively refers to *alterations* of material states and to absolutely nothing else; consequently, this law should not be introduced where *these* are not under consideration. It is the regulator of *alterations* of objects of outer *experience* appearing in time, but these are altogether material. Any alteration can only occur when another, determined according to a rule, has preceded it, but through which, then, it occurs as necessarily brought about: this necessity is the causal nexus.

Yet as simple as the law of causality is, from the most ancient times to the most recent we find it expressed quite differently as a rule in manuals on philosophy, that is, conceived more abstractly, and thus more broadly and indeterminately. In these, for instance, a cause is called that through which something else is brought into existence or something else is produced, made actual, etc.; as Wolff says 'a cause is a principle on which the existence or actuality of another entity depends'.[a] Now causality obviously concerns only alterations of forms of uncreated, indestructible matter; whereas, an actual origination,[b] a coming-into-being,[c] of that which previously had not been, is an impossibility. For the most part we may blame such traditional, overly broad, distorted, and false conceptions of causal relation on unclarity
37 of thought, but certainly along with this, there also lurks intent – specifically theological intent – already ogling the cosmological proof from a distance, ready to serve this proof, ready even to falsify transcendental, *a priori* truths (the mother's milk of human understanding). This is seen most clearly in Thomas Brown's *On the Relation of Cause and Effect*, a book numbering 460 pages, which in 1835 had already gone through its fourth edition, and since then probably many more, and which, despite his tedious, rambling, academic prolixity, does not treat his subject badly. Now this Englishman has quite correctly recognized that the law of causality always concerns *alterations*, and that any effect is an *alteration*. However, that any cause is likewise an *alteration,* from which it follows that the whole affair is merely an uninterrupted nexus of *alterations* succeeding one another in time – this he will not admit, although it cannot possibly have escaped his notice. Rather, he always most awkwardly calls the cause an *object*, or even a substance, that *precedes* the alteration, and with this utterly false expression, which generally spoils his explanations, throughout his whole, lengthy book he twists and tortures himself pitifully, against his better knowledge and *conscience*, simply and solely so that his presentation does not stand in the way of the cosmological proof that is somewhat tangential

[a] *causa est principium, a quo existentia, sive actualitas, entis alterius dependet* [*Ontologia*, Section 881]
[b] *Entstehn* [c] *Ins-Daseyn-treten*

and will someday be advanced elsewhere by others. – Indeed, what must be the state of such a truth, for which the way is paved from a distance through such trickery?

But then what, for their part, have our good, honest, German professors of philosophy, who value spirit[a] and truth above all, done for the precious cosmological proof, especially after *Kant*, in the critique of reason,[b] dealt it a deadly wound? Of course, the good advice there was costly (and they know it, these worthies, even if they will not admit it), since *first cause*[c] is just the same as *cause of itself*,[d] a contradiction in terms,[e] although the former expression is used more frequently than the latter and is pronounced with a quite serious, even solemn demeanour; indeed, many, especially English Reverends, devoutly roll their eyes upward when with emphasis and feeling they utter 'the first cause'[f] – that contradiction in terms. They know it: 38
a first cause is just as inconceivable as is a point at which space has an end or a moment when time takes its beginning. For every cause is an *alteration*, and one must necessarily ask about the alteration preceding it, by which *it* was brought about, and so on *in infinitum, in infinitum*! It is inconceivable that there ever was a first state of matter, from which, while it had not always been, everything following it would have proceeded. For, had this state in itself been their cause, then they would have had to exist always, so that the state which now exists does not first exist now. But if at a specific time it first began to be causal, then at that time something must have *altered* it, whereby it ceased to rest; but then something has come about, an alteration has occurred, about the cause of which – i.e. about an alteration preceding *it* – we must immediately ask, and we are again on the ladder of causes and are whipped on higher and higher by the inexorable law of causality – *in infinitum, in infinitum*. (Will these gentlemen still not be ashamed to speak to me of an origin of matter out of nothing? Corollaries await below to attend to them.) Thus the law of causality is not so obliging as to allow itself to be used like a hackney cab, which one can send off after one reaches one's destination. It is much more like the broom brought to life by Goethe's sorcerer's apprentice, which once set in motion will not stop running and drawing water so that only the old wizard himself is able to put a stop to it. But these gentlemen, one and all, are no wizards. So what have they done, these noble and righteous friends of truth, these, who at all times wait for the meritorious in their subject in order to proclaim it to the world as soon as it shows itself; these

[a] *Geist* [b] *Vernunftkritik* [c] *causa prima* [d] *causa sui*
[e] *contradictio in adjecto* [f] ['Reverends' and 'the first cause' are Schopenhauer's English]

who, when someone comes who really is what they only pretend to be, far from wanting to suppress his works through clever silence and cowardly secreting, will rather be the immediate heralds of his merit – certainly, as certainly, as is well known, as folly loves understanding above all. So what have they done for their old friend, the hard-pressed cosmological proof,
39 already lying half dead? – Oh, they have devised a fine trick: 'Friend', they have said to it, 'things go badly for you, very badly, since your fatal encounter[a] with the stubborn old mule of Königsberg, as badly – as with your brothers, the ontological and the physico-theological proofs. But have faith, *we* will not abandon you because of this (we are paid for this, you know). However – there is nothing else to do – you must change your name and clothing, for if we call you by your name, everyone runs from us. But if, as you are incognito, we take you by the arm and once again introduce you into society – but only, as we said, incognito – then everything will be fine! So first, from now on your object takes the name of "the absolute"; that has a foreign, decorous and noble ring – and we know best how much can be accomplished among the Germans by putting on an air of nobility. Everyone understands what is meant and imagines himself all the wiser. But you yourself enter disguised in the form of an enthymeme. That is, leave right at home all your prosyllogisms and premises, which you use to drag us up the long climax; everyone knows that they amount to nothing. But as a man of few words, appearing proud, bold, and noble, you will reach your goal with a single bound: "the absolute", you exclaim (as do we, too), "then, by the devil, *that* must *be*; otherwise there would indeed be nothing"! (with this, you pound on the table). But where would it be? "Stupid question! Have I not said it was the absolute"? – That will do, upon our word, that will do! Germans are accustomed to accept words instead of ideas:[b] from childhood on we train them for it – only look at Hegelry: what is it other than empty, hollow, disgusting verbiage? And yet, how brilliant was the career of this philosophical ministerial creature! Nothing more was required for this than a few venal associates to intone the fame of the bad, and their voice found an echo which even now reverberates and spreads in the numb skulls of a thousand stooges: see how quickly out of a common mind, indeed out of a common charlatan is made a great philosopher. Thus, take heart! Moreover, friend and patron, we second[c] you in yet another way: we could not even live without you! – Has the carping old critic of Königsberg criticized reason and clipped its wings – good! So
40 we will invent a *new* reason of which no one had heard anything until

[a] *Rencontre* [b] *Begriffe* [c] *sekundiren*

now, a reason that does not think, but immediately *intuits*,[a] intuits ideas (a superior word, created for mystification) embodied; or even *apprehends*[b] them, immediately apprehends what you and the others first wanted to prove; or – for those who concede little, but are also content with little – has a *presentiment*[c] of it. We pass off popular ideas inculcated early as immediate inspirations of this, our new reason, i.e. actually as inspirations from above. But we denigrate the old, discredited reason, calling it *understanding* and sending it packing. And the true, real understanding? – what in all the world does true, real understanding have to do with us? – You smile incredulously. But we know our public and the *harum horum*, which we have before us on the benches. Bacon of Verulam already said 'at the universities, young people learn to believe'.[d] There they can learn from us something righteous! We have some good advice on the articles of faith. – If despair overcomes you, always remember that we are in Germany where we have been able to do what would have been possible nowhere else: namely to proclaim as a great mind and profound thinker a mindless, ignorant, nonsense-spreading philosophaster who, through unprecedented, hollow verbiage, thoroughly and permanently disorganizes their brains. I mean our dear Hegel. And we have been able to do so not only with impunity and even without being mocked – but truly, they believe it, they have believed it for thirty years, up to the present day! – Thus, despite Kant and his critique, if, with your assistance, we have the absolute, we are safe. – Then we will philosophize from top down, from this absolute, by means of deductions of the most diverse kinds, only similar to one another through their agonizing tediousness, producing the world, and calling the latter the finite as well as the former the infinite – which again provides a pleasurable variation of verbosity – and we will always only speak in general about God, explaining how, why, wherefor, and for what reason, through which voluntary or involuntary process, he made the world or gave birth to it; whether he is outside it; whether he is in it, etc.; as if philosophy were theology and sought not enlightenment about the world, but about God.'

Thus the cosmological proof, which this apostrophe addressed and which 41
we are concerned with here, actually consists in the assertion that the principle of reason of becoming, or the law of causality, necessarily leads to a thought by which the law itself will be abolished and declared null and void. For one attains the first cause[e] (the absolute) only by ascending

[a] *anschaut* [b] *vernimmt* [c] *ahndet*

[d] [Francis Bacon *de Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum Libri* IX (*Nine Books of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*), 1623 Book VI, chap. 4]

[e] *causa prima*

from consequent to ground, via a series as long as you please. But in this series one cannot stop without annulling the principle of reason.

Now that I have briefly and clearly demonstrated the invalidity of the cosmological proof, as I have that of the ontological proof in the second chapter, perhaps the sympathetic reader will wish to see done what is necessary with the physico-theological, which has more plausibility. Except this is completely out of place, since its subject belongs to a completely different area of philosophy. Thus with regard to the sympathetic reader, I refer him to begin with to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*[a] and expressly[b] to his *Critique of the Power of Judgement*,[c] and to supplement his purely negative method, to my positive one in *On Will in Nature*,[d] that publication slender in size, rich and weighty in content. In contrast, the unsympathetic reader may pass this and all my writings intact to his grandchildren. It concerns me little, since I am not here for one generation, but for many.

As will be proved in the next section, since the law of causality is known to us *a priori* and, thus, is transcendental, valid for every possible experience, hence without exception; and further, since this law establishes that from a definitely given, relatively first state, a second, equally definite state must follow according to a rule, i.e. every time, then the relation of the cause to the effect is a necessary one; accordingly, the law of causality warrants hypothetical judgements and thereby proves itself to be a form of the principle of sufficient reason, on which all hypothetical judgements must be supported and on which all necessity rests, as will be shown later.

I call this form of our principle the principle of sufficient reason of
42 *becoming* because its application at all times presupposes an alteration, the appearance of a new state, thus a becoming. Further, it belongs to its essential character that the cause always precede the effect in time (cf. § 47.), and only through this will it be first recognized which of the two states bound by the causal nexus is cause and which effect. Conversely, there are cases in which the causal nexus is known to us from previous experience, but in which the succession of states follows so rapidly that it escapes our perception. Then, with complete certainty, we conclude from the causality to the succession, e.g., that the ignition of the powder precedes the explosion. On this, I refer the reader to *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 2, chap. 4, p. 41 of the 2nd edition.[e]

[a] [A620/B648–A630/B658] [b] *ex professo* [c] [Ak. 5: 400–410]
[d] [Hübscher *SW* 4, 37ff. and 56ff. See pp. 335ff. and 370ff. below]
[e] [*WWR* 2 (Hübscher *SW* 3), 44ff.]

From this essential connection of causality with succession, it follows again that the concept of *reciprocal action*,[a] taken strictly, is vacuous.[b] For it presupposes that the effect has again been the cause of its cause; thus, that which follows has at the same time been that which precedes. I have fully demonstrated the inadmissibility of this favourite concept in my 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy' appended to my *The World as Will and Representation*, pp. 517–21 of the second edition to which I, therefore, refer the reader.[c] It will be noted that, as a rule, authors make use of this concept when their views begin to become unclear; thus, its use is just as frequent. Indeed, when ideas completely run out for a writer, no word is more ready to suggest itself than *Wechselwirkung*; thus, the reader can even regard the word as a kind of warning shot indicating that the author is in deep trouble. It is useful to note that the word *Wechselwirkung* is found only in German and no other language possesses a customary equivalent to this term.

The law of causality yields two important corollaries, which just because of this, receive their verification as cognitions *a priori*, and, hence, as elevated above all doubt and allowing no exceptions. Specifically these two corollaries are the *law of inertia* and that of the *permanence of substance*. The first means that every state, including a body at rest as well as one in any kind of motion, remains unaltered, undiminished, and unaugmented, 43
and must even persist through endless time, if a cause does not appear that alters or destroys it. – However, from the other, which expresses the imperishability[d] of matter, it follows that the law of causality applies only to the *states* of bodies, thus to their rest, motion, form, and quality, directing the arising and passing of these in time. But it in no way applies to the existence of the *bearer* of these states, to which has been given the name *substance* just to express its exemption from all arising and passing. *Substance persists*; i.e. it can neither arise nor pass away; hence, the amount of substance in the world can neither be increased or diminished. That we know this *a priori* verifies our consciousness of the unshakeable certainty with which anyone who sees a given body disappear, be it through a sleight-of-hand trick, or disintegration, or burning, or evaporation, or whatever process, nevertheless firmly presupposes that whatever might have become of the *form* of the body, the substance, i.e., the *matter* of the body, exists undiminished and could be found somewhere else; and likewise that wherever a body not previously present is found, it must

[a] *Wechselwirkung* [The term has been translated as 'reciprocity of action' or 'interaction']
[b] *nichtig* [c] [*WWR* 1, 487–91 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 544–9)] [d] *Sempiternität*

have been brought there or coalesced out of invisible particles, perhaps through precipitation. However, this is never the case with regard to its substance (matter), for that it could come into existence implies a complete impossibility and is absolutely inconceivable. The certainty with which we assert this in advance (*a priori*) arises from the fact that our understanding completely lacks a form for thinking of the arising or passing away of matter, while the law of causality, which alone is the form under which we are able to think of alterations at all, still always applies to the *states* of bodies, never to the existence of the *bearer* of all states, *matter*. For this reason I assert the principle of the permanence of substance as a corollary of the causal law. Moreover, we could never have attained *a posteriori* the conviction of the permanence of substance, in part because, in most cases, the state of affairs[a] is impossible to verify empirically, in part because all empirical knowledge,[b] gained simply through induction,
44 has always only approximate, hence precarious, but never unconditional certainty. Therefore the certainty of our conviction of this principle is also of a completely different kind and nature from that of the correctness of some *empirically* discovered natural law, in that it has a completely different and fully unshakeable, unwavering firmness. This is so, just because this principle expresses a *transcendental* cognition, i.e., one that determines and fixes prior to all experience any possibility in all experience, but just because of this the world of experience altogether reduces to a mere phenomenon of the brain. Even the most general[c] and most invariable of all the different kinds of natural laws – that of gravitation – is of empirical origin, and hence without guarantee of its universality.[d] For this reason, from time to time it is still challenged, and, likewise, doubts arise as to whether it also applies beyond our solar system. In fact, astronomers do not fail to call attention to indications and corroborations of this uncertainty, discovered on occasion, making it clear that they regard the law of gravity to be merely empirical. Of course, the question can be posed whether gravitation would occur between bodies which were separated by an *absolute* void, or whether within a solar system gravity could perhaps be mediated by an ether, and thus could not operate between fixed stars, which, then, is only to be decided empirically. This proves that here we are not dealing with *a priori* knowledge. If, in contrast, we accept the probability that, according to the Kant–Laplace hypothesis, every solar system was formed out of the gradual condensation of a primaeval nebula, we cannot for a moment think that any primordial stuff[e] would arise out of *nothing*; rather, it is necessary for

[a] *Thatbestand* [b] *Erkenntniß* [c] *allgemeinste* [d] *Allgemeinheit* [e] *Urstoff*

us to presuppose its particles as having previously existed somewhere and having only aggregated, just because the principle of the permanence of substance is a transcendental one. Moreover, *substance* is a mere synonym for *matter* because the concept of substance is only realizable as matter and thus has its derivation[a] in matter. In my 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy', pp. 550ff. of the 2nd edition,[b] I have thoroughly discussed this and especially demonstrated how this concept has been formed merely for an underhanded purpose. This *a priori* certain imperishability of matter 45
(called permanence of substance), like many other equally certain truths, is for professors of philosophy a forbidden fruit; therefore, they slip by it, glancing aside timidly.

The endless chain of causes and effects produces all *alterations*, yet it never extends beyond these, so two things[c] remain untouched. These are, on the one hand, *matter*, because, as has just been shown, matter is the *bearer* of all alterations or it is just that *in which* such alterations take place; and on the other hand, the original *forces of nature*, because these forces are the means *by which* alterations or effects are possible at all – the means by which causes first receive causality, i.e., efficacy,[d] which they thus merely hold in fee.[e] Cause and effect are the *alterations* connected to necessary succession in time. In contrast, the forces of nature, the means by which all causes operate, are exempted from all change;[f] thus, in this sense, they exist beyond all time, but just because of this, they exist always and everywhere, omnipresent and inexhaustible, always ready to manifest themselves as soon as and only when the occasion appears, on the guidance of causality. The cause, like its effect, is always a particular, a particular alteration. In contrast the force of nature is something universal, unalterable, existing at all times and everywhere. E.g. that amber now attracts the thread is the effect; its cause is the preceding friction and present proximity of the amber, and the natural force active in this process, directing it, is electricity. The explanation of the subject is found in a detailed example in *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, § 26, pp. 153ff. of the 2nd edition,[g] where I have indicated how, in a long chain of causes and effects, the most diverse forces of nature successively appear and come into play. Through this explanation, the distinction between cause and force of nature, the fleeting phenomenon and the eternal form of activity, will then be readily understood. And since in that work the entire § 26 is devoted to this

[a] *Ursprung* [b] [*WWR* 1, 518–21 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 580–3)] [c] *Wesen*
[d] *die Fähigkeit zu wirken* [e] *bloß zur Lehn haben*
[f] *Wechsel* [g] [*WWR* 1, 160–1 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 160–1)]

investigation, it suffices here to put the matter briefly. The *norm* that a
46 force of nature follows, with respect to its *appearance* in the chain of causes and effects, and thus the bond connecting it with this, is the *law of nature*. However, the confusion of natural force with cause is as frequent as it is pernicious to clarity of thought. It even appears that before me these concepts have never been purely sorted out, no matter how great is the need. Not only were forces of nature even made into causes when electricity, gravity, etc. were said to be causes, but many even make them into effects by asking about a cause of electricity, of gravity, etc. which is absurd. However, it is something completely different when the number of forces of nature are thereby diminished, in that one is reduced to another, as, in our time, magnetism is reduced to electricity. But every *genuine* (actually original) force of nature, to which every fundamental chemical property[a] belongs, is essentially an occult quality,[b] i.e., no longer capable of physical explanation, but only of a metaphysical one, i.e., one transcending appearance. But no one has taken this confusion, or rather, identification, of a force of nature with a cause, further than *Maine de Biran* in his *Nouvelles considérations des rapports du physique au moral*[c] because this is essential for his philosophy. Besides, it is noteworthy that when he speaks of causes, he almost never puts 'cause' alone, but almost every time says 'cause or force',[d] just as we saw above in § 8 how Spinoza put 'reason or cause'[e] eight times on a single page. So both are conscious of identifying two disparate concepts in order to be able to apply first the one, then the other, depending on the circumstances. And to this end they are compelled always to keep the identification before the reader.

Causality, this director of each and every alteration, now appears in nature in *three* different forms: as *cause* in the narrowest sense, as *stimulus*, and as *motive*. The true and essential distinction among inorganic bodies, plants, and animals depends on precisely this difference, not on external anatomical or chemical characteristics.

Cause in the narrowest sense is that according to which the alterations in the *inorganic* kingdom result; thus, these effects are the theme of mechanics,
47 of physics, and of chemistry. The third Newtonian principle, 'action and reaction[f] are equal to one another', applies only to cause in the narrowest sense: this means that the preceding state (the cause) undergoes an alteration

[a] *chemische Grund-Eigenschaft* [b] *qualitas occulta*
[c] [*New Considerations on the relations of physics and morals;* properly *Nouvelles considérations sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme*, Paris: Ladrange, 1834]
[d] *cause . . . cause ou force* [e] *ratio sive causa* [f] *Wirkung und Gegenwirkung*

which in magnitude equals the alteration (the effect) which that state has brought about. Further it is only with this form of causality that the degree of the effect always corresponds exactly to the degree of the cause so that the one can be calculated from the other and vice-versa.

The second form of causality is *stimulus*: it governs organic life as such, thus that of plants, of the vegetative, or the part of animal life without consciousness, which, in fact, is just a plant life. It is characterized through the absence of the distinguishing marks of the first form. Thus action and reaction are not equal to one another and the intensity of the effect in no way follows, through all degrees, the intensity of the cause. Moreover, through an intensification of the cause, the effect may even be turned into its opposite.

The third form of causality is *motive*: this form of causality directs animal life proper, thus their doings, i.e., the external actions consciously performed by all animal beings. The medium of motives is *cognition*: consequently the receptivity for motives requires an intellect. Therefore the true characteristic of the animal is cognizing, forming representations. The animal moves, as animal, always toward an aim and end; therefore, it must have *cognized* these; i.e. these must have presented themselves to it as something different from itself, but of which it is conscious. From this it follows that the animal is to be defined as 'that which cognizes': no other definition catches what is essential; indeed, perhaps none other holds water. A lack of cognition necessarily implies a lack of movement from motives; then only movement from stimulus remains, that is, plant life; thus, irritability and sensibility are inseparable. But the motive's way of operating is obviously different from that of a stimulus: the influence of a motive can be very brief; indeed, it need only be for a moment. For its effectiveness, unlike that of a stimulus, does not have any sort of relation to its duration, to the proximity of the object, and the like. Rather the motive only needs to be perceived in order to operate, while a stimulus 48
always requires contacts, often even intussusception, but always of a certain duration.

This short statement of the three forms of causality is sufficient here. The detailed presentation is found in my prize essay on freedom (pp. 30–4 of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*).[a] Only one thing is to be emphasized here. The distinction between cause, stimulus, and motive is obviously merely the result of a being's degree of *receptivity*: the greater the receptivity, the more subtle the mode of influence can be.[b] A stone

[a] [*FW*, 52–6 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 29–36)] [b] *desto leichterer Art kann die Einwirkung seyn*

must be shoved; the human being obeys a glance. Both, however, will be moved by a sufficient cause, thus with equal necessity. For motivation is merely causality proceeding by cognition. The intellect is the medium of motives because it is the highest intensification[a] of receptivity. But through this the law of causality loses absolutely nothing of its certainty and rigour. The motive is a cause and operates with the necessity that all causality entails. This necessity is obvious among animals, whose intellect is a simpler one and, thus, only provides cognition of the present. The intellect of the human is doubled: in addition to the intuitive, he also has abstract cognition, which is not bound to the present; i.e. he has reason. Therefore, given clear consciousness, he has an elective decision[b]: namely he can carefully balance mutually exclusive motives as such against one another; i.e. he can let them try their power on his will, and then the stronger will determine him, and his doings will follow with as much necessity as that with which a struck ball rolls. Freedom of will means (not in the verbiage of professors of philosophy,[c] but) '*that two different actions are possible for a given human in a given situation*'. But the complete *absurdity* of this assertion is a truth as certainly and clearly demonstrated as can be any truth outside the realm of pure mathematics. In my 'Prize Essay on the
49 Freedom of the Will', crowned by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences, one can find this truth presented most clearly, methodically, thoroughly, and, moreover, with particular reference to the facts of self-consciousness by which ignorant people come to believe the above-stated absurdity. In essentials, Hobbes, Spinoza, Priestley, Voltaire, even Kant, have taught the same. Now, this certainly does not stop our worthy professors of philosophy from speaking of freedom of will as a completely settled matter, quite unabashedly, as if nothing had happened.* What then, do these gentlemen believe to be the purpose for which the above-mentioned great men came

* 'Whatever one wants to make, for a metaphysical purpose, of a concept of freedom of the will, the appearance of it, human actions, are determined according to universal natural laws just as much as any other natural occurrence.' The beginning of *Idea for a Universal History* [*from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* Ak. 7: 17] –

'All the actions of the human being in appearance are determined by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes according to the order of nature, and if we could thoroughly investigate all the appearances of his power of choice, then there would not be a single human action that we could not predict with certainty and recognize as necessary, given its preceding conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can only consider the human being if we simply observe and, as occurs in anthropology, try to investigate physiologically the moving causes of his actions.' *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 548 of the 1st and p. 577 of the 5th edn [A549–550/B577–578] –

[a] *Steigerung* [b] *Wahlentscheidung* [c] *Philosophieprofessorenwortkram*

to exist by the grace of nature? – so that *they* could live by *philosophy* – right? – But once I had presented the matter more clearly than ever had been done before in my prize essay, and moreover with the approval of a royal society that had also published my essay, then it was certainly the duty of these high-minded gentlemen to oppose such pernicious and erroneous theory and horrible heresy, and to refute it most thoroughly. Indeed, it was their duty all the more, since, in the same volume (*The* 50
Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics) along with the aforementioned essay, in the prize essay 'On the Foundation of Morals', I irrefutably and clearly demonstrated Kant's practical reason with its categorical imperative (which these gentlemen always use under the name 'moral law' as the foundation stone of their shallow moral systems) to be a completely ungrounded and futile assumption, so that a human being possessing the least spark of the power of judgement, if he read it, could no longer believe in this fiction. – 'Well, they would probably have done that' – They would be careful not to get onto slippery ground! – Silence, keeping their traps shut, that is the extent of their talent and their sole means against intellect, understanding, seriousness, and truth. My ethics is not mentioned in any of the products of their useless but prolific scribbling appearing since 1841, although the book is incontestably the most important which has appeared in ethics in the last sixty years. Indeed, so great is their fear of me and my truth that the book has never been announced in any of the literary journals issued by the universities or academies. Hush, hush,[a] so the public does not notice: this is and remains their whole policy. Of course, an instinct for self-preservation may lie at the basis of this clever behaviour. For, must not a philosophy directed by no consideration other than the truth, found among the petty systems composed among a thousand considerations by people qualified by their good disposition, play the role of an iron pot among clay pots? Their pitiful fear before my works is fear before the truth. E.g. this theory of the complete necessity of all acts of will certainly stands as a glaring contradiction of all the assumptions of their favoured spinning-wheel philosophy[b] tailored to suit Judaism. But far from being challenged, this strictly proven truth, as a certain datum and fulcrum, as a

'It may be admitted that if it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a human's way of thinking, as it shows itself both through inner and outer actions, that every, even the least incentive to these actions and all external occasions which affect them, were so known to us, then his future conduct could be predicted as certainly as the appearance of a solar or a lunar eclipse.' *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 230 of the Rosenkranz and p. 177 of the 4th edn [Ak. 5: 99]

[a] *Zitto, zitto* [b] *Rockenphilosophie* [following Günther Zöller]

genuine 'foothold',[a] instead proves the vanity of this whole spinning-wheel philosophy and demonstrates the necessity for another view of the essence of the world and of humans, one fundamentally and incomparably more profoundly conceived – regardless of whether or not such a view can pass examinations by the professors or philosophy.[61]

51

§ 21

APRIORITY OF THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY – INTELLECTUAL BASIS[b] OF EMPIRICAL INTUITION – THE UNDERSTANDING[62]

In the professorial philosophy of philosophy professors it will always be found that intuition of the external world is a matter of the senses, after which follows a long and wide-ranging discourse on each of the five senses. In contrast, nothing is said of the intellectual basis of intuition, namely that intuition is principally the work of the *understanding*, which by means of its unique form of causality and by means of what underlies this, pure sensibility (that is, time and space), the understanding first creates and produces this objective external world from the raw stuff[c] of a few sensations in the sense organs. And indeed, I have already advanced the main points of the subject in the first edition of the present essay from 1813, pp. 53–5[d] and soon thereafter, in 1816, I thoroughly discussed it in my essay *On Vision and Colours*,[e] a presentation for which Prof. Rosas in Vienna has shown his approval by letting it lure him into plagiarism. For the particulars, see *On Will in Nature*, p. 19.[f] In contrast, the professors of philosophy have taken little notice of this, as of other great and important truths which it has been the love and labour of my entire life to explain so that the human race may adopt them – . It is not to their taste; it does not at all suit their purpose; it leads to no theology; indeed, it is not in any way suited to the proper instruction of students for the highest purposes of the state; in short, they want to learn nothing from me, and do not see how very much they could have learned from me – everything that is, that their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren will learn from me. Instead of this, each of them sits down in order to enrich the public with his original thoughts in a long, spun-out metaphysics. If having fingers qualify him for

[a] δός μοι ποῦ στῶ ['give me a foothold': the saying, attributed to Archimedes, continues καὶ κινῶ τὴν γῆν, 'and I will move the earth']
[b] *Intellektualität* [c] *Stoff* [d] [Hübscher *SW* 7, 35–7]
[e] [see pp. 233, 278] [f] [see p. 335]

this, then he is qualified. But truly, *Machiavelli* was correct when he – as Hesiod before him (*Works*, 293) – said, 'there are three sorts of minds: first the sort who, from their own means, acquire insight and understanding of things; then the sort who recognize what is correct when others explain it 52
to them; finally the sort who are capable of neither one nor the other' (*The Prince*, chap. 22).

One must be forsaken by all the gods to believe that the intuitive world out there, filling space in its three dimensions, moving forward in the inexorably strict course of time, governed at each step by the law of causality, without exceptions, but in every detail only following the laws which we can indicate prior to all experience of them – that such a world out there is completely objective-real[a] and would be able to exist without our having anything to do with it, but then through mere sensation[b] enters our head where it now has another existence like the one outside. For what a poor thing is mere sensation, after all! Even in the most refined of sense organs, sensation is nothing more than a local, specific feeling, capable in its own way of some variation, however, in itself always subjective, which as such can contain absolutely nothing objective, and so nothing similar to an intuition. For sensation of any kind is and remains a process within the organism itself, and as such, confined to the region beneath the skin. It can, therefore, in itself, never contain something that lies beyond this skin, something that lies outside of us. Sensation can be pleasant or unpleasant – which proves a reference to our will – but nothing objective lies in sensation. The sensation in the sense organs is one heightened by the confluence of nerve-endings, and because the nerve-endings are diffuse and thinly covered, they are readily excited from the outside; moreover, they are especially open to a particular influence of some sort – light, sound, odour. However, it remains mere sensation, just like everything else in the inside of our bodies, hence, something essentially subjective, the alterations of which reach consciousness immediately, simply in the form of the *inner* sense, thus in time alone, i.e., successively. Only when the *understanding* – a function not simply of one of the delicate nerve-endings, but of the artificially[c] and enigmatically constructed brain (weighing three, and in exceptional cases five pounds) – becomes active and applies its single and only form, the *law of causality*, a powerful transformation occurs, through which subjective sensation becomes objective intuition. For by means of its very 53
own form, and thus *a priori*, i.e., *prior* to all experience (for experience is not possible until then), the understanding apprehends a given bodily

[a] *objectiv-real* [b] *Sinnesempfindung* [c] *künstlich*

sensation as an *effect* (a word which it alone understands), which, as such, must necessarily have a *cause*. At the same time, in order to place any cause *outside* the organism, the understanding takes for assistance the form of the *outer* sense, *space*, which also lies predisposed in the intellect, i.e. in the brain. For through space the outside first arises for the understanding, as the only possibility for the outside is space. Hence, pure intuition *a priori* must furnish the basis of empirical intuition. By this process, as I will soon show more precisely, the understanding takes the assistance of all, even the most minute data of a given sensation in order to construct the *cause* in space in conformity with the data. However, this operation of the understanding is not one which proceeds discursively, reflectively, abstractly[a] – by means of concepts and words – but an intuitive and completely immediate one (as, by the way, is expressly denied by Schelling, in the 1st volume of his *Philosophical Writings*, of 1809, pp. 237–8, likewise by Fries, in his *Critique of Reason*[b] Vol. 1, pp. 52–6 and 290 of the first edition). For through this operation alone, hence in the understanding and for the understanding, the objective, real, physical world presents itself, filling space in three dimensions, and then, according to the same law of causality, further alters in time, and moves in space. – Consequently, the understanding had first to create the objective world itself. It cannot, however, stroll into our head ready-made through the senses and the openings of their organs. That is, the senses provide nothing more than the raw stuff, which, by means of the simple forms of space, time, and causality (as given above), the understanding immediately recasts[c] into the objective apprehension of a physical world governed according to law. Consequently our daily, *empirical intuition* is *an intellectual one* – and it warrants this predicate – which the philosophical windbags in Germany have attributed to an alleged intuition of dream worlds where their beloved absolute is supposed to perform its evolutions. But now I will first more precisely demonstrate the great gulf between sensation and intuition as I explain how raw is the stuff from which this beautiful work proceeds.

54 Actually only two senses serve objective intuition: touch and sight. They alone furnish the data on the basis of which the understanding, through the above-mentioned process, is able to produce the objective world. The other three senses primarily remain subjective since their sensations in fact indicate an external cause, but contain no data for determining its *spatial* relations. Now *space*, however, is the form of all intuition, i.e., of apprehension,[d] in which alone *objects* can actually present themselves.

[a] *in abstracto* [b] [*Neue Kritik der Vernunft* (*New Critique of Reason*), 1807]
[c] *umarbeitet* [d] *Apprehension*

Thus, these three senses can indeed serve to announce to us the presence of an object that we acknowledge by other means, but on the basis of their data there is no spatial construction, and so no objective intuition. We can never construct the rose from the scent, and a blind person can listen to music for his whole life without achieving the least objective representation of the musicians, or the instruments, or the vibrations in the air. In contrast, hearing is of great worth as the medium of speech, making it the sense of *reason*,[a] this name even being derived from hearing, as well as the medium of music, the single way to apprehend complicated numerical relations not merely in the abstract[b] but immediately, that is, concretely.[c] But tone never indicates spatial relations, thus it never leads to the nature[d] of its cause; rather, we remain with tone itself, and so it is not a datum from which the understanding can construct the objective world. These are only sensations of touch and sight; therefore, a blind person without hands and feet could construct for himself *a priori* space in all its regularity,[e] but could achieve only a very obscure representation of the objective world. However, for all that, what touch and sight produce is still by no means intuition, but the raw stuff for intuition: in the sensations of these senses there is so little intuition that these sensations have absolutely no similarity to the properties of the things that present themselves to us by means of them, as I will soon show. Only what actually belongs to sensation must be clearly separated here from what has been added to the intuition by the intellect. At first this is difficult, because we are so accustomed to passing 55
immediately from the sensation to its cause, that this cause presents itself to us without our noticing in and for itself the sensation, which provides here, as it were, the premises for that conclusion of the understanding.

So to begin with, touch and sight have their own particular advantages, and thus, they are mutually supportive. Sight requires no contact, indeed, not even proximity: its immeasurable field extends to the stars. After all, it senses the finest nuances of light, of shadows, of colour, of transparency. It thus provides the understanding a great deal of finely determined data from which, after long practice, it constructs and immediately presents intuitions of the shape, size, distance, and nature of bodies. In contrast, touch is indeed restricted to contact, but provides such unerring and varied data that it is the most basic sense. Ultimately the perceptions of sight refer to touch; indeed, vision is to be considered an imperfect, but extensive touch that makes use of light rays as long feelers. Hence, vision

[a] *Vernunft* [connected with the verb *vernehmen,* 'to apprehend', esp. by hearing: cf. *BM* 149 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 147–8)]
[b] *in abstracto* [c] *in concreto* [d] *Beschaffenheit* [e] *Gesetzmaßigkeit*

is quite certainly exposed to many deceptions, as it is completely confined to properties mediated by light. Vision is one-sided, while touch provides the data for cognition of size, shape, hardness, softness, dryness, moisture, smoothness, and temperature, etc., and in this is partly aided by the shape and movement of arms, hands, and fingers, from the position of which the understanding takes away the data for spatial construction of bodies, and partly aided by muscle power, by means of which it recognizes weight, solidity, toughness or brittleness – all with minimal possibility for deception.

For all of this, these data provide absolutely no intuition; rather this remains the work of the understanding. If I press my hand against the table, then in the sensation that I receive from this lies absolutely nothing of the representation of the firm cohesion of the parts of this mass, indeed nothing even similar; rather, it is only when my understanding passes from the sensation to the cause, that it constructs a body that has the properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hardness. If in the dark, I lay my hand
56 on a flat surface, or instead grasp a ball of some three inches in diameter, then in both cases it is the same parts of my hand that sense the pressure: merely from the different position that my hand takes in one or the other case, my understanding constructs the shape of the body, the contact with which body is taken to be the cause of the sensation, and the understanding confirms the shape as I change the points of contact. If someone born blind feels a cubical body, then the sensations of his hand are completely uniform and are the same on all sides and in all directions. Indeed, the edges press a small part of his hand; nonetheless, in this sensation lies absolutely nothing similar to a cube. But his understanding draws an immediate and intuitive conclusion from the felt resistance to its cause, which now, in just this way presents itself as a firm body, and from the movements his arms make as he touches, because the sensation in his hands remains the same, he constructs the cubical shape of the body in space, which is known to him *a priori*. If he did not already have the representation of a cause and of a space, along with its laws, the image of a cube could never emerge from any succession of sensations in his hand. If one were to let a rope run through his closed hand, then, from such a position of his hand, he would construct a long, uniform body, of cylindrical form, moving in one direction as the cause of the abrasion and its duration. However, the representation of movement, i.e., the alteration of location in space, by means of time, could never arise from any mere sensation in his hand, for such a thing cannot lie in the sensation, nor can sensation alone ever produce it. Rather, in order to pass from sensation, given only empirically, to its cause and then to construct

the cause as a moving body of the shape referred to above, his intellect must, prior to all experience, carry within itself the intuitions of space, time, and thereby the possibility of motion, as well as the representation of causality. For, there is a very great disparity between mere sensation in the hand and a representation of causality, materiality, and movement in space mediated through time! Sensation in the hand, even in different points 57
of contact and positions, is something much too uniform and lacking in data to make it possible to construct the representation with its three dimensions as well as the influence of the bodies on one another, including the properties of extension, impenetrability, cohesion, shape, hardness, softness, motion and rest – in short the basis of the objective world. Rather this is only possible in that space as a form of intuition, time as a form of alteration, and the law of causality as a regulator of the appearance of alterations pre-exist[a] in the intellect itself. These ready-made forms, prior to all experience, precisely constitute the intellect. Physiologically, it is a function of the brain, which learns this function from experience no more than the stomach learns to digest or the liver learns to secrete bile. This alone explains why many people born blind achieve such a complete knowledge of spatial relations that to a great extent they make up for their lack of vision and accomplish astonishing achievements, as is this case a hundred years ago with *Saunderson*, who, blind from childhood on, taught mathematics, optics, and astronomy at Cambridge. (Diderot provides a detailed report about Saunderson, *Letter on the Blind*[b].) And in the same way we can explain the opposite case of *Eva Lauk*, who, born without arms and legs, achieved a correct intuition of the external world through vision alone just as quickly as other children. (One can find a report about her in *The World as Will and Representation* Vol. 2, ch. 4.[c]) Thus all this proves that time, space, and causality do not at all come to us from the outside, neither through vision, nor through touch, but have an internal, and thus not an empirical, but an intellectual origin. From this it again follows that intuition of the physical world is in essence an intellectual process, a work of the understanding, for which sensation merely furnishes the occasion and the data to be applied in particular cases.

Now I will demonstrate the same for the sense of sight. What is immediately given here is limited to the sensation of the retina, which admits of great variety, but nonetheless can be reduced to the impression of light

[a] *präformirt*
[b] *Lettre sur les aveugles* [*à l'usage de ceux qui voient* {*for the Use of Those Who See*} (1749)]
[c] [Hübscher *SW* 3, 44]

58 and dark, including their intermediate degrees, and to the impression of colours proper. This impression is thoroughly subjective, i.e., existing only within the organism and under the skin. Thus without the understanding, we would only become conscious of these as particular and various modifications of the sensation in our eyes that would not be similar to the shape, position, proximity or distance of things outside us. For what provides the *sensation* in vision is nothing more than a varied affection[a] of the retina, quite similar to the view of a palette with many bright blobs of colour. Nothing more than this would remain in the consciousness of someone who is standing before an expansive, rich vista and for whom sensation remains unchanged, but for whom understanding is suddenly completely taken away (perhaps through damage to the brain). For this was the raw stuff from which previously his understanding created that intuition.

From such limited stuff as light, dark, and colours, through its very simple function of referring the effect to a cause, with the aid of the intuitive form of space given to it, the understanding can produce the visible world, so inexhaustibly rich in its many forms. Now above all, this depends on the aid provided by sensation. This first consists in the fact that, as a surface, the retina admits of a juxtaposition of impressions; second, that the light always works in straight lines, and that in the eye itself it is refracted rectilinearly; and finally that the retina possesses the capacity to immediately sense the direction from which light impinges on it, which is perhaps explained by the light rays' penetrating to the body of the retina. But the result of this is that the mere impression already indicates the direction of the cause; thus, it directly points to the location of the object which transmits or reflects the light. To be sure, the transition to this object as cause already presupposes the recognition of causal relation as well as the laws of space, but both of these are just the endowment of the *intellect*, which here has to create the intuition from the mere sensation. We will now consider its process more precisely.

The first thing which the intellect does is again to set upright the
59 impression of the object which appears on the retina upside-down. As is well known, this original reversal arises because any point of the visible object transmits its rays in straight lines in all directions. In the narrow aperture of the pupil, the rays coming from the upper end cross with those coming from the lower end, whereby the latter are upper and the former are lower, and, in the same way, those coming from the right cross to the

[a] *Affektion*



Figure 1

left. The refracting apparatus in the eye, lying behind the pupil, that is, the *humor aqueus*, *lens*, and *corpus vitreum*, simply serves to concentrate the light rays passing from the object so as to find room for them on the small space of the retina. Now if vision consisted merely of sensation, then we would perceive the impression of the object reversed because we received it as such; however, in that case, we would also perceive it as something situated in the interior of the eye since we would just remain with the sensation. However, actually, the understanding steps in at once with its causal law, referring the sensed effect to its cause: having received from the sensation the datum about the direction from which the light ray arrived, it thus follows this backwards on both lines to the cause. Therefore, the crossing is now set aright in a reversal whereby the cause presents itself upright, externally, as an object in space, namely in the position from which it emitted the rays, not in the way in which they arrived (see Fig. 1). – The pure intellectual nature of the matter, to the exclusion of all extraneous grounds of explanation, particularly physiological ones, can also be confirmed by the fact that, if one sticks one's head between one's legs, or lies with one's head down a slope, one nevertheless sees things not upside-down, but quite upright, although on that portion of the retina on which usually the lower part of things appear, now the upper appears, and everything is reversed, but not the understanding.

The second thing which the understanding produces in recasting sensation as intuition is that it makes one simple intuition of that which is sensed twice, since each eye receives the impression of the object from a somewhat different direction. The object, however, is still only presented as one, which can only happen in the understanding. The process through 60
which this comes to be is as follows. Our eyes are parallel only when we

look into the distance, i.e., over 200 feet away; otherwise, we direct them both to an object to be observed, making them converge, and the two lines, one drawn from each eye up to the exact, fixed point of the object, form an *angle*, called the *optical angle*. The lines themselves, however, are called *optical axes*. When we view an object lying directly before us, these lines impinge exactly on the middle of each retina, hence, on two *points*, one in each eye, exactly *corresponding* to one another. As that which is always seeking only the *cause* of everything, the understanding immediately recognizes that even though the impression here is doubled, it nevertheless proceeds from only *one* external point, and thus has as its basis *one* cause; accordingly, this cause then presents itself as one and only one object. For everything that we intuit,[a] we intuit as *cause*, a cause of a sensed effect, hence *in the understanding*. Nevertheless, as we perceive[b] with both eyes not merely a single point, but a considerable surface of the object and still perceive only one object, the explanation just given must be carried somewhat further. Whatever lies in the object on one side of the vertex of the optical angle no longer casts its rays exactly in the mid-point of each retina, but just to the side of the retina; however, in both eyes, it casts its rays to the same side, e.g., the left side, of each retina: therefore the points on which these rays impinge, just like the middle points, *correspond to one another symmetrically*, or are *homonymous*[c] *points*. Soon the understanding becomes acquainted with these and accordingly extends the abovementioned rule of its causal apprehension to *them*. Consequently the understanding refers not only the light rays falling on the middle point of each retina, but also the light rays impinging on the remaining points that *correspond to one another symmetrically* in both retinas to one and the same point in the object transmitting such rays, and thus intuits all these points, hence the whole object, only *singularly*. At this point, it should be noted that the outer side of one retina does not correspond at all to the outer side of the other, and the inner side of the one does not correspond to the inner side of the other, but the right side of the right retina corresponds to the right side of the other, etc. Thus the matter is not to be understood in a physiological sense,
61 but in a geometric sense. A number of clear figures illustrating this process and all phenomena connected with it can be found in Robert Smith's *Optics*, and, in part, also in Kästner's German translation of 1755. I have given only *one* figure, Fig. 2, which actually presents a special case to be brought up later; however, this can serve to illustrate everything if one completely ignores point *R*. According to this figure, we always direct both eyes

[a] *anschauen* [b] *auffassen* [c] *gleichnamige*



Figure 2

symmetrically in order to catch the rays emanating from the same points of the object with the points symmetrically corresponding to one another on both retinas. With movement of the eyes sideways, upwards, downwards, and in all directions, the point of the object which previously impinged on the mid-point of the retina, now impinges each time on another point, but always the homonymous point, the point corresponding to that in the other eye. If we review (*perlustare*) the object, we let our eyes glide here and there over it in order to bring each point successively into contact with the centre[a] of the retina, which sees most clearly; thus, we feel the object with our eyes. From this it is clear that single vision with two eyes is basically the

[a] *Centro*

same as touching a body with ten fingers, each of which receives a different impression from another direction; the collective impressions of which, however, the understanding recognizes as proceeding from a single body, the shape and size of which it then apprehends[a] and constructs in space. This is why a blind person can be a sculptor: one such was the famous *Joseph Kleinhanns*, blind since his fifth year, who died in the year 1853 in
62 Tyrol.* For intuition always occurs through the understanding, no matter from which sense it receives the data.

But now, when I touch a ball with crossed fingers, I immediately believe I have felt two balls, because the understanding, tracing back to the cause, constructing the cause according to the laws of space, and presupposing the natural position of the fingers, must attribute to two different balls the two spherical surfaces, which the outside of the middle and index finger touch simultaneously. Now it is just the same for vision: an object will appear doubled to me when my eyes no longer converge symmetrically, no longer close the optical angle on *one* point of the object, but look toward the object from different angles, i.e., when I cross my eyes. For now the rays emanating from *one* point of the object will no longer impinge on the points symmetrically corresponding to one another in the two retinas, which my understanding has become acquainted with through constant experience. Rather the rays impinge on completely different points, which, if the eyes were positioned correspondingly, could only be affected by two different bodies. Thus, I now see *two* objects because intuition occurs only through the understanding and in the understanding. – The same also occurs if the eyes are not crossed. That is, if two objects stand before me at unequal distances, and I stare at the more distant, thus closing the optical angle on it, then the rays emanating from the object standing closer will impinge on both retinas at points not symmetrically corresponding to one another. Thus my understanding will attribute them to two objects; i.e. I will see the object standing closer doubled. (On this see Fig. 2.) In contrast,

* The *Frankfurter Konversationsblatt* of 22 July 1853 reports on him: 'The blind sculptor *Joseph Kleinhanns* died on 10 July in Nauders (Tyrol). Blind since his fifth year as a result of cowpox, the boy played and carved as a pastime. Prugg gave him instruction and figures to copy, and in his twelfth year, the boy finished a life-sized Christ. In the workshop of the sculptor Nißl in Fügen he profited much in a short period of time, and on account of his good abilities and talents, he became a widely known blind sculptor. His various works are quite numerous. His images of Christ alone run almost to four hundred, and in these his mastery is apparent, taking into account his blindness. He also completed other noteworthy pieces, and two months ago a bust of Emperor Franz Joseph, which was shipped to Vienna.'

[a] *apprehendirt*

if I close the optical angle on the latter as I stare at it, then for the same reason, the distant object will appear to me doubled. In order to test this, one may hold something like a pencil only two feet from his eyes and alternately look first on it and then on an object farther in the distance behind it.

But best of all, one can also do the experiment reversed, so that, with 63
two actual objects placed directly and closely before both open eyes, one still sees only *one*. This proves most strikingly that intuition in no way lies in sense impression, but occurs through an act of the understanding. Fasten together two cardboard tubes, about 8 inches long and 1½ inches in diameter, completely parallel, like binoculars, and affix an eight-penny piece before the opening of each tube. Now, putting the other end up to your eyes, look through the tubes. You will perceive only *one* eight-penny piece surrounded by *one* tube. Since both eyes are forced by the tubes into completely parallel positions, the coins will impinge exactly on the centre of the retina of each eye and upon the points surrounding the retina, hence, on the points symmetrically corresponding to one another. Hence, with nearby objects, the understanding usually, indeed, necessarily assumes the points of the optical axes to be converging, so it takes a single object to be the cause of the light streaming back; i.e. we see only one object, for the causal apprehension of the understanding is so immediate.

I do not have the space here to refute each individual attempt at a physiological explanation of single vision. However, the falsity of such explanations proceeds from the following considerations. 1) If the matter relies on an organic connection, the corresponding points in the two retinas, on which single vision demonstrably depends, must be homonymous in the *organic* sense, except, as has already been shown, they are merely so in the *geometrical* sense. For the two inner and the two outer corners of the eyes correspond to one another organically, as does everything else. Whereas, for the purpose of single vision, the right side of the right retina corresponds in the opposite way,[a] to the right side of the left retina, etc. as the phenomena explained above irrefutably elucidate. Precisely because the matter is intellectual, only the most intelligent animals, namely the higher-order mammals, as well as birds of prey, especially owls, etc. have eyes positioned so that the two axes can be directed to the same point. 2) The first of the hypotheses advanced by Newton (*Opticks*, 15th Query), that of the confluence or partial crossing of the optic nerves before they enter 64
the brain, has been proven false because then it would be impossible to see

[a] *umgekehrt*

double by crossing ones eyes. Moreover, Vesalius and Caesalpinus have cited anatomical cases in which there was absolutely no intermingling; indeed, no contact between the nerves took place. Yet the subjects nonetheless had single vision. Finally, against this intermingling of the impression is the following: that if, keeping the right eye tightly closed, one looks at the sun with the left eye, one will see a long-lasting image of the glare only in the left eye, never in the right eye, or vice-versa.

The third means by which the understanding recasts sensation as intuition is by constructing bodies from mere surfaces previously obtained. The understanding thus adds the third dimension as it causally estimates the extension of bodies into that dimension (in space, of which it is conscious *a priori*) according to the type of the bodies' influence[a] on the eye and the gradations of light and shadow. While objects fill space in all three dimensions, they can only affect[b] the eye in two: as a result of the nature of the organ, sensation in vision is merely planimetric, not stereometric. Everything stereometric in intuition is first added by the understanding. Its only data for this are the direction from which the eye receives the impression, the limits[c] of the impression, and the different degrees of light and dark, data which immediately indicate their cause and through which, e.g., we recognize if we have before us a disk or a ball. This operation of the understanding, like the previous one, is also completed so immediately and quickly that we are conscious of nothing but the mere result. Hence perspective drawing is such a difficult problem that it is to be solved only by mathematical principles and must first be learned, even though it produces nothing more than a presentation of the sensation of vision just as such data exist prior to this third operation of the understanding. Thus perspective drawing presents vision in its mere planimetric extension. When one views a drawing, just as when one views reality, the understanding immediately adds the third dimension to the *two* dimensions given in the drawing.
65 Put another way, such perspective drawing is like printing, which anyone can read, but which few can write because our intuitive understanding apprehends the effect only so it can construct the cause out of it, but then immediately disregards the effect completely. Therefore we immediately recognize, e.g., a chair in any possible position, but to draw it in any position is a matter of that art which abstracts from this third operation of the understanding in order to portray only the data of the chair for the viewer to complete. As I said, this is primarily the art of perspective drawing, but then in an all-encompassing sense that of the art of painting. The picture

[a] *Einwirkung* [b] *wirken* [c] *Gränzen*

provides lines drawn in accordance with the rules of perspective, light and dark points in proportion to the effect of light and shadow, and finally patches of colour in quality and intensity learned from experience. The viewer interprets[a] this picture because he assumes the usual causes from similar effects. The art of the painter consists in his knowing with discernment[b] how to retain the data of sensations from vision as they are *prior* to this third operation of the understanding while the rest of us toss them away as soon as we have made the above-mentioned use of them without taking them into memory. We will become even more precisely acquainted with the third operation of the understanding considered here because we will now proceed to a fourth, which, being very closely related, elucidates it.

This fourth operation of the understanding consists in the cognition of the distance of objects from us. This, however, is just the third dimension which we discussed above. Indeed, as has already been said, the sensation in vision provides us with the *direction* in which objects lie, but not their *distance*, and thus not their *location*. Thus the distance must first be brought out by the *understanding*, consequently it results from pure *causal* determinations. Now the *visual angle* is preeminent among those from which the object presents itself; nonetheless, this is completely ambiguous and from it alone nothing can be decided. It is like a word with two meanings: one must first surmise from the context what is meant. For from the same visual angle an object can be small and near or large and distant. Only if we have known its size by other means can we recognize its distance by the visual angle, and conversely, we can know its size when its distance is 66
known to us. Linear perspective depends on the diminution of the visual angle as a result of distance, the principles of which can be readily derived. That is, because our eyesight can reach equally to all sides, we actually see everything like a hollow sphere, in the centre of which the eye stands. Now first this sphere has an endless number of intersecting circles in all directions, and the angles, the size of which are given by the parts of these circles, are the possible visual angles. Second, this sphere becomes larger or smaller depending on whether we assume its radius to be longer or shorter. Therefore we can think of it as consisting of infinitely many concentric and transparent hollow spheres. Since all the radii diverge, these concentric hollow spheres are larger in proportion to the distance they stand from us, and with them the degrees of their intersecting circles increase, and so the true size of the object occupying these degrees also increases. Therefore, these objects are larger or smaller according to whether they occupy the

[a] *liest . . . ab* [b] *mit Besonnenheit*

same part, e.g., 10°, of a larger or smaller hollow sphere. Their visual angle meanwhile is the same in both cases, so that it remains undecided as to whether the object occupies 10° of a sphere of 2 miles or of 10 feet in diameter. Conversely, if the size of this object has been ascertained, then the number of degrees that it occupies will diminish in proportion as the hollow sphere to which we transfer it is more distant and, therefore, larger. Hence all of its limits will contract proportionately. From this, the fundamental rule of all perspective follows. For, since objects and the space between them must diminish in constant proportion to their distance from us, as a result of which all limits contract, the consequence will be that with increasing distance, everything lying above us descends, everything lying below us ascends, and everything lying to the sides contracts. As long as we have before us an uninterrupted sequence[a] of visibly connected objects, we can certainly recognize the distance from this constant convergence of all lines, that is, from linear perspective. However, we could not do this from the mere visual angle alone; rather, the understanding must always use the aid of another datum, which serves as a sort of commentary to the visual angle, since it indicates with certainty the share[b] that
67 distance has in the angle. Of such data there are primarily four types, of which I will give a closer account. By means of these, even when I lack linear perspective, it happens that although a human being who stands 100 feet from me appears 24 times smaller in visual angle than when he stands 2 feet from me, I nonetheless, in most cases, immediately apprehend his size correctly, which yet again proves that intuition is intellectual and not merely sensuous. – A special and interesting proof of the foundation of linear perspective presented here, as well as the intellectual nature of intuition in general, is the following. When, as a result of staring for a long time at a coloured object of definite outline, I still see the physiological coloured spectrum[c] of this object (as when, e.g., a red cross leaves a spectrum of a green cross), then this spectrum will appear to me to be larger as the surface on which I project it is more distant, and smaller as the surface is closer. For the spectrum itself takes up[d] a part of my retina which is definite and which does not change, the point first stimulated by the red cross, and so, because the spectrum was projected, i.e., was apprehended as an

[a] *Folge* [b] *Antheil*

[c] *physiologisches Farbenspektrum* [*Spektrum*, as a borrowing from the Latin, *spectrum*, 'image', might be translated as 'afterimage' when Schopenhauer refers to an image arising or remaining after strong stimulation, even with closed eyes; however, Schopenhauer uses the word both in this sense and in the common sense referring to the image cast by refraction through a prism]

[d] *nimmt . . . ein*

effect of an external object, it thus creates a visual angle of the object, given once and for all, of, let us say, 2°. If (in this case, where all commentary to the visual angle is lacking) I shift this angle to a distant surface, with which I inevitably identify it, as belonging to its effect, then it is 2° of a distant, and therefore much greater sphere, that the cross takes up, hence the cross is large. In contrast, if I cast the afterimage on a nearby object, it then fills 2° of a smaller sphere, and is therefore small. In both cases, the intuition proves to be completely objective, completely equal to that of an external object, and thereby proves the intellectual nature of all objective intuition because indeed it proceeds from a completely subjective ground (the afterimage stimulated in a completely different way). – Concerning this fact (which I have a vivid and detailed memory of having first noticed in the year 1815), there appeared an article in *Comptes rendus* of 2 August 1858, by Mr Séguin who served up the matter as a new discovery and gave all sorts of distorted and silly explanations. At every opportunity, the illustrious colleagues[a] of this gentleman pile experiment upon experiment, the more complicated the better. *Expérience!* is their only solution: but a little 68
correct and genuine reflection on the observed phenomena is seldom to be encountered: *expérience! expérience!* and stuff and nonsense to boot.

Thus, among the above-mentioned subsidiary data,[b] which provide the commentary on the given visual angle, belong first the inner alterations of the eye, by means of which the eye accommodates its optical refractory apparatus to different distances by increasing or diminishing refraction. But now what these physiological alterations consist of has still not been worked out. Sometimes they have been sought in the increase of the convexity of the *cornea*, sometimes that of the *lens*, but the most recent theory (which, however, was already expressed in substance by *Kepler*) is to me the more probable, according to which the lens recedes for distant vision, but moves forward for near, and at the same time with lateral pressure it becomes more convex, and in this case, the process of the mechanism of opera glasses would be completely analogous. One may find this theory set forth thoroughly in A. Hueck's treatise *The Movement of the Crystal Lens*, 1841. In any case we have from this inner alteration of the eye, if not a clear perception, still a certain sensation, and we use this immediately to estimate the distance. However, since these alterations just serve to make completely clear vision possible from some 7 inches up to 16 feet, the aforementioned datum is applicable for the understanding only within this distance.

[a] *illustres confrères* [b] *datis*

However, in addition to this, the second datum is used, that is, the *optical angle* formed by the two optical axes already explained above with regard to simple vision. Obviously the more distant the object, the smaller the angle becomes, and the nearer the object, the larger it becomes. This different adjustment of the eyes to one another is not without a certain, subtle sensation, which, however, comes into consciousness only insofar as the understanding uses it as datum for its intuitive judgement of distance. Moreover, this datum reveals not merely distance, but also exactly the *location* of the object, by means of the parallax of the eyes, which consists in the fact that each eye sees the object in a somewhat different
69 direction, which is why it appears to jerk when one closes one eye. Hence with one eye closed, one will not easily be able to snuff out a lamp because this datum is missing. However, as soon as the object lies 200 feet or more distant, the eyes become parallel and thus the optical angle completely disappears, so this datum applies only within the aforementioned distance.

Beyond this, *atmospheric perspective* aids the understanding by indicating to the understanding greater distance as colours become dull, as physical blue appears before all dark objects (according to Goethe's perfectly true and correct colour theory), and as contours become blurred. Because of the great clarity of the air, this datum is very weak in Italy; hence, there it readily misleads us: e.g. Tivoli appears very close when seen from Frascati. In contrast, in a fog, which is an abnormal enhancement of this datum, all objects appear larger to us because the understanding takes them to be more distant.

Finally, there still remains for us the estimation of distance by means of intervening objects whose sizes are known to us intuitively,[a] such as fields, streams, woods, etc. The estimation is only applicable to an unbroken connection, thus only to terrestrial, not to celestial objects. In general we are more practised at using it in horizontal than in vertical orientation.[b] Thus a ball on a tower 200 feet high appears to us much smaller than when it lies on the ground 200 feet from us because in the latter case we estimate the distance more accurately. Whenever we see people in such a way that whatever lies between them and us remains to a great extent obscured, they appear to us strikingly small.

This last way of estimating applies reliably only to terrestrial objects and in horizontal orientation, and we can partly attribute to it the fact that when we look toward the horizon our intuitive understanding takes everything to

[a] *intuitiv* [b] *perpendikularer Richtung*

be more distant and thus larger than in a vertical orientation – and partly to estimation by atmospheric perspective, to which the same applies. Because of this, it occurs that the moon appears so much larger on the horizon than at its zenith; whereas its visual angle, accurately measured, and thus the image which it casts on the eye, is certainly no greater. For the same reason, 70
too, the firmament presents itself as flattened out, i.e., extended wider horizontally than vertically. Thus both are purely intellectual or cerebral, not optical or sensuous. The objection that, even when at its zenith, the moon is sometimes dimmed and still does not appear larger, is to be refuted by the fact that at the same point the moon does not appear red, because its dimness is caused by a thicker haze, and thus by a means other than atmospheric perspective. This objection is also to be refuted by the fact that, as was said, we apply this estimation only to horizontal and not to vertical orientation, and also at this point other correctives occur. From Mont Blanc, *Saussure* is said to have seen so enormous a rising moon that he did not recognize it and fainted with terror.

In contrast, the action of the telescope and magnifying glass depends on isolated estimation by visual angle, with size estimated through distance and distance through size, because here the other four supplementary means of estimation are excluded. The telescope actually magnifies, but it appears merely to bring things nearer, because we recognize the size of the objects empirically, and now we explain the apparent increase in size by the shorter distance. So, e.g., seen through a telescope, a house appears not 10 times larger, but 10 times closer. In contrast, the magnifying glass does not actually magnify; rather, it merely makes it possible for us to bring the object so much nearer to the eye than we could otherwise do, and the object appears only as large as it would appear at such a short distance without the magnifying glass. Specifically, the convexity of the *lens* and *cornea* do not permit us to see clearly at a distance of less than 8–10 inches from the eye; however, instead of the eye, the convexity of the magnifying glass now increases the refraction; so even at $^1/_2$ inch distance from the eye, we still obtain a clear image. Our understanding places the object seen at such proximity and in corresponding size at the natural distance for clear vision, that is 8–10 inches from the eye, and now estimates it size according to this distance by the given visual angle.

I have stated all of these processes concerning vision so thoroughly in order to demonstrate clearly and irrefutably that the *understanding* is 71
predominantly active in apprehending any alteration as *effect* and referring it to its cause on the basis of the fundamental *a priori* intuitions of space and time, thereby bringing into existence the cerebral phenomenon of

the objective world, in aid of which the senses provide only a few data. And indeed, the understanding completes this business only through its own form, which is the causal law, and therefore quite immediately and intuitively – without the assistance of reflection, i.e., of abstract knowledge by means of concepts and words, which are the material of *secondary* cognition, i.e., of *thought*, and so of *reason*.

That the cognition based on the understanding[a] is independent from reason and its assistance also explains why, if the understanding once posits an incorrect cause for given effects, and hence immediately intuits this cause, such that an *illusion*[b] arises, reason may still correctly recognize the true state of affairs in the abstract;[c] however, reason cannot come to the aid of understanding with this abstract knowledge; rather, regardless of the better knowledge, the illusion remains fixed. Double vision and double touch, as were explained above, are the same sort of illusion resulting from the removal of the sense organs from their normal positions. It is the same with a hundred similar cases in which the understanding is inaccessible to reason's teaching as the understanding presupposes causes which are usual and familiar to it, immediately intuiting these causes, even though reason has communicated the correct state of affairs by other means. This is so, as was mentioned above, in the moon's appearing greater on the horizon; but also in the image of a solid body appearing to float in the focal point of a concave mirror; in the painted relief we take for real; in the movement of a shore or bridge on which we are standing as a ship passes by; in the high mountains' appearing much closer than they are because of the paucity of atmospheric perspective resulting from the pure atmosphere in which their highest peaks lie. For in any of these correction is impossible, as in its cognition understanding is prior to reason and cannot be reached by reason, so that *illusion* (i.e. the deception of the understanding) remains, even if *error* (i.e. the deception of reason) can be prevented. That which is correctly cognized by *understanding* is
72 *reality*; that which is correctly cognized by *reason*, is *truth*, i.e., a judgement that has a ground. The opposite of the former is *illusion* (that which is falsely intuited); the opposite of the latter is *error* (that which is falsely thought).

Although the purely formal part of empirical intuition, thus the law of causality, as well as space and time, lies *a priori* in the intellect, the application of this law to empirical data is not given to the intellect at the same time; rather, it acquires these first through practice and experience.

[a] *Verstandeserkenntniß* [b] *falsche Schein* [c] *in abstracto*

For this reason newborn children indeed experience impressions of light and colour, except they still do not apprehend objects and actually see; rather, for the first weeks, they are in a stupor, which disappears as soon as their understanding begins first by means of touch and sight to practice its function on the data of the senses, through which the objective world gradually enters their consciousness. This entry can clearly be recognized as their gaze becomes intelligent and their movements show some intentionality, especially when for the first time they acknowledge their caregiver by showing a friendly smile. One can also observe that children experiment with vision and touch for some time in order to perfect their apprehension of objects under different illumination, in different directions, and at different distances, and so they work at a quiet, but serious study until they have acquired all the understanding's operations of vision described above. However, this schooling is much more clearly verified through those born blind, but operated on later, since these people give accounts of their perceptions. Since *Cheselden*'s blind person became famous (about whom the original report is given in the *Philosophical Transactions*, Vol. 35) the case has often been repeated and each time it has been confirmed that these people who acquired the use of their eyes late in life indeed see light, colours, and figures immediately after the operation, but still have no objective intuition of objects, for their understanding must first learn to apply its causal law to the unfamiliar data and their alterations. When for the first time Cheselden's blind person glanced into his room with various objects in it, he distinguished nothing, but had only a total impression, of a totality consisting of a single piece: he took it to be a smooth, multi-coloured surface. It did not occur to him to recognize separate things placed behind one another at various distances. For such blind persons, for whom sight has been restored, touch, to which things are already familiar, must first make these things familiar to sight, as if presenting and introducing these things. At the beginning they have absolutely no judgement about distance, but they grasp at everything. When one such blind person with restored sight saw his house from outside, he could not believe that all the big rooms could be in that little thing. Another was elated when, some weeks after the operation, he made the discovery that a copper engraving on the wall represented all sorts of objects. In the *Morgenblatt* of 23 October 1817,[a] there is a report of a person born blind who received sight in his seventeenth year of life. He had first to learn intelligent intuition,[b] for he did not recognize

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[a] [*Morgenblatt für die gebildeten Stände* (after 1837 *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser*)]
[b] *das verständige Anschauen*

by sight any objects previously familiar to him by touch, and thus he took goats to be humans, etc. His sense of touch had first to make the sense of sight familiar with each individual object. Then he also had absolutely no judgement of the distance of objects he saw, but grasped for all of them. – *Franz*, in his book, *The eye: a treatise on the art of preserving this organ in healthy condition, and of improving the sight* (London: Churchill, 1839), says, pp. 34–6: 'A definite idea of distance, as well as of form and size, is only obtained by sight and touch, and by reflecting on the impressions made on both senses; but for this purpose we must take into account the muscular motion and voluntary locomotion of the individual. – Caspar Hauser,* in a detailed account of his own experience in this respect states, that upon his first liberation from confinement, whenever he looked through the window upon external objects, such as the street, garden etc., it appeared to him as if there were a shutter quite close to his eye, and covered with confused colours of all kinds, in which he could recognize or distinguish nothing singly. He says farther, that he did not convince himself till after some time during his walks out of doors, that what had at first appeared to him as a shutter of various colours, as well as many other
74 objects, were in reality very different things; and that at length the shutter disappeared, and he saw and recognized all things in their just proportions. Persons born blind who obtain their sight by an operation in later years only, sometimes imagine that all objects touch their eyes, and lie so near to them that they are afraid of stumbling against them; sometimes they leap toward the moon, supposing that they can lay hold of it; at other times they run after the clouds moving along the sky, in order to catch them, or commit other such extravagancies . . . Since ideas are gained by reflection upon sensation, it is further necessary in all cases, in order that an accurate idea of objects may be formed from the sense of sight, that the powers of the mind should be unimpaired, and undisturbed in their exercise. A proof of this is afforded in the instance related by Haslam,** of a boy who had no defect of sight, but was weak in understanding, and who, in his seventh year was unable to estimate the distances of objects, especially as to height; he would extend his hand frequently towards a nail on the ceiling, or towards the moon, to catch it. It is therefore the

* Feuerbach's *Caspar Hauser – Beispiel eines Verbrechens am Seelenleben eines Menschen*, Anspach, 1832, p. 79, etc. [*Caspar Hauser – An Example of a Crime against the Psychological Life of a Human Being* by Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach. Franz's note, repeated by Schopenhauer]

** Haslam's *Observations on Madness and Melancholy*, 2nd edn, p. 192. [Franz's note, repeated by Schopenhauer]

judgement which corrects and makes clear this idea or perception of visible objects.'

The intellectual nature of intuition depicted here is corroborated physiologically by *Flourens*' *On Life and on Intelligence*[a] (second edition, Paris, Garnier Brothers, 1858). On p. 49, under the heading: 'difference between the tubercule and the cerebral lobe',[b] Flourens says: 'We must make a great distinction between the senses and the intelligence. The removal of a cerebral tubercule determines the loss of *sensation*, of the *sense* of sight; the retina becomes insensible; the iris becomes set. The removal of a cerebral lobe allows *sensation, sense, sensibility* of the retina and *mobility* of the iris to continue; it destroys simply *perception*. In the one case we are concerned with a *sensorial* fact, in the other with a *cerebral* fact; in the one case it is the loss of *sense*, in the other the loss of *perception*. The distinction between perceptions and sensations is nevertheless a great result, and its demonstration is obvious. There are two means for causing loss of vision 75
through the brain: 1) through tubercules, that is the loss of sense, of sensation; 2) through the lobes, that is the loss of perception, of intelligence. Accordingly, sensibility is not intelligence; thinking is not feeling; and thus an entire philosophy is upset. Therefore an idea is something other than a sensation, and here we have new proof of the radical error of this philosophy.'[c] Further, Flourens says, p. 77, under the heading: 'distinction between sensibility and perception':[d] 'One of my experiments proves that we must clearly distinguish between *sensibility* and *perception*. If we remove an animal's *actual brain* (the *lobes* or *cerebral hemispheres*), the animal loses its sight. But with regard to the eye, nothing has altered: objects continue to be projected on the retina; the *iris* retains its capacity to contract, and the *optic nerve* remains perfectly sensitive and responsive. And yet the animal no longer sees; there is no longer any *vision* although everything that is *sensation* continues to be present; there is no longer any *vision* because

[a] *De la vie et de l'intelligence* [b] *Opposition entre les tubercules et les lobes cérébraux*

[c] *Il faut faire une grande distinction entre les sens et l'intelligence. L'ablation d'un tubercule détermine la perte de la* sensation*, du* sens *de la vue; la rétine devient insensible; l'iris devient immobile. L'ablation d'un lobe cérébral laisse la* sensation*, le* sens*, la* sensibilité *de la rétine; la* mobilité *de l'iris; elle ne détruit que la* perception *seule. Dans un cas, c'est un fait* sensorial*; et, dans l'autre, un fait* cérébral*; dans un cas, c'est la perte du* sens*; dans l'autre, c'est la perte de la* perception*. La distinction des perceptions et des sensations est encore un grand résultat; et il est démontré aux yeux. Il y a deux moyens de faire perdre la vision par l'encéphale: 1° par les tubercules, c'est la perte du sens, de la sensation; 2° par les lobes, c'est la perte de la perception, de l'intelligence. La sensibilité n'est donc pas l'intelligence, penser n'est donc pas sentir; et voilà toute une philosophie renversée. L'idée n'est donc pas la sensation; et voilà encore une autre preuve du vice radical de cette philosophie*

[d] *Séparation de la Sensibilité et de la Perception*

there is no longer any *perception*. Consequently *perceiving* and not *feeling* is the first element of the *intelligence*. *Perception* is part of *intelligence*, for it is lost along with *intelligence* and through the removal of the same organ, namely the *lobes* or *cerebral hemispheres*. *Sensibility* is not part of it at all, since it continues to exist after the loss of *intelligence* and the removal of the *lobes* or *hemispheres*.'[a,63]

That the intellectual nature of intuition was already generally realized by the ancients is indicated by the famous verse of the ancient philosopher Epicharmus: 'The mind sees and the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind.'[b] Plutarch, who cites him (*On the intelligence of animals*, ch. 3[c]) adds: 'because sensation in the eye and the ear produces no sensory perception, if not accompanied by the understanding',[d] and shortly before this he says: 'The theory of Strato, the natural philosopher, proves that "it is completely impossible to perceive without understanding."'[e] Shortly
76 thereafter, he says again: 'Therefore all beings that perceive must also have understanding, since only through understanding are we able to perceive.'[f] Another verse of the same Epicharmus, which Diogenes Laertius (III, 16) quotes, may be relevant here:

> Eumaeus, wisdom is not for us alone,
> But every living being also has understanding.[g]

[a] *Il y a une de mes expériences qui sépare nettement la* sensibilité *de la* perception. *Quand on enlève le* cerveau proprement dit (lobes *ou* hémisphères cérébraux) *à un animal, l'animal perd la vue. Mais, par rapport à l'oeil, rien n'est changé: les objets continuent à se peindre sur la rétine; l'*iris *reste contractile, le* nerf optique *sensible, parfaitement sensible. Et cependant l'animal ne voit plus; il n'y a plus* vision, *quoique tout ce qui est* sensation *subsiste; il n'y a plus* vision, *parce qu'il n'y a plus* perception. *Le* percevoir, *et non le* sentir, *est donc le premier élément de l'*intelligence. *La* perception *est partie de l'*intelligence, *car elle se perd avec l'*intelligence, *et par l'ablation du même organe, les* lobes *ou* hémisphères cérébraux*; et la* sensibilité *n'en est point partie, puisqu'elle subsiste après la perte de l'*intelligence *et l'ablation des* lobes *ou* hémisphères

[b] Νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τ̓ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά· (*Mens vidit, mens audit; caetera surda et coeca*)

[c] *De sollertia animalium* [961a]

[d] ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος [961a–b] (*quia affectio oculorum et aurium nullum affert sensum, intelligentia absente*)

[e] Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ̓ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει. [961a–b] (*Stratonis physici exstat ratiocinatio, qua 'sine intelligentia sentiri omnino nihil posse' demonstrat*)

[f] ὅθεν ἀνάγκη, πᾶσιν, οἷς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ τῷ νοεῖν αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφύκαμεν (*quare necesse est, omnia, quae sentiunt etiam intelligere, siquidem intelligendo demum sentiamus*)

[g] Εὔμαιε, τὸ σοφόν ἐστιν οὐ καθ̓ ἕν μόνον, | ̓Αλλ̓ ὅσσα περ ζῇ, πάντα καὶ γνώμαν ἔχει (*Eumaee, sapientia non uni tantum competit, sed quaecunque vivunt etiam intellectum habent*) [*The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, III 'Life of Plato', 12]

Porphyry also (*On abstinence* III, 21[a]) attempted to demonstrate in detail that all animals have understanding.

That this is so follows necessarily from the intellectual nature of intuition. All animals, down to the lowest, must have understanding, i.e., cognition of the causal law, if only in very different degrees of acuity[b] and clarity, but always at least as much as is required for intuition with their senses, for sensation without understanding would not only be useless, but a cruel gift of nature. No one, except those without understanding, will doubt that higher animals have understanding. But it is also at times undeniably evident that their cognition of causality has actually originated *a priori* and not merely from habit of seeing one thing follow from another. A very young dog does not leap down from a table because he anticipates the effect. A short while ago, I had installed in my bedroom large curtains, reaching to the ground, of the sort that part in the middle when one draws the cord. In the morning upon arising, as I drew these for the first time, I noticed to my surprise that my very intelligent poodle[c] stood there quite astounded, and looked around, upwards and sideways, for the cause of the phenomenon; thus he sought the alteration that he knew *a priori* must have preceded it. The same occurred on the next morning. – But even the lowliest of animals, the water polyp, lacking separate sense organs, has perception and, consequently, understanding, when, to reach brighter light, it clings with its arms to its water plant as it wanders from leaf to leaf.

And we distinguish human understanding[d] (which we nonetheless clearly separate from reason[e]) from this lowest understanding only by degree, while all the intermediate levels of the ranks of animals are full, the 77
highest members of which, the ape, elephant, and dog, astound us with their understanding. But the work of the understanding always consists in the immediate apprehension of causal relations, first, as was indicated, between one's own body and other bodies, from which objective intuition proceeds; and next among these objectively intuited bodies, where now, as was seen in the previous section, causal relations occur in three different forms: namely as cause, as stimulus, and as motive, according to which three forms all movement in the world proceeds and which are understood only by the understanding.[f] Now if, of these three, it is *causes* in the

[a] *De abstinentia* [*On abstinence from animal food*] [b] *Feinheit*

[c] [In a letter to Frauenstädt, 9 December 1849, Schopenhauer laments the premature death of his white poodle 'Atma' (*GB* 240); shortly thereafter he acquired a brown poodle that he also called 'Atma' or by the affectionate 'Butz']

[d] *Verstand* [e] *Vernunft* [f] *und vom Verstande allein verstanden wird*

narrowest sense that the understanding investigates, then it creates mechanics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and invents machines for its prosperity or ruin. However, an immediate, intuitive apprehension of causal connections ultimately lies at the basis of all its discoveries. For this is the sole form and function of the understanding; in no way, however, is it the complicated clockwork of the twelve Kantian categories, the invalidity of which I have proven. – All understanding[a] is an immediate and, therefore, intuitive apprehension of causal connection, although to be fixed it must at once be set down in abstract concepts. Thus calculating is not understanding and in and of itself provides no comprehension[b] of things. This comprehension is achieved only by means of intuition, through correct cognition of causality and *geometric* construction of the course of events. *Euler* has presented this better than anyone else because he understood the matter from the ground up. In contrast, calculation concerns nothing but abstract concepts of quantities, and it establishes the mutual relations among these. We never achieve the least understanding of a physical process by this means. For such understanding requires *intuitive* apprehension of spatial relations by means of which the causes operate. Calculation determines how much and how large, and is, therefore, indispensable to praxis. It can even be said, *where calculation begins, understanding ceases*: for the head busied with numbers, while it calculates, is completely estranged from the causal connection and the geometrical construction of the physical course of events: it is stuck in nothing but abstract, numerical concepts. The result,
78 however, indicates nothing more than *how much*, never *what*. *L'expérience et le calcul*, that motto[c] of French physicists, is by no means sufficient. – Whereas, if *stimuli* are the understanding's guide, then it will produce plant and animal physiology, therapy, and toxicology. Finally, if it has applied itself to *motivation*,[d] then it will either simply use this theoretically as a guide in order to promote morals, theory of right, history, politics, and even dramatic and epic poetry, or instead use it practically, either to train animals or even to make the human race dance to its tune once it has happily discovered which string to pull to make each puppet move at its pleasure. But whether the understanding, by way of mechanics, uses the weight of bodies to make machines so cleverly that their working occurs at just the right time to serve its purpose, or whether for its own ends it puts into play the collective or individual inclinations of humans, it is all the same as regards the function at work here. Now in this practical

[a] *Verstehn* [b] *Verständniß* [c] *Waidspruch* ['experience and calculation'] [d] *Motivation*

application, the understanding is called ingenuity;[a] and if this is accompanied by deception, guile;[b] and when its ends are quite trivial, wiliness;[c] and when it is in connection with the detriment of others, unscrupulousness.[d] Whereas in merely theoretical use it is simply called *understanding*; however, in its higher degrees, it is then called acumen, insight, sagacity, penetration; in contrast, a lack of it is called dullness, stupidity, idiocy, etc. These extremely different degrees of the understanding's acuteness are innate and not to be acquired, although practice and knowledge of the subject matter are generally required for its correct use, as we have seen even in its first application, empirical intuition. Any simpleton has reason: if he is given the premises, then he will draw the conclusion. But understanding requires *primary* cognition, consequently intuitive cognition, and therein lies the distinction. Accordingly, the core of any great discovery, as well as that of any plan of worldwide historical significance, is the product of a fortuitous moment, in which, through favourable internal and external circumstances, a complicated causal series, or hidden causes of phenomena seen a thousand times, or an obscure path never before taken, is suddenly illuminated for the understanding. –

Through the above discussions of the processes of touch and vision it 79
is indisputably established that empirical intuition is in its essentials the work of the *understanding*, and that on the whole the senses provide it with scant material, in their sensations; so that the *understanding* is the artist forming the work, the *senses* only the assistants that present the material. But the understanding's procedure consists throughout in the transition from given effects to their causes, which are first presented as objects in space through just this procedure. The prerequisite for this is the law of causality, which for just this reason must be aided by the understanding itself, because it could never have come to it from the outside. Indeed, the law of causality is the first condition of all empirical intuition, but this is the form in which all experience occurs: how then could the law first be derived from experience, for which it is the essential prerequisite? – Precisely because this absolutely cannot be, and because *Locke's* philosophy had all but abolished all apriority, *Hume* denied the entire reality of the concept of causality. In view of this, he already mentioned (in the 7th of his *Essays on Human Understanding*[e]) two false hypotheses, which have been advanced again in our time: one is that the effect of will on a member of the

[a] *Klugheit* [b] *Schlauheit* [c] *Pfiffigkeit* [d] *Verschmitzheit*

[e] [Cf. 'Of the Idea of necessary Connexion', *Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding* (1848), known today as *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*]

body is the origin and prototype of the concept of causality; the other is that the resistance with which bodies oppose our pressure against them is the origin and prototype of the concept of causality. Hume refutes both with his custom and his association. But I do so in this way: there is absolutely no causal connection between the act of will and the action of the body; rather, both are immediately one and the same, which is doubly perceived, once in self-consciousness, or the inner sense, as an act of will,[a] and at the same time in the external, spatial intuition of the mind, as action of the body. (See *The World as Will and Representation*, 3rd edn, Vol. II, p. 41.[b]) The second hypothesis is false, first because, as was shown above in detail, a mere sensation of touch provides absolutely no objective intuition, much less the concept of causality (this concept can never arise from the mere feeling of an impeded effort of the body, which indeed often occurs without external cause); and second because our pressing against an external object
80 must have a motive and already presupposes the perception of the object, but this presupposes the cognition of causality. – The independence of the concept of causality from all experience can be thoroughly demonstrated by the fact that it has been proven that the possibility of all experience depends on this concept, as I have shown above. In § 23 I will demonstrate that *Kant's* proof, advanced with the same intent, is wrong.

This is also the place to note that Kant either did not realize or, because it did not suit his purpose, intentionally evaded the way the causal law, known to us prior to all experience, brings about empirical intuition. In *Critique of Pure Reason* the relation of causality to intuition is not mentioned in the 'Doctrine of elements', but in a place where it would not be expected, namely in the chapter 'The paralogisms of pure reason', and, in fact, in the 'Criticism of the fourth paralogism of transcendental psychology', only in the first edition, pp. 367ff.[c] That he assigns the discussion to this place already shows that, in considering this relation, he always had in mind only the transition from appearance to the thing in itself, but not the source of intuition itself. Accordingly, he says here that the existence of an actual object external to us is not given directly in perception, but rather can be thought of as an external cause of the perception and so can be inferred. But whoever does this, is for Kant a transcendental realist, and hence, headed the wrong way. Certainly Kant here understands by 'external object' the thing in itself. In contrast, the transcendental idealist stops at the perception of what is empirically real, i.e., of what exists in space external to us, without first having to infer the cause in order to

[a] *Willensakt* [b] [Hübscher *SW* 3, 41–2] [c] [A367–380]

give it reality. *Perception*, for Kant, is something completely immediate, something that occurs without any assistance from the causal nexus or, therefore, from the understanding: he identifies perception directly with sensation. This is proven in a passage from the same source, p. 371: 'I am no more necessitated to draw inferences in respect of the reality of external objects', etc., and also this on p. 372,[a] 'Now one can indeed 81
admit that', etc. From these passages it is completely clear that for him *perception* of external things in space precedes all application of the causal law, and thus this law does not enter into perception as an element and condition: for him mere sensation is immediately perception. Only insofar as one enquires about what may be *external* to us, as understood in the *transcendental* sense, in other words about the thing in itself, is causality mentioned in connection with perception. Kant further takes the causal law as existing and possible only in reflection, thus in abstract, distinct conceptual knowledge,[b] but he has no idea that the application of the causal law *precedes all reflection*, which is obviously the case, particularly with empirical sensory intuition, which otherwise never could take place, as my analysis of this above has irrefutably proven. Thus Kant must leave completely unexplained the origin of empirical intuition: for him it is as if given by a miracle, merely a matter of the senses, coinciding with sensation. I do wish that the thoughtful reader would attend to the passages cited in Kant so that it will be evident to him how much more accurate is my conception of the whole sequence and process. This extremely erroneous Kantian view has ever since prevailed in philosophical literature because no one was so bold as to question it, and I have needed first to clear the way, in order to cast light on the mechanism of our cognition.

Moreover, the fundamental idealistic insight advanced by Kant has lost absolutely nothing through my correction of the matter; indeed, with me it has gained all the more insofar as the requirement of the causal law is absorbed into empirical intuition, as its product, and is extinguished, so that it cannot legitimately be used any further for the purpose of a wholly transcendent question about the thing in itself. That is, if we reflect on my theory of empirical intuition, as given above, we will find that the first datum of intuition, the sensation, is a completely subjective process internal to the organism because it is beneath the skin. Locke has already thoroughly and fundamentally proven that these sensations of the 82
sense organs, even assuming that they are incited[c] by external causes, still can have absolutely no similarity to the property[d] of these causes – the

[a] [A371, A372] [b] *Begriffserkenntniß* [c] *anregen* [d] *Beschaffenheit*

sweetness lies not in the sugar, the red lies not in the rose. But even that they must have an external cause at all depends on a law, the origin of which demonstrably lies in us, lies in our brain, and hence is ultimately no less subjective than sensation itself. Indeed, both *time* (the first condition for the possibility of any *alteration*, and thus the occasion on which an application of the causal law can first occur) and *space* (which first makes possible the externalization[a] of a cause, and which thereby presents itself as object) are subjective forms of the intellect, as Kant certainly proved. Accordingly we find all the elements of empirical intuition lying within us, and nothing is contained in them which would give reliable reference to anything absolutely different from us, a thing in itself. – But there is more: under the concept of *matter* we think of that which still remains of a body when we strip it of its form and all of its specific qualities, that which, for just this reason, must be one and the same in all bodies. Now, however, those forms and qualities that we have eliminated are nothing other than the particular and specially determined *way of acting*[b] of bodies, which constitutes their difference as such. Therefore, if we disregard the forms and qualities of objects, then what remains is only *activity in general*,[c] pure acting[d] as such, causality itself (considered objectively) – that is, what remains is only the reflection of our own understanding, the image of its only function projected outward, and matter is pure causality through and through: its being is its acting in general.[e] (Cf. *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, § 4, p. 9; and Vol. 2, pp. 48–9.[f]) Therefore, pure matter cannot be intuited, but only thought: it is something thinking adds to any reality as its basis, since pure causality (mere acting without a determined way of acting) cannot be given intuitively and thus cannot be found in experience. – Hence matter is only the objective correlate of
83 pure understanding; it is really causality and nothing else, just as this is the immediate cognition of cause and effect in general and nothing else. Now for just this reason, the law of causality can have no application to matter itself: i.e. matter can neither arise nor perish, but it is and persists. For since all change[g] of accidents (forms and qualities), i.e., all things arising and perishing, occurs only by means of causality, but matter itself is pure causality as such, objectively comprehended, matter cannot exercise its power over itself, just as the eye can see everything, but just not itself. Furthermore, since 'substance' is identical with matter, it can be said that

[a] *Nach-außen-verlegen* [b] *Wirkungsart* [c] *die bloße Wirksamkeit überhaupt*
[d] *Wirken* [e] *ihr Wesen ist das Wirken überhaupt*
[f] [Hübscher *SW* 2, 10; *SW* 3, 52–3] [g] *Wechsel*

substance is *acting* comprehended abstractly;[a] *accident* is the particular way of acting,[b] acting concretely.[c] – Thus these are now the results to which true idealism, i.e. transcendental idealism, leads. Through my principal work, I have shown that by the path of representation we cannot arrive at a thing in itself, i.e., at that which also exists altogether outside of representation, but we must strike a course leading through the heart of things, a course that at once breaches the fortress, as if by treachery.

However, if one wants to compare, or even completely identify the honest and quite profound analysis of empirical intuition given here in its elements, which show themselves to be altogether subjective, with *Fichte's* algebraic equation between I and Not-I, with his sophistic sham-demonstrations, which required a mask of unintelligibility, even of nonsense, in order to deceive the reader with such explanations as the I spins the Not-I out of itself – in short, with all the foolishness of the science of nulledge,[d] then this would be patent chicanery and nothing else. I protest against all association with this *Fichte*, just as Kant publicly and expressly protested against the same in an *ad hoc* notice in the *Jena Literary Journal*[e] (Kant: 'Declaration concerning Fichte's Science of Knowledge', in *Advertisements of the Jena Literary Journal*,[f] 1799, No. 109). If Hegelians or similar ignoramuses still prefer to speak of a Kantian–Fichtean philosophy, there is Kantian philosophy and Fichtean wind-baggery – this is the true state of affairs, and it will remain so, despite all those who acclaim the bad and 84
disdain the good, who are more numerous in the German fatherland than anywhere else.

§ 22

ON THE IMMEDIATE OBJECT[64]

The sensations of the body, then, provide the data for the initial application of the causal law and are precisely the means through which intuition of this class of objects arises. Consequently this class of objects gets its being and existence only by means of, and through the exercise of, this function of the understanding as it comes into operation.

Now insofar as the organic body is the starting point for the intuition of all other objects and thus is the mediation[g] of these, in the first edition of this

[a] *in abstracto* [b] *Art des Wirkens* [c] *in concreto*
[d] *Wissenschaftsleere* [we are indebted to Christopher Janaway for this translation of a term Schopenhauer frequently used to refer to Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, 'Science of Knowledge']
[e] *Jena'schen Litteratur-Zeitung* [f] *Intelligenzblatt der Jena'schen Litteratur-Zeitung*
[g] *das Vermittelnde*

essay I had called the body the *immediate object*. This expression, however, can only apply in a quite non-literal sense. For although perception of its sensations is absolutely immediate, it does not present itself as an object at all, but so far everything still remains subjective, that is, sensation. From this, intuition of all other objects as causes of such sensations certainly emanates, whereupon these causes present themselves as objects, but not the body itself, for in this process the body provides mere sensation to consciousness. The body is objectively cognized (that is, as an object) only *mediately*, because it, like all other objects, presents itself in the understanding, or in the brain (which is the same), as a cognized cause of a subjectively given effect. In precisely this way it presents itself as *objective*, which can happen only when its parts act on its own senses, that is, when the eye sees the body, the hand touches it, etc., and on the basis of such data the brain, or the understanding, constructs the body, as it does other objects, in space, according to its form and quality. – Accordingly the immediate presence in the consciousness of representations belonging to this class depends on the position which they take in the chain of causes and effects connecting everything to what is then the body of the all-cognizing subject.[a]

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§ 23

DISPUTATION OF THE PROOF OF THE APRIORITY OF THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY ADVANCED BY KANT[65]

A principal object of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a demonstration that the law of causality is universally valid for all experience, is *a priori*, and, following from this, is restricted to the possibility of experience. However, I cannot agree with the proof of the apriority of the principle given there. In essence, it is the following:[66] 'the necessary synthesis of the manifold of all empirical cognition through the imagination creates a succession, but still not a determinate succession, i.e., the succession leaves indeterminate which of two perceived states comes first, not only in my imagination, but in the object. However, a definite order of this succession, through which alone what is perceived becomes experience (i.e. is justified as objectively valid judgements) first occurs through the pure concept of the understanding of cause and effect. Thus the principle of causal relation is a condition for the

[a] *zu dem jedesmaligen Leibe des Alles erkennenden Subjekts*

possibility of experience and as such is given to us *a priori*.' (See *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st edn, p. 201; 5th edn, p. 246.[a])

According to this, the order of succession of alterations of real objects should first be recognized as something objective through the causal nature[b] of these alterations.[67] Kant repeats and explains this assertion in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, especially in his 'Second Analogy of Experience' (1st edn, p. 189; more completely in the 5th edn, p. 232[c]), then at the conclusion of his 'Third Analogy', a passage which I ask anyone who wants to understand the following to read again. Throughout this he asserts that the *objectivity of the succession of representations*, which he explains as their conformity with the succession of real objects, is simply cognized through the rule by which they follow one another, i.e., through the law of causality. He thus asserts that through my mere perception, the objective relation of appearances following one another remains completely indeterminate, since I then perceive merely the sequence[d] of my representations. But if my judgement is not supported by the law of causality, the sequence 86
in my apprehension[e] does not justify any judgement about the objective sequence. Moreover, in my apprehension, I can allow the succession of all my perceptions to proceed in reverse order, since there is nothing that apprehension determines as objective. To clarify this assertion Kant cites the example of a house, the parts of which he can observe in any succession he prefers, e.g., from top to bottom or from bottom to top, such that the determination of the succession would be merely subjective and not grounded in any object because it depends on his choice. And as a contrast, he cites the perception of a ship sailing down a river, which he first perceives upstream and in succession gradually downstream, in which case he cannot change his perception of the succession of the ship's positions. Therefore he derives the subjective sequence of his apprehension from the objective sequence in appearance, which for this reason he calls an *event*. Against this, I assert *that the two cases are not at all different, that both are events*, the cognition of which is objective, i.e., a cognition of alterations of real objects, which are recognized as such by the subject. *Both are alterations of the position of two bodies relative to one another*. In the first case, one of these bodies[f] is the observer's own body,[g] and indeed, only a part of the same, namely the eye, and the other is the house, relative to the parts of which the eye is successively altered. In the second case, the ship alters its position relative to the river; thus, the alteration is between two bodies.[h]

[a] [paraphrasing A201/B246] [b] *Kausalität* [c] [A189/B232]
[d] *Folge* [e] *Apprehension* [f] *Körper* [g] *Leib* [h] *Körpern*

Both are events: the only difference is that in the first case the alteration proceeds from the observer's own body, the sensations of which are indeed the starting point of all of the observer's perceptions. The body, however, is nevertheless an object among objects, and thus is subjected to the laws of this objective, physical world.[a] Insofar as the observer behaves as a purely cognizing being, the movement of his body according to his will is for him merely an empirically perceived fact.[68] The order of succession of alterations could be reversed in the second case, just as it could in the first, so long as the observer had the power to pull the ship upstream, just as in the first case he has the power to move his eye in the opposite direction. For
87 from the fact that the succession of perceptions of the parts of the house depends on his choice, Kant wants to conclude that the succession itself is not objective and is not an event. But the movement of his eye in the direction from the roof to the cellar is an event, and the opposite, from cellar to roof, is a second event, just as the ship's course is an event. In this there is absolutely no difference, just as there is no difference whether I pass by a line of soldiers or they pass by me: both are events. If from the shore I stare at a ship passing nearby, then it will soon appear that the shore moves with me and the ship stands still. Now in this I am mistaken only in the cause of the relative alteration of place, since I ascribe the movement to the wrong object, but I nonetheless objectively and correctly cognize the real succession of the positions of my body relative to the ship.[69] In the case he cites, Kant would also not have believed he found a difference if he had considered that his body is an object among objects and that the succession of its empirical intuitions depends on the succession of the influences of other objects on his body. Consequently, this succession is something objective, i.e., it takes its place among objects *immediately* (if not also mediated), independent of the subject's choice, and consequently it can be readily cognized even if the objects successively influencing his body do not stand in a causal relation to one another.

Kant says time cannot be perceived; thus, no succession of representations can be empirically perceived as objective; i.e. as alterations of appearances distinguished from alterations of merely subjective representations. The objectivity of alterations can be cognized only through the law of causality, which is a rule according to which states follow one another. And the result of his assertions would be that we perceive absolutely no sequence in time as objective, excepting that of cause and effect, and that any other sequence of appearances perceived by us is determined thus and

[a] *Körperwelt*

not otherwise merely through our choice. Against all of this I must assert that appearances can certainly *follow one another* without *following from one another*. And this in no way undermines the law of causality. For it remains 88
certain that any alteration is an effect of another, since this is established *a priori*, except that an alteration does not merely follow the one which is its cause, but all others which are simultaneous with that cause and with which it stands in no causal connection. It is not perceived by me in the sequence of the series of causes, but in a completely different sequence, which, however, is for this reason no less objective and is very different from a subjective one, one which is dependent on my choice, one which, e.g., is similar to my mental images.[a] Events that follow one another in time, but do not stand in causal connection, are just what is called *Zufall*, a word that derives from *Zusammentreffen* and *Zusammenfallen*, something unconnected, just as τὸ συμβεβηκός comes from συμβαίνειν[b] (cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 4[c]).[70] If I step out of the door of my house and then a tile falls from the roof, striking me, there is no causal connection between the tile's falling and my exiting, but nonetheless there is a succession – that my exiting precedes the tile's falling is objectively determined in my apprehension and not subjectively determined through my choice, which otherwise would likely have reversed the succession. In just the same way, the succession of sounds in music is objectively determined and is not determined subjectively by me, the listener. But who would say that the sounds of the music follow one another according to the law of cause and effect? Indeed, even the succession of day and night is without a doubt recognized by us as objective, but certainly they are not understood to be cause and effect of one another, and before Copernicus, the world was in error concerning their common cause, and the correct knowledge[d] of their succession had not thereby been affected. Incidentally, Hume's hypothesis is refuted by this, since the sequence of day and night, most ancient and without exception, has not by custom misled anyone into taking them for cause and effect.[71]

Kant says in the same passage[72] that a representation shows objective reality (meaning that it is quite distinct from mere mental images) only through our recognizing its necessary connection with other representa- 89
tions, that is subject to a rule (the causal law), and its place in a determinate

[a] *Phantasmen*

[b] *Zufall* [chance], *Zusammentreffen* [concurrence], *Zusammenfallen* [coincidence]; τὸ συμβεβηκός [chance, coincident], συμβαίνειν [to come to pass]

[c] [73b, 1–15] [d] *Erkenntniß*

order of the temporal relation of our representations. But of how few representations do we recognize[a] the place that the causal law gives them in the series of causes and effects! and yet we always know how[b] to distinguish the objective from the subjective, real objects from mental images. In sleep, in which the brain is isolated from the peripheral nervous system and, hence, from external impressions, we cannot make that distinction; therefore, while we dream we take mental images for real objects and only on waking (i.e. when the sensory nerves[c] and, thereby, the external world re-enter consciousness) do we recognize the error, although the law of causality asserts its authority in a dream as well so long as the dream is not interrupted, albeit with an impossible content often foisted upon it.[d] One would almost believe that Kant was under Leibniz's influence in the passage cited above, no matter how much in his entire philosophy Kant was otherwise opposed to Leibniz, especially if one notices that quite similar remarks are found in Leibniz's *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*[e] (Book IV, ch. 2, § 14), e.g., 'the truth of sensible things consists only in the connection of phenomena, which must have its reason, and this is what distinguishes them from dreams . . . the true criterion, where objects of the senses are concerned, is the connection of phenomena, which guarantees the factual truths with regard to sensible things outside us'.[f,73]

With this whole proof of the apriority and necessity of the causal law as the sole means by which we could recognize the objective succession of alterations (insofar as the causal law is a condition of experience), Kant has obviously made a most amazing and palpable error, one which is only explicable as a consequence[g] of his preoccupation with the a *priori* part of our cognition, a preoccupation which led him to lose sight of what otherwise anyone would have seen. In § 21 I have provided the only correct proof of the apriority of the causal law. This is confirmed in every moment by the unshakeable certainty with which everyone expects that the causal law would apply in any case of experience, i.e., by the certainty that we
90 attribute to this law, distinguished from every other certainty grounded on induction, e.g. the empirically known laws of nature. It is even impossible

[a] *erkennen* [b] *wissen* [c] *sensibeln Nerven*
[d] *nur daß ihm oft ein unmöglicher Stoff untergeschoben wird*
[e] *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement*
[f] *la vérité des choses sensibles ne consiste que dans la liaison des phénomènes, qui doit avoir sa raison, et c'est ce qui les distingue des songes . . . Le vrai Critérion, en matière des objets des sens, est la liaison des phénomènes, qui garantit les vérités de fait, à l'égard des choses sensibles hors de nous*
[g] *Folge*

for us to think that somewhere in the world of experience this law might be subject to an exception. E.g. we could *imagine*[a] that the law of gravity might cease to operate at some time, but not that this could occur without a cause.[74]

In his proof,[75] Kant errs in a way opposite to Hume. For Hume explained all consequences[b] as mere sequences;[c] in contrast, Kant wants there to be no other sequences, but consequence. Certainly only the pure understanding can conceive of *consequence*, but it can no more conceive of mere *sequence* than it can conceive of the distinction between right and left, which, like sequence, is to be grasped only through pure sensibility. The sequence[d] of events in time can certainly be recognized empirically (which Kant denies in the same passage), as can the juxtaposition of things in space. But the *way in which* something generally *follows*[e] another in time is no more to be explained than the way in which something *follows from*[f] another: the former cognition is given and conditioned by pure sensibility; the latter is given and conditioned by pure understanding. However, as he explains the objective sequence of appearance as merely cognizable through the chain of causality, Kant slips back into the same mistake for which he reproaches *Leibniz*, 'that he intellectualizes the forms of sensibility' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st edn, p. 275; 5th edn, p. 331[g]). – My view on succession[h] is the following. We derive the knowledge[i] of the mere *possibility* of succession from the form of time belonging to pure sensibility. The succession of real objects, the form of which is precisely time, we cognize empirically and consequently as *real*.[j] However, through the understanding, by means of causality, we cognize merely the *necessity* of a succession of two states, i.e., an alteration, and that we have the concept of the necessity of succession is in itself a proof that the law of causality is not known empirically, but is a law given to us *a priori*. After all, the principle of sufficient reason is the expression of a necessary connection among all of our objects, i.e., 91
representations; it is the expression of the fundamental form[k] lying at the core of our cognitive faculty; it is the universal form of all representations and the sole origin of the concept of *necessity*, that concept which, of course, has no true content, nor verification other than that of the appearance of the consequent when its ground is given.[76] In the class of representations that we are now considering, where this principle appears as the law of

[a] *uns . . . denken* [b] *alles Erfolgen* [c] *bloßes Folgen* [d] *die Folge*
[e] *folge* [f] *erfolge* [g] [A275/B331] [h] *Succession*
[i] *Kenntniß* [j] *wirklich* [k] *Grundform*

causality, this law determines the temporal sequence, which stems from the fact that time is the form of these representations, and that is why the necessary connection here appears as the rule of succession. In other forms of the principle of sufficient reason the necessary connection that it everywhere demands will appear to us in forms quite different from time, and as a result, will not appear as succession. Yet the principle of sufficient reason will always retain the character of a necessary connection, by which the identity of this principle reveals itself in all of its forms – or, rather, this principle reveals the unity of the root of all laws.

If Kant's assertion, which I challenged, were correct, then we would only recognize the *reality* of succession from its *necessity*; however, this presupposes an understanding which simultaneously comprehends all series of causes of effects, hence, an omniscient understanding. Kant has imposed the impossible on the understanding, merely in order to have less need of sensibility.

How can Kant's assertion that the objectivity of succession is known only because effect necessarily follows cause be reconciled with his other assertion (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st edn, p. 203; 5th edn, p. 249[a]) that the empirical criterion for which of two states is the cause and which is the effect is mere succession? Who cannot see here the most obvious circle?

If the objectivity of succession were recognized only from causality, then it would be conceivable only as such and would be nothing more than this. For if it were still something else, then it would have other distinguishing marks[b] by which it could be recognized, which Kant precisely denies. Consequently, if Kant were correct, one could not say: 'this state is the effect of that, therefore it follows it.' Rather, following[c] and being an effect[d] would be one and the same, and that proposition would be tautological. If the distinction between sequence and consequence were abolished, Hume
92 would again be correct, as he explained all consequence as mere sequence, or, in any case, denied the distinction.

Kant's proof[77] would thus be reduced to our recognizing empirically only the *reality*[e] of succession. But since we also recognize the *necessity* of succession in certain series of events, and since we even know prior to all experience that every possible event must have a definite place in one or another of these series, there already follow from this both the reality[f] and

[a] [A203/B249] [b] *unterscheidende Merkmale* [c] *Folgen*
[d] *Wirkungseyn* [e] *Wirklichkeit* [f] *Realität*

the apriority of the law of causality, and for the latter the proof given in § 21 above is the only correct one.[78]

From Kant's theory that objective succession is possible and recognizable only through causal connection, another parallel follows: namely, that simultaneity is possible and recognizable only through reciprocal action,[a] as set forth in the *Critique of Pure Reason* under the heading, 'Third Analogy of Experience'.[b] Here Kant goes so far as to say 'that the simultaneity of appearances, which do not operate on one another reciprocally, but would be somewhat separated by empty space, would not be an object of possible perception'[c] (this would be an *a priori* proof that there is no empty space between the fixed stars); and 'that the light that *plays between* our eyes and the heavenly bodies' (which expression slips in the idea that the light of the stars not only works on our eyes, but also that of our eyes works on the stars) 'effects a community between us and the latter and thereby proves the simultaneity of the latter'.[d] This last statement is even empirically false since the sight of a fixed star in no way proves that it is simultaneous with the spectator, but at most proves that it existed a few years ago, and in some cases, thousands of years ago. As to the rest, this Kantian theory stands or falls with the first, only it is much easier to see through. In addition, above in § 20, I have already discussed the vacuousness of the concept of reciprocal action.

If one wishes, one may compare this refutation of the Kantian proof in question here to two previous attacks, namely, that by *Feder* in his book *On Space and Causality* § 29[e] and that of *G. E. Schulze* in his *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy*, Vol. 2, pp. 422ff.[f]

It is not without great reluctance that I dared (1813) to produce objections 93
to a prominent theory that was taken as proven and even repeated in the most recent books (e.g. Fries, *Critique of Reason*, Vol. 2, p. 85[g]) – a theory of that man whose amazing profundity I respect and to whom I owe so much that is so important, that his spirit can say to me in Homer's words:

'I also removed the fog that covered your eyes'.[h]

[a] *Wechselwirkung* [b] [A211–215/B256–262] [c] [paraphrasing A212/B259]
[d] [A213/B260; emphasis and parenthetical material are Schopenhauer's]
[e] [*Uber Raum und Causalität, zur Prüfung der Kantischen Philosophie* (*On Space and Causality, Toward a Examination of Kantian Philosophy*), Göttingen: J. C. Diederich, 1787]
[f] [*Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie*, 2 vols. Hamburg: Carl Ernst Bohn, 1801]
[g] [*Neue Kritik der Vernunft* (*New Critique of Reason*), 1807]
[h] Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν [*Iliad* 5.127]

§ 24

ON THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW OF CAUSALITY[79]

According to our previous discussion, it is a misapplication of the law of causality whenever it is applied to something other than *alterations* in the empirically given material world, e.g., to natural forces, by means of which such alterations are first possible at all; or to matter, *in* which they take place; or to the universe, to which must be attributed an absolutely objective existence, not one conditioned by our intellect; and also in many other ways. Here I refer to what was said about this in *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 2, ch. 4, pp. 42ff. (3rd edn, II, pp. 46ff.).[a] Of course, the origin of such misapplication is partly in our applying the concept of cause, like countless other concepts in metaphysics and morals, much *too widely*, and partly through our forgetting that the law of causality is, indeed, a presupposition that we bring with us into the world and that makes possible intuition of things external to us. However, for just this reason, we are not justified in applying such a principle to the eternal order of the world and to all that exists in it external to and independent of the function[b] of our cognitive faculty from which this principle has arisen.

§ 25

THE TIME OF AN ALTERATION[80]

Since the principle of sufficient reason of becoming is applicable only to
94 *alterations*, it must be noted here that ancient philosophers already posed the question of the time in which an alteration takes place. For, it cannot take place while the earlier state still exists, and also not after the new state has already appeared; however, if we allow the alteration its own time between the two states, then during this time, a body must be in neither the first nor the second state, e.g., a dying person must neither be dead nor living, a body neither at rest nor in motion – which would be absurd. The niceties and subtleties on this question are found compiled in *Sextus Empiricus*, *Against the Mathematicians*,[c] Book IX, 267–271 and hypothesis III, ch. 14, and some of this is found in *Gellius*, Book VI, ch. 13. – Plato had rather cavalierly[d] dismissed this difficult point in the *Parmenides* (p. 138, Bip. edn[e]), merely asserting that the alteration occurs *suddenly* and fills *no*

[a] [Hübscher *SW* 3, 46ff.] [b] *Vorrichtung*
[c] *Adversus Mathematicos* [d] *cavalièrement* [e] [156d]

time at all. It is ἐξαίφνης (*in repentino*[a]) which he calls ἄτοπος φύσις ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν [οὐδενὶ] οὖσα, that is, a thing of odd nature, being in no way in time (which then still occurs in time).

Consequently, it was left to *Aristotle*'s perspicacity to clear up this difficult matter, which task he accomplished thoroughly and in detail in the 6th book of the *Physics*, chs. 1–8. His proof that no alteration occurs suddenly (the ἐξαίφνης of Plato), but that every alteration occurs gradually, and hence occupies a certain time, is provided entirely on the basis of pure *a priori* intuition of time and space, but also turns out to be very subtle. In any case, the essentials of this very lengthy demonstration can be reduced to the following propositions. To be contiguous[b] means that things have in common their most extreme opposite limits; consequently, only two extended[c] things can be contiguous with one another, not two indivisible things (since they would then be one); consequently, only lines can border on one another, not mere points. This is transferred from space to time. As there is always a line between two points, so there is always a time between two nows.[d] This is the time of an alteration, if there is *one* state in the first now and another state in the second. The time of an alteration is, as is any time, infinitely divisible; consequently, in it, that which is altering goes through an infinite number of stages through which the second state gradually emerges out of the *first* state. – Here is how the matter can be explained in a way that is easy to understand: between two successive states, the difference between which we can grasp with our senses, there lie infinitely more states, the differences between 95
which are imperceptible because the state which newly appears must have arrived at a certain stage or size in order to be perceptible to the senses. Thus the course of subtle[e] stages, or ever so slight extensions,[f] leads to the new state, as the new state gradually emerges. Considered collectively, these are included under the term alteration, and the time that they take up is the time of alteration. If we apply this to a body that is struck, then the most immediate effect is a certain oscillation of its inner parts, and after the impulse has been transmitted through them, the body breaks into external motion. – Aristotle quite correctly infers from the infinite divisibility of time that everything that fills time (hence also every alteration, i.e., transition from one state to another) must in every case be infinitely divisible, so that everything that arises, in fact comes together from infinite parts, and hence is always gradual and never sudden. In the last chapter of his

[a] [suddenly] [b] *an einander gränzen* [c] *Ausgedehnte*
[d] *zwei Jetzt* [e] *schwächere Grade* [f] *geringere Ausdehnungen*

book, from the principles given above and from the gradual arising of every motion which results from them, Aristotle draws the important conclusion that nothing indivisible, and so no mere *point*, can move. *Kant's* definition of matter agrees with this quite well: matter is 'that which moves in space'.

Thus this law of the continuity and graduality of all alterations, first set forth and proved by Aristotle, we find stated by *Kant* three times, namely in his *Dissertation on the sensible and intelligible forms of the world*[a] § 14; in the *Critique of Pure Reason* 1st edn, p. 207 and 5th edn, p. 253;[b] and finally in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* at the close of 'General Observations on Mechanics'. In all three passages, his presentation of the subject is brief, but also not as thorough as that of Aristotle, with whom, nonetheless, Kant's presentation is in complete agreement in its essentials. Therefore, doubtless Kant took up these ideas directly or indirectly from Aristotle, although Kant never names Aristotle. Aristotle's proposition, 'nows are not contiguous'[c] is repeated in the form 'there is always a time between two moments', to which expression it may be objected that 'even
96 between two centuries there is none because in time, as in space, there must be a clear boundary'. – So in the first and oldest of the presentations cited, instead of mentioning Aristotle, Kant wants this doctrine that he advanced identified with *Leibniz's* law of continuity.[d] If the two were really the same, then Leibniz would have gotten the matter from Aristotle. Now Leibniz first advanced this law of continuity[e] in a letter to Bayle (*ibid.*, p. 104), in which, however, he calls it 'the general principle of order'[f] (following his own expression, p. 189 of his *Philosophical Works*,[g] ed. Erdmann) and for this term he gives a very general and vague, primarily geometric rationale, which has no direct bearing on the time of alteration, which he never even mentions.

[a] *Dissertatio de mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma* [*De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*: Kant's Inaugural Dissertation (1770)]
[b] [A207ff./B253ff.] [c] οὐκ ἔστι ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενα τὰ νῦν [*Physics* 218a]
[d] *lex continuitatis* [e] *loi de la continuité* [f] *principe de l' ordre général*
[g] *opera philos*[*ophica,* ed. Johann Eduard Erdmann. Berol: G. Eichler, 1840]

On the second class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing in it

§ 26

EXPLANATION OF THIS CLASS OF OBJECTS[81]

The only essential distinction between humans and animals (which has always been attributed to *reason*, a very special cognitive faculty exclusive to humans) is based on the fact that humans have a class of representations which no animal shares: these are *concepts*, that is, *abstract* representations, as opposed to the intuitive representations from which, however, concepts are derived. The immediate result of this is that animals neither speak nor laugh, but the mediated result is the many and significant ways in which human life is distinguished from that of the animal. For a different sort of motivation has now come about through the addition of abstract representations. Although the actions of humans follow with no less strict necessity than those of animals, because of the kind of motivation humans have, insofar as it consists of *thoughts* which make possible *elective decisions*[a] (i.e. the conscious conflict of motives), purposeful, deliberate action, in accord with plans and maxims, in unison with others, etc. has replaced the mere impulse from present objects of intuition. But this has brought about everything that makes the life of humans so rich, so cultivated, and 98
so terrible, that here in the West, which has made them pale and white, and where the ancient, true, profound, original religions[b] of their homeland could not follow, humans no longer recognize animals as their brothers, but believe them to be something fundamentally different from themselves; and to maintain this illusion, humans call animals beasts, assigning derogatory terms to all the vital functions which humans have in common with them, considering them to be without rights, as humans steel themselves against the identity of essence[c] they share with the animals, an identity which still presses itself upon them.

[a] *Wahlentscheidung* [b] *Ur-Religionen* [c] *Identität des Wesens*

Nevertheless, as was just said, the entire distinction consists in that, apart from intuitive representations, which were considered in the previous chapter and which in any case animals share, the human being also holds in his brain (which, mainly for this purpose, is so much more voluminous) abstract representations, i.e., those derived from intuitive representations. Such representations have been called *concepts*[a] because each of these subsumes[b] in itself – or, rather, under itself – innumerable individual things, and is thus itself a *totality*[c] of individual things. They can also be defined as *representations of representations*. For with their formation, the faculty of abstraction reduces[d] complete and hence, intuitive representations (which were discussed in the previous chapter) to their constituents in order to be able to think about these separately, each in itself, as different properties or relations of things. But now, with this process, representations necessarily lose their intuitive quality, just as water loses its fluidity and visibility when reduced to its constituents. For every property thus separated (abstracted) can indeed be *thought* of in isolation,[e] however, not *intuited* in isolation. The formation of a concept occurs generally by dropping much from what is given intuitively in order to be able to think in isolation of what remains. A concept is thus a reduction in thought[f] of that which is intuited. When various intuitive objects are considered, if something different is dropped from each and still something the same remains among all, this is the *genus* of any species. Hence the concept of any *genus* is the concept of every species subsumed under it after the removal of everything which does not belong to *all* of the species. Now, however, any possible concept can be
99 thought of as a *genus*; therefore, it is always something general and, as such, not something intuitive. For that reason, a concept also has a *sphere*, which is the totality[g] of everything conceivable through the concept. Now the higher the level of abstraction, the more is lost, and therefore the less is thought. The highest, i.e., the most general concepts, are the emptiest and poorest; ultimately these are just empty shells, as, e.g., being, essence, thing, becoming, etc. – Incidentally, whatever could philosophical systems produce when they are merely spun out of these same concepts and have as their matter only such empty shells of thought? They must be infinitely empty and poor, and therefore, turn out to be tedious and suffocating.

Now since, as I have said, representations that are sublimated,[h] and thereby decomposed[i] into abstract concepts, have forfeited all their intuitive quality, they would completely escape consciousness and would thus

[a] *Begriffe* [b] *begreift* [c] *Inbegriff* [d] *zerlegt* [e] *für sich allein*
[f] *Wenigerdenken* [g] *Inbegriff* [h] *sublimirten* [i] *zersetzen*

have no value for the intended operations of thought if they were not fixed and held fast in our senses by arbitrary signs: these signs are words. Therefore insofar as they make up the contents of the lexicon, that is, of language, words always refer to *general* representations, concepts, never to intuitive things: whereas a lexicon which lists individual things contains not words, but only proper names and is either a geographical or a historical lexicon, i.e., either listing that which is separated by space or by time, since as *my* readers know, time and space are the *principium individuationis*.[a] Simply because animals are limited to intuitive representations and not capable of abstraction (hence, not capable of concepts), they have no language, even if they are able to pronounce words. In contrast, they understand proper names. That the same deficiency excludes them from laughter is evident from my theory of the laughable,[b] in the first book of *The World as Will and Representation* § 13, and Vol. 2, ch. 8.[c]

If we analyse a lengthy and continuous speech of a completely uneducated human being, we will find in it such an abundance of logical forms, structures, figures of speech, distinctions, and subtleties of all sorts, correctly expressed by means of grammatical forms, with their inflections and constructions – even with frequent application of indirect speech[d], the different modes of verbs, etc. – everything according to rule, so that it 100
is astonishing, and we must recognize in it a very extensive and coherent learning.[e] However, the acquisition of this occurs on the basis of the apprehension of the intuitive world, the complete essence of which it is the fundamental business of reason to set down in abstract concepts, a business reason can only carry out through language. With the acquisition of language, then, the whole mechanism of reason, that which is essential to logic, is brought to consciousness. Obviously this cannot occur without great intellectual effort and eager attentiveness, and children are endowed with the power for such attentiveness by their desire to learn, which is strong when they see for themselves its true usefulness and necessity, and appears weak only when we try to force on children that which is unsuitable to them. Thus with the acquisition of language, together with all its figures of speech and subtleties, as much as by means of listening to adult speakers as by means of speaking themselves, children – even those brought up uneducated – complete this development of their reason and acquire that genuine, concrete logic, which consists not in rules of logic, but in the

[a] [principle of individuation] [b] *des Lächerlichen*
[c] [*WWR* 1, 84–5 (Hübscher, *SW* 2, 70–1); *WWR* 2, ch. 8 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 99–112)]
[d] *sermo obliquus* [e] *Wissenschaft*

immediate, correct application of logic, just as a musically talented human being acquires the rules of harmony without reading notes and studying thorough bass, but merely through playing the piano by ear. – Only the deaf and dumb do not go through the above-mentioned schooling in logic by means of the acquisition of language; therefore, they are nearly as irrational as animals if they do not receive the artificial instruction suitable to them by learning to read, which for them is the surrogate of this natural schooling of reason.

§ 27

USES OF CONCEPTS[82]

As has been shown above, our reason, or the faculty of thought, has as its fundamental essence the capacity for abstraction, or the ability to form *concepts*; thus, it is the presence of these in consciousness which produces such astonishing results. That reason is able to do this is in essence based on the following.[83]

101 Precisely because concepts contain less than the representations from which they are abstracted,[a] they are easier to handle than these representations and are related to them in somewhat the same way as the formulas of higher arithmetic are related to the operations of thought from which they are derived and which they represent, or as the logarithm is related to its number. Of the many representations from which they are abstracted, concepts contain only the very part that is being used; if instead one wanted to bring to mind any representation itself through the imagination, one would have to drag along a load of inessentials and would be confused by them;[84] now, however, by applying concepts one thinks of only the parts and relations of all these representations that are needed for the task at hand. Thus their use can be compared to casting off useless baggage or also compared to working with quintessences instead of with the species of plants themselves or with the quinine instead of the cinchona bark. What is properly and in the strict sense of the word called *thinking* is in general the occupation of the intellect with *concepts*, the presence in consciousness of the class of representations that is now taken under consideration. Thinking is also designated by the word *reflection*, which, as an optical metaphor, expresses at the same time the derivative and secondary nature of this type of cognition. Now this thinking, this reflection,

[a] *abstrahirt*

imparts to humans that *discretion*[a] which animals lack. For, since reflection makes it possible for humans to think of thousands of things with one concept, but always to think about only what is essential, humans can, as preferred, ignore differences of all kinds, even the difference between space and time. It is the means by which human beings achieve in thoughts a view of the past and future, as well as of that which is absent, while in this regard the animal is tied to the present. Now again, this discretion, this ability to *deliberate*,[b] this presence of mind, is actually the root of all human theoretical and practical achievements, through which humans so greatly surpass animals; namely, it is first of all the root of concern for the future, with regard to the past, and afterwards of intentional, systematic, methodological procedure in every project, and then of the cooperation of many toward a single goal, hence of order, of law, of the state, etc. – However, concepts are especially the proper material of the natural sciences 102
and humanities,[c] the aims of which ultimately are to trace knowledge of the particular through the universal, which is possible only by means of the principle of all and nothing,[d] and this again is only possible through the existence of concepts.[85] Therefore, Aristotle said, 'without the universal, it is impossible to get knowledge' (*Metaphysics* XII, ch. 9).[e] Concepts are just those *universalia* over whose existence the realists and the nominalists fought for so long in the middle ages.

§ 28

REPRESENTATIVES[f] OF CONCEPTS. THE POWER OF JUDGEMENT[86]

As has already been said, a concept is not at all to be confused with a mental image, which is an intuitive, complete and hence particular representation not immediately brought about by an impression on the senses, and thus not belonging to the complex of experience. However, a mental image is then also to be distinguished from a concept when a mental image is used as a *representative of a concept*. This occurs when one wants to take an intuitive representation from which a concept arose and make it correspond to this

[a] *Besonnenheit* [b] *sich zu* besinnen [c] *Wissenschaften*
[d] *dictum de omni et nullo* [The logical principle that what is predicated of any whole is predicated of any part of that whole, and what is not predicated of the whole is not predicated of any part of it: supposedly originating in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* I, 1, 24b26]
[e] ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν (*absque universalibus enim non datur scientia*) [1086b now found in *Met.* XIII.9]
[f] *Repräsentanten*

concept, which is always impossible, as, e.g., there are no representations of 'dog' in general, of 'colour' in general, of 'triangle' in general, of 'number' in general – no mental images corresponding to these concepts. As soon as one calls up the mental image, e.g., of some dog, it must, as representation, be thoroughly determined, i.e., of some specific size, a definite form, colour, etc. while the concept that it represents has no such determining characteristics.[a] However, with the use of such a representative of a concept, one is always aware that the mental image does not adequately represent the concept, but is full of wholly arbitrary determinations. *Hume* in his *Essays on Human Understanding*,[b] toward the end of Essay 12, Pt. 1, and *Rousseau* too, *On the Origin of Inequality*,[c] in the middle of Pt. 1, are in agreement with what is said here. In contrast, in the chapter on 'Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding',[d] Kant teaches something
103 completely different. Only inner observation and clear deliberation can decide the matter. Hence, one should investigate whether in one's concepts one is aware of a 'monogram of pure *a priori* imagination',[e] e.g., when one thinks of dog, one is conscious of something between dog and wolf,[f] or whether, according to the explanations put forth here, either one thinks of a concept through reason, or through the imagination one puts forth[g] some representative of the concept as a complete image.

All thinking, in the broader sense of the word, and so all inner intellectual activity in general, requires either words or images;[h] without one of the two, thinking has no content. But both are not required simultaneously, although they are able to work together for mutual support. Now thinking in the narrower sense, or abstract thinking carried out with the aid of words, is either purely logical reasoning, in which case it then remains completely in its own domain, or it touches on the limits of intuitive representations in order to come to an understanding of them[i] for the purpose of connecting what is given empirically and grasped intuitively with clearly thought-out, abstract concepts so as to completely possess it. Thus for an intuitively given case, thinking seeks either the concept or the rule to which the case belongs; or instead, for a given concept or rule, it seeks the case which verifies it. This feature is the activity of the *power of judgement*, and indeed (following Kant's division) in the first case, it is

[a] *Bestimmungen* [b] [*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*]
[c] *Sur l'origine de l'inégalité* [*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (*Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men*, 1754)]
[d] [in *Critique of Pure Reason* A137/B176–A147/B187] [e] [A142/B181] [f] *entre chien et loup*
[g] *vorstellt* [h] *Phantasiebilder* [i] *um sich mit diesen auseinanderzusetzen*

a reflecting activity and in the second, a subsuming activity. Accordingly, the power of judgement is the mediator between the intuitive and the abstract modes of cognition, or between understanding and reason. For most people the power of judgement is only rudimentary, often even just nominal:* they are destined to be led by others. One should have nothing more to say to them than what is necessary.

Thinking, operating with the aid of intuitive representations, is the real core of all cognition, as it can be traced back to the source, to the basis of all concepts. Therefore it is the producer of all truly original thoughts, 104
all primary fundamental insights, and all discoveries, insofar as chance has not taken the major role in these. In such originality the *understanding* is predominantly active, as *reason* is with purely abstract thought in the narrower sense. Among these belong certain thoughts that run through our minds, coming and going, dressing themselves first in this and then in that intuition, until finally, achieving clarity, they fix themselves in concepts and find words. Indeed, there are some which never find words, and unfortunately, these are the best: 'that are too good for words', as Apuleius said.[a]

But *Aristotle* went too far when he claimed that no thinking can occur without mental images. Aristotle's remarks in the book, *On the soul*, III, chs. 3, 7, 8 – such as 'the soul never thinks without a mental image',[b] and 'if one contemplates, one must necessarily contemplate with some mental image',[c] and similarly in *On memory*, 'a thought is impossible without a mental image'[d] – made a great impression on thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by whom they were often and emphatically repeated, as e.g., Pico della Mirandola said in *On the imagination*, ch. 5: 'for he who reasons and thinks, must do so while viewing mental images'[e] – Melanchthon, *On the soul*, p. 130, says: 'whoever thinks must view mental images'[f] – and Giordano Bruno, *On the composition of the imagination*,

* Whoever takes this to be hyperbolic should consider the fate of Goethe's colour theory; and if he is amazed that I find in this a verification of the point, then he himself has provided another proof

[a] *quae voce meliora sunt* [*Metamorphoses* XI, 23]

[b] οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή (*anima sine phantasmate nunquam intelligit*) [*de anima* III, 7, 431a, 16]

[c] ὅταν θεωρῇ, ἀνάγχη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν (*qui contemplatur, necesse est, una cum phantasmate contempletur*) [*de anima* III, 8, 432a, 8]

[d] νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος (*fieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam intelligatur*) [*de memoria et reminiscentia* ch. 1, p. 449b, 31]

[e] *De imaginatione*: *Necesse est, eum, qui ratiocinatur et intelligit, phantasmata speculari*

[f] *De anima*: *oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari*

p. 10, says, 'Aristotle says: he who wants to know, must view mental images'.[a] *Pomponatius,* O*n immortality*,[b] pp. 54 and 70, also expresses himself in this sense. – Only this much can be maintained: that any true and original knowledge, even any genuine philosopheme, at its innermost core, or at its root, must have some kind of intuitive apprehension.[c] Although something momentary and single,[d] this subsequently imparts spirit and life to the entire explanation, no matter how exhaustive – just as a small drop of the right reagent imparts the colour of the resulting precipitate to the whole solution. If the explanation has such a core, it is like a banknote payable in cash; in contrast, any other explanation arising out of a mere combination
105 of concepts is like a banknote which is itself again secured only by the backing of other promissory notes. Any purely rational verbiage is merely a clarification of what follows from given concepts, which actually brings nothing new to the light of day, and so, instead of endlessly filling entire books with it, it could be left for one to figure out oneself.[87]

§ 29

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON OF KNOWING[88]

Yet thinking in the narrower sense does not consist in the mere presence of abstract concepts in consciousness, but rather in a combination or separation of two or more concepts under the various restrictions and modifications that logic specifies in the theory of judgements. Such a clearly thought-out and expressed relation of concepts[e] is specifically called a *judgement*. Now in relation to this judgement, the principle of reason is again applicable, however, in a very different form from the one stated in the previous chapter, namely as the principle of reason of knowing,[f] *principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*. As such it says that if a judgement would express *knowledge*,[g] it must have a sufficient ground, and on account of this property it receives the predicate *true. Truth* is thus the relation of a judgement to something distinct from it which is called its ground, and as we will soon see, even admits of a significant variety of forms. However, since a ground is always something on which a judgement is supported, or on which it rests, the German term *Grund* is aptly chosen. In Latin, and

[a] *De compositione imaginum*: *dicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari*
[b] *de immortalitate* [c] *Auffassung* [d] *ein Momentanes und Einheitliches*
[e] *Begriffsverhältniß* [f] *Satz vom Grunde des Erkennens* [g] *eine* Erkenntniß

all of the languages derived from it, the term for the ground of knowledge is identical with that for *reason*, that is, both are called *ratio*, *la ragione*, *la razon*, *la raison*, *the reason*. From this it is evident that knowledge of the grounds of judgement is recognized as the preeminent function of reason, its business *par excellence*.[a] Now these grounds, upon which a judgement can rest, can be divided into four types, and the truth which each attains is different, according to its type. These four types of truth are presented in the next four sections.

§ 30 106

LOGICAL TRUTH[89]

A judgement can have another judgement as its ground. Its truth then is *logical* or *formal*. Whether it also has material truth remains undecided and depends on whether the judgement that supports it has material truth or the series of judgements on which it is grounded traces back to a judgement of material truth. – Such grounding of one judgement on another always arises through an equivalence[b] with it; now this occurs either immediately in mere conversion or contraposition of the same, or even by the addition of a third judgement from which the truth of the judgement to be grounded becomes evident from the mutual relations of the other two. This operation is a complete *inference*.[c] It is brought about both by opposition and by subsumption of concepts. Since an inference, as grounding of one judgement through another, by means of a third, always concerns only judgements and these are only combinations of concepts, which are the exclusive objects of reason, inferring[d] has been correctly explained as the unique business of reason. The whole of syllogistics is the aggregate of rules for applying the principle of reason to the mutual relations of judgements, thus it is the canon of *logical truth*.[90]

Those judgements the truth of which is evident from the four well-known laws of thought[91] can be seen as grounded through another judgement, for even these four well-known laws of thought are judgements from which the truth of the other judgements follows. E.g. the judgement 'a triangle is a space enclosed by three lines' has as its ultimate ground the principle of identity, i.e., the thought expressed by this principle. The judgement, 'no body is without extension', has as its ultimate ground the

[a] κατ' ἐξοχήν [b] *Vergleichung* [c] *Schluß* [d] *das Schließen*

principle of contradiction. The judgement, 'every judgement is either true or not true', has as its ultimate ground the law of the excluded middle. Finally, the judgement, 'no one can accept something as true without knowing why', has as its ultimate ground the principle of sufficient reason of knowing. Since the greatest part of humankind has never heard of these
107 abstract laws, in ordinary reasoning judgements following from the four laws of thought are accepted as true even without their first being traced back to these four laws as their premises. Nonetheless, this fact makes those judgements no less dependent on these laws as their premises. For when someone says 'if the support for a body is taken away, then it will fall', this judgement could have been made without one's ever being aware of the principle 'all bodies gravitate toward the centre of the earth'; nonetheless, this judgement would still depend on this principle as its premise. Therefore, I cannot accept that up to now in logic an *intrinsic truth*[a] was attributed exclusively to judgements grounded in the laws of thought, i.e., that intrinsic truths were explained as *immediately true* and that this *intrinsic logical truth*[b] was distinguished from *extrinsic logical truth*,[c] which would be to ground one judgement on another judgement.[d] Every truth is the relation[e] between a judgement and something beyond it, and *intrinsic truth* is a contradiction.

§ 31

EMPIRICAL TRUTH[92]

A representation of the first class, that is, an intuition mediated by the senses, an experience, can be the ground of a judgement; then the judgement has *material* truth and indeed this is *empirical truth* insofar as the judgement itself is *immediately* grounded on experience.

To say that a judgement has *material* truth generally means that its concepts are as mutually connected, separated, or limited as is required by the intuitive representations through which the judgement is grounded. To know this is the immediate concern of the *power of judgement*, which, as has been said, is the mediator between the intuitive faculty and the abstract (or discursive) cognitive faculty, thus between understanding and reason.

[a] *innere Wahrheit* [b] *innere logische Wahrheit* [c] *äußeren logischen Wahrheit*
[d] *welche das Beruhen auf einem andern Urtheil als Grund wäre* [e] *Beziehung*

§ 32 108

TRANSCENDENTAL TRUTH[93]

The forms of intuitive empirical cognition, lying in the understanding and pure sensibility as conditions of the possibility of all experience, can be the ground of a judgement, which is then a synthetic *a priori* judgement. Nevertheless, since such a judgement has material truth, it is a transcendental judgement because the judgement is not merely based on experience, but on the conditions that lie in us for the entire possibility of experience. For the judgement is determined through just that through which experience itself is determined: namely, either through the *a priori* forms of space and time intuited by us, or through the law of causality known to us *a priori*. Examples of such judgements are propositions such as: two straight lines do not enclose a space – nothing occurs without a cause – $3 \times 7 = 21$ – matter can neither arise nor perish. Actually, the whole of pure mathematics could be cited as an example of this type of truth, no less than my table of praedicabilia *a priori*, found in the 2nd volume of *The World as Will and Representation*,[a] as well as most principles in Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

§ 33

METALOGICAL TRUTH[94]

Finally the formal conditions of all thought that lie in our reason can also be the ground of a judgement, the truth of which is then of a kind that I believe is best described if I call it *metalogical truth.* This expression in any case has nothing to do with the *Metalogicon*[b] which *John of Salisbury*[c] wrote in the twelfth century, as in his prologue he explains, 'since I take up the defence of logic, this book is called *Metalogicon*',[d] and then he makes no further use of the word.[95] But there are only four such judgements of metalogical truth,[96] which were long ago found through induction and called laws of all thinking, although there has not always been unity about their number and the way to express them, while there is complete agreement about what they are supposed to indicate in general. They 109
are the following: 1) A subject is equal to the sum of its predicates, or

[a] [Hübscher, *SW* 3, 55] [b] *Metalogicus* [c] Joannes Sarisberriensis
[d] *quia Logicae suscepi patrocinium, Metalogicus inscriptus est liber*

a = a; 2) A predicate cannot at the same time be attributed to and denied of a subject, or a = ~a = 0;[97] 3) Of any two contradictory, opposing predicates, one must belong to every subject; 4) Truth is the relation[a] of a judgement to something outside it, as its sufficient ground.[98]

We know through a reflection, which I prefer to call a self-examination of reason, that these judgements are the expression of conditions of all thinking and, thus, have these conditions as their ground. In making vain attempts to think contrary to these laws, reason recognizes them as conditions of the possibility of all thinking; we then find that to think contrary to them is of as little avail as it is to move our limbs against the direction of their joints.[99] If the subject could cognize itself, then we would also recognize these laws *immediately* and not first through investigation of objects, i.e., representations. In this regard it is just the same with the grounds of judgements of transcendental truth, and they do not come to consciousness immediately, but only concretely,[b] by means of objects, i.e. representations. E.g. if we were to attempt to think of an alteration without a prior cause, or even of an arising or perishing of matter, then we would become aware of the impossibility of such a thing, that is, as an objective impossibility, although it has its root in our intellect; otherwise, we certainly could not bring it to consciousness in a subjective way.[100] In general, a great similarity and relation is noticeable between transcendental and metalogical truths, indicating a common root for both. Here we see the principle of sufficient reason as metalogical truth, after it appeared in the previous chapter[c] as transcendental truth, and in the following chapter[d] it will appear in still another form as transcendental truth. That is precisely why I have taken the trouble in this essay to present the principle of sufficient reason as a judgement that has a fourfold ground – not as four distinct grounds that produce the same judgement by chance, but as one ground presenting itself as fourfold, which I figuratively call the
110 fourfold root. The three other metalogical truths are so greatly similar to one another that almost out of necessity one must strive to find for them a common expression, just as I have done in the 9th chapter of the second volume of my principal work. Conversely they are very different from the principle of sufficient reason. If an analogue for these three other metalogical truths were sought among the transcendental truths, then the analogue likely to be chosen would be: substance – I mean to say matter – is permanent.[101]

[a] *die Beziehung . . . auf* [b] *in concreto* [c] [Schopenhauer refers to § 32]
[d] [See ch. 6, § 32; see Hübscher *SW* 1, 'Anmerkungen zu der Schrift über den "Satz vom Grunde"', 11]

§ 34

REASON[102]

Since the class of representations considered in this chapter belongs only to humans, and since everything that so powerfully distinguishes human life from that of animals and gives humans such great advantage over them (as has been proven) is based on the capacity[a] for these representations, then these representations obviously and indisputably constitute *reason*, which has always been reputed to be the advantage of humankind, just as everything that at all times and by all peoples has been expressly regarded as the manifestation or result of reason, of the λόγος, λόγιμον,[b] τὸ λογιστικόν, *ratio*, *la ragione*, *la razon, la raison, reason*, obviously reduces to what is made possible only by abstract, discursive, reflective, mediated cognition,[c] tied to words, but not to the merely intuitive, immediate, sensible cognition that animals also share. In *On Duties*,[d] I, 16, Cicero quite correctly associates reason and speech[e] describing them as 'that which by teaching, learning, communicating, negotiating, and judging unites humans',[f] etc. Similarly in *On the Nature of the Gods*,[g] II, 7, 'I call it reason, or, if you prefer many words, mind, deliberation, cogitation, prudence'.[h] Also, in *On the Laws*,[i] I, 10, 'reason, which alone constitutes an advantage over the animals, through which we have the power for conjecture, for proving, for refutation, for discussion, for concluding something, for inferring'.[j] All philosophers in all places and at all times spoke of reason in this sense until Kant, who himself still described it as the faculty of principles and inference – though it is not to be denied that he gave rise to subsequent 111
distortions. In *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, § 8, and in the appendix, pp. 577–85[k] and again Vol. 2, ch. 6, finally in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, pp. 148–54,[l] I have already spoken at length about the agreement of all philosophers on this point and about the true

[a] *Fähigkeit*
[b] [perhaps λογικός, 'belonging to the reason, rational', is intended here instead of λόγιμον, 'worth mention']
[c] *Erkenntniß* [d] *De officiis* [e] *ratio et oratio*
[f] *quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, judicando, conciliat inter se homines*
[g] *De natura deorum*
[h] *rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam*
[i] *De legibus*
[j] *ratio, qua una praestamus beluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refellimus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus*
[k] [*WWR* I, 554–53 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 610–19)] [l] [*BM* 148–52 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 146–51)]

nature of reason, in contrast to the falsification of the concept of it by philosophy professors in this century. I need not repeat everything which is said there; rather, I add the following observations.

Philosophy professors have found it advisable to do away with the name by which reason was previously indicated and the sense in which reason has always been understood by all peoples and also by all philosophers; instead, philosophy professors no longer give the name reason to the faculty of thinking and contemplating through reflections and concepts, the faculty which distinguishes humans from animals, the faculty which language requires and which makes language possible – language, on which human discernment and all human achievements depend – but against all conventional use and all common sense they no longer call it *reason*,[a] but *understanding*,[b] and instead of calling everything derived from it *rational*,[c] they call it *intelligent*,[d] which must always appear out of place[e] and gauche, and indeed as a discordant note. For always and everywhere, the immediate and more intuitive faculty that was described in the previous chapter was designated as *understanding*, *intellectus, acumen, perspicacia, sagacitas*, etc. and the results that were derived from it, and that were specifically different from the rational results under discussion here, were called intelligent, clever, subtle, etc. That is why intelligent and rational were always clearly distinguished as expressions of two completely and widely different intellectual capacities. But the philosophy professors could pay no attention to this, for their politics demanded this sacrifice, and in such cases they said: 'Out of the way, truth! We have higher, well-defined aims: out of the way! For the greater glory of God,[f] do as you have long been trained to do! Do you pay some kind of honorarium or wages? Out of the way, truth, out of the way! Go where you belong: go cower in the corner.' That is, they
112 needed the place and name of *reason* for an invented, fabricated, or (to put it more correctly and straightforwardly) a completely fictitious faculty that was supposed to rescue them from the perils in which *Kant* had put them, a faculty for immediate, metaphysical knowledge, i.e., one going beyond all possibility of experience, one grasping the world of things in themselves and its relations, hence, a faculty that is above all a 'consciousness of God', i.e., one that immediately cognizes the Lord God, construing *a priori* how he created the world, or (if that should be too trivial) how he developed the world out of himself through a more or less necessary life process, how he, so to speak, begat the world, or even, as was most

[a] *Vernunft* [b] *Verstand* [c] *vernünftig*
[d] *verständig* [e] *queer* [f] *in majorem Dei gloriam*

convenient (if at the same time most comic) how, as was the custom of noblemen in ending an audience, he merely 'dismissed' the world so that it might take to its feet and march on wherever it wants. Only the mind of an insolent nonsense-scribbler[a] like Hegel would be bold enough for this last. Thus it is the same tomfoolery that for fifty years, under the name of cognition of reason, spun-out at length, fills hundreds of books pretending to be philosophy, books which (one would suppose ironically) are called 'science' and 'scientific', even repeating these expressions to the point of nausea. *Reason* (to which all such wisdom is audaciously imputed) is explained as a 'faculty of the supersensible', and even 'of ideas', in short, as an oracular faculty lying within us, designed immediately for *metaphysics*. For fifty years, great difference of opinion has prevailed among the adepts about the manner of their perception[b] of all these marvels[c] and supersensible perceptions.[d] According to the most impudent, reason has an immediate rational intuition of the absolute, or even, if you prefer, of the infinite,[e] and its evolution[f] into the finite. According to others, who are somewhat less pretentious, it behaves more like a listener than a seer, since it does not exactly intuit, but merely *apprehends*[g] what goes on in Cloud-cuckooland,[h] and then repeats it faithfully to the so-called understanding, which then writes philosophical compendia. And following Jacobi's pun, reason[i] is supposed to have its name from this alleged apprehension[j] – as if it were not obvious that the pun is taken from language (which itself 113
depends on reason), and from the apprehension of words (in contrast to mere hearing, which animals also have). But this wretched pun has flourished for half a century, has passed as a serious thought – even as a proof – and has been repeated a thousand times. Finally, according to the least pretentious, reason neither sees nor hears, and thus experiences neither the view nor the report of all these so-called marvels, but has nothing further of them than a mere presentiment, *Ahndung,* from which word now, however, the d has been eliminated,[k] giving the word a quite singular touch of silliness, which, supported by the sheepish look[l] of the current apostle of such wisdom, must necessarily secure[m] its entry.

But as my readers know, I accept the word *idea* only in its original, Platonic sense, and I have thoroughly discussed it, particularly in the 3rd

[a] *Unsinnschmierer* [b] *Perception* [c] *Herrlichkeiten* [d] *Wahrnehmungen*
[e] *Vernunftanschauung des Absolutums, oder auch* ad libitum *des Unendlichen*
[f] *Evolutionen* [g] *vernimmt* [h] νεφελοκοκκυγία [Aristophanes *Birds*, 819]
[i] *Vernunft* [j] *Vernehmen*
[k] [*Ahndung* is archaic for *Ahnung,* presentiment; *Ahndung* can also mean 'vengeance, punishment']
[l] *Schaafsphysiognomie* [m] *verschaffen*

book of my principal work. On the one hand, the French and English attach to the word *idée* or *idea*, a very ordinary, but nonetheless quite specific and clear sense. On the other hand Germans, when one talks to them of ideas (particularly when it is pronounced *Uedähen*[a]), their heads begin to swim, all discernment abandons them, and they feel as if they were about to go up in a balloon. Then there was something for our adepts of rational intuition to do; therefore, the most impudent of all, the infamous charlatan Hegel, right away called his principle of the world and all things 'the idea' – and everyone thought he really had something there. – However, if one is not struck dumb, but asks, what, then, are these ideas, really (the faculty for which is defined as reason), then one usually gets as an explanation highfalutin', hollow, confused, verbiage, in convoluted sentences[b] of such length that a reader, if he has not already fallen asleep in the middle of such a sentence, in the end finds himself more in a state of stupefaction than of enlightenment – then again, he may suspect that it was intended as a chimera. Meanwhile, if he desires a special acquaintance with ideas of this kind, then all sorts of things are soon dished up for him: namely the scholastics' principal themes, which unfortunately,
114 Kant himself unjustifiably and erroneously called 'ideas of reason', as I have explained in my critique of his philosophy.[c] However, he did so only to show them to be something absolutely indemonstrable and theoretically unjustifiable: specifically the representations of God, an immortal soul, and of a real, objectively existing world and its order – which, as variations are also cited merely as 'God', 'freedom', and 'immortality'. Sometimes it is said to be the absolute, which we have recognized in § 20 above as the cosmological proof, compelled to travel incognito; and sometimes, however, it is said to be the infinite, in contrast to the finite, since the German reader, as a rule, is quite content with this verbiage and does not notice that in the end nothing can be clearly understood by this, except 'that which has an end' and 'that which has no end'. Furthermore, other favourites, particularly among the sentimental and genial, are the alleged ideas 'the good, the true, and the beautiful', although these are three very broad and abstract concepts because they are drawn from countless things and relations, and hence are very poor in content, like thousands of other, similar abstractions. Concerning their content, I have demonstrated above in § 29 that truth is a property exclusively belonging to judgements,

[a] [In lecturing, Hegel pronounced the word in this way in his Swabian accent. See letter to Julius Fräuenstädt, 21 August 1852, *GB* 290]

[b] *Perioden* [periods]

[c] [E.g. *WWR* 1, 517–18 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 578–9)]

thus a logical property, and as for the two remaining abstractions under consideration here, for the first, I refer the reader to *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, § 65, and for the second, to the whole third book of the same work. However if these three meagre abstractions are treated with an air of downright mysteriousness and solemnity, with raised eyebrows, then young people could easily imagine the wonder that lies behind them – something completely out of the ordinary and inexpressible – so that they deserve the name 'ideas', and will be hitched to the triumphal car of this pretended metaphysical reason.

If it is thus taught that we possess a faculty for cognition which is immediate, material (i.e. providing the matter, not merely the form), and supersensible (i.e. leading beyond all possibility of experience), a faculty expressly intended for metaphysical insight, one inherent in us for such a purpose, and that this faculty comprises *our reason* – then I must be so 115
impolite as to call it a bare-faced lie. For the simplest, but most honest self-examination must convince anyone that such a faculty absolutely does not exist within us. Consistent with this is what has been proved in the course of time through the investigations of qualified, competent, honest thinkers: that what is innate and thus *a priori* and independent of the experience of our entire cognitive faculty is entirely limited to the *formal* part of cognition, i.e., to the consciousness of the intellect's own functions and the manner of their only possible activity, which functions, however, one and all require material from the outside in order to produce material cognition. Thus there lie in us, first, the forms of external, objective intuition, as space and time; and, next, the law of causality, which is the only form of the understanding, by means of which it constructs the objective corporeal world; and, finally, the formal part of abstract knowledge.[a] This last is laid down and presented in *logic*, which our forefathers have therefore quite correctly called the *doctrine of reason*. However, this very logic also teaches that *concepts,* which make up the judgements and conclusions to which all laws of logic refer, must obtain their *material*[b] and *content* from *intuitive* cognition – just as understanding creates *this* by taking the material which gives content to its *a priori* forms from sensation.

Thus everything *material*[c] in our cognition, i.e., everything which cannot be reduced to subjective *form* (to the very manner of activity, the very function of the intellect), hence, the entire content[d] of cognition, comes from the outside, that is, ultimately, from the objective intuition of the corporeal world, proceeding from sensation. It is this intuitive, empirical

[a] *Erkenntniß* [b] *Stoff* [c] *Materielle* [d] *Stoff*

cognition which *reason* – *real* reason – following the material provided by cognition, then works up into concepts, which it sensibly fixes through words, and then it has the material for its endless combinations through the judgements and inferences that constitute the web of our world of thought. Thus *reason* has absolutely no *material*, but simply a formal content: this is
116 the subject of logic, which therefore contains merely procedures and rules for the operations of thought. Of course, in thinking, reason must take its material content from the outside, from the intuitive representations that the understanding has created. It exercises its function on these representations, as, in finally forming concepts, it eliminates some of the different properties of things and retains other properties, which it now combines into a concept. But representations thereby forfeit their intuitive quality, gaining, however, in comprehensibility and ease of use,[a] as has been shown above. – Thus this, and this alone, is the activity of reason; whereas reason can never produce *material from its own means*. – It has nothing but forms: it is feminine; it merely receives, but produces nothing. It is not by chance that it appears as feminine in Latin as well as German; whereas understanding is masculine.

Now if it is said that 'Sound reason teaches this', or that 'Reason should rein in the passions' and the like, then in no way does this mean that reason produces material knowledge from its own means; rather, this points to the results of rational reflection, to logical inferences from principles that abstract knowledge, enriched by experience, has gradually gained, and by virtue of which we can clearly and readily survey not merely that which is empirically necessary and hence to be foreseen, should the occasion arise, but the grounds and consequences of our own deeds as well. 'Rational' or 'reasonable' is everywhere synonymous with 'consistent' or 'logical', and the opposite is also true. For indeed, logic is just the natural method of reason itself expressed as a system of rules: these expressions (rational and logical) are related to one another as are practice and theory. A rational way of acting is understood in just this sense as a way of acting that is quite consistent, proceeds from universal concepts, and is intentionally led by abstract thoughts, but not determined by momentary, fleeting impressions; however, nothing is said about the morality of such a way of acting; on the contrary, it could be bad as well as good. Detailed explanations of this
117 can be found in my 'Critique of Kantian Philosophy' 2nd edn, p. 576 ff.,[b] as well as in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, p. 152 ff.[c] Finally

[a] *Uebersichtlichkeit und Leichtigkeit der Handhabung*

[b] [*WWR* 1, 545ff. (Hübscher *SW* 2, 610 ff.)] [c] [*BM* 151–2 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 149 ff.)]

knowledge from *pure reason* (knowledge that we can bring to consciousness *a priori*, i.e., without the aid of experience) is such that its origins lie in the formal part of our cognitive faculty, be it thinking or intuiting. This sort of knowledge is always based on propositions that have transcendental or even metalogical truth.

In contrast, the idea of reason through its own means providing original material knowledge, knowledge therefore beyond all possibility of experience, positively enlightening us – the idea of reason as something that must contain *innate ideas* – is a pure fiction of philosophy professors, resulting from the anxiety evoked in them by the *Critique of Pure Reason*. – Are these gentlemen acquainted with a certain *Locke*, and have they read him? Perhaps once, a long time ago, superficially, in passages, in a poor, hackneyed German translation, looking down on the great man with conscious superiority – for I do not see an increase in knowledge of modern languages in proportion to the decrease in knowledge of ancient languages, no matter how much it is lamented. Of course they have had no time to waste on such old curmudgeons; in fact, even a real and fundamental knowledge of Kantian philosophy is at most to be found in some – very few – old fellows. For the youth of the generation now in manhood must have been expended on the works of that 'giant intellect, Hegel', of the 'great Schleiermacher' and the 'discerning Herbart'. Alas! Alas! Alas! For this is just what is pernicious about such university celebrities and about what comes out of the mouths of decent colleagues in office and aspirants hoping to rise to the heroic heights of a university chair: that mere products of the factory of nature are praised as great minds, as the exceptions and ornaments of humankind, to good, faithful, youth of mediocre minds, lacking in judgement, so that these students dedicate themselves, with all their youthful energy, to the sterile study of such people's endless and mindless scribbling and squander the short and valuable time granted to their higher education, instead of devoting their youthful energy to real instruction, offered by the 118
works of rare, genuine thinkers, the true exceptions among humankind, 'scattered swimmers in the vast abyss',[a] who across the centuries have only now and then emerged, since even nature only occasionally produces their sort and then 'breaks the mould'. These genuine thinkers would also have been alive for today's youth, had they not been cheated out of their share of these genuine thinkers by the exceeding perniciousness of those who praise the bad, those members of the great fellowship of sponsors of mediocre thinking, who always flourish and hoist their banners high as the regular

[a] *rari, nantes in gurgite vasto* [Virgil, *Aeneid* I, 118]

enemies of the great and genuine, who humble them. Just because of these and their activities, the age has so declined that Kantian philosophy, which our fathers understood only after years of serious study and through great effort, has now become unknown to the current generation, before whom Kant's philosophy is like pearls before swine[a] and who try to attack it in a kind of crude, awkward, doltish way – as barbarians throw stones at statues of Greek gods unfamiliar to them. Because this is the way it is nowadays, it is incumbent upon me to recommend something new to the advocates of that reason that knows immediately – that comprehends, that intuits, in short, that reason that produces material knowledge from its own means – to recommend the *first* book of the world-famous, 150-year-old work of *Locke*, which is expressly directed against all innate knowledge, and especially to recommend the 3rd chapter, §§ 21–26.[b] For although *Locke* goes too far in his denial of all innate truths, insofar as he extends that denial to *formal* knowledge (for which Kant most brilliantly corrected him later), nonetheless he was perfectly and undeniably correct about all material knowledge, i.e., substantial knowledge.[c]

I have already said it in my *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*; however, it must be repeated because, as the Spanish proverb teaches, there are none so utterly deaf as those who will not hear (*no hay peor sordo, que el que no quiere oir*): if *reason* were a faculty designed for metaphysics, a faculty providing the material of knowledge, and thus one giving information that extends beyond all possibility of experience, then concerning the subjects
119 of metaphysics, and hence of religion too (since they are the same), just as great agreement among the human race would have to prevail as concerning the subjects of mathematics, so that if someone deviated from others in his views, he would promptly have to be seen as not quite right in the head. But instead exactly the opposite takes place: on no theme is the human race so thoroughly divided as on this one. Ever since humans have begun to think, all philosophical systems have everywhere been in conflict, and some have been diametrically opposed to one another; and ever since humans have begun to have faith (which has been even longer), religions have been fighting one another with fire and sword, with excommunication and cannons. For in the time of quite lively faith there was not some insane-asylum for the occasional heretic, but prisons of the inquisition with all the appurtenances. Thus experience speaks here loudly and urgently against the deceptive pretence of a reason that would be a faculty of immediate,

[a] ὄνος πρὸς λύραν [literally 'an ass before a lyre']
[b] [*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*]
[c] *aller materialen, d.i. Stoff gebenden Erkenntnisse*

metaphysical knowledge or, to put it more clearly, of inspirations from above, and it is really high time for severe judgement about such a pretence; for terrible to say,[a] everywhere in Germany, year in and year out for the past half century, such a lame, such a palpable lie has been disseminated from the lectern to the students' bench and then has wandered from the bench back again to the lectern; indeed, even among the French there have been found a couple of pinheads[b] who have allowed themselves to be taken in by this fairy tale and then have returned to France with it, where, however, the good sense[c] of the French will show the door to *raison transcendentale*.

But then, where was the lie hatched and how has the fairy tale come into the world? – I must acknowledge that, unfortunately, *Kant's* practical reason, with its categorical imperative, first provided the occasion for[d] this fairy tale. That is, having once accepted practical reason, nothing further was needed, but to provide as its companion piece or its twin sister an equally imperial theoretical reason proclaiming metaphysical truths 'from the tripod'.[e] I have described the brilliant success of this action in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, p. 148ff.,[f] to which I refer the reader. While I thus admit that *Kant* provided occasion for this false assumption, 120
I must add, however, that those fond of dancing readily find a piper. It is indeed like a curse that burdens the race of bipeds, that because of their affinity for the preposterous and bad, they are readily pleased by the worst – yes, by the very errors – in the works of great minds, so that they praise and admire these errors; whereas what is really admirable easily passes unnoticed. That which is truly great, that which is actually profound in Kant's philosophy, is now known by extremely few, for when serious study of his works ceased, the understanding of them ceased. For the sake of acquaintance with history, his works are read cursorily by a few, who imagine that what came after him was for the first time correct, and for this reason one notices that in all their talk about Kantian philosophy, they only know the shell, the surface of it; they take home a rough sketch of it, here and there snatching a word, but never penetrating to its profound sense and spirit. Now, what such people have always liked best in Kant are first the antinomies, something completely distorted, but even more, practical reason with its categorical imperative, and yet still more the moral theology based thereon, about which, however, Kant was never serious. Since a theoretical dogma of exclusively practical value is like a wooden

[a] *horribile dictu* [b] *ein Paar Pinsel* [c] *bon sens* [d] *den nächsten Anlaß . . . gegeben*
[e] [*ex tripode*: the reference is to the tripod seat used by the oracular priestess of Apollo at Delphi]
[f] [*BM* 148ff. (Hübscher *SW* 4, 146ff.)]

flintlock that can be given to children without danger, it is also of the same type as 'wash my skin, but don't get it wet'. Concerning the categorical imperative itself, Kant never asserted it as a fact; rather the opposite: he repeatedly protested against this, and served it up merely as the result of a most amazing combination of concepts, because he needed a sheet anchor for morals. But philosophy professors have never investigated the foundation of the matter, so that, apparently, prior to me it has not once been recognized. Instead, they have hastily sought to bring credit to the categorical imperative as a firmly grounded fact, giving it the puristic name 'the moral law', which always reminds me of Bürger's 'Mamsell Laregle';[a] indeed, they have made of it something as solid as Moses' stone tablets, carved with the Decalogue, which, for them, the categorical imperative
121 completely replaces. In my treatise on the 'Foundation of Morals'[b] I have dissected practical reason with its imperative and have demonstrated so clearly and certainly that there has never been life nor truth in them, that I would like to see who could refute me with reasons and in an honest way help give the categorical imperative legs again. However, this does not disconcert philosophy professors. They can no more do without their 'moral law of practical reason' as a familiar *Deus ex machina* for grounding their morals than they can do without freedom of will, since these are two quintessential pieces of their old women's spinning-wheel philosophy. That I have dealt death blows to both makes no difference: for philosophy professors, the two live on – like a monarch already dead, who for political reasons is allowed to reign for a few more days. Against my relentless demolition of these two old fables, these brave men still use their old tactic: quietly, quietly, they slink past it imperceptibly, acting as if nothing had happened so the public will believe that what such a one as I have said is not worth hearing. Now, of course, they are called to philosophy by the ministry, and I am purely by nature. And it will turn out in the end that these heroes act like that idealistically minded bird, the ostrich, which thinks that if it just covers its eyes, the hunter will not see it. Well, now, good counsel comes with time: even if in the mean time (perhaps until I am dead and they can tailor my things to their liking) the public can

[a] [A poem by Gottfried August Bürger (1789) about a school-mistress figure; perhaps 'Miss Rule' would be an English equivalent]

[b] ['On the Foundation of Morals' is the original title of the second of two essays Schopenhauer submitted for contests, both of which were published in 1841 as *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. In the publication, this essay was slightly revised and re-titled 'Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals']

content themselves with these gentlemen's bloviation,[a] insufferably boring ruminations, arbitrary constructions of the absolute, and nursery school morality – for later people will see further.

> Tomorrow, then, the true shall have
> All its friends well-disposed;
> Even if today the base still
> Gain the favour and full place.
> *West–East Divan* p. 97[b]

But then do these gentlemen know the times? – A long prophesied epoch has begun: the church is tottering, tottering so badly, that the question is 122
whether it will once again recover its centre of gravity, for faith is lost. It is with the light of revelation just as with other lights: some darkness is the condition. A certain degree and extent of knowledge has considerably increased the number of those for whom faith is impossible. This attests to the general spread of insipid rationalism, which shows its bulldog countenance more and more. And, imagining itself to be wonderfully clever, it calmly prepares to measure with its tailor's ell the profound mysteries of Christianity, over which the centuries have brooded and disputed. Above all, the central dogma of Christianity, the doctrine of original sin, has become an object of childish ridicule for empty-headed rationalists because even for them nothing can be imagined to be more clear and certain than that everyone's existence has begun with birth, and therefore those coming into this world cannot bear guilt. How clever! – And just as when poverty and neglect gain the upper hand the wolves begin to appear in the village, so under these circumstances materialism, lying ever ready, takes the fore, arriving hand-in-hand with its accomplice, bestiality[c] (called humanism by certain people). – The need for knowledge increases with the inability to have faith. There is a boiling point on the scale of culture at which all faith, all revelation, all authority evaporate, at which people, according to their own lights, demand that they be instructed, but they also want to be convinced. The apron strings of childhood have fallen away: people want to stand on their own legs. But in this, people's metaphysical need (*The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 2, Ch. 17) is as ineradicable as any physical need. It becomes serious in the demand for philosophy, and humankind appeals in its need to all the thoughtful minds to whom it has ever given birth. The hollow verbiage and impotent exertions of intellectual

[a] *Gesaalbader* [b] [Goethe, 'Buch des Unmuts', *West-östlicher Divan,* Stanza 36]
[c] *Bestialismus* [cf. Hübscher *SW* 3, 529–30 ff.]

eunuchs are no longer enough; rather, it then requires a serious-minded philosophy, i.e., one aiming at the truth, not at stipends and fees, one which does not ask whether it pleases ministers or councillors or whether it suits the interest of this or that contemporary church faction; rather, it is
123 obvious that the business of philosophy is something completely different from providing a means of livelihood for the poor in spirit.[a]

However, I return to my theme. A *theoretical* oracle was associated with the *practical* oracle which Kant had falsely attributed to reason by means of an amplification[b] that simply required some daring. The honour for this discovery is probably traceable to F. H. Jacobi, from which dear man the professors of philosophy joyfully and thankfully accepted this valuable gift. For in this way he helped them out of the straits in which Kant had placed them. Cold, sober, deliberating reason, which Kant had so cruelly criticized, was degraded to *understanding*, and from that point on had to bear that name; the name of reason, however, was assigned to a completely imaginary, or in plain language, a made-up faculty, in which one had something like a little window that opened upon the superlunary, or indeed the supernatural world, a window through which could be received, fully finished and prepared, all the truths that old-fashioned, honest, reflective, and deliberative reason had previously troubled itself with and struggled over in vain for centuries. For fifty years, so-called German philosophy based itself on such a completely fictitious faculty, snatched out of thin air: first as the free construction and projection of the absolute I and its emanations into the not-I; then as the intellectual intuition of absolute identity, or indifference, and its evolutions into nature, or of the origin of God out of his dark ground, or groundlessness, *à la* Jakob Böhme; finally as the pure self-thinking of the absolute idea and the theatre of the ballet of the self-movement of concepts; and all the while still as immediate apprehension of the divine, the supersensible, of holiness, of fineness, truthfulness, goodness – and whatever other 'nesses' may be desirable[c] – or even a mere presentiment, *Ahnen*, (without the d[d]) of all that splendidness. – So that is called reason? Oh, no, these are jokes which are supposed to serve as expedients for philosophy professors who have been embarrassed by Kant's serious *Critiques*, in order somehow, by hook or by crook,[e] to pass off the matters[f] of state religion as the findings of philosophy.

[a] *die Armen am Geiste* [b] *Amplification*
[c] *der Gottheit, der Schönheit, Wahrheit, Gutheit, and was sonst noch für Heiten gefällig sein mögen*
[d] [*Ahnden,* 'vengeance, punishment', is also an archaic form of *Ahnen,* 'presentiment']
[e] *per fas aut nefas* [f] *Gegenstände*

First in the line of dutifulness[a] of all professors of philosophy is to ground 124
philosophically and settle beyond all doubt the doctrine of God as creator and ruler of the world, as a personal, and consequently individual being, endowed with understanding and will, who produced the world out of nothing and guides it with the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness. But this puts philosophy professors in a precarious situation with respect to serious philosophy. That is, *Kant* arrived: the *Critique of Pure Reason* was already written more than sixty years ago, and the result of this has been that all proofs that have been offered over the course of the Christian centuries for the existence of God (which are reducible to only three possible types of proof) are absolutely not able to deliver what is required. Indeed, the impossibility of any such proof, and along with this the impossibility of all speculative theology, are completely proven *a priori*, and indeed, in a way generally understandable – not in a way full of empty verbiage and Hegelian claptrap[b] such that one can make what one wants out of it, as has become the fashion in our day. No, Kant's arguments are quite serious and honest, following venerable practice, so that for sixty years, however awkward it has become for many, no one has been able to raise a cogent objection to Kant's arguments. Moreover, as a result of Kant's arguments, the proofs of the existence of God have been fully discredited and have become useless. Indeed, philosophy professors have looked down on such proofs, even shown a decided contempt for them because the matter is so completely self-evident that it would be ridiculous even to want to demonstrate it. Ai! Ai! Ai! if only this had been known sooner. Then we would not have troubled ourselves for centuries over such proofs, and it would not have been necessary for Kant to crush these with the complete weight of his critique of reason. Such contempt as mentioned above will remind many of the fox with sour grapes. In any case, whoever would like a sample of such proof, will find a quite characteristic one in Schelling's *Philosophical Writings*, Vol. 1, 1809, p. 152.[c] – While others have taken solace in the fact that Kant said that neither can the opposite be proven – as if the old rascal were not aware that 'the proof is incumbent on those who assert the affirmative'[d] – along came Jacobi's amazing discovery like a knight to 125
the rescue of the philosophy professors, granting to this century's German scholars a quite unusual faculty of reason of which no human being had previously heard or known.

[a] *Obliegenheit* [b] *Wischiwaschi*

[c] [Schopenhauer here refers to Schelling's argument, 'If there *is* a *God*, then he can only exist *because* he is']

[d] *affirmanti incumbit probatio*

And still all these tricks were in no way necessary. For the existence of God itself is not in the least challenged by the impossibility of proving it since it stands on quite certain grounds and unshakeably firm. In fact, it is a matter of revelation, and of course this is much more certain, as the revelation has been solely and exclusively granted to the people who, for that reason, are called the chosen ones. This much is evident: that knowledge of God as the personal ruler and creator of the world who made everything good occurs solely in the Jewish faith and the two doctrines of faith derived from it, which, in a broader sense, can be called its sects, but this knowledge is not to be found in the religions of any other peoples of ancient or modern times. For it would not occur to anyone to confuse the Lord God, say, with the *Brahman* of the Hindus, who lives and suffers in me, in you, in my horse, in your dog – or even the Brahmā who is born and dies to make way for other Brahmās, and moreover, whose production of the world is attributed to sin and guilt* – not to mention duped Saturn's voluptuous son, whom Prometheus defies and whose fall he prophesies. But if we consider *the* religion which has the greatest number of followers on earth, and which thus has the majority of humankind as its adherents and in this regard can be called the most eminent – that is, Buddhism – then today we can no longer hide the fact that, just as it is strictly idealistic and ascetic, it is also decidedly and expressly atheistic, so much so that when the doctrine of pure theism is presented to its priests, they expressly
126 reject it. Therefore (as is reported to us in the *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. 6, p. 268, similarly by Sangermano in his *Description of the Burmese Empire*, p. 81) in an essay delivered to a Catholic Bishop, the high priest of Buddhists in Ava counted among the six mortal sins the doctrine 'that there is a being who has created the world and all things and is alone worthy of praise and worship'. (See I. J. Schmidt's *Investigations in the Field of the History of Ancient Central-Asian Civilization*, St Petersburg 1824, p. 276.)[a] For just this reason, I. J. Schmidt in St Petersburg (an admirable scholar whom I firmly believe to be the most thoroughly knowledgeable expert on Buddhism in Europe) also said in his paper 'On the Kinship of Gnostic

* 'If Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds . . . how can tranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of beings?' *Prabod'h Chandro'Daya* [*or the Moon of Intellect, an Allegorical Drama*], trans. J. Taylor. [London: Longman, 1812], p. 23. Brahmā is also part of the Trimūrti, the personification of nature as birth, preservation, and death; that is, he represents the first of these

[a] *Forschungen im Gebiete der älteren* [*religiösen, politischen und litterarischen*] *Bildungsgeschichte* [*der Völker*] *Mittelasiens,* [*vorzüglich der Mongolen und Tibeter*. St Petersburg and Leipzig: Carl Cnobloch, 1824]

Doctrines with Buddhism',[a] p. 9: 'The writings of the Buddhists lack any positive indication of a supreme being as the principle of creation, and that indication even appears to be assiduously avoided when this subject arises in the course of the discussion.' He says the same in his *Investigations in the Field of the History of Ancient Central-Asian Civilization*, p. 180: 'The system of Buddhism knows no eternal, uncreated, single divine being who always was and created everything visible and invisible. This idea is completely foreign to it and in Buddhist books there is not the least trace of it. Neither is there a creation; the visible universe is not without beginning, although it has *originated* out of empty space consistent with immutable natural laws. It would be an error to assume that something – call it fate or nature – were considered or venerated by the Buddhists as a divine principle; rather, it is the opposite, since precisely this development from empty space, this precipitation out of itself, this partitioning of empty space in innumerable parts, or this matter that now originates, is the evil of *Jirtinschi* or of the universe in its inner and outer relations, from which the *Ortschilang*, or continuous change, has *originated* following immutable laws after these laws were established by this evil'. He says just the same in his lecture held on 15 September 1830 at the St Petersburg Academy,[b] p. 26: 'The expression "creation" is foreign to Buddhism since Buddhism knows only of the formation of the world'; and p. 27: 'It must be understood 127
that in their system cannot be found an idea of any sort of primordial divine creation.' There are hundreds of other similar examples. However, I will only call attention to one, because it is quite popular and, besides, official. That is, the 3rd volume of the very instructive Buddhist work, *The Mahāvasi, Rājā-Ratnācari and the Rājā-Vali, from the Singhalese,*[c] by E. Upham, London, 1833, contains the translation from the Dutch protocols of the individual and successive official interrogations, which, around 1766, the Dutch Governor of Ceylon held with the high priests of the five preeminent pagodas. The contrast between the interlocutors, who could not come to a very good understanding, is most amusing. The priests, filled with love and compassion for all living beings, as is consistent with

[a] *Über die Verwandtschaft der gnostisch* [*-theosophischen*] *Lehren mit* [*den Religionsystemen des Orients, vorzüglich*] *dem Buddhaismus* [Leipzig: Carl Cnobloch, 1828]

[b] [*Über einige Grundlehren des Buddhaismus.* 2. Abhandlung. Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences à St Pétersbourg. VI. Série. Sciences politiques, Histoire et Philologie. Vol. 1, pp. 222–62. Schopenhauer is referring to a 42-page reprint, without title page, of this lecture]

[c] [*The Mahâwansi; the Rájá-Ratnácari, and the Rájá-Vali, forming the sacred and historical books of Ceylon; also, a collection of tracts illustrative of the doctrine and literature of Buddhism: translated from the Singhalese*]

the doctrine of their religion – even if they should happen to be Dutch Governors – make efforts to be compliant and to provide satisfying answers to all his questions. But the naive and guileless atheism of these pious and even encratistic[a] high priests comes into conflict with the sincere, heart-felt conviction of the Governor, who was already judaicized in the cradle. His faith has become so second nature to him that he cannot even consider that these spiritual men are not theists; therefore, he asks again and again about the supreme being, about who then created the world, and the like. The priests then opine that there could be no higher being than the triumphant Perfect One, the Buddha Sākyamuni, who was born the son of a king, voluntarily lived as a mendicant, and up to his death preached his noble doctrine for the well-being of humankind in order to save us all from the misery of constant rebirth; the world, however, was made by no one;* it was self-created;[b] nature expands and contracts, but it is that which, in existing, does not exist; it is the necessary concomitant of rebirth; these are but the consequences of our sinful habits, etc. These conversations continue in this way for about a hundred pages. – I mention this fact primarily because it is really scandalous that still today, in the
128 writings of German scholars, religion and theism have been completely accepted without question as identical and synonymous, while religion relates to theism as *genus* to a individual species, and in fact Judaism and theism are simply identical; therefore, we stigmatize all people who are not Jews, Christians, or Muslims,[c] with the popular term heathens. Muslims and Jews even repudiate Christians for not being pure theists because of the doctrine of the Trinity. For Christianity, whatever might be said, has Indian blood in its veins and thus a constant tendency to rid itself of Judaism. – Kant's critique of reason is the most serious attack that has ever been waged on theism, on account of which philosophy professors have hastened to set it aside, but if it had appeared in Buddhist countries, then, as the citations above suggest, it would have been seen as nothing more than an edifying tract for the most fundamental refutation of heretics against Buddhism and as a beneficial confirmation of the orthodox teaching of idealism, that is, of the doctrine of the merely apparent existence of

* Κόσμον τόνδε, φησὶν 'Ηράκλειτος, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν ['The cosmos, says Heraclitus, is neither made by some god nor by some human'] *Plut*[*arch*]. *De animae procreatione* ch. 5 [1014A]

[a] *enkratistischen*
[b] [Following the German *selbstgeschaffen*, Schopenhauer parenthetically provides the English]
[c] *Mohammedaner*

the world that presents itself to our senses. The two other main religions coexisting with Buddhism in China are just as atheistic: that of Lao-Tzu and that of Confucius; therefore, the missionaries could not even translate the first verse of the Pentateuch into Chinese because the language has absolutely no expressions for God and creation. Even the missionary Gützlaff, in his recently appearing *History of the Chinese Empire*,[a] is so honest as to say, p. 18: 'it is extraordinary that none of the philosophers (in China), who nonetheless possess the full measure of the light of nature, has risen to a recognition of a creator and Lord of the universe.' What J. F. Davis reported is in complete agreement with this (*The Chinese*, ch. 15, p. 156[b]): that Milne, the translator of the *Shing-yu*, says in the introduction to this work that from it can be seen, 'that the bare light of nature, as it is called, even when aided by all the light of pagan philosophy, is totally incapable of leading men to the knowledge and worship of the true God'. All this confirms that the only basis of theism is revelation, as it must be if revelation is not to be superfluous. I take this opportunity to remark 129
that the word 'atheism' contains a surreptitious presupposition insofar as it presumes that theism is self-evident. Instead, one should say: 'non-Judaism', and instead of 'atheist', 'non-Jew'. This would be an honest way of speaking.

Now as I said above, since the existence of God is a matter of revelation and thereby unshakeably established, it requires no human confirmation. But now philosophy is merely the attempt, really superfluous and undertaken in idleness, for once to leave reason (the human faculty to think, to contemplate, reflect) to its own powers – as when someone takes a toddler to a park to loose the apron strings, so that the toddler might try out its powers – in order to see what might result. Such tests and attempts are called speculation, and it lies in the nature of the case that speculation at once overlook and ignore all authority, divine as well as human, and go its own way to seek the highest and most important truths in its own way. Now if, on this basis and ground,[c] its result is none other than those of our great Kant cited above, then for this reason it need not immediately renounce all honesty and conscientiousness, and like a scoundrel, slink by secret paths just to somehow get back to the Jewish basis and ground as the necessary condition[d] of speculation; rather, it must quite honestly

[a] *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reichs* [2 vols., Quedlinburg, 1836]

[b] [*The Chinese: A general Description of the Empire of China and its Inhabitants*. 2 vols., London: Charles Knight, 1836. The correct citation is p. 164]

[c] *Grund und Boden* [d] *conditio sine qua non*

and simply track the truth in another way, by such paths as are open to it, but never by following some other light than that of reason; rather, without concern for where it is led, it must go its own way calmly and with confidence, like someone working at their calling.

If our philosophy professors understand this matter differently and believe that they cannot eat their bread with honour as long as they have not set the Lord God on the throne (as if he needs them), then from this it is readily explainable why they have not found my works to their taste and why I am certainly not their man; for of course, I cannot serve with their kind, or like them stand in every marketplace, passing on the latest news about dear God.

On the third class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing in it

§ 35[103]

EXPLANATION OF THIS CLASS OF OBJECTS

The third class of objects for the faculty of representation constitutes the formal part of complete representations, namely, the intuitions, given *a priori*, of the forms of the outer and inner senses, space and time.

As pure intuitions, they are objects of the faculty of representation by themselves and separate from complete representations and from the determinations of being full or empty which first arise through complete representations. For even pure points and lines absolutely cannot be presented,[a] but can only be intuited *a priori*, just as the infinite extension and infinite divisibility of space and time are objects only of pure intuition and are foreign to empirical intuition. What distinguishes this class of representations, in which space and time are *pure intuitions*, from the first class, in which space and time are *perceived* (indeed, conjointly perceived) is matter; therefore, on the one hand I have explained matter as the perceptibility of space and time, and on the other hand as causality that has become objective.

In contrast, the form of understanding of causality is not by itself and 131
separately an object of the faculty of representation, but first comes to consciousness with and in the material part of cognition.[104]

§ 36[105]

PRINCIPLE OF THE REASON OF BEING

Space and time are so constituted[b] that all of their parts stand in a relation to one another, so each of them determines and is conditioned by another.

[a] *dargestellt* [b] *haben die Beschaffenheit*

In space, this relation is called *position*; in time, *succession*. These relations are unique, completely different from all other possible relations of our representations, and therefore, neither the understanding nor reason is capable of grasping them by means of mere concepts; rather, they are intelligible to us simply and solely by means of pure, *a priori* intuition since it cannot be made clear through mere concepts what is above and below, right and left, back and front, what is before and after. Kant[a] quite correctly confirms this by explaining that the distinction between the right and left glove absolutely cannot be made intelligible any other way than by means of intuition.[106] Now I call the law according to which the parts of space and time determine one another with regard to these relations the *principle of sufficient reason of being*, *principium rationis sufficientis essendi*. An example of this relation, already given in the 15th section, the connection between the sides and angles of a triangle, itself shows that this relation is completely different both from that between cause and effect and from that between cognitive ground and consequence, which is why the condition may be called reason of *being*, *ratio essendi*. It goes without saying that insight into such a *ground of being*[b] can become a ground of knowledge,[c] just as an insight into the law of causality and its application in a specific case is a ground of knowledge of the effect; however, this in no way annuls the complete difference between the ground of being, of becoming, and of knowing. In many cases, that which is a *consequence* according to *one*
132 form of our principle, is a ground according to another; hence, the effect is very often the ground of knowledge of the cause. E.g. the thermometer's rising, is, according to the law of causality, a *consequence* of increased heat; whereas, according to the principle of reason of knowing, a thermometer's rising is a *ground*, a ground of knowledge of increased heat, as well as the judgement which this expresses.[107]

§ 37[108]

GROUND OF BEING IN SPACE

The position of any part of space, say, of one given line (the same applies to areas, bodies, points) relative to any second line and its completely different position relative to any possible other line, is thoroughly determined, so that one position stands to the other in the relation of consequence to ground. Since the position of a line relative to the position of any other

[a] [*Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, Ak. 4: 286] [b] *Seynsgrund* [c] *Erkenntnißgrund*

possible line determines its position relative to all other lines, including that just referred to as determined in relation to the other, it does not matter which is considered to be determined first and which is considered to be determining the other; i.e. it does not matter which is considered to be the ground[a] on which others are based.[b] This is so because there is no succession in space; indeed, the representation of simultaneity[c] arises just because the totality of representations of the complex of experience is formed through the union of space with time. Thus with the ground of being in space, an analogue of the so-called reciprocal action[d] prevails everywhere, about which I will give details on considering reciprocity of grounds in § 48. Now because the position of any line is determined by all others just as they are determined by it, it is just a matter of choice if a line is considered merely as determining others and not as determined, and the position of any line relative to any other line allows the question of its position relative to a third, and by means of the second position the first is necessarily as it is. Therefore in the concatenation of grounds of being, as in the grounds of becoming, there is absolutely no end to be found in what comes before,[e] and on account of the infinity of space and of the lines in it, there is also none in what follows after.[f] All possible relative spaces are figures because they are bounded, and all these figures have their 133
ground of being in one another because of their common boundaries. The series of grounds of being[g] in space, like the series of grounds of becoming,[h] proceed infinitely,[i] and indeed not only in one direction, but in all directions.

A proof of all this is impossible, for these are propositions whose truth is transcendental,[109] since they have their ground immediately in the intuition of space, which is given *a priori*.

§ 38[110]

GROUND OF BEING IN TIME. ARITHMETIC

In time each moment is conditioned by the previous moment. Here the ground of being, as the law of sequence,[j] is so simple because time has only one dimension, and thus there can be in time no multiplicity of relations. Every moment is conditioned by the previous one: only through the first

[a] *ratio* [b] *rationata* [c] *Zugleichseyns* [d] *Wechselwirkung* [e] *a parte ante*
[f] *a parte post* [g] *series rationum essendi* [h] *series rationum fiendi*
[i] *in infinitum* [j] *Folge*

can one reach the second; only insofar as the first *was*, has flown by, can the second *be*. This nexus of the parts of time is the basis of all counting, the words of which only serve to mark the individual steps of succession; hence, all of arithmetic teaches absolutely nothing but methodical abbreviations of counting.[111] Every number presupposes the previous one as ground of its being: I can only reach 10 through all previous numbers, and solely by means of this insight into the ground of being, I know that where there are 10, there are also 8, 6, and 4.

§ 39[112]

GEOMETRY

In just the same way, all of geometry depends on the nexus of the positions of the parts of space. Consequently, geometry would be an insight[a] into this nexus, but as was said above, such an insight is not possible through mere concepts,[113] but only through intuition, so every geometrical proposition would have to be reduced to this intuition, and the proof would merely consist in clearly bringing out the nexus whose intuition is at issue; nothing
134 more could be done. However, we find the treatment of geometry to be completely different. Only Euclid's twelve axioms rest on mere intuition, and even among these really only the ninth, eleventh, and twelfth rest on separate and distinct intuitions. All the others rest on the insight that in science, unlike in experience, one is not concerned with real things,[114] infinitely different, existing separately, and adjoining one another, but one is concerned with concepts. The others also rest on the insight that in mathematics one is concerned with *normal intuitions*,[b] i.e., figures and numbers whose laws are binding for all experience and which thus combine the comprehensiveness of a concept with the complete determinacy of a particular representation. For although normal intuitions, like intuitive representations, are completely determinate (and *as such* are not general because they exclude indeterminacy), they are nonetheless general because they are the mere forms of all appearances and as such apply to all real objects to which such forms belong. Therefore what Plato said about his Ideas would apply to these normal intuitions, even in geometry, as well as to concepts: namely, that no two which are exactly alike can exist, for then they

[a] *Einsicht* [b] *Normalanschauungen*

would only be one.* I say that this would also apply to normal intuitions in geometry, were they not, like objects that are only *spatial*, distinguished by simple *juxtaposition*, by *locus*.[a] According to Aristotle, Plato already made this observation: 'Moreover, besides that which is sensible and Ideas, he says there are mathematical things that are intermediate, different from that which is sensible in being eternal and inalterable, different from Ideas in being many alike, while each Idea itself is unique',[b] *Metaphysics* I, 6, 135
with which compare X, 1.[115] Now the simple view that such a difference of place does not abolish the rest of identity could, it seems to me, replace those nine axioms, and for the essence of science, the purpose of which is to know the particular from the universal, this view would be more suitable than the statement of nine different axioms that all rest on a single view. So then what Aristotle says, *Metaphysics* X, 3, would apply to geometric figures: 'equality is unity in all of these'.[c]

However, for normal intuitions in time, that is numbers, there is no such difference as juxtaposition, but simply, as for concepts, the identity of indiscernibles,[d] and there is only one five and one seven. Here too can be found the reason why the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is not, as Herder opined in his *Metacritique*,[e] one of identity, but as Kant has so profoundly discovered, is a synthetic *a priori* proposition,[f] based on pure intuition. 12 = 12 is a proposition of identity.

* Perhaps *Platonic* Ideas can be described as normal intuitions [*Normalanschauungen*], which, unlike mathematical intuitions, would not only be valid for the formal aspect of complete representations, but also for the material aspect; thus, they would be complete representations that as such would be thoroughly determinate, and at the same time, like concepts, would concern many things; i.e. according to the explanation given in § 28, they would be representatives of concepts, completely adequate as such

[a] *Ort*

[b] ἔτι δέ, παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη, τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον (*item, praeter sensibilia et species, mathematica rerum ait media esse, a sensibilibus quidem differentia eo, quod perpetua et immobilia sunt, a speciebus vero eo, quod illorum quidem multa quaedam similia sunt, species vero ipsa unaquaeque sola*) [987b, 14ff. To maintain consistency with Schopenhauer's use of *Idee* we translate τό εἶδος as 'Idea' instead of 'Form']

[c] ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἑνότης (*in illis aequalitas unitas est*) [1054b, 3]

[d] *identitas indiscernibilium* [see Leibniz, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, ch. 27, secs. 1 and 3]

[e] [*Verstand und Erfahrung: Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Pt. I. Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1799, p. 31]

[f] *synthetischer Satz* a priori

Thus in geometry, only in the case of axioms is appeal actually made to intuition. All remaining theorems are demonstrated, i.e., a ground of knowledge of the theorem is specified, which compels one to accept them as true; thus, the logical truth, not the transcendental truth of the theorem, is demonstrated.[116] (§§ 30 and 32.) But this, which lies in the ground of being and not in that of knowing,[117] is never evident except by means of intuition. Therefore upon a geometric demonstration of this kind one indeed has the conviction that the demonstrated proposition is true, but in no way does one see why what the proposition asserts is as it is; i.e. one does not possess the ground of being, but usually by this point the demand for it has arisen. For proof through demonstration of the ground of knowledge produces mere conviction (*convictio*), not insight (*cognitio*): perhaps for this reason it would be more correct to call this refutation rather than demonstration.[a] Therefore a demonstration of this kind usually leaves behind an unpleasant feeling, as is generally the case with a marked lack of insight, and here the lack of knowledge of *why* something is so is first felt through a given certainty *that* it is so. In this case, the feeling is similar to
136 that which is produced when someone pulls a rabbit out of a hat and we cannot understand how the trick works. As occurs in such demonstrations, the ground of knowledge without ground of being is analogous to many theories of physics, which explain a phenomenon without being able to indicate the cause as, e.g., the Leidenfrost experiment, insofar as it works in a platinum crucible.[118] In contrast, the ground of being of a geometric proposition recognized through intuition gives satisfaction as does any acquired knowledge. If one has the ground of being, the conviction of the truth of the proposition is supported on it alone, and no longer on the ground of knowing given by demonstration. E.g. *Euclid* demonstrates the 6th proposition in his first book, 'if two angles of a triangle are equal, then their opposite sides are equal', in this way: let the triangle be *a b g,* in which the angle *a b g* is equal to the angle *a g b*; then I assert that the side *a g* is also equal to the side *a b* (see Fig. 3).

For if side *a g* is unequal to side *a b*, then one of them is greater. Let *a b* be greater. Remove from the greater side, *a b,* a segment *d b*, equal to the smaller *a g*, and draw the line *d g*. Now since (in the triangles *d b g*, *a b g*) *d b* is equal to *a g*, and *b g* is common to both, then the two sides *d b* and *b g* are equal to the two sides *a g* and *g b*, respectively, and the angle *d b g* is equal to the angle *a g b;* the base line *d g* is equal to the base line *a b*; and the triangle *a b g* is equal to the triangle *d g b*; the greater is equal to the

[a] *elenchus . . . demonstratio*



Figure 3

smaller – which is absurd. Thus *a b* is not unequal to *a g*; consequently, it is equal.

In this proof we now have a ground of knowledge of the truth of the theorem. But who bases[a] his conviction of this geometric truth on this proof? Instead, one's conviction is based on the ground of being, known by intuition, according to which (through a necessity that no longer admits of being demonstrated, but only of being intuited) if from both end points of a line, two other end points incline equally toward one another, they can only meet at one point equidistant from both end points because the two angles thereby arising actually are only one, appearing to be two merely because of their opposing positions, so there is no ground for the lines' 137
meeting closer to one than to the other point.

Through cognition[b] of the ground of being, one sees the necessary consequence of the conditioned from its condition; in this case, the equality of the sides from the equality of the angles (that is, their connection); however, through the ground of knowing, one understands only the coexistence of both. Indeed, it can even be asserted that by the usual method of proofs one will actually be convinced only that both figures in the present example coexist, but not that they always coexist, which truth (since the necessary connection has in fact not been shown) one obtains here through a conviction merely grounded in induction, a conviction which rests on the fact that one finds it so with every figure one draws. Of course only with such simple theorems as Euclid's 6th is the ground of being so obvious. Still I am convinced that it must be possible to show the ground of being for any theorem, even the most complicated, and the certainty of the proposition must be reducible to such a simple intuition. Also, anyone is *a priori* conscious of the necessity for such a ground of being for any spatial relation as much as anyone is *a priori* conscious of the necessity for the cause of any alteration. Certainly in complicated theorems it must be very

[a] *gründet* [b] *Erkenntniß*



Figure 4



Figure 5

difficult to give the ground of being, and here is not the place for difficult geometric investigations. Therefore, just to make even clearer what I mean, I will seek to reduce a slightly more complicated proposition to its ground of being, where that ground is not so immediately obvious. I skip over ten theorems to the sixteenth. 'In every triangle of which one side has been produced, the exterior angle is greater than either of the interior opposite angles.' Euclid's proof is as follows (see Fig. 4).

Let the triangle be *a b g*, and let side *b g* be produced to *d*, and I assert that the exterior angle *a g d* is greater than either of the opposite interior angles. – Bisect the side *a g* at *e* and draw *b e*, and then produce it to *z* such that *e z* is equal to *e b*. Join *z g* and produce *a g* to *h*. – Now since *a e* is equal to *e g*, and *b e* is equal to *e z*, the two sides *a e* and *e b* are equal to the two sides *g e* and *e z*, respectively, and the angle *a e b* is equal to the angle
138 *z e g*, for they are vertical and opposite angles. Hence the base line *a b* is equal to the base line *z g*, and the triangle *a b e* is equal to the triangle *z e g*, and the remaining angles are equal to the remaining angles; consequently, the angle *b a e* is equal to the angle *e g z*. But the angle *e g d* is greater than *e g z*; consequently, the angle *a g d* is also greater than the angle *b a e*. – Also bisect *b g*, and in a similar way it will be proved that the angle *b g h*, i.e., the vertical and opposite angle *a g d* is greater than *a b g*.

I would prove the same proposition in the following way (see Fig. 5).



Figure 6

For angle *b a g* to be equal to (let alone greater than) angle *a g d*, line *b a* would have to lie in the same direction relative to *a g* as *b d* (this is just what is called equality of angles); i.e. be parallel to *b d*; i.e. it could never meet *b d*. However, if a triangle is to be formed, it must (ground of being) meet *b d* and so do the opposite of what would be required for angle *b a g* even to be the same size as *a g d*.

For angle *a b g* to be equal to (let alone greater than) angle *a g d*, line *b a* would have to lie in the same direction relative to *b d* as *a g* (this is just what is called equality of angles); i.e. be parallel to *a g*; i.e. it could never meet *a g*. However, if a triangle is to be formed, it must meet *a g* and so do the opposite of what would be required for angle *a b g* even to be the same size as *a g d*.

Through all of this I have in no way proposed a new method of mathematical demonstration, no more than my proof will take the place of Euclid's; for by its whole nature and because it presupposes the concept of parallel lines (which come later in Euclid) my proof is unsuitable as a new method; rather, I have only wanted to show what the ground of being is and how it is different from the ground of knowing, since the latter merely produces conviction,[a] which is something completely different from insight into the ground of being. But the fact that in geometry one strives to produce only conviction (which, as was said, leaves a sense of dissatisfaction) but not insight into the ground of being[b] (which like any insight, satisfies and delights) may be one reason[c], among others, why many otherwise brilliant minds have an aversion to mathematics.

However, I cannot refrain from again providing a figure which has 139
already been given in other places[d] (Fig. 6), the mere appearance of which,

[a] *convictio* [b] *Grund des Seyns* [c] *Grund* [d] [*WWR* 1, 98 (Hübscher *SW* 3, 86ff.)]

without further discussion provides twenty times the conviction of the truth of the Pythagorean theorem than Euclid's mousetrap proof. The reader interested in this chapter may find the subject discussed further in *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, § 15 and Vol. 2, ch. 13.[119]

On the fourth class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing in it

§ 40[120]

GENERAL EXPLANATION

The last class of objects of the faculty of representation still remaining for our consideration is one quite special, but very important: for everyone it[121] is comprised of only *one* object, namely the immediate object of the inner sense, *the subject of willing*,[122] which is object for the cognizing subject and indeed is given only to the inner sense; thus, it appears only in time, not in space, and even there, as we will see, with a significant qualification.

§ 41[123]

SUBJECT OF COGNITION AND OBJECT

Any cognition necessarily[a] presupposes subject and object. Thus even self-consciousness is not absolutely simple, but just like the consciousness of other things (i.e. the faculty of intuition), it divides into that which is cognized and that which cognizes. Here what is cognized appears absolutely and exclusively as will.

Therefore the subject cognizes itself only as *something that wills*,[b] but 141
not as *something that cognizes*.[c] For the I that represents,[d] the subject of cognition, can never itself become a representation or object, since, as the necessary correlate of all representations, it is their condition; however, the beautiful passage of the sacred Upanishad applies to it: 'that which sees all is not to be seen; that which hears all is not to be heard; that which knows all is not to be known; that which discerns all is not to be

[a] *unumgänglich* [b] *ein Wollendes* [c] *ein Erkennendes* [d] *das vorstellende Ich*

discerned. Beyond it, seeing, and knowing, and hearing, discerning, there is nothing.'[a] – *Oupnek'hat*, Vol. 1, p. 202 – [124]

Therefore there is no *cognition of the cognizing* because it would require that the subject separate itself from cognizing and yet cognize the cognizing, which is impossible.

To the objection, 'I not only cognize,[b] but I also know[c] that I cognize' I would answer: your knowing[d] of your cognizing[e] is different from your cognizing only in its being expressed. 'I know that I cognize', says nothing more than 'I cognize', and then, without anything further, this says nothing more than 'I'. If your cognizing and your knowing of this cognizing are two different things, then try just once to have either by itself alone: first to cognize[f] without knowing[g] about it, and then again, to know simply of cognizing without this knowing being at the same time cognizing. Of course, one can abstract from any *particular* cognition and so arrive at the proposition 'I cognize', which for us is the ultimate possible abstraction, but identical with the proposition 'for me, there are objects' and this is identical with 'I am subject', which contains nothing more than merely 'I'.

Now if the subject cannot be cognized, it could be asked how its various powers of cognition (sensibility, understanding, reason) can be recognized.[h] – We do not recognize these because cognizing has become an object for us; otherwise, there would not be so many contradictory judgements about them; rather, they are inferred, or, put more correctly, they are common expressions for the established classes of representations, which at all times are more or less precisely distinguished in those very powers of cognition. But with regard to the subject (as the necessary cor-
142 relate and condition of those representations), these cognitive powers are abstracted from those representations, and, consequently, they are related to the classes of representations just as the subject in general is related to the object in general. Just as with the subject the object is also immediately assumed (since otherwise the word is even without meaning), and in the same way the subject is also immediately assumed with the object, so that being the subject means exactly the same as having an object, and being the object means exactly the same as being cognized by the subject; so now, in exactly the same way for an object *determined in some way*, the subject

[a] *Id videndum non est: omnia videt; et id audiendum non est: omnia audit; sciendum non est: omnia scit; et intelligendum non est: omnia intelligit. Praeter id, videns, et sciens, et audiens, et intelligens ens aliud non est.* [Anquetil-Duperron, Abraham Hyacinthe (trans.). *Oupnek'hat (id est, secretum tegendum . . .)*, 2 vols. Argentorati: Levrault, 1801]

[b] *erkenne* [c] *weiß* [d] *Wissen* [e] *Erkennen* [f] *erkennen* [g] *wissen* [h] *bekannt*

is also immediately assumed to be *cognizing in just that way*. Insofar as it is a matter of indifference whether I say that objects have such and such determinations inherent in and specific to them or that the subject cognizes in such and such ways, it is all the same whether I say that the objects are divisible into such and such classes or that such and such different powers of cognition are specific to the subject. Also, traces of this insight are to be found in that amazing mix of profundity and superficiality – in Aristotle – as one can often find in him already the seed of critical philosophy. In *On the Soul*[a] III, 8, he says: 'the soul is in a way everything that exists'[b]; and next: ὁ νοῦς ἐστι εἶδος εἰδῶν, i.e., understanding is the form of forms, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν, and sensibility the form of objects of the senses.[c] Now as a result, whether one says that sensibility and understanding no longer exist or that the world has ended – is all the same. Whether one says that there are no concepts or that reason is gone and now there are but animals – is all the same.

Failure to recognize this relation gave rise to the controversy between realism and idealism, ultimately appearing as the dispute between the old dogmatism and the Kantians, or between ontology and metaphysics and the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic.[d] This dispute rests on the failure to recognize this relation when considering the first and third classes of representations I have advanced, just as the controversy between the realists and the nominalists in the middle ages resulted from the failure to recognize this relation when considering the second of our classes of representation.[125]

§ 42[126] 143

SUBJECT OF WILLING

As explained above, the subject of cognition can never be cognized, never be an object, a representation. Nonetheless, since we have not only an outer cognition (in sensory intuition), but also an inner cognition of ourselves, and since every kind of cognition presupposes by its very nature something that is cognized and something that cognizes, what is cognized in us as

a *De anima*

b ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα (*anima quodammodo est universa, quae sunt*) [431b, 21]

c [432a, 2]

d [Schopenhauer refers to the first and second parts of the 'Transcendental doctrine of elements' in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*]

such is not something that cognizes, but something that wills, the subject of willing, will. Beginning with cognition, one can say that[127] 'I cognize' is an *analytic* proposition; in contrast, 'I will' is *synthetic* and, indeed, *a posteriori*; for it is given through experience, here through inner experience (i.e. only in time).[128] To that extent, the subject of willing would be an object for us. If we introspect,[a] we find ourselves always as *willing*. However, willing has many degrees, from the mildest wish up to passion, and I have often explained (e.g. in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, p. 11[b] and elsewhere) that not only all affects, but also all of the inner movements subsumed under the broad concept of feeling, are states of will.[129]

But now the identity of the subject of willing with the cognizing subject, by means of which (and, indeed, necessarily), the word 'I' includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world[c] and therefore inexplicable.[130] For to us, only relations among objects are conceivable; among these, however, two can be one only insofar as they are part of a whole. In contrast, here, when speaking of the subject, the rules for cognition of objects no longer apply, and an actual identity of the cognizer with that which is cognized as willing, thus of the subject with the object, is *immediately given*. But whoever truly realizes the inexplicability of this identity will with me call it the miracle *par excellence*.[d]

Now just as the subjective correlate of the first class of representations is understanding, that of the second is reason, and that of the third pure sensibility, so that of the fourth is found to be the inner sense, or self-consciousness in general.[131]

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§ 43[132]

WILLING. LAW OF MOTIVATION

Precisely because the subject of willing[e] is immediately given in self-consciousness, what willing[f] is cannot be further defined or described; moreover, it is the most immediate of all of our cognitions, and indeed, the fact that it is immediate must ultimately cast light on all remaining cognitions, which are mediated.

With every observed decision of others, as well as our own, we regard ourselves as justified in asking, 'Why?'; i.e. we presume it to be necessary that there was something preceding it, from which it followed, which we

[a] *in unser Inneres blicken* [b] [*FW*, 38–9 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 11ff.)] [c] *Weltknoten*
[d] *das Wunder* κατ' ἐξοχήν [e] *Subjekt des Wollens* [f] *Wollen*

call the ground, or more precisely, the motive for the action now resulting.[133] It is as inconceivable that there can be an action without a motive as that there can be movement of an inanimate body without a push or pull. As a result, motive is included among the causes and has already been counted and characterized among these as the third form of causality (§ 20). But all causality is only the form of the principle of reason in the first class of objects, thus in the physical world given in outer intuition. In the physical world alterations are bound together, since the cause is the condition, coming from without, of any event. In contrast the interior of such events remains a secret to us, since we always remain on the outside. In the physical world, we do see[a] this cause necessarily produce its effect, but we do not experience how it actually is able to do so, or what goes on inside. Thus we see mechanical, physical, chemical effects, and also those of stimuli, following their respective causes every time, without understanding the event through and through; rather, what is essential remains a mystery to us, so we then attribute it to properties of bodies, natural forces, even the vital force, which, however, are merely occult qualities.[b] It would be no better with our understanding of the movements and actions of animals and humans, and we would also see these evoked in an inexplicable way through their causes (motives) if insight into the interior of the event were not open to us; from our inner experience we know[c] that the event is an act 145
of will,[d] evoked by a motive that consists of a mere representation. Thus we recognize[e] the influence of the motive, like all other causes, not only from the outside, and hence only mediately, but we simultaneously recognize it from the inside, quite immediately, and therefore in accordance with its entire way of acting. Here we stand behind the scenes, as it were, and experience the secret of how, in accordance with its innermost nature, the cause produces the effect, for here we cognize by a completely different means,[f] and thus in a completely different manner.[g] The result of this is the important proposition: *motivation is causality seen from within*. Causality thus presents itself here in a completely different way, in a completely different medium, for a completely different type of cognition; and so it must be presented as a special and particular form of our principle, which thus appears here as the *principle of sufficient reason of acting*, *principium rationis sufficientis agendi*, or more briefly put, the *law of motivation*.[134]

From a different perspective, with reference to my philosophy in general, I add here that the law of motivation is related to the law of causality given

[a] *sehn* [b] *qualitates occultae* [c] *wissen* [d] *Willensakt*
[e] *erkannt* [f] *auf einem ganz anderen Wege* [g] *Art*

in § 20 above, so this fourth class of objects for the subject, and thus that of the will which is perceived[a] in ourselves, is related to the first class. This insight is the cornerstone of my whole metaphysics.

For a detailed discussion of the manner and the necessity of motives' effects, their being conditioned through the empirical, individual character, as well as through the individual's cognitive capacity, etc., I refer to my 'Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will'.[b]

§ 44[135]

INFLUENCE OF WILL ON COGNITION

The influence that will exercises on cognition is not based on causality, strictly speaking, but on the identity of the cognizing with the willing subject (discussed in § 42) since the will compels cognition to repeat representations that have once been present to the cognizing subject, generally directing attention to this or that, and evoking any series of thoughts it
146 prefers.[136] In this too the will is determined by the law of motivation, according to which the will is the secret director of the so-called association of ideas. In the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation* I have devoted a specific chapter (the 14th) to this, which itself is nothing other than the application of the principle of reason in its four forms to the subjective train of thought and, thus to the presence of representations in consciousness. But the individual's will is what sets the whole mechanism in action:[c] in line with the person's interests, i.e., their individual ends, it drives the intellect to produce in addition to its present representations others that are intimately related logically, or analogically, or through spatial or temporal proximity. In this the action of the will is so immediate, however, that for the most part we are not clearly aware of it, and so quick that sometimes we are not aware of the occasion for a representation thus evoked, so that it then appears to us as if it has come to our consciousness without any connection to anything else; but that this could not have happened, as I said above, is precisely the root of the principle of sufficient reason,[137] as is carefully explained in the chapter cited above. Any image that is suddenly presented in our imagination, and any judgement that does not follow from a ground that was previously present, must be evoked through an act of will that has a motive, although

[a] *wahrgenommene* [b] [*FW*, 54–7 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 31–5)]
[c] *das ganze Getriebe in Thätigkeit versetzt*

the motive (because it is trifling) and the act of will (because its satisfaction is so easy that it is simultaneous with the act of will) are frequently not perceived.[138]

§ 45[139]

MEMORY

The characteristic of the knowing subject, that in making representations present it obeys the will more easily the more often such representations have already been present to it (i.e. its *capacity to function as a result of practice*)[a] is *memory*. I cannot agree with the usual description of memory as a warehouse in which we store a stock of finished representations that we would subsequently always have, but without our always being aware of them. Through practice, arbitrary repetition of representations which 147
have once been present to us becomes so easy that as soon as a member of a series of representations has become present to us, we immediately call up the remainder, often even apparently against our will. If one wants an image for this characteristic of our faculty of representations (just as Plato provides one as he compares memory with a soft mass that receives and retains impressions[b]), the most accurate appears to me to be that of a cloth, which if often folded in a certain way, thereafter takes the same shape. Just as the body learns to obey the will through practice, it is the same with the faculty of representation. It is not at all as the usual description takes it: a recollection of a representation, always the same, again and again fetched from its warehouse; rather, a new mental image actually arises each time, but through practice with a special ease. Therefore, it occurs that mental images (which we believe have been stored in memory, but which we actually only practise through frequent repetition) are changed imperceptibly, and we become aware of this change if after a long time we again see an old, familiar object, and it does not completely correspond to the image that we associate with it.[c] This could not occur if we stored completely finished representations. For just this reason, all acquired knowledge gradually disappears from our memory if we do not use it, precisely because it comes only from custom and skill developed through exercise and so, e.g., most scholars forget their Greek and, on returning home, most artists forget their Italian. In any case this explains why, if we once knew well a name, a verse, or the like, but have not thought about it in many years, it is difficult

[a] *Uebungsfähigkeit* [b] [See *Theaetetus*, 190e–196c] [c] *mitbringen*

to recall, but once this recall is accomplished, we have it at our disposal for several years because now the practice is renewed. Therefore, whoever understands several languages should from time to time read something in those languages, by which means he will retain possession of them.[140]

This also explains why the surroundings and events of our childhood so deeply impress themselves on our memory; it is because as children we have only a few, primarily intuitive representations, and therefore, to be occupied, we constantly repeat them. It is the case among people who
148 have little capacity for original thought that this goes on throughout their entire lives (and indeed not only with intuitive representations, but also with concepts and words); thus, such people sometimes have a very good memory, if it is not hindered by obtuseness and dull intellect. In contrast the genius sometimes does not have an excellent memory, such as Rousseau said of himself: this can be explained in that a genius does not have time for much repetition because of the great number of original thoughts and syntheses[a] – although it would not be easy to find a genius with a completely bad memory because energetic and flexible powers of thought make up for constant practice. And we do not want to forget that Mnemosyne is the mother of the muses. Therefore, one can say that memory is subject to two mutually antagonistic influences: on the one hand that of the energy of the faculty of representation, and on the other hand that of the number of representations that busy this faculty. The less the first factor, the less must the other be also in order for there to be a good memory, and the greater the second, the greater too must be the other.[141] This also explains why people who incessantly read novels thereby lose their memory, because for them, just as for the genius the number of representations (which in this case are not their own thoughts and syntheses, but are another's) quickly pass in succession, allowing them neither time nor patience for repetition and practice, and they do not have what compensates the genius for lack of practice. Moreover, the whole thing is still subject to the corrective that people have the best memory for what interests them, the worst for all that remains. Thus many great minds forget the petty affairs and events of everyday life, and likewise, with unbelievable speed, they forget insignificant people to whom they have been introduced, while people of limited intellect retain everything admirably. Nonetheless, geniuses will have a good, even a stupendous memory for what is important for *them* and for what is significant in itself.[142]

[a] *Kombinationen*

But in general it is easy to see that we best retain such series of representations as are coherent, connected by the bond of one or more of the species of the aforementioned grounds and consequences, but it is more difficult to retain that which is not coherent, and which only connects through 149
our will according to the law of motivation, i.e. that which is put together arbitrarily. That is, with the former, we are spared half the trouble by the forms known to us *a priori*; this, like all *a priori* cognition in general, also probably gave rise to Plato's theory that all learning is only recollection.[143]

General remarks and results[144]

§ 46[145]

THE SYSTEMATIC ORDER

The sequence in which I have presented the different forms[146] of our principle is not a systematic presentation, but merely chosen for clarity, putting first that which is better known and that which at least presupposes the rest, according to Aristotle's rule 'In learning, begin not with that which is first, and which is the beginning of the matter, but first learn that which is easiest' *Metaphysics* IV, 1.[a,147] But this is the systematic order which the classes of the grounds must follow. First the principle of the reason of being must be cited, and, here again, first in its application to *time*, the simple scheme of all the remaining forms of the principle of sufficient reason, containing only what is essential, the prototype[b] of all finiteness. Then, after the statement of the ground of being in space, the law of causality must be stated; after this the law of motivation follows; and finally the principle of sufficient reason of knowing will be stated, since the others refer to immediate representations, but this last refers to representations of representations.

The truth expressed here, that time is the simple scheme, containing 151
only what is essential to all forms of the principle of reason, explains the absolutely perfect clarity and accuracy of arithmetic, to which the clarity and accuracy of no other science can be compared. That is, all sciences are based on the principle of reason, since without exception they are connections of grounds and consequences. But now the series of numbers is the simple and sole series of the ground of being and

[a] καὶ μαθήσεως οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ῥᾷστ' ἄν μάθοι (*et doctrina non a primo, ac rei principio aliquando inchoanda est, sed unde quis facilius discat*) [1013a2 now found in V, 1]

[b] *Urtypus*

consequence in time. Because of this perfect simplicity, since it excludes nothing, nor are there anywhere indeterminate relations, it leaves nothing to be desired in clarity, accuracy, and apodictic certainty. In these qualities, all other sciences are inferior, even geometry, because so many relations arise from the three dimensions of space that a survey of it becomes too difficult for pure intuition, as well as for empirical intuition. For this reason, complicated problems of geometry are solved only through calculation, and thus geometry quickly resolves into arithmetic. I need not show that the remaining sciences contain all sorts of obscure elements.[148]

§ 47[149]

TEMPORAL RELATION BETWEEN GROUND AND CONSEQUENT

According to the laws of causality and motivation, the ground must precede the consequent in time. This is absolutely essential, as I have demonstrated in detail in the 2nd volume of my principal work, ch. 4, pp. 41–2[a] to which I refer here so as not to repeat myself. Accordingly, one will not be misled by the example Kant cites (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st edn, p. 202; 5th edn, p. 248[b]),[150] namely, that the cause of the warmth in a room, the stove, is simultaneous with its effect – as long as one considers that a thing is not the cause of another thing, but a state is the cause of another state. The state of the stove, that it has a higher temperature than the surroundings,[c] must precede the imparting of the excess heat to its surroundings; and now, since any heated layer of air is displaced by any colder layer of air
152 streaming in, the first state, the cause, and, as a result, the second state, the effect, are renewed as long as the stove and the room are not of the same temperature. Thus here the stove and the warmth of the room are not persistent, simultaneous cause and effect, but a chain of alterations,[151] or a continual renewal of the two states, one being the effect of the other. But from this example we can see how even Kant's concept of causality was unclear.[152]

In contrast, the principle of sufficient reason of knowing does not entail any temporal relation, but only a relation for our reason: thus, *before* and *after* are here without meaning.

With the principle of reason of being, so far as it is valid in geometry, there is likewise no temporal relation, but only a spatial one, of which it may be said that everything is simultaneous, if here simultaneity as well

[a] [Hübscher *SW* 3, 41–2] [b] [A202/B248] [c] *umgebende Medium*

as succession were to have any meaning. Conversely, in arithmetic, the ground of being is nothing other than the temporal relation itself.

§ 48[153]

RECIPROCITY OF GROUNDS

In any of its meanings, the principle of sufficient reason can establish a hypothetical judgement, just as any hypothetical judgement ultimately is based on it,[154] and the laws of hypothetical inferences thus always remain valid, that is, it is valid to infer from the existence[a] of a ground to the existence of a consequent, or from the non-existence[b] of the consequent to the non-existence of the ground; but it is invalid to infer from the non-existence of the ground to the non-existence of the consequent and from the existence of the consequent to the existence of the ground. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in geometry, the existence of the ground can almost always be concluded from the existence of the consequent and non-existence of the consequent from the non-existence of the ground. This occurs because, as is shown in § 37, each line determines the position of another, and it is a matter of indifference from which line one begins, i.e., which line one will consider to be the ground and which the consequent. One can be convinced of this by going through all the geometric theorems. It is only when it is not merely a question of figures, i.e. of the position of lines, but 153
of areas, without regard to figures, that one cannot generally conclude from the existence of the consequent to the existence of the ground, or rather one cannot reciprocate the propositions and make that which is conditioned into the condition. An example of this is provided by this proposition: if triangles have equal bases and equal heights, then they are equal in area. It cannot be converted: if triangles have equal area, then their bases and heights are also equal. For the heights can be of inverse proportion to the base.

It has already been mentioned in § 20 above that the law of causality does not admit of reciprocation, since the effect can never be the cause of its cause, and therefore the concept of reciprocal action,[c] given its actual sense, is not admissible. – According to the principle of reason of cognition, a reciprocity can occur only with convertible concepts, because only the spheres of these are coextensive. Otherwise, there is a vicious circle.[d,155]

[a] *Daseyn* [b] *Nichtseyn* [c] *Wechselwirkung* [d] *circulus vitiosus*

§ 49[156]

NECESSITY

The principle of sufficient reason in all of its forms is the sole principle and the sole support of any and all necessity. For *necessity* has no other genuine and clear sense[a] than the inevitability of the consequent when the ground is posited. Therefore any necessity is *conditioned*; thus, absolute, i.e., unconditioned necessity, is a contradiction in terms.[b] For *being necessary* can never mean anything other than following from a given ground. In contrast if one wants to define it as 'that which cannot not be', one merely provides a verbal explanation – one takes refuge behind a highly abstract concept in order to avoid a factual explanation, from which refuge one is immediately driven by the question: how is it possible, or even conceivable, that something could not not be, since everything that exists is only given empirically? For the result is that this something is possible only insofar as a
154 *ground* from which it follows is posited or already present. Being necessary and following from a given ground are convertible concepts, such that one can always be substituted for the other. Thus the favourite concept of the philosophasters, '**absolutely** *necessary being*', contains a contradiction: through the predicate '*absolute*' (i.e. depending on nothing else) the concept eliminates the only determination through which '*necessity*' is conceivable and makes sense. Here again we have an example of the *misuse of abstract concepts* in the surreptitious service of the metaphysical, as I have similarly demonstrated for the concepts '*immaterial substance*', '*absolute ground*', and '*cause in general*'.* I cannot emphasize enough that all abstract concepts are to be checked[c] against *intuition*.

Hence there is a four-fold necessity in accordance with the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason: 1) logical necessity, according to the principle of reason of knowing, on the basis of which if one has affirmed the premises, the conclusion is given without fail; 2) physical necessity, according to the law of causality, on the basis of which as soon as the cause has appeared, the effect cannot fail to appear; 3) mathematical necessity, according to the principle of reason of being, on the basis of which any

* For 'immaterial substance' see *The World as Will and Representation* 1, 582ff. (of the 3rd edn) [*WWR* 1, 520–1 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 582–3)] and for 'absolute ground' see § 52 of the present work. [This note was added by Julius Frauenstädt, the first editor of Schopenhauer's collected works, and is maintained and noted as such in Hübscher's edition]

[a] *Sinn* [b] *contradictio in adjecto* [c] *kontrolliren*

expressed relation of a true geometric theorem is as the theorem states, and any correct calculation remains irrefutable; 4) moral necessity, according to which any human being, and even any animal, upon the appearance of a motive, must carry out the only action which is in conformity with his innate and inalterable character, which action now follows as inevitably as any other effect from a cause, even if it is not as easy to predict as anything else because of the difficulty of fathoming and completely knowing the individual empirical character and its allotted sphere of knowledge (to investigate this is a different thing from becoming acquainted with the properties of a neutral salt and, thereupon, to predict its reaction). I never tire of repeating this because of the knuckleheads and numbskulls who 155
have no respect for the unanimous instruction of so many great minds, and who are always bold enough to assert the opposite for the benefit of their spinning-wheel philosophy. Still I am no philosophy professor who must show obeisance to the folly of others.

§ 50[157]

SERIES OF GROUNDS AND CONSEQUENTS

According to the law of causality, the condition is repeatedly conditioned and, indeed, in the same way; hence, an infinite series[a] arises in the past.[b] It is the same with the ground of being in space: every relative space is a figure having boundaries which put it in connection with another relative space and which again condition the figure of this other relative space, and so on, *in infinitum*, in all dimensions. If one considers a single figure by itself, the series of grounds of being have an end because one commences with a given relation, just as the series of causes has an end if one arbitrarily[158] stops at some cause. The succession of grounds of being in time has a infinite extension into the past as well as into the future,[c] since each moment is conditioned by an earlier one and necessarily brings about the one which follows; thus, time can have neither beginning nor end.[159] In contrast, the series of grounds of cognition, i.e., a series of judgements, in which any one judgement imparts logical truth to another, always ends somewhere, specifically either in an empirical, a transcendental,[160] or a metalogical truth. If the first, that is, an empirical truth, is the ground of the major premise to which one has been led,[161] and if one continues to ask 'why', then what one demands is no longer a ground of cognition,

[a] *series in infinitum* [b] *a parte ante* [c] *a parte post*

but[162] a cause; i.e. the series of grounds of cognition shifts to a series of grounds of becoming. But now if one once does the opposite, that is, one allows the series of grounds of becoming to shift to the series of grounds of cognition, so that one would be able to find an end, then this is never brought about by the nature of the thing, but by special intention, that is a trick – indeed, it is the well-known sophism going under the name of the
156 ontological proof. That is, one may use the cosmological proof to arrive at a cause at which one prefers to stop so that one can make it into the *first cause*, but one cannot then bring the law of causality to a stop: it will continue to ask 'why'. So then one secretly puts it aside and substitutes for it the principle of reason of knowing, which seems remotely similar. Instead of the required cause, one thus provides a ground of cognition created out of the concept itself, a ground still to be demonstrated, the reality of which is thus still problematic. And this ground of cognition – because it is still a ground – must now figure as a cause. Of course, one had set this concept up in advance for this very purpose, ascribing reality to this concept, possibly for decency's sake lightly veiling it, and preparing for the delightful surprise of later finding it in there – as we have precisely elucidated above in § 7. – Yet the chain of causes ultimately rests on a proposition of transcendental or metalogical truth, and if one were to continue to ask 'why', there would be no answer because the question makes no sense; that is, one does not know what sort of ground it requires. The principle of reason is the *principle of all explanation*: to explain a thing means to trace its given existence or connection back to some form of the principle of reason, according to which form the existence or connection must be as it is. Accordingly, the principle of reason itself, i.e., the connection that it expresses in any of its forms, cannot be further explained because there is no principle to explain the principle of all explanation – like an eye, which sees everything except itself.[163] – While there are series of motives, in that the decision to accomplish an end becomes the motive for the decision to accomplish a whole series of means, yet this series always ends in the past[a] in a representation from the first two classes, where the motive that originally had the capacity to set this individual will in motion is to be found. That it could do this[164] is a datum by which we can recognize the empirical character that is given here; but why the empirical character was moved by it cannot be answered because the intelligible character lies outside of time and never becomes an object. The series of motives as such

[a] *a parte priori*

thus finds its end in such an ultimate motive, and according to whether its 157
final link was a real object or a mere concept, it shifts to either a series of causes or into a series of cognitive grounds.[165]

§ 51[166]

EVERY SCIENCE HAS AS ITS GUIDING THREAD ONE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON IN PREFERENCE TO THE OTHERS

Because the question 'why' always seeks a sufficient reason, and because the connection of findings[a] through the principle of sufficient reason distinguishes a science from a mere aggregate of findings, in § 4 'why' was called the mother of all sciences. It is also the case that in each science one of the forms of our principle is the guiding thread more so than the others, although in each science the others also apply, but in a subordinate role. Thus the ground of being is the principal guiding thread in pure mathematics (although in proofs the exposition proceeds only through cognitive grounds); at the same time, the law of causality appears in applied mathematics, and this law completely dominates in physics, chemistry, geology, and the like. The principle of reason of knowing applies throughout all sciences, since in all sciences the particular[b] is known from the general.[c] However, this principle is the main guiding thread and nearly the sole governing principle in botany, zoology, mineralogy, and other classificatory sciences. If one considers all motives and maxims – whatever they be – to be data by which action is explained, the law of motivation is the principal guiding thread of history, politics, pragmatic psychology, etc. – If, however, one makes motives and maxims themselves, according to their value and origin, into the subject of investigation, the law of motivation is the guiding thread of ethics. In the second volume of my principal work, ch. 12, p. 126,[d] one may find the main classification of the sciences, worked out according to this principle.[167]

§ 52[168]

TWO PRINCIPAL RESULTS

In this treatise I have attempted to show that the principle of sufficient reason is a common expression of four completely different relations, each 158
of which is based on a particular law, given *a priori* (since the principle

[a] *Erkenntnissen* [b] *Besondere* [c] *Allgemeinen* [d] [Hübscher *SW* 3, 139ff.]

of sufficient reason is synthetic *a priori*); and according to the principle of *homogeneity*, it must be accepted that just as these four laws (discovered through the principle of *specification*) come together in a common expression, they also arise from one and the same original constitution[a] of our entire cognitive faculty, which is their common root, and which, accordingly, must be regarded as the innermost core of all the dependency, relativity, instability, and finiteness of objects of our consciousness, which is confined to sensibility, understanding and reason, subject and object, or that very world which the brilliant Plato repeatedly disparaged as 'that which always becomes and passes away, but never truly is',[b] the cognition of which would be only 'opinion amid non-rational perception',[c] and which Christianity, in the correct sense, called *temporality*, following the very form of our principle that I have indicated in § 46 as its simplest scheme and the prototype[d] of all finiteness. After all, the general sense of the principle of sufficient reason may be reduced to the fact that always and everywhere each thing is only *by means of another thing*. Now, however, the principle of reason is *a priori* in all its forms, thus rooted in our intellect; therefore, this principle cannot be applied to the totality of all existing things – the world – including this intellect in which the world resides.[e] For such a world, presenting itself by means of *a priori* forms, is for just this reason mere appearance; therefore, what applies to this world as a consequence of just these forms can have no application to the world itself; i.e. to the thing in itself presenting itself in the world. Therefore, one cannot say 'the world and all things in it exist by means of something else' – which proposition is simply the cosmological proof.[169]

If in the present treatise I have achieved the derivation of the result as just expressed, then I would think that this would make the demand that any philosopher who in his speculations builds his conclusion on the principle of sufficient reason or who just speaks of a ground at all would have to determine which type of ground he means. One might
159 suppose that as a result of this, whenever there is a question of a ground, no confusion would be possible. Except there are far too many examples where either we find the expression of ground and cause confused and used without discrimination, or at other times we find talk *in a general way*, without any more precise determination, of a ground and of that which is grounded, of the principle and of that which follows the principle,[f] and of the condition and of that which is conditioned, perhaps exactly because

[a] *Urbeschaffenheit* [b] ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μὲν καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν
[c] δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου [d] *Urtypus* [e] *dasteht* [f] *Princip . . . Principiat*

there is a secret awareness of an unjustified[170] use of this concept. Kant himself speaks in this way of the thing in itself as the *ground* of appearance. Thus he speaks (*Critique of Pure Reason* 5th edn, p. 590)[a] of the *ground of the possibility* of all appearance, of an *intelligible ground* of appearances, of an *intelligible cause*, of an *unknown ground* of the possibility of the sensible series in general (p. 592),[b] of a *transcendental object* lying at the *ground* of appearances, of the *ground* why our sensibility has this one condition much more than all other supreme conditions (p. 641),[c] and the like in many passages. All of this appears to me not to be in keeping with those weighty, profound, indeed, immortal words (p. 591): 'that the contingency* of things is *itself only a phenomenon* and could lead to no other regress than the empirical one that determines *phenomena*.'[d]

Anyone familiar with modern philosophical works knows that, since Kant, the concept of ground and consequence, of principle and that which follows the principle, etc. are used much more indeterminately and in an absolutely transcendent way.[171]

The following is my objection to this indeterminate use of the word *ground* and of the principle of sufficient reason in general – it is also the second result, closely connected to the first, that this treatise provides concerning its proper object. Through their common character, and given that all objects for the subject are distributed under them, the four laws of our cognitive faculty (the common expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason) are shown to be fixed through one and the same original 160
constitution and intrinsic characteristic[e] of the cognitive faculty,[172] which appears as sensibility, understanding, and reason. Since this is so, even if one imagines that a new, fifth class of objects could arise,[173] we would still have to presuppose that in this fifth class the principle of sufficient reason would also appear in a new form. So, nevertheless, we may not speak of an *absolute ground*, and there is no more a *ground in general* than there is a *triangle in general*; rather, this is an abstract concept achieved through discursive thought[f] – nothing more than a representation from representations – a way of thinking of many things through one means. Just as any triangle must have acute, right, or obtuse angles, must be equilateral,

* Empirical contingency is meant, which for Kant means the same as dependence on other things – concerning this, I refer to my criticism, p. 524 in my 'Critique of Kantian Philosophy' [*WWR* 1, 494–5 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 552–3)]

[a] [A562/B590] [b] [A564/B592] [c] [A613–614/B641–642]
[d] [A563/B591] [e] *dieselbe Urbeschaffenheit und innere Eigenthümlichkeit*
[f] *durch diskursives Denken gewonnenen Begriff*

isosceles, or scalene, so too any ground must belong to one of the four stated possible types of grounds, since we have only four definitely differentiated classes of objects; and thus any ground must apply within one of the four stated possible classes of objects of our faculty of representation – which, consequently, presupposes as already given its use in connection with that faculty, i.e., the whole world, and is restricted to this world – but any such ground cannot apply beyond this world or entirely beyond all objects. However, should anyone think differently about this, and believe that a ground in general is something different from what is drawn from the four types of grounds and expresses what is common among them, then we renew the controversy between the realists and nominalists, and in the present case I must stand with the latter.[174]

Variants in different editions

A 1813: *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (*Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Rudolstadt, in Commission der Hof-Buch-und-Kunsthandlung,* 1813) as provided in Hübscher *SW* 7.

B 1847: *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (*Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Zweite, sehr verbesserte und beträchtlich vermehrte Auflage*. Frankfurt-am-main: Joh. Christ. Hermann'sche Buchhandlung. F.E. Suchsland, 1847) as provided in Hübscher *SW* 1. This text provides the basis for the present translation. B is an extensive revision of A, and the end notes show important differences as well as Schopenhauer's important handwritten variants and notes to both B and A. The present translation excludes minor stylistic variants and spelling changes. Wherever Schopenhauer quotes English in the original, we provide the text as he quotes it. We note those instances in which Hübscher follows Frauenstädt's inclusions of handwritten additions.

1 Note on the inside of the cover in A [Hübscher *SW* 7, 136]: '*If* and *because*, like *condition* and *cause* are different. *Condition* is that to which the cause is connected. E.g. *If* it is cold, migrating birds leave *because* they need a warm climate.'

Note across from the title page in A [Hübscher *SW* 7, 136]: 'We cannot *think* of anything which contradicts the condition of all thought, we cannot *experience* anything which contradicts the conditions of all experience. We cannot experience, e.g. a body of more than three dimensions, a becoming, a development, an action that does not proceed in the succession of time. We know *a priori* that each body has three dimensions, every event has a *time* and form, succession and a *cause*. It is the same with the *senses*. We cannot see or hear anything which contradicts the *a priori* conditions of seeing and hearing. It is the same with digestion [*Verdauen*] and everything.'

2 Footnote in A includes the reference to the *Philebus*, and to 'Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 673–88 [B673–688] 2nd and following edn'.

3 in A: 'unity' [*Einheit*].

4 in A: 'fundamental qualities of our mind' [*Grundbeschaffenheiten unsers Geistes*].

5 Section title in A: 'An Advantage that this Inquiry Could Have'.

6 The following from A is deleted in B, between '. . . discovered later' and 'Above all . . . ': 'For the Horatian fable of the country mouse and the city mouse is always very applicable for philosophy. Here too we must prefer that which is little, but possessed with confidence and irrefutable certainty, to that which is a lot, built for the most part on rhetoric, on being impressive, on being contentious, the pleasure of which can in any moment be disturbed by uncorrupted and fearless criticism. For this reason, everything which works for better understanding, must, it seems to me, be welcome in philosophy, especially since the complaints of philosophers that have frequently been heard are that they are not understood, and conversely, readers' complaints about the obscurity of philosophers have, to be sure, been heard, while without a doubt both parties always wish to make themselves understood precisely. Or could there even be times in which intelligibility and, consequently, understanding, are feared and shunned? Now such a time could be quite prosperous, even quite religious and virtuous, only never philosophical.'

7 In B, after 'its great depth', 'Clarity is the good faith . . . ' to ' . . . This explains why, in some writings,' replaces in A: 'Moreover, I am of the opinion that anyone who understands himself completely, which, in fact, is rare, must be able to make himself understandable to others if, for their part, they have the will to understand him, which is also not always the case. For in any human being all abilities and all fundamental truths are present although in greatly differing degree, and only in a few to a preeminent degree: and it is for that reason that few have the ability for production in the arts or discovery and invention in the sciences; in contrast, we all more or less have the ability for receptivity, for understanding, and for recognition of what is true, if it is just presented to us clearly, i.e., separated from all secondary matters. Thus one who produces something out of his own power could be compared to a musical instrument; in contrast, the others could be compared to glass or metal vessels that certainly will themselves produce no music, but still will echo and transmit the sounds of any instrument. But only pure tones resound; impure do not: this annoys many people, which is why it may happen that in some writings . . . '.

8 Added in B: 'e.g. those of Schelling'.

9 In A: 'The importance of the principle of sufficient reason is so great that I dare to assert that it is . . . '.

10 In A: 'Science is specifically defined as a system . . . and is set in opposition to . . . '.

11 'Therefore, Plato already says . . . *Meno* p. 385 Bip.' added in B.

12 In A: 'most contain'.

13 'which Aristotle already expressed . . . *Metaphysics* v, 1. ' added in B.

14 In A: 'Since it is constantly made by us *a priori*'.

15 In A, the sentence is 'Since this principle is a fundamental principle [*Grundsatz*] of all cognition, a more or less exactly determined, abstract expression for such a fundamental principle was without a doubt also discovered very early; thus, it would be difficult and, moreover, not of great interest, to demonstrate where such a one is first to be found.'

16 '*Philebus* p. 240 Bip. and again in the *Timaeus* . . . according to preceding causes' added in B.

17 In B: 'although along with some superficiality and confusion'; but in A: 'although in any case rather arbitrarily'.

18 A long passage, over three paragraphs, 'Now this is the origin of the classification of the causes . . . in contrast, as far as I know, they also did not attain consciousness of the necessary distinction in question here' added in B, replacing in A: 'For the Scholastics too the principle that nothing is without a cause was an axiom. According to Wolff's claim, however, Leibniz is the first who put forth our principle in a universal way, formally as a fundamental principle. Also he first clearly separated two distinct applications of the same: the first applies specifically to the judgement that for anything to be true, it must have a ground from which it follows; the second applies to alterations in the external world, that none could happen without a cause'.

19 In A: 'in the keen-sighted [*scharfsinnigen*] Descartes we still find no clear idea [*Begriff*] of this distinction' for 'our excellent Descartes . . . and we will soon see to what serious and deplorable results this has led metaphysics' in B.

20 'But actually it is intent that . . . ' to the end of § 7 is added in B.

21 From beginning of § 8, 'Although Spinoza's philosophy consists . . . ' to '. . . *ibid*. prop. 25. –' replaces the following in A: 'That Spinoza had absolutely no clear concept of the distinction between ground and consequent and cause and effect is indicated by countless passages in his writing. Permit me to cite only a few examples'.

22 A long passage, over six paragraphs, 'However, this view will lead at its height . . . ' to '. . . and from his hands Mr von Schelling has accepted it credulously' replaces the following in A: 'One can see the total confusion of ground and consequent with cause and effect. One finds more examples of this sort in *Ethics* I, definition 1. – prop. 11, proof 2. – prop. 24, coroll. – prop. 28, proof and note. – But not only this, rather the mixing and confusion of these relations [*Relationen*] is precisely connected with the basis [*Basis*] of his system (of course, what concerns us here is only the demonstrative part, the presentation [*Darstellung*]). He posits a substance, God, whose attributes [*Attribute*] or accidents [*Accidentien*] are thought and extension. Now substance and accident is the correlate to subject and predicate in judgement. In analytic judgement, from the concept of the subject all its predicates follow. Thus the same relation [*Verhältniß*] must also exist between substance and accident, and Spinoza accepts it between God and world, that is, the relation of cognitive ground and consequent. 'From the necessity of the divine nature, everything that can fall under infinite intellect must follow.' [*Ex necessitate divinae naturae omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, sequi debent*.] (*Ethics* I, prop. 16.) But at the same time he everywhere calls God the cause of the world. 'Everything that exists, expresses the power of God who is the *cause* of all things' [*Quidquid existit Dei potentiam, quae omnium rerum* causa *est, exprimit*], *ibid*. prop. 36. proof – 'God is the immanent *cause* of all things, but not the transient' [*Deus est omnium rerum* causa *immanens, non vero transiens*], *ibid*. prop. 18. – 'God is

the *efficient cause* not only of things existing, but also of the essence of things' [*Deus non tantum est* causa efficiens *rerum existentiae, sed etiam essentiae*], *ibid.* prop. 25. – (The passages cited above provide more examples.) Thus the total mixing of the concept of the cognitive ground and consequent with cause and effect is precisely connected with the basis of his presentation.'

23 § 9 of B replaces § 9 of A: 'Thus Leibniz is the first in whom we find a clear concept of this distinction. In his *Principles of Philosophy* [*principiis philosophiae*] he very decidedly distinguishes cognitive ground [*ratio cognoscendi*] from efficient cause [*causa efficiens*] and posits both as two variations of the principle of sufficient reason [*principii rationis sufficientis*], which here he formally puts forth as a fundamental principle of all cognition'.

24 'is thus the first . . . discussed their distinction' is added in B.

25 'however, it serves to point . . . which then follows §§ 881–884' is added in B.

26 In B 'an inadmissible idea' replaces in A 'a completely empty concept, by which nothing can be thought'.

27 'in general' is added in B.

28 'Now that Wolff wants . . . can wait longer for the others' replaces in A: 'Now why he wants to call the first-mentioned property of this state "principle of being" and the second "principle of becoming" I do not understand.'

29 'That the stone is such as it is, . . . true sense of the causal law comprehensible' replaces in A: 'That the stone is such as it is, with such capacity for heat, etc., is, just as much as its coming into contact with free heat, a result of a chain of previous causes, "principles of becoming"; the coincidence of both qualities constitutes the state, which, as cause, occasions the warming, as effect, and nowhere does there remain room for Wolff's "principle of being" which I thus do not acknowledge, and I have mentioned it so extensively because I will use the term with a completely different meaning below.'

30 In A, the paragraph 'In his *Theory of Reason* § 81, *Reimarus* . . . still confuses it with cause' is at the end of § 11, after paragraphs on Lambert and Platner ('Plattner' in A).

31 This section on Hume is added as § 12 in B, resulting in a re-numbering of the subsequent sections through to § 15 of B.

32 In B, from beginning of § 13, 'The main passage in *Kant* . . . ' to ' . . . that the Kantian school has produced, e.g., the ones' replaces in A: 'Kant, with whom an epoch in philosophy began, has also had a beneficial influence on logic. He effected a more decided division of logic from transcendental philosophy or earlier metaphysics. However, Kant introduces our principle of sufficient reason in both. In the *Logic* that bears his name, p. 73, [now called *The Jäsche Logic* Ak. 9: 51] he calls the principle the criterion of external logical truth or the rationality of cognition, on which rests the actuality (p. 75) of cognition. But in "Transcendental Logic" [*Critique of Pure Reason,* A201–2/B246–7] he introduces the principle [*Satz*] as the principle [*Princip*] of causality and even proves it as such, which I will discuss in detail in the appropriate place. Although he thus recognizes the distinction, he does not exactly determine its expression in keeping with this distinction (as I will show at the end of this essay) and he

gives rise to obscurities and misunderstandings. Many excellent textbooks on logic that the Kantian school has produced, e.g. . . . '

33 Two paragraphs, 'In his "Letters on Spinoza's Doctrine" *F. H. Jacobi* says . . . ' to ' . . . deserves no place among the beliefs of serious and honest researchers' added in B.

34 In B 'as one which is directed not to its validity, but rather to the *a priority* of the law of causality' replaces in A 'which is of a completely different sense'.

35 'compare *Posterior Analytics* I, 3' added in B.

36 Added in B: 'In the 5th chapter we will discuss . . . ' to ' . . . he requires a proof for the right to require a proof'.

37 In B, 'Or again, when I ask why . . . that the left glove does not fit the right hand' replaces in A: 'If I ask in another example: why are you doing [*thust*] this? then you will indicate some sort of motive. Will this be a cause from which the action necessarily follows as an effect? No, for it cannot indicate to me anything from which the action necessarily follows; whereas, the connection between cause and effect is a necessary one. Or will it be a ground under which the action is to be subsumed as consequent? No, for the question concerns not a cognition, but a preceding alteration'.

38 In B the paragraph, 'Thus, since not all cases . . . must be determined before the concept of the species' is added to the end of § 15. In A, a similar, but separate section (§ 15), entitled 'All applications of the principle must be divided into definite species', is as follows: 'We see from the examples given that not all cases in which the principle of sufficient reason finds application can be reduced to ground and consequent and to cause and effect, that, thus, in this classification, the law of specification must not have been satisfied. But according to the law of homogeneity, we must presuppose that the cases of the application of the principle of sufficient reason are not infinitely different, rather that they all must be reducible to certain species. Now before I attempt this classification, it is necessary to determine what in all cases is specific to the principle of sufficient reason as its special character. The concept of genus must be determined before the concept of species'.

39 In A, § 16 reads: '*Our consciousness, as far as it appears as sensibility, understanding, and reason, divides into subject and object, and, so far, comprises nothing else. To be object for the subject and to be our representation are the same. All of our representations are objects for the subject, and all objects for the subject are our representations. But nothing existing of itself and independently, likewise nothing existing in isolation and apart, can become an object for us; rather, all of our representations stand in a connection that is governed by laws and of a form determinable a priori*. This connection is the sort of relation which the principle of sufficient reason, considered in general, expresses. This law governing all our representations is the root of the principle of sufficient reason. It is a fact, and the principle of sufficient reason is its expression. But generally, as it is advanced here, we are able to achieve it only through abstraction. It is given to us only through concrete cases [*Fälle* in concreto].

Note: All assertions advanced in this section will be defended and explained through the whole of the following part of the treatise. The root of the principle of sufficient reason will be clearly recognized through the consideration of its four parts'.

40 § 16 in B incorporates minor phrasing from a separate § 17 in A, called 'Its fourfold nature'. (On this alteration, see the translators' Introduction.) § 17 in A reads: 'In the aforementioned cases, the law of necessary connection [*Verknüpfung*] of all of our representations reveals itself, and consequently the principle of sufficient reason, as an expression of the same law, is applied. Considered more closely, however, the principle divides itself according to the laws of homogeneity and of specification into definite species, clearly distinguished from one another. I maintain that the number of these species is *four*, governed by the *four classes* into which everything which can become an object for us, i.e. all of our representations, break down. These classes will be advanced and discussed in the next four chapters.

However, since Kant's deduction of the categories, there has been almost nothing so basic and immediate that it might not be deduced *a priori*. What Goethe said has even happened to things the grounds of which no earlier time had hoped to reach.

Therefore it might be expected that now I too will not fail to present an *a priori* deduction as my justification of this division. But I admit that I do not see the possibility of a deduction *a priori* of the four classes of representations which are only given to us. Nevertheless I could certainly advance a fearsome deduction that, even if empty and groundless, would serve as a scarecrow for doubters, if only through its tediousness. But I greatly fear that in doing so I would recall the inflated wineskins which had been hung before the door of *Apuleius*' home, so that when the wind moved them as he came home drunk at night, he would take them to be robbers who wanted to break into his house.* Therefore, I ground my division of all of our representations upon inductions, which are not amenable to any other proof than the challenge of finding some sort of object that does not belong under any one of the four classes I have advanced or presenting two of these classes as reducible to only *one*.

Incidentally, I note that even Kant's enumeration of the categories is grounded ultimately upon induction: specifically, it is drawn up according to the logical table of judgements, and the division of the properties of judgements into four species, each of which is comprised of three types, is solely grounded on induction, which Kant himself indicated as he said in advancing them: 'If we . . . attend only to the mere form of the understanding in judgement, we *thus find* that the functions of thinking can be brought under four headings [*Titel*].' (*Critique of Pure Reason* p. 95 [A70/B95].) And in the same work (p. 145 [B145]) he says: 'For the peculiarity of our understanding, that

* [footnote in A] 'Apuleius *Metamorphosis* Book II *in fine* [at the end] and Book III *initio* [at the beginning]'.

it is able to bring about the unity of apperception *a priori* only by means of the categories and only through precisely this type and number of them, no further ground may be given any more than can be given for why we have precisely these and no other functions for judgement or for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition.' But as far as his *deduction* of the categories is concerned, it is by no means a demonstration that there must be such categories and just that many; rather, it is 'the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate *a priori* to objects' [A85/B117]. Therefore, for the present division of the possible objects for the subject, a deduction is not only unnecessary, but a requirement for it would be without sense and meaning. As has been said, this division is grounded solely on induction. The principle of sufficient reason appears in a different form for each of the four classes of objects which I now advance for our faculty of representation, but it is everywhere acknowledged that, as indicated above, the principle is to be recognized as ultimately the expression of the same thing and as springing from the same root (given in § 16), the fourfold nature of which becomes evident from just these four forms. At the same time as I advance each class of representation, in each case I will indicate the specific form of the principle of sufficient reason which governs as the law of connection.'

41 § 17 in B replaces § 18 in A which reads 'The first class of possible objects of our faculty of representation is that of *the complete representations that comprise the totality of an experience* [*das Ganze einer Erfahrung*]. The principle of sufficient reason governs in it as the law of causality, of which more is to follow.

The representations belonging to this class are *complete*. This refers to Kant's classification [*Eintheilung*] and means: they encompass that of sensible appearance which is *material* as well as that which is *formal*. They constitute *a totality of experience*, meaning that they stand in a connection that is recognizable only through the understanding. Thus they concern our entire sensibility and our entire understanding. They are what is called *the objective, real world*.'

42 The title of § 18 in B, 'Outline of a transcendental analysis of empirical reality' replaces the title of § 19 in A: 'Outline of an analysis of experience. The understanding'. (On this and subsequent alteration to this section, see the translators' Introduction.)

43 In B 'Their *perceptibility* is *matter* . . . in § 21' replaces in A: 'Their *perceptibility*, i.e., *matter*, can only be more carefully discussed below (§ 42): here it is presupposed'.

44 After 'perceived' Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to A includes 'by its course' [Hübscher *SW* 7, 136].

45 In B 'thus this representation of simultaneity . . . time and space' replaces in A: 'It is indeed false to say that in space everything is *simultaneous*. For in mere space there is as little simultaneity as there is a before and after, and the latter representations are only possible by means of time, the former, that of *simultaneity*, only by means of the unity of the representations of time and space'.

46 In B 'there would be no *change*' replaces in A 'we would know [*kennen*] no change'.

47 In B 'However, empirical representations . . . as a product proceeds from its factors' replaces in A: 'However, complete representations constituting the totality of experience appear in both forms simultaneously, and an *intimate unity* of both is even the condition of experience, which, as it were, proceeds from them as a product proceeds from its factors'.

48 In B 'What creates this *union*' to the end of the section replaces in A: 'What brings this *union* about is the *understanding*: its *categories* are the various means by which it does its business [*die verschiedenen Weisen dieses seines Geschäfts*]. It creates *experience* through the intimate union of these heterogenous forms of sensibility, i.e., a *totality of representations* in which everything else of this class is contained and determined, subjected to laws we know *a priori*; in which, moreover, countless representations (in common parlance [*vulgo*], objects) are *simultaneous*; in which, despite the ceaselessness of time, substance persists, and despite the rigid immutability of space, the states [*Zustände*] of substance change; in which, in brief, the entire, objective, real world exists for us. However, it would be a very troublesome and difficult business, lying far beyond the bounds of my present task, to observe more profoundly and discuss more closely the way in which, through the function of the understanding, this union and, along with it, experience arise, i.e. to give a complete analysis of experience. Kant's transcendental analytic of the pure understanding [*Critique of Pure Reason* I, Pt. II, Division I] is an important preparation for this. However, through attentive consideration of the individual categories and their relations to the forms of sensibility, anyone can be convinced of the truth of the aforementioned in general and of the new explanation of the understanding thereby advanced (which understanding, in the chapter following, is likewise distinguished from reason, explained in a new way and more precisely than has been done until now)'.

49 The titles of § 19 in B and § 20 in A are identical: 'Immediate presence of representations'.

50 In B 'the representation of matter and thus that of a persisting external world' replaces in A: 'totality of representations of an experience'.

51 In B 'That representations are *immediately present* . . . ' to ' . . . insofar as they belong to this complex' replaces in A: 'and since the subject will not remain with this *one* representation, nor, according to the laws of the world of experience, can it remain, there is no simultaneity in mere time, thus, any representation will always disappear, once more driven out by another, following an order not determinable *a priori*, but depending on circumstances soon to be mentioned. Since, despite the ephemerality and the isolated nature of representations with respect to their immediate presence in the consciousness of the subject, given the function of the understanding, there nonetheless remains for this subject the representation of a totality of experience, as I have described above. And so with respect to this opposition, representations, insofar as they belong to the totality of representations of experience'.

52 'This view of the matter, which is common, is called *realism* . . . inevitably realistic fundamental view of Judaism. But realism overlooks' is added in B.

53 In B 'Realism overlooks the fact that the object no longer remains object . . . all objective existence is also immediately nullified' replaces in A: 'It was overlooked that the object is absolutely nothing apart from its reference to the subject, and that, if one takes this away or abstracts from it, absolutely *nothing* else remains, and the *existence in itself* that was attributed to it was an absurdity [*Unding*] and vanishes'.

54 In B '*Leibniz*, who indeed felt the object's being conditioned by the subject . . . that which represents and the representation' replaces in A: '*Leibniz*, since he could not free himself from the thought of objects existing in themselves, independent of their reference to the subject, i.e., of their being represented, but wanted more closely to determine this being, came upon the necessity of explaining the objects in themselves as subjects (monads), and in this way he gave the most eloquent proof that our consciousness within the limits of sensibility, understanding, and reason, never knows the subject and object, that which represents and the representation'.

55 'who never came to understand the matter and, therefore, did not arrive at clear conceptions, had nevertheless understood' added in B.

56 B omits from A the following: 'Meanwhile we will discuss this identity of the subjective and the objective fully below (§ 42). For now we have to note the following.

The distinction between subject and object, that which cognizes and is never cognized [*dem Erkennenden, nie Erkannten*] and that which is cognized but never cognizes [*dem Erkannten, nie Erkennenden*] is the most important of all distinctions that we are able to comprehend. It appears to be indicated in many languages in that the "I am" [*Sum*] is from other stock [*Stamm*] than the "is" [*Est*]. But the infinitive is generally the unification of both meanings under the concept of a "to be" [*Seyn*], the means by which I, the knowing subject, and the table, on which I presently write, share a common predicate – this infinitive is the progenitor [*Stammvater*] of many and more fertile errors, from which an entire genealogy of error [*Sphalmatogonie*] can issue: e.g. (assuming that the double meaning of progenitor should apply to these) it engenders substance, realities, perfections, and many others, and from these the most diverse children, e.g., from substance: dualism, Spinozism, rational psychology, etc. Nonetheless, that any concept of a "being", generally expressed in the infinitive, inevitably goes with our languages, indeed our reason, is, like so much else, a proof of how little we are fitted for cognition and how much for willing, so that if we always remain children in the former, we can nonetheless be heroes in the latter at any age'.

57 In the note ending § 19 of B 'nothing is to be understood by this . . . remains ideal' replaces in A, in the note ending § 20: 'nothing is to be understood by this other than complete representations connected in a totality of experience'.

58 The title of § 20 in B is identical to that of § 23 in A.

59 'appears as' in B, § 20, replaces 'governs' in A, § 23.

60 'All objects that persent themselves in the totality of representations that constitutes . . . in the direction of the course of time' in B, § 20, replaces in A § 23: 'All representations contained in the totality of representations, which we call experience, are connected to one another through it [the principle of sufficient reason of becoming]'.

61 Everything from near the beginning of § 20 in B, '1) a state of affinity to oxygen, 2) a state of contact with oxygen, 3) a state of a certain temperature' to the end of § 20 in B replaces the following in § 23 of A: '1st) a state of affinity to oxygen [*Sauerstoff*], 2nd) a state of contact with oxygen, 3rd) a state of a certain temperature. Since the ignition must follow immediately, as soon as the first state was present, but since this ignition first follows at a determined moment in time, then this first state must not always have been present, but must have followed from a previous one, e.g., from the state of the appearance of free heat in a body, from which the increase in temperature must follow. The state of the appearance of heat in a body is again occasioned through a preceding one, e.g., the sun's rays falling on a burning lens; this perhaps by a cloud's moving away from the direction of the sun; this by wind; this by uneven density of air; this by other states, and so on indefinitely [*in indefinitum*]. When all determining factors, except *one*, obtain for the occurrence of a new state, this *one* – if it appears just now, that is, last – will be called the cause *par excellence* [κατ' ἐξοχήν]. Calling this factor the cause may in everyday life be allowable, but is not a precise means of expression since determining that a state has been the last to occur gives it no special standing over the others. In the example just mentioned, there is no justification for calling the cloud's moving away the cause of the ignition because it occurs later than the burning lens' being directed at the object; this could have occurred later than the cloud's moving away, and the addition of oxygen could have occurred even later than this, and following customary language such chance determinations of time would have decided which of these is the cause. Moreover, on a more correct consideration we find that the *entire state* is the condition of the one following, so that it does not matter in which order in time its determinations have come together. This customary language drags in more language with it that leads to great confusion, specifically that the object will be called a cause, rather than the state; e.g. in the example given above, some will call the burning lens the cause of the ignition, others the clouds, others the sun, others the oxygen, and so on arbitrarily, according to preference. But there is absolutely no sense in saying that one object is the cause of another; rather, causality is a relation between two *states*, and with reference to this relation one is called a *cause*, the other *effect*, and their following one after another is called *consequence* [*Erfolgen*]. From this consideration that the law of causality refers only to states and not to things, that only states – not things – arise and pass away, come to be and cease to be, the principle of the permanence of substance automatically results, hence through mere analysis of the concept of causality, without synthesis. This is only incidental here.

Since the second state must follow from the first according to a rule, i.e., every time, then the relation between cause and effect is a necessary one, and thus, the law of causality warrants hypothetical judgements and thereby proves itself to be a form of the principle of sufficient reason, on which all hypothetical judgements must be supported.

I call this form of our principle the principle of sufficient reason of *becoming* because its application at all times presupposes an alteration, a becoming. Further, it belongs to its character that the cause always precede the effect in time (cf. § 53.), and only through this will it be recognized which of the two states bound by the causal nexus is cause and which effect.'

62 § 21 is added in B and has no equivalent in A; § 21 of A bears the title of § 22 in B.

63 Material covering more than one paragraph, 'In the *Morgenblatt* of 23 October 1817 . . . ' through to 'of the *lobes* or *hemispheres*' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to his copy of B [Hübscher *SW* 1, *Anmerkungen zu der Schrift über den 'Satz vom Grunde'* 3].

64 § 22 in B bears the title of § 21 in A, and in B Schopenhauer eliminated all of the material of the former § 21. The title and all the material of § 22 in A is dropped from B. We here provide §§ 21 and 22 of A.

In A, § 21 reads as follows:

§ 21

ON THE IMMEDIATE OBJECT

We have seen that by means of the nature of the inner sense, which is the condition of cognition that always attaches to the subject, only a series [*Reihe*] of representations that is simple (admitting of no coexistence [*kein Zugleich anerkennende*]) and fleeting (not persistent) can be *immediately present* to the subject. Representations are immediately present, means: they are not cognized only in the unity of time and space carried out in the understanding, i.e., in the totality of experience, but they are cognized as representations of the inner sense in mere time. The condition mentioned above for the immediate presence of a representation of this class is that the representation stand in a causal relation with a determinate other representation belonging to the complete totality of experience. I call this representation *immediate*, in contrast to all others, which are *mediated* through it. This representation is *that of one's own body*: it is the *immediate object*. As one object among objects it is subject to the principle of causality governing this class of representations. This object is immediately present to the subject only by means of alterations that other objects effect in it, and what is called the existence of these other objects means nothing other than the capacity to be immediately present to the subject in such a way. But it is important to note that these objects are not only cognized in their acting [*Wirkung*], not only cognized in the modifications that they bring about in the immediate object – (if they were

only cognized in their acting, then there would be only *one object* for the subject, the immediate object with changing states). Rather, the cause of any effect will also be cognized as the substrate of a power, i.e., as substance and as present in space (i.e. *other objects, as well as the immediate object, will be cognized as belonging to the totality of experience*) through the functions of the understanding and the applications of these to the forms of sensibility (which are not to be encountered in this class of representations without the material of sensibility). That an object would actually come into causal relation with an immediate object depends on all sorts of circumstances, on its position in space, on the medium in which it is to be found, on the receptivity of the immediate object (the health of the senses), etc. –

Comment 1. The concept of causality necessarily had to be anticipated here, although it will first be explained in the second half of this chapter.

Comment 2. It is worth noting for a fundamental understanding of what was said in this section, that all parts of the immediate object are again mediated objects, since one part affects the others. E.g.: my hand is my immediate object when through its touch I cognize the influence of another object on it and therefore cognize it as present in space. My hand is a mediated object when I see it, i.e., when I cognize its activity – its actuality – its filling space from the light rays reflected from it to my eyes. My eye, which here was an immediate object, again becomes mediated, since I touch it, etc. Furthermore, it is easy to observe that if I find among the objects given to me mediately some of a nature similar to one which is immediate to me, I conclude that they are also immediate objects for the subject, even if the similarity is more or less distant, as with animals. Plants provide the occasion for the supposition that they are indeed immediate, but not mediated objects for the subject, i.e., having life, but not sensibility.

In A, § 22 reads as follows:

§ 22

MENTAL IMAGES AND DREAMS. FANTASY

However, once representations have been immediately present to the subject through the mediation of the immediate object, without this mediation the subject is afterwards capable of voluntarily repeating representations, even with alterations of their order and connection. I call such repetitions *mental images* [*Phantasmata*] and the faculty of these, the *fantasy* [*Phantasie*] or *imagination* [*Einbildungskraft*]. Its representations are indeed *complete* (according to the explanation given in § 18 [§ 17, in B]), but do not *belong to the totality of experience*; hence, they are not subject to the law of causality that governs this totality; rather, as actions [*Handlungen*] of mere choice, they are subject to the law of motivation which governs the class of objects of the faculty of representation to be discussed last. I mention them here because they belong here

as complete representations, although through the predicate of voluntariness [*Willkürlichkeit*] they evade the law of the totality of experience and are subject to another law. Furthermore, I mention them because as *mental images* they can be distinguished from *concepts*, which are to be dealt with in the next chapter.

We know how to distinguish mental images from real objects because in a waking state the *immediate object* is always *immediately present* to our consciousness; whereas the immediate presence of all other representations belonging to the totality of experience is based upon an alteration of the immediate object, which is thus included as an *integral part* of any representation belonging to the totality of experience present at any moment. It is the same way with mental images as with real objects: mental images (as repetitions) include representations of alterations of the immediate object and related functions of the understanding, although the more vivid the fantasy the weaker for the moment will be the presence of the immediate object to consciousness. The immediate object almost always remains such a presence for us that while mental images, including those that contain alterations in the immediate object, become objects for us, at the same time we still cognize the immediate object as *without* such alterations. But if mental images reach so high a degree of vivacity that they drive the immediate object completely out of our consciousness, then we can cognize them as mental images only through the reappearance of the immediate object in consciousness; and so this reappearance must again follow because the immediate object, as a representation belonging to the totality of experience, *persists* according to the laws of experience. According to the rule that will be noted in what follows in this chapter, any event must have a necessary place in some sort of series of causes and effects. We observe the immediate object just as we observe other objects, in the connectedness of experience, and we cognize the immediate object according to the laws of experience. In most cases of fantasy, this rule is not followed, so we recognize that the immediate object could not have undergone the effect that was represented in the fantasy, since in it we can seldom follow the series of effects and causes very far and never to a conclusion. For example, if I have imagined that someone has entered my room, I can recognize it as a fantasy only by the first means indicated (through the reappearance of my immediate object in my consciousness), since inquiry into the circumstance that must have preceded the person's entry into my room can seldom go very far.

In sleep the immediate object, and with it all mediated objects, is withdrawn from consciousness: without an object, no subject; therefore, sleep without consciousness. Mental images, i.e., renewals of representations mediated by other means, but without this mediation, are nonetheless possible in sleep and known as *dreams*. Since in sleep the immediate object is withdrawn for us, in sleep we cannot distinguish mental images from real objects because the aforementioned criterion is lacking. We recognize the fantasy as such only upon waking, at the reappearance of the immediate object in consciousness – a necessary reappearance because all representations belonging to the totality of

experience persist, independent of their immediate presence in consciousness. Waking is thus the single criterion distinguishing dreams from reality [*Wirklichkeit*]. If we doubt whether an event was dreamed or real, this occurs because the moment of waking is forgotten. Then we must resort to the much less certain criterion of investigating whether the event takes place in any chain of effects and causes.

65 With alterations, § 23 in B corresponds to § 24 in A, the title of which is 'Disputation of Kant's Proof of this Principle and Assertion of a New Proof Composed with the Same Purport'.

66 In B 'A principal object of the *Critique of Pure Reason* . . . ' through to ' . . . In essence, it is the following' replaces in A: 'A principal object of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a demonstration that the law of causality is universally valid for all experience, that it is limited to experience, and that it is *a priori*: it would be superfluous to repeat what is said there. Since I generally refer to what is said there, I will merely touch upon one point in the *Critique of Pure Reason* with which I cannot agree: namely, the proof of the apriority of the principle [of causality].

But first this. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 246 [B246] Kant sees the principle of sufficient reason as identical with the law of causality. Salomon Maimon in his *Logic*, p. xxiv, Kiesewetter in his *Logic*, p. 16, G. E. Schulze in his *Logic*, pp. 32 and 84 have declared their opposition to this. I, however, agree with Kant, except that, according to my view presented throughout this treatise, the law of causality is one of the four modifications or forms of the principle of sufficient reason.

On the same page of the *Critique of Pure Reason* cited above, Kant also provides a proof of the principle of sufficient reason that in essence is the following'.

67 In B, the sentence 'According to this, the order of succession of alterations . . . through the causal nature of these alterations' starts paragraph 2 of § 23. In A this paragraph begins as follows: 'It is first to be noted that this proof proceeds only from the law of causality and not at all from the principle of sufficient reason, which as I hope to prove, also has three completely different applications or forms. In any case, I agree with Kant that the law of causality in connection with the other categories, thus generally with the understanding, makes possible the totality of objective cognition that we call experience. (§ 42 explains this more thoroughly.) Except that, according to my view, the understanding does this only by unifying time and space through its categories, not through mere categories alone. Not experience, but only its laws, known *a priori*, are given to understanding: experience itself is the unity of space and time produced by the understanding and thus is to be grasped only through the *simultaneous* application of the understanding and sensibility. Therefore, I cannot agree that the order of succession of alterations of real objects is recognized as something objective solely through the category of causality'.

68 'Both are events . . . merely an empirically perceived fact' in B reads in A: 'Both are events: the only difference is that in the first case the alteration is between the immediate and the mediated objects, in the second, between two mediated objects'.

69 'If from the shore I stare at a ship passing nearby, . . . the real succession of the positions of my body relative to the ship' added in B.

70 'just as τὸ συμβεβηκός comes from συμβαίνειν (cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 4.)' added in B.

71 'Indeed, even the succession of day and night . . . has not by custom misled anyone into taking them for cause and effect' replaces in A: 'Indeed, even that succession with which we compare all others, the rotation of the earth, is without a doubt known [*erkannt*] to us objectively, but certainly not through the means of the concept of causality, since its cause is completely unknown [*unbekannt*] to us'.

72 For 'Kant says in the same passage', A reads: 'Kant says (pp. 242–3)' [i.e. B242–243].

73 '. . . to distinguish the objective from the subjective, real objects from mental images' through to the end of the paragraph in B replaces in A: '. . . to distinguish the objective from the subjective, real objects from mental images, which, as I have shown in § 22 [in A only, as given above], occurs in our being conscious of whether the presence of a representation is mediated through the immediate object, or, absent this mediation, called forth by choice as a mere repetition. In a dream, as has been said, where the immediate object is withdrawn from consciousness [*entrückt*], we cannot make that distinction; therefore, while we dream we take mental images for real objects, and only on waking (i.e. when the immediate object re-enters consciousness) do we recognize the error, although the law of causality asserts its authority in a dream as well'.

74 In A this paragraph reads as follows: 'I cannot acknowledge as valid Kant's proof of the apriority and necessity of the causal law – that only by means of this law can we recognize the objective succession of alterations (insofar as the causal law is a condition of experience). However, I do agree with him that we are conscious *a priori* of the rules according to which alterations of events must follow one another, and I also agree with him about all the inferences which he draws from these rules. However, the proof of our being conscious *a priori* of the causal law seems to me already to lie in the unshakeable certainty with which everyone expects that the causal law would apply in any case of experience, i.e., by the certainty that we attribute to this law, a certainty distinct from every other certainty grounded on induction, e.g., the empirically known laws of nature. It is even impossible for us to think that somewhere in the world of experience this law might be subject to an exception. E.g. we could *imagine* that the law of gravity might cease to operate at some time, but not that this could occur without a cause'.

75 B omits a complete paragraph immediately preceding this paragraph. This paragraph, omitted in B, is as follows in A: 'However, there is certainly also

a *proof* of the kind Kant wants, namely a demonstration that experience is possible only through the mediation of the law of causality. The demonstration goes as follows. Only *one* object is given to us *immediately*: our own bodies. Now there is no way to understand how we get beyond this representation to other objects in space, except by means of the application of the category of causality. Without this application we would have no other object than the immediate object, with its succession of states. Without applying the understanding at all, we would remain with mere sensation and never arrive at intuition – intuition being of objects, and not merely of perceivable [*wahrnehmbarer*] space and time, and being precisely the union of time and space, realized [*erfüllten*] through the categories. Nothing is given immediately except the immediate object in space and the succession of its states in time; indeed, even the immediate object itself is first given as an *object* through the applications of the categories of subsistence, reality, unity, etc. The cognition of *mediated* objects, however, now begins with the category of causality and proceeds from it. A cause is inferred from an alteration in the eye, ear, or any other organ, and the cause is posited at the point in space where its effect proceeds from, as the substrate of this power. Then the categories of subsistence, existence, etc., can first be applied to the effect. The category of causality is thus the actual point of transition, hence, the *condition of all experience*, and as such, precedes experience, and is not first derived from experience. Through the category of causality we originally cognize the object as *actual* [*wirklich*], i.e., *acting* [*wirkend*] on us. That we are not conscious of this inference presents no difficulty: we are never conscious of the inference from the colour of the body to its shape. Moreover, it is no inference of reason [*Vernunftschluß*], no combining of judgements [*Urtheilen*]: we have nothing to do with the concept of the category,* but with the category itself. The category itself leads immediately from the effect to the cause; therefore, we are as little conscious of its function as that of the other categories, since precisely through these categories our consciousness changes from dull sensation to intuition. I would like to give the name of *inference of understanding* [*Verstandesschlusses*] to this inference. It is a type of inference that is not mediated through any abstract concept, and so not through any minor premise, and in logic it must be assigned to a species of inferences whose distinctive feature does not allow us to attribute to them an origin in a completely different intellectual power. To this type of inference, following the precise separation of understanding and reason which I advanced, the former designation [i.e. "inference of reason"] is not suitable. One can receive a palpable proof – in the most literal sense of the word – of the inference asserted by me, but so frequently denied (recently by Fries in his [*New*] *Critique of Reason* Vol. 1, pp. 52–6 and 290 and by Schelling in the first volume of his [*Philosophical*] *Writings*, pp. 237–8). If one lays the middle finger over the index finger and feels a ball with both, then one will believe with the greatest certainty that one feels two balls, and one can only

* 'Only after familiarity with the following chapter can this be completely understood'.

convince oneself with one's eyes that it is only *one* ball. This remarkable illusion had already drawn the notice of Aristotle (*Metaphysics* III, 6 [IV, 6, 1011a, 33; cf. *On Dreams* I, 2, 460b, 20–25]). In this case, through the most reliable sense, in the most immediate way, one believes one perceives two balls, and indeed this certainty is founded simply on the inference which, expressed in concepts, would be as follows: if two spherical surfaces simultaneously affect the outside of the middle finger and the index finger, then these cannot belong to one ball; that is happening now; therefore, there are two spheres here – except that the alteration of the natural position of the fingers presupposed by the major premise makes the conclusion false.'

76 In A this sentence reads: 'After all, the principle of sufficient reason is the expression of the necessity lying at the core of our cognitive faculty, of a connection among all of our objects, i.e., representations'.

77 In A two paragraphs immediately precede this paragraph. The two paragraphs, deleted from B, read: 'That entire theory of Kant's ultimately rests on a false dilemma, namely: if representations succeed one another, then this occurs either by my choice [*nach meiner Willkühr*] or according to a rule. – This is false: for a succession can also occur according to a necessity which is not rule-governed. Such a necessity is of this sort: my body (as an object among objects and as subordinate to the causal law) has a passivity to external influences, the influences of countless objects, which (because of their common form in time) must be recognized by me in succession since I cognize my body itself in time.

Finally, one could ask: if the objectivity of succession, i.e., that of change [*Wechsels*], is recognized simply from causality, from what will the objectivity of duration be recognized? For time is posited as a determination of representations owing to duration as well as to change, not only insofar as these are immediately present to my consciousness, but also insofar as they belong to the total representation of experience. It happens that we generally recognize time not only in reference to the former, but also to the latter (i.e. according to the usual way of putting it, we know time as a determination of real objects) because the immediate object, as well as any other, belongs to the world of objects, and successive alterations of these are given to us as immediately as the immediate object itself; but these alterations presuppose time, not merely as a form of representations, insofar as they are immediately present to me, but also within the total representation of an experience'.

78 In A the final clause of this sentence reads: 'which, moreover, the proof given above, even in the manner desired by Kant, puts beyond all doubt'. To its end § 24 in A continues:

I completely agree with Kant that the perception of any succession of states of real objects is *accompanied* by the presupposition of a cause. However, I deny merely that a succession is conditioned through this. I agree with him that every event belongs to a series in which its place is determined through a rule, and hence is necessarily determined. Only I cannot grant that we discover the place of any event in time simply through this rule and from the event's place

in one of these series; that is, I cannot agree that we are unable to recognize the place of an event empirically. For there are countless series of causes and effects, and the members of any such series have an objective temporal relation (i.e. one existing in the connectedness of experience) not only to one another in a given series, but also to the members of any other series, although they have no such causal relation. Now indeed, the temporal relation of any member to the remaining members of the *same* series is *a priori* knowable according to the causal law, and thus, it is certain that two members of the same series can never be simultaneous. However, the temporal relation of a member of one series to one of *another* series is knowable only empirically, through the fundamental form of time, which makes possible not only representations immediately present to the subject, but also all complete representations connected to the totality of experience, where each one must be simultaneous with many others. One can illustrate this by presenting time with content [*erfüllte Zeit*] in the image of a circular plane whose centre is the present and whose infinitely possible radii represent the infinitely possible series of causes and effects. Events are all conceivable points in this plane circle, each of which belongs to a conceivable radius. Empirically, by means of the intuition of time, we recognize the distance of any point from the centre and can then compare them, i.e., determine their places in time. According to Kant's doctrine we must discover the distance from the centre only along the continuum of the radius, so two points can only be compared if they lie along *one* radius, or rather, there must be only *one* radius in the circle. We see, however, that all possible points can be compared according to their distance from the centre and that simultaneous events can never be effect and cause of one another since they are necessarily represented by distinct points that lie on a *single* parallel circle and thus never along a *single* radius. I know quite well that absolute, pure time has only *one* dimension and, therefore, its image is a line: but here I am discussing time with content, in which, because of the strict union (or multiplication, as it were) between it and space that leads to a totality of experience, many things must be simultaneous. Moreover, in this image the direction of time can, as it were, be given a single designation, namely a centripetal one.

From Kant's theory that objective succession is possible and recognizable only through causal connection, another parallel follows: namely, that simultaneity is possible and recognizable only through reciprocal action. (*Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 256–65 [B256–265].) It stands or falls with the first, only it is much easier to see through, and here is not the place for a separate refutation of it, especially since in disputing the other, I fear I have come to be too prolix.

It is futile to defend Kant's doctrine that I challenged above: it is not just erroneous, but is a profound error because it arose through the intellectualization of sensibility. As an attempt to prove the apriority of the causal law from the most irrefutable fact, it is a most brilliant idea, but for just this reason blinding – it is futile, I say, for anyone to want to defend it by asserting that Kant had in no way claimed that an event's following from its cause [*die Folge*

einer Begebenheit auf ihre Ursache] is the *empirical* criterion of its reality and of the objectivity of its place in time, but only the universal condition of the possibility of real succession [*Succession*]; or that he did not say that in order to recognize a sequence [*Folge*] of representations as an event we must *perceive* its causal nexus, only that the causal nexus must be *presupposed*. I refute such a defence by referring to the whole passage, which I challenged, in which it is asserted that a sequence of representations can be distinguished from that which is merely subjectively given in our apprehension only by means of cognizing the necessary order according to the law of causality. That this order is the criterion for this distinction, one finds repeated in the most manifold ways, and with reference to the parallel theory of objective simultaneity it is said, pp. 258–59 [B258–259], 'that the simultaneity of appearances which do not operate on one another reciprocally, but are somewhat separated by empty space, is not an object of possible perception' [paraphrasing B259] (this would be an *a priori* proof that there is no empty space between the fixed stars); and p. 260 [B260] 'that the light that *plays between* our eyes and the heavenly bodies' (an expression which slips in the idea that the light of the stars not only works on our eyes, but also that of our eyes works on the stars) 'effects a community between us and the latter and thereby proves the simultaneity of the latter'.

Every criterion is, after all, empirical, since it is always a mark [*Merkmal*], which, when it is found in a particular case, verifies that the case belongs under a rule or concept, and what occurs in particular cases is always empirical. – For an alteration to be recognized as objective, its cause does not need to be *perceived* (according to that supposed defence), but merely *presupposed*, so the unavoidable question arises: how is an *alteration* (i.e. a change of representations) recognized as one for which we must presuppose a cause? If Kant had merely wanted to say that the representations belonging to the class we are now considering follow one another and connect according to a law different from that of our concepts and mental images (later we will consider the law which these follow) and that this law consequently belongs to their character, then I completely agree. But if it is his opinion that recognizing to which class the representations belong requires recognizing the law governing the sequence of the representations, then I maintain the reverse: that it is only after we immediately recognize to which class some given representations belong that we know at the same time and *a priori* which law governs their sequence and connection. Indeed, I agree with Kant that complete representations making up the totality of experience are connected by causal nexus, but I simply deny that the objectivity of their sequence is recognized only through the causal nexus; whereas, in my view, time is not only the form of representations immediately present to us, but is the form of all complete representations that are connected into a totality of experience.

It is not without great reluctance that I have dared to produce objections to prominent [*hauptsächliche*] theory – taken as proven and even repeated in the most recent books – a theory of that man whose amazing profundity I respect

and to whom I owe so much that is so important, that his spirit can speak to me in Homer's words:

'I also removed the fog that covered your eyes.'

[Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν (*Iliad* 5.127)]

That I nonetheless have dared to produce these objections, Plato's words may excuse: 'for we are not to honour a man before the truth' [Οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ] (*Republic* 10 [595c]) and 'it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener' [πολλά τοι ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες πρότερον (πρότεροι) εἶδον] (*ibid.* [596a]), and finally, Herder's maxim: 'error perishes; truth endures.' [*Gott: Einige Gespräche*, Drittes Gespräch, Theophron (*God: Some Conversations*, Third Conversation, Theophron).]

And finally, even if my objections are based on error, since the same could deceive others, my objections might perhaps have the use of giving rise to a clearer presentation and firmer foundation for this very brilliant doctrine. This may also be said with reference to the refutation of Kant following in § 26.

79 § 24 in B bears the title of § 25 in A, and B eliminates all of the material of the former § 25. In A, § 25 reads as follows:

§ 25

ON THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW OF CAUSALITY

As has been said, the law [*Gesetz*] of sufficient reason of becoming now under consideration is universally valid [*allgemeingültig*] and governs without restriction the world of real objects, i.e., governs complete representations connected in the total representation of experience. Our own body is also such a representation or object among objects, as has been mentioned often enough; therefore, it too is completely subject to the law of causality. But I still must repeat that between object and subject there is the greatest of all conceivable distinctions. Everything cognized is object; that which cognizes is subject, which for that reason, insofar as it cognizes, is never cognized (cf. § 42 [in A]). The relation between object and subject is such a necessary one that without it both are inconceivable. But cognition of the law governing this relation is impossible because all cognition presupposes this relation insofar as cognition applies to objects and, therefore, is possible only given this relation. But whoever applies to the subject the laws which apply to the world of objects (i.e., the laws of pure sensibility and of the understanding which Kant has proven to be known to us *a priori*) makes a transcendent use of the laws, going beyond the bounds of the laws' validity; consequently, he applies the laws valid for objects of experience to that which cannot at all be an object for the subject of cognition. Not only common understanding but also speculation lapsed into this mistake by applying the law of causality to the subject just as to the object, and thereby arriving at two opposing assertions which became the bases of two opposing systems. According to the first, the representation arises through the causality

of the object; thus, the subject is passively subjected to the law of causality. This is the basis of *realism*. – According to the second, the representation arises through the causality of the subject: thus, the subject is actively subject to the law of causality. This is the basis of *idealism*.*

80 § 25 in B bears the title of § 26 in A, and B eliminates virtually all of the material of the former § 26. In A, § 26 reads as follows:

§ 26

THE TIME OF AN ALTERATION

As we have seen, the principle of sufficient reason of becoming applies only to *alterations*. Even if it is not strictly germane, I cannot now refrain from saying something about an issue touched on by many philosophers, namely the *time in which alteration takes place*. On this issue Plato and Kant in particular stand in direct contradiction. For Plato (*Parmenides* p. 138 [156d]) asserts that an alteration occurs *suddenly* and fills *absolutely no time*. By contrast, Kant expressly says (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 253 [B253]) that an alteration occurs *not suddenly*, but *in a time*. Schelling, too, in *System of Transcendental Idealism*, p. 299, says something relevant here, which, however, is too closely connected with the system presented in that work for me to be able to go into it here, so I must be satisfied with just a reference to it.

I think it best to reveal my judgement on this subject with an examination of Kant's law of *continuity of all alterations*. What Kant says about this belongs with the above-mentioned passage I recommended for re-reading and is found on pp. 253–6 of the *Critique of Pure Reason* [B253–256].

Put briefly, Kant's proof of the continuity of all alteration is this: 'Since there is no smallest possible part of time [*Zeittheil*], then between two moments there is always a time, and thus there is also a time between states which fill time and follow one another. This is *the time of alteration*: in this time of alteration, the cause works continually, and the new state arises gradually in this time of alteration, emerging through all degrees of reality' [paraphrasing B254].

Against this I say: 1) there is no time between two moments; even between two centuries there is no time since in time as in space there is a clear boundary that we intuit *a priori*, although we are no more able to present it in filled time than in filled space (in which no line can be drawn without breadth). 2) Time is a continuous quantity [*Quantum continuum*] and not discrete [*discretum*]. Now since empty time is imperceptible and would abolish the complete unity of our experience, there must be an appearance in every part of time and, thus, a series

* With regard to what is considered here, we improve nothing by positing an absolute I in place of the subject. For above all this absolute I is subject, and, thus, cannot stand under laws valid for certain classes of objects, since objects are present only with the subject and for the subject.

[On the bottom margin in his copy, Schopenhauer included the handwritten remark 'The law of relation is the transference [*Übertragung*] of a sensation to an object as its cause'; see Hübscher *SW* 7, 136].

of appearances must be a continuum. Furthermore, because all appearance consists of objects, the states of which change [*wechseln*], and, indeed, as was acknowledged above, only insofar as a state always follows from one preceding it, the states must also be a continuum; i.e., one state in time immediately borders on the other from which it follows. Thus the *continuum* of time is filled through the continuum of states, which, in order to follow from one another, can have nothing between them. Thus, for this reason, contrary to what Kant says, there is no time of alteration. Alteration is not a thing in time; rather, it is a mere comparative concept [*Vergleichungsbegriff*], existing only in our reflection as the idea that there is now a state which was not previously, and that previously there was one which is not now. However, a discrete quantity [*Quantum discretum*] must be distinguished from a distinct quantity [*Quantum distinctum*]. A discrete quantity is a magnitude, the parts of which are separated by something completely different from them in kind [*toto genere*], thus not belonging to the whole magnitude. Its opposite is the continuous quantity. A distinct quantity, however, is a magnitude, the parts of which, although as such homogeneous in kind [*in genere*], are still specifically distinct from one another. Its opposite is the univocal quantity [*Quantum univocum*]. Now something can be a discrete quantity and still be univocal; e.g. a row of trees. So, too, something can be a continuous quantity and still be distinct: an example of this is a series of states. If between any two states there were something not belonging to them, but which like them filled time, something that Kant calls an alteration, then the series of states would not be a continuum, but discrete and distinct. Although this sequence is now a continuum, i.e., a state on which another follows immediately, it is also a distinct state, i.e., this state is specifically different from others.

However, the duration of a state is often so brief that we do not perceive it because of the limited acuity of our senses, and other imperceptible states can often lie between two states whose duration is sufficient for them be perceptible, where the first of the two states is perceived as cause of the second, and the second is perceived as effect of the first. So we posit the first of the two perceived states as cause of the second – even though it is not. In practical life, however, this leads to no problem because, as cause of the intermediate state, it is the mediated cause of the second, perceived state. But to think of the time filled by these states that are of too brief duration to be perceptible as occupied not by a state [*Zustand*], but by something completely different called an alteration, conflicts with the law of causality, according to which a state can only arise when the state immediately preceding it contains the conditions for it. But then again according to this law, when a time appears to pass between the cause and effect, we can infer that there are states which are of too brief duration to be empirically cognized as discrete. Thus there is no alteration in time, but mere states, and since these states must immediately border on one another, there is no continuity of alteration, but a *continuity of states*, which is already self-evident, since alteration is nothing but a concept arising through a reflective act of comparison: for continuity can only have a quantity [*Quantum*], i.e., a

magnitude in space or time, but a concept cannot have a magnitude in space or time.

That alteration takes no time can be proven from *a priori* concepts, as has been shown to this point, but it can also be intuited *a priori*, although this is only possible through a unique alteration which can be constructed merely from pure intuitions of space and time. This alteration is the transition from rest to motion and from motion to rest. Given that this alteration can be intuited *a priori*, I can establish as an axiom the fact that between the moment when a point in space rests and that in which it moves, there cannot be a third in which it does neither, but does alter its state.

For this reason, an alteration would be something that is not in time, but of which we have a concept only by means of time. As I have said, Plato, whose opinion agrees with my result [*Resultat*], says that for this reason an alteration is sudden [ἐξαίφνης], which he calls a thing of odd nature, being in no way in time [ἄτοπος φύσις ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν (οὐδενὶ) οὖσα]. He could as well have called it a timeless being [ἄχρονος φύσις]. There is, however, still something equally odd [ἄτοπον] that, although it has meaning only in time, still fills no time. This is the *present*. It is the clear border between the past and the future. Duration is to time what extension is to space. Just as a border in space is without extension, so the present is without duration. Consequently it fills no time and, thus, is *never*. Nonetheless, the present exists throughout our entire life. From this last fact it is clear why we treat the present with great seriousness, no matter how trivial its content. And the mass of trivialities that fills the greatest part of our lives is always treated with a dignity that is quite strange and, to those who are reflective, laughable, because it is – *present*. Whoever can achieve this reflection changes from a laughable person to one who laughs – a laughing Democritus. Perhaps this timeless quality of the present admits of a kind of explanation, in that it is only through time that it attains significance. For, as the form of inner sense, time is that in which *all objects* must appear; but the *subject*, which can never be object, never enters this form, and the present is the point of contact between the subject and the object. – Furthermore, just as the present, despite its timelessness, is conditioned through time, so, conversely, time is conditioned by the present, since we must think of any time as past or future, thus always in relation to the present.

81 § 27 in A bears a similar title to § 26 in B, but reads entirely differently, as follows:

§ 27

EXPLANATION OF THIS CLASS OF OBJECTS. REASON

The second class of possible objects for our faculty of representation is made up of *representations of representations*: these are concepts, combinations of which are *judgements*, which can again be combined; this occurs when a judgement is based entirely on one or two others through the principle of sufficient reason; the result, then, is an *inference* [*Schluß*].

The class of representations considered in the previous chapter belongs not only to humans, but also to animals, and concerns merely sensibility and understanding.* The class of objects to be considered now, however, belongs exclusively to humans and the faculty for objects of this class is *reason*. *Thus reason is the faculty of representations of representations or concepts*. Therefore, concepts are not at all to be confused with the functions of the understanding, the categories, which unify space and time to create that which is perceptible; concepts are especially not to be confused, as often occurs, with the category of unity, which unifies the manifold of all sensible intuition. However, just as sensibility cannot comprehend what causality is, or the understanding cannot comprehend what temporal sequence and position are, so both together are unable to grasp what a concept is; i.e. there can be no intuitive representation of the nature of a concept, but the nature of it is only conceivable through concepts themselves, and put simply, a concept is a representation of a representation. – Further, reason is also the faculty for the combination of concepts, thus of *judgements*, and through the connection of these, in the way indicated above, of *inferences*. The presence of this class of representations, and thus the activity of reason, is *thinking* [*Denken*] in the proper sense of the word. I know that this explanation of reason and of concepts varies greatly from all previous ones and that understanding and reason have never been so very clearly distinguished from one another as occurs through this explanation of reason and that of the understanding given in § 19. All other explanations familiar to me have always seemed to me to be as unsatisfactory as they are vague. – This entire chapter, but especially § 33, contains the corroboration of what is given here, and in § 58 may also be found a defence of it, which appears to be necessary insofar as Kant designated with the name practical reason something totally different in kind [*toto genere*] from reason.

Complete representations (i.e. real objects), be they intuited through the immediate object or through repetitions spontaneously recalled (i.e. mental images), are always particular representations; this is so even of the representations of the two classes still to be discussed. *Concepts*, however, are always general because, as mere representations of representations, they cannot contain everything contained by the representation; i.e. they are not so thoroughly determined. But for just this reason, concepts must be representations of many representations, the differences among which are at the same time left undetermined. Thus any concept is general and has a sphere. Concepts depend on language to be preserved and communicated, since otherwise they would not be fixed. In turn, language depends on concepts because language is nothing more than their tool. Proper names, which do not refer to concepts, but refer immediately to particular objects, are an exception to this and actually belong

* It is entirely superfluous to note that among animals, by innumerable gradations, the understanding is duller and the sensibility sharper than among humans. Then among humans, there are also those of sharper or duller understanding, just as there are those of sharper or duller senses. Those who perceive the relations and connections of things more clearly and with greater versatility and thus are in a position to apply their reason to more complex combinations have sharper understanding.

to no language. Because they indicate no concept, they are easily understood by animals.

82 In § 27 of B bears the same title as § 28 of A.

83 This paragraph is added in B.

84 The opening of the second paragraph of § 27 in B incorporates material from the opening of the single paragraph in § 28 of A. In A, that material reads: 'But precisely because concepts contain less than the representations of which they are in turn representations, they are easier to handle than these representations and are related to them in somewhat the same way as the formulae of higher arithmetic are related to the operations of thought, from which the formulae are derived and which they represent. From the many representations of which they are representations, they contain exactly the parts which are needed; if instead one wanted to bring representations to mind through the imagination, one would have to drag along a load of inessentials, as it were, and one would be confused by these; as it is, however, by applying concepts one thinks of only the parts and relations of all these representations that are needed for the task at hand'.

85 This sentence comprises the remainder of § 28 in A. Schopenhauer added the intervening material to the equivalent § 27 of B, as well as the references following this sentence to Aristotle and the medieval fight between the nominalists and the realists.

86 § 29 in A corresponds to § 28 in B, but as a single paragraph, which reads as follows:

§ 29

REPRESENTATIVES OF CONCEPTS

As has already been said, a concept is not at all to be confused with a mental image, which is a complete and particular representation neither brought about through the immediate object nor belonging to the complex of experience. However, a mental image is then also to be distinguished from a concept when a mental image is used as a *representative of a concept*. This occurs when one wants to have the representation itself that the concept is a representation of, and that corresponds to the concept. This is always impossible, as, e.g., there is no representation of 'dog' in general, of 'colour' in general, of 'triangle' in general, of 'number' in general – no mental images corresponding to these concepts. As soon as one calls up the mental image, e.g., of some dog, it must, as representation, be thoroughly determined, i.e., of some specific size, a definite form, colour, etc. since the concept that it represents has no such determining characteristics. However, with the use of such a representative of a concept, one is always aware that the mental image does not adequately represent the concept, but is a wholly arbitrary determination. (See the note to § 40 on Platonic ideas.) What is said here is obviously in conflict with Kant's doctrine in the chapter on schematism (*Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 176–81 [B176–181]).

Only inner observation and clear deliberation can decide the matter. Hence, one should investigate whether in one's concepts one is aware of a 'monogram of pure *a priori* imagination' [A142/B181], e.g., when one thinks of dog, one is conscious of something between dog and wolf [*entre chien et loup*], or whether, according to the explanations put forth here, either one thinks of a concept through reason, or by way of imagination represents [*vorstellt*] as a complete image some representative of the concept [*einen Repräsentanten des Begriffs*].

87 At this point in A there is a short section, entirely omitted from B. It is as follows:

§ 30

TRUTH

Concepts are of no other use than for judgements. Judgements have no value, except insofar as they are *true*. To say that judgement is *true* means that it has a sufficient ground. This must be something distinct from the judgement to which it relates. *Truth is thus the relation of a judgement to something beyond it*.

88 § 29 of B bears the same title as § 31 of A, but § 29 of B incorporates little from A. In A § 31 reads as follows:

§ 31

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON OF KNOWING

Thus our principle appears here again as the principle of *sufficient reason of knowing*, *principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*. It receives this name as it is the guide to knowledge.

A judgement that has absolutely no ground is not true; it has arisen out of no knowledge. Truth, as has been said, is the relation of a judgement to something beyond it, whereupon it is based or rests and for which, then, in German language [*im Teutschen*] the name *ground* is well-chosen. However, the grounds upon which a judgement can rest are again of four types, and the truth which each of these contains is a different one. These four types of truth are presented in the next four sections.

89 § 30 of B is equivalent to § 32 of A and bears the same title.

90 The opening paragraph in § 30 of B expands and alters the first paragraph of § 32 in A. The opening paragraph of § 32 in A reads as follows: 'A judgement can have another judgement as its ground. Its truth then is *logical* or *formal*. Whether it also has material truth remains undecided and depends on whether the judgement that supports it has material truth or the series of judgements on which it is grounded rests on a judgement of material truth. This grounding of one judgement on another is always subsumption of concepts; therefore, the form of an *inference* [*eines Schlusses*] arises when it is clearly presented. Since an inference, which is the derivation [*Zurückführung*] of one judgement through

another, always concerns only judgements and these are only combinations of concepts, which are the exclusive objects of reason, inferring is correctly explained as the unique business of reason'.

91 In B 'laws of thought' [*Denkgesetzen*] replaces in A 'principles of thought' [*Grundsätzen alles Denkens*] with corresponding changes from 'principles' to 'laws' in the remainder of the paragraph. Otherwise, the second paragraph of § 32 in A is virtually identical to the second paragraph of § 30 in B.

92 § 33 of A corresponds to § 31 of B, with the same title, but in A is much longer. § 33 of A is as follows:

§ 33

EMPIRICAL TRUTH

An experience can be the ground of a judgement: then the judgement has *material* truth, and indeed this is *empirical truth* insofar as the judgement itself is *immediately* grounded on experience.

To say that a judgement has *material* truth generally means that its concepts are connected and qualified [*modificirt*] in the same way that the representations in experience (which they represent) are mutually connected and are qualified in relation to the whole. Thus, there must be just as many types of connection and qualification of concepts as there are types of connection and qualification of representations in the totality of experience. Here we have the actual reason why nothing other than the *table of judgements* could provide the correct clue to the discovery of the *categories* [*Critique of Pure Reason* A67/B92–A83/B104]: because for every function of our understanding that connects representations to a totality of experience, we must have a corresponding form for the combinations of concepts (i.e. for representations of those representations). And because we can function in this way, we certainly have reason, i.e., the faculty not only for complete representations and for their connections to the totality of experience (which animals also have) but also the faculty (like a higher power) for representation of these representations and for any corresponding connections found in the totality of experience – that is, a faculty for concepts and judgements, which animals lack. General logic stands in the same relation to reason as transcendental logic stands to the understanding, which is why the former has quite correctly been called the doctrine of reason. The forms of general logic must therefore provide directions for discovering transcendental logic. But considered precisely, this applies only as far as general logic examines the possible connections and relations that concepts have in judgements and also examines categorical judgements connected with one another in a hypothetical or disjunctive judgement, an examination that corresponds to that undertaken by transcendental logic concerning the possible connections of forms of sensibility made perceptible through the categories. In the case of inferences, however, it is judgements *themselves* that are the object to which the principle of sufficient reason (i.e. the universal principle of dependence)

[*dem universalen Princip der Dependenz*] applies, not merely the representations of representations which are the concepts contained in the judgements. Consequently inferences are no longer related to the understanding or to transcendental logic; rather, they remain completely and exclusively in the realm of reason and of general logic.

As the faculty of concepts and judgements in general, reason must also be as Kant described it: the faculty of *a priori* principles. For principles can only be put forth abstractly [*in abstracto*], that is, only by reason, even when they have arisen from the understanding or sensibility. No doubt Kant's having put forth this characteristic of reason also led him to find the origin of the moral law in reason (hence it is here called practical reason), particularly because, not respecting the immense distinction between knowledge of what must be and cannot be otherwise and what *should* be, he considered this moral law to be an *a priori* principle, since it is not taken from experience. – Furthermore, because of this ability to establish principles *a priori* in the abstract [*a priori in abstracto*], along with the ability to draw inferences, and because reason, unlike understanding, is not immediately bound to sensibility, reason is led to what Kant called its *ideas*. From metaphysical principles, following the guidance of pure sensibility (which goes on to infinity), but at the same time also following the guidance of the unifying understanding (which creates the totality of experience), reason makes inferences over and over again, while at the same time it seeks the totality and resolution of the infinite series of inferences.

The faculty which we have now clearly described is nothing other than *reason*. It not only makes science possible, but also has incomparably greater value in that it gives us the ability to *guide our actions by concepts* and not, like the animals, merely by *particular representations*. For this reason, we call *a rational action* one that follows from concepts, without regard for and independent of the chance, particular representations which may be present in our consciousness. The possibility of these sorts of actions is a condition of freedom, and the animal, lacking concepts, is completely given over to the desire or the affect which has just taken hold of it. However much the presence of representations may change and solicit our will, for us the *unalterable concept* remains. Furthermore, since through its concepts reason makes possible an overview of our whole lives and their events, it is the condition of the equanimity and steadfastness with which some people bear the misfortunes and setbacks of life, people whom some like to call practical philosophers, although this steadfastness says nothing about their morality. Finally reason and concepts are the conditions for all reflection, scheming, and premeditation through which all so-called great undertakings and all great misdeeds come about. With regard to all its connections to our actions, reason may now be called *practical*, but not with the meaning Kant advanced, which has since been universally applied. A more precise explanation follows in § 58.

93 § 32 in B is equivalent to § 34 in A; however, § 32 in B bears a different title from § 34 in A, substituting here, as throughout B 'transcendental' for 'metaphysical'. § 34 in A reads:

§ 34

METAPHYSICAL TRUTH

The conditions of all experience can be a ground of a judgement, which is then a synthetic *a priori* judgement. Such a judgement also has material truth and, indeed, *metaphysical truth*. For the judgement is determined through just that which determines experience itself: namely, either through the *a priori* forms of pure sensibility intuited by us or through the categories of the understanding known to us *a priori*. Such judgements are, e.g., the following: two straight lines do not enclose a space – nothing occurs without a cause – $3 \times 7 = 21$ – there is no intermediate state between rest and motion. –

94 § 33 in B is equivalent to § 35 in A, and both bear the same title.

95 After 'the truth of which is then of a kind' A reads 'for which I feel compelled to make up a new expression: I call it *metalogical* truth'. The reference to John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* is added in B.

96 'of metalogical truth' is added in B.

97 The metalogical truth given in B as '2) A predicate cannot at the same time be attributed to and denied of a subject, or $a = \sim a = o$' reads in A as '2) A predicate cannot belong to a subject that it contradicts, or $a = \sim a = o$'.

98 The metalogical truth given in B as 'Truth is the relation of a judgement to something outside itself, as its sufficient ground' reads in A as 'Truth is the relation of a judgement to something outside it. This latter is precisely the principle of sufficient reason of knowing'.

99 Where B reads 'we then find that to think contrary to them is of as little avail as it is to move our limbs against the direction of their joints', A has: 'just as through experiments we only become acquainted with the possible movements of the body, exactly as we become acquainted with the properties of any other object'.

100 'E.g. if we were to attempt . . . could not bring it to consciousness in a subjective way' is added in B.

101 'I mean to say matter' is added in B. Schopenhauer also omits from B the following note in A after the end of the paragraph:

'*Note*: it is to be noted that the relation of the ground of cognition to the consequent yields material for a hypothetical judgement only in the case where the ground is a judgement: but what is implicit in the concept of a hypothetical judgement is that it is the combination of two judgements as ground and consequent.'

102 § 34 is added in B and has no equivalent in A.

103 § 35 in B corresponds to § 36 in A, bearing the same title.

104 In B two sentences, 'What distinguishes this class of representations . . . ' through to 'but first comes to consciousness with and in the material part of cognition' replace in A: 'But then, the conditions of the totality of representations of an experience that reside in the understanding – the categories – are not objects for the faculty of representation by themselves and separately,

but are so only in the representations of which they are the conditions, and so concretely [*in concreto*]. Only through abstraction can a concept of them, i.e., a representation of a representation of them, be obtained, but a representation of them is impossible'.

105 § 36 in B corresponds to § 37 in A, bearing the same title.

106 In B 'These relations are unique . . . ' through to ' . . . cannot be made intelligible any other way than by means of intuition' replaces in A: 'These relations are specific, completely different from all other possible relations of our representations, and therefore the understanding is not capable of grasping them, but simple intuition alone can do so; what is above and below, right and left, back and front, absolutely cannot be comprehended by the understanding'.

107 In B two sentences, 'In many cases . . . ' through to 'as well as the judgement which this expresses' replaces in A: 'I now turn to the general and abstract statement of this law'.

108 § 37 in B corresponds to § 38 in A, bearing the same title.

109 In B 'transcendental'; in A 'metaphysical'.

110 § 38 in B corresponds to § 39 in A, bearing the same title.

111 Where B has 'the words of which only serve to mark the individual steps of succession; hence, all of arithmetic teaches absolutely nothing but methodical abbreviations of counting' A reads 'all of arithmetic'.

112 § 39 in B corresponds to § 40 in A, bearing the same title.

113 In B 'mere concepts'; in A 'the understanding'.

114 In B 'real things'; in A 'complete representations'.

115 The quotation and citation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is added in B.

116 In B 'thus, the logical truth, not the transcendental truth of the theorem, is demonstrated'; in A 'thus a logical ground of the judgement, not a metaphysical ground, is provided'.

117 In B 'But this, which lies in the ground of being and not in that of knowing'; in A 'This, however, is the ground of being and not of knowing'.

118 Two sentences, 'In this case, the feeling is similar . . . insofar as it works in a platinum crucible' added in B.

119 The final paragraph, 'However, I cannot refrain . . . in *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, § 15 and Vol. 2, ch. 13', and Fig. 6 are added in B.

120 § 40 in B corresponds to § 41 in A, bearing the same title.

121 ' . . . is one quite special, but very important: for everyone it' is added in B.

122 In B '*the subject of willing* [*des Wollens*]'; in A '*the subject of will*' [*des Willens*].

123 § 41 in B corresponds to § 42 in A, bearing the same title.

124 The opening three paragraphs of § 41 in B replace the opening paragraph of § 42 in A, which reads as follows: 'The subject is cognized only as *something that wills*, a spontaneity, but not as *something that cognizes*. For the representing I, the subject of cognition can never itself be a representation or object, since as a necessary correlate of all representations, it is itself a condition. *Therefore cognition of the cognizing is impossible* which can be explained in the following way. Any instance of cognition yields upon its occurrence a synthetic proposition, be it *a priori* or *a posteriori. But the proposition*

'*I cognize*' *is an analytic proposition* because cognition is a predicate inseparable from I and always assumed with it (i.e. with the subject of cognition and judgement). And in fact, the subject of any analytic proposition does not arise through synthesis, but is in the strictest sense original, something given as the condition of all representations. To be the subject means nothing more than to cognize, [in his copy, Schopenhauer adds the note: 'On p. 112 a willing subject is also discussed' – i.e. in § 43 of A; see Hübscher *SW* 7, 136] just as to be an object means nothing more than to be cognized. Thus a cognition cannot be cognized because for that would be required that the subject itself be separate from cognizing and yet still cognizing the cognition, which is impossible, not only because it is a self-contradiction, but because the entire essence of the subject as such is cognition, from which, therefore, it cannot be thought of as separate'.

125 In B, the sentence in the penultimate paragraph 'Also, traces of this insight are to be found in that amazing mix of profundity and superficiality – in Aristotle – as one can often find in him already the seed of critical philosophy' through to the end of the section replaces the following in A: 'If the identity of the subjective and objective asserted by the philosophy of nature means nothing but this indifference, then I completely agree with it; however, I doubt that it only means this because arriving at this requires no intellectual intuition [*intellektuale Anschauung*] but only mere reflection. Thus if for this reason one wants to call two things one, because one absolutely cannot be thought of without the other, I have no quarrel with it, since when there is agreement one can be flexible about words [*re intellecta in verbis simus faciles*], although I do not recognize as a necessary relation anything which is the single predicate of the two things related. But other things too (e.g. cause and effect, father and son, brother and sister) stand in just such a relation – things which *as such* can only be thought of together, each having its meaning only through the other and otherwise having no meaning. But for this reason these are not called one, but two, which is as much as to say that when given concretely [*in concreto*], these always have other predicates too. If one now says that sensibility and understanding no longer exist or that the world has ended – it is all the same. Whether one says that there are no concepts or that reason is gone and now there are but animals – it is all the same.

It is noteworthy that failure to recognize the relation that was just discussed has given rise to two great controversies, perhaps still not resolved, which could still be settled satisfactorily through insight into this relation. First there is the dispute between the old dogmatism and the Kantians, or between ontology and metaphysics and the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, a dispute which rests on the failure to recognize this relation when considering the first and third classes of representations that I have advanced. And second, there was, throughout the middle ages, the dispute between the realists and the nominalists which rested on the failure to recognize this relation when considering the second of our classes of representation.

If one *imagines away* all *forms* or *determinations* of being an object [*des Objektseyns*] and consequently those of cognition or being the subject [*Subjektseyns*] – I do not mean, if one *abstracts* – this would be imagining away their differences and would yield the general concepts of object and subject – rather, if one *imagines them away*, i.e., thinks of object and subject without them (a thought that cannot actually be completed, only attempted), then on the one hand there are no definite powers of cognition, and on the other hand there are no definite classes of representation. However, it happens that nonetheless something of both remains – an *x* and a *y*. For there remains something which is neither time, nor space, nor the understanding which unifies them, much less reason, which presupposes that these and their combinations already exist; rather, there remains on the side of the object what was presupposed in our outline of the analysis of experience, the perceptibility of all of these forms – matter; and on the other side that which perceives matter, the cognizing *subject without any further determination* of the nature of its cognition. As I have said, this thought cannot be completed because with matter one always thinks of space, and with the cognizing subject one always thinks of time. Now I call these two *x* and *y* because the one becomes too dark, the other becomes too bright to be cognized. However, this much is obvious, that our investigation does not rigidify [*erstarrt*] in a thing in itself, because these two, exactly like all of their determinations and forms that we just imagined away, can only be thought of, can only have meaning, in relation to one another and without this relation disappear. If for this reason one wants to call them one, then I will agree, but with the added stipulation explained above. But an intellectual intuition of the absolute identity of both, which places them under the category of unity, would have the advantage of leaving one unknown quantity instead of two. However, lacking such intuition, and moreover, given that the category of unity (or any category) cannot be applied to that which is not an object, we have here reduced the phenomenon of consciousness to its original nakedness, appearing as subject and object, still only imperfectly comprehended and avoiding our effort to fix it. We can provisionally dismiss the question of why there is this appearance of subject and object at all with the answer that the principle of sufficient reason (and thus also this question, which is only authorized by it) presupposes subject and object, indeed even presupposes their forms and laws. I will surmise that a completely different area of philosophy from the one that the present essay belongs to could provide us with, not so much an answer to this question, as something that renders the question superfluous and satisfies us in a completely different way.

Just above we saw which controversies had arisen through the failure to recognize the true relation between the subject, made determinate by sensibility, understanding, and reason, and the object corresponding to it under these determinations. So too this failure to recognize all the determining factors in the relation between subject and object engendered idealism and realism, the former imagining that it can think of a subject [*ein Subjekt*] without object, and the latter an object without subject.'

126 § 42 in B corresponds to § 43 in A, bearing the same title.
127 'Nonetheless, since we have . . . .' through to 'Beginning with cognition, one can say that' is added in B.
128 At this point, A has the following sentence, omitted in B: 'However it [the proposition 'I will'] is most likely the first of all empirical propositions [*Erfarhrungssätze*] in each person's consciousness, the one with which knowledge [*Erkennen*] begins'.
129 'If we introspect . . . ' to the end of the first paragraph is added in B.
130 In B 'is the knot of the world and therefore inexplicable' replaces in A: 'is absolutely inconceivable'.
131 This third paragraph is added in B.
132 Parts of § 43 in B correspond to parts of §§ 44 and 45 in A, and in B, § 46 of A is eliminated. In A §§ 44, 45, and 46 read:

§ 44

WILLING

Precisely because the subject of willing is immediately given in inner sense, what willing is cannot be further defined or described. One could point to something that willing has in common with other states and with which we are familiar from other states, e.g., alteration and causality, but insofar as what is essential to willing is found nowhere else, willing cannot be subsumed under any other concept. For this reason, what willing is, we can – even must – presuppose to be known. In order to understand willing better, we shall introduce some states related to it, but not to be confused with it.

Acting is not willing, but the effect of willing when it becomes causal. The external conditions of willing's becoming causal are called *ability* [*das Können*]. What is called *wishing* [*Wunsch*] is willing as long as it has not become causal, because it is opposed either by external conditions or by the same subject's willing something else. Among many opposing wishes, the one which becomes causal is contrasted with the others by its being called willing *par excellence* [κατ' ἐξοχήν], and an act which imparts causality, if not immediately and actually [κατ' ἐντελέχειαν] then potentially [κατὰ δύναμιν], is called a *decision*. The wishes that oppose the wish that is raised to the level of willing remain as wishes. If they have more moral value than the one that becomes willing, they are customarily called *pious hopes* [*fromme Wünsche*] – expressing the reproach that what remained a wish should have become a willing, and what had become a willing should have remained a wish.

§ 45

LAW OF MOTIVATION

It is a fact that with respect to what comes after it [*a parte posteriori*] willing falls under the law of causality because it causally affects real objects, one

of which is the immediate object of cognition – the body, which is also an immediate object of willing. But under what law does willing fall with respect to what comes before it [*a parte priori*]? Does it necessarily follow from a preceding state, according to a rule? or is it a faculty that by itself initiates a series of states? This is the ancient dispute about freedom.

With every observed decision of others, as well as our own, we regard ourselves as justified in asking, 'Why?'; i.e., we presume it to be necessary that there was something preceding it, from which it followed, which we call the ground, or more precisely, the motive for the action now resulting. However, in all of our actions, we have the most vivid and often the most uneasy awareness [*Bewußtseyn*] that a firm decision had to follow from none of the states of representation among the three classes cited above, but that, if not as a wish, at least as a decision, it only depended immediately on the subject of willing itself; but only the willing itself can be perceived by the subject of willing, not the state preceding that willing. Thus we see here that the law of causality does not apply to the will, since according to this law any state always follows necessarily from a preceding state. However, because we nonetheless presuppose that there is a sufficient reason for any decision of our own as well as of others, a specific form of the principle of sufficient reason must govern here, which I call *principle of sufficient reason of acting*, *principium rationis sufficientis agendi*, or more briefly put, *law of motivation*, and I call the ground that is presupposed by this law the *motive*.

§ 46

MOTIVE, DECISIONS, EMPIRICAL AND INTELLIGIBLE CHARACTER

If we have to indicate the motive of a decision, then we indicate the states of representations, either of the complete representations comprising the totality of experience, where a motive must be a relation among objects, or the concatenation of judgements that ultimately must have reference to some real objects, i.e., ultimately must have material truth if they are to *provide* a motive.* In these connections, error reigns: to avoid this requires good sense. Since good sense is distributed in unequal measure, it occurs

* Reference to the morality of actions changes none of this. For moral maxims pertaining to moral actions are not motives, but a general expression for certain classes of motives. When Arnold von Winkelried embraces the enemy's spears, the motive of his action is the peril to his fatherland which he wants to prevent. The maxim of not in general putting his own well-being before the common good, or that of another (a maxim that need in no way be recognized abstractly [*in abstracto*] by the actor), is just an expression of the attribute common to many motives, and in this connection the subject who is determined by motives with this attribute is called *good*. – Whoever retains an entrusted deposit, has as motive the view that wealth promotes his well-being. The maxim of promoting his well-being in this way only expresses the attribute common to many motives. The subject whose actions result from motives which bear this character, is called *evil* [*böse*]. He need not at all be conscious of the maxim for this as an abstraction [*in abstracto*].

that the same conditions of real objects provide very different judgements, and so different motives. But apart from this, following any explanation of motives we are aware of their inadequacy: at most they motivate wishing, but not a decision, which is the act of will proper. Therefore we must view the decision either as something completely unconditioned, subject to no rule, or we must presuppose a state of the subject of willing as a necessary condition for the decision, a state that we are never able to observe, since the *subject of willing* is cognized just in willing (i.e. in the individual acts of will), but not in any preceding state.* For, indeed, the *wish* precedes the *decision*, but is itself already a willing, and nothing is explained by saying that of two opposing wishes, the stronger will become a willing through a decision, for just why the willing subject so strongly wishes this or that must be considered either to be completely anomalous [*regellos*] or to proceed from a state of the subject of willing, but this state is not observable; it is not an object of inner sense, thus *not something in time*. After all, just like the present, a decision occupies no time: just as the present is related to the subject of cognition, so the decision appears to be related to the subject of willing, and appears to be the point of contact between the unknowable subject of will (lying outside of time) and motives (lying in time); just as above we regarded the present to be the point of contact between the unknowable subject of cognition (lying outside of time) and objects (occupying time). If we overlook variations owing to different degrees of cleverness [*Klugheit*], we see that given the same observable motives, one person acts in one way, another in another way; however, the same person, given exactly the same circumstances, acts in exactly the same way, as though according to maxims, even if these are not present to his reason as abstract propositions, and even if he is most vividly aware that he could have acted in a completely different way had he so *willed*, i.e., that his will is determined by nothing external – and it is not a question here of *being able* [*Können*], but only of willing, which by its nature is free to the greatest degree, indeed, which is the innermost essence of the human being, independent of everything else. This observation leads to the assumption that there is an enduring state of the subject of the will, one from which his decisions necessarily follow. As *thus observed*, the way of acting is any person's *empirical character*; it can be surmised and inferred from the individual's actions, but it is not an immediate object of inner sense for individuals themselves. Since these expressions of the individual character are fragmentary, but indicate unity and unalterability of character, it must be thought of as the appearance of a permanent state, as it were, of the subject of the will, lying outside of time, which absolutely can never be cognized. I say permanent state, *as it were*, since *state* and *permanent* are only temporal, but there is no expression for the extra-temporal. Perhaps I could better indicate what is meant, although also figuratively, if I call it a universal act of will

* This qualification applies when, as above, the subject of willing is presented as an object of inner sense.

lying outside of time, of which all temporal acts are only the emergence, the appearance. Kant has called this the *intelligible character* (perhaps it would more correctly be called unintelligible), and in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 560–86 [Ak. A532–558/B560–586], he provides a discussion of the difference between it and the *empirical* character, as well as the whole relation of freedom to nature, a discussion I regard as an incomparable, highly admirable masterpiece of human profundity. In the first volume of his [*Philosophical*] *Writings*, pp. 465–73, Schelling provides a very valuable, illustrative exposition of this. In referring to any work, here, as in the whole essay generally, I have not wanted to repeat what has already been well put elsewhere, but only to provide what was necessary and what touches on the issue from the angle relevant to our present purpose. It is generally my intention to exclude from this philosophical monograph everything extraneous, and particularly to exclude everything ethical and aesthetic, since these would provide no new class of objects and, like so many other topics, are not necessary to our division of classes of objects; considering them would fill a treatise exceeding the present essay in scope as much as in content, one which would read very differently from our division, but be completely in agreement with it.

If we could know the empirical character of a human being perfectly, then from the circumstances in which we find him, as the motives of his actions, we could predict his behaviour as something following from a rule, just as well as an effect can be predicted from knowledge of the cause. However, there would still have to be a significant *correction* to the prediction because of the difference between a human being's circumstances (which belong to the total representation of an experience that we all have in common, i.e., which is objective), and the combinations of judgements that he makes about them according to the measure of the acuity of his understanding. However, perfect knowledge of the empirical character and of which correction to apply is impossible because neither is given to us as object, but we only surmise them from a limited number of cases, and a perfect knowledge of even these cases is impossible because we never know all the past and present impressions that the human being has received and that modify his disposition when he makes a decision and modify his judgement when he deliberates. Nevertheless, such knowledge is in fact possible to a certain degree, often even actual and of great use to the people of the world. For the latter purpose, pragmatic psychology provides an introduction, but it is the overall purpose of empirical psychology. The empirical character of animals is much easier to establish since each species has only one character that presents itself just as clearly in every individual and with just as slight variation as there is in the manifested type of the nature [*Beschaffenheit*] of the species. Therefore the empirical character of the species can be surmised quite well from experience with different individuals, and anyone who has attentively observed many individuals of the species will be able to predict how a dog, a cat, or a monkey would act in any particular instance – better and with a high degree of certainty with the less perfect species of animals. The movement of the infusiorians must even happen

according to definite mathematical patterns. Concerning the human race, such observations of the species as a whole are indeed what is called knowledge of human nature (i.e., an unsystematic, empirical–pragmatic psychology), the rules of which, however, are never certain because of the obvious existence of individual character, which is a phenomenon of freedom conditioned by reason, and like freedom peculiar to humans. From what has been observed here, the difference between a play or novel and Aesop's fables or Reynard the Fox is clear. In any case, this is why in this last book proper names coincide with the species, or rather, are just a pleonastic addition to them: Noble the Lion, Isegrin the Wolf, Brown the Bear. Finally this is why only the human has an individual physiognomy and the animal has merely the physiognomy of the species, although the face of an individual animal can have accidental differences from that of another, just as its paws can.

Motive, then, is the sufficient ground of acting for the empirical character. Indeed, the circumstances that become motives for acting are not causes of these actions (which, as such, are not their effect) because the action does not follow from motives, but from the empirical character solicited [*sollicitirten*] by motives, which character itself is not immediately perceptible, but (to repeat) is inferred and imperfectly surmised from actions.

In one respect, the law of causality can be compared to the optical law that governs the way a light ray affects a colourless, transparent body with parallel surfaces or a colourless mirror: that is, it is let through or reflected unaltered, and afterwards it is as it was before, and from the former state of affairs the latter can be predicted. But the law of motivation can be compared to the optical law that governs the way a light ray affects a coloured body: here the same light is red from this body or green from another, or from a third, which is black, it is not reflected at all; and just how each body would reflect the light cannot be predicted from whatever else is known about the body or about the light, but is only known upon perceiving the two working together. Just as it has reflected the light once, it will reflect the light at all times because there is just one kind of light. Now, however, if there were many specifically different kinds of light, the same body could reflect one as yellow and another as red, and then it would be as difficult to determine the colour of the body as it is difficult to know a human being's empirical character because it appears under all sorts of influences: under one influence the person acts one way, under another the person acts otherwise, although the person always acts the same under the same influences. But we see in the great poets, particularly in Shakespeare, that it is possible to obtain glimpses into the coloured ball of the empirical character so profound that, while beyond the reach of all explanation, they intimate an immediate insight into the intelligible character.

With the forms of the principle of sufficient reason previously presented, the knowledge of what is grounded was given along with the knowledge of the ground as such, permitting a hypothetical judgement that is certain. This is not the case with the present form: we are able to know motives, but we

do not thereby know how the subject will subsequently act. For each subject has a particular empirical character, and perfect knowledge of the empirical character of an individual is impossible. Here the rule-governed quality that applies to the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason ceases because in that case we remain in the world governed by laws, but here we encounter a completely different world, bordering on the realm of freedom. If I compare my presentation of the first three forms of our principle with moving images I had cast on the wall with a magic lantern, then now with the fourth form, a trap door has opened, one through which there enters a light before which some of my images disappear, and some become fragmented, unclear, and confused.

133 This sentence appears as the first sentence of the second paragraph of § 45 in A.

134 '*principle of sufficient reason of acting, principium rationis sufficientis agendi*, or more briefly put, *the law of motivation*' appears in the final sentence of the second paragraph of § 45 in A.

135 The title of § 44 in B changes that of § 47 in A, from '*Causality of Will on Cognition*' in A to '*Influence of Will on Cognition*' in B. § 47 in A reads:

The will not only causally affects the immediate object and, thus, the external world, but also the cognizing subject: for it can compel the cognizing subject to repeat representations that have once been present to the cognizing subject, generally to direct attention to this or that, and to evoke any series of thoughts it prefers. In particular the mental images (mentioned above) are repetitions of the kind of representations made present through the mediation of the immediate object, but without such mediation; thus, unlike immediate representations, they do not belong to the totality of experience, and consequently are not subject to the law of causality governing the totality of experience, but to that law that governs the expressions of the will, the law of motivation, even when we do not perceive the expression of the will, but only its immediate effect as it then appears to us, as if something without any connection to anything else has come to our consciousness. But that this could not have happened, as I said above, is precisely the root of the principle of sufficient reason. Any image that is suddenly presented in our imagination, and any judgement that does not follow from a ground that was previously present, must be evoked through an act of will that has a motive, although the motive (because it is trifling) and the act of will (because its satisfaction is so easy that it is simultaneous with the act of will) are frequently not perceived. The motive for the evocation of such mental images, or even judgements, that, as we say, occur to us suddenly, is normally the association of ideas, i.e., the wish to have representations similar to each present representation; this is an act of will that arises from the motive of our particular desire to perfect our knowledge (therefore, it is stronger among intelligent people), to which end it is useful to unite similar representations in order to satisfy the law of homogeneity.

136 'to repeat representations that have once been present to the cognizing subject, generally directing attention to this or that, and evoking any series of thoughts it prefers' occurs in § 47 of A.

137 'so that it then appears to us as if it had come to our consciousness without any connection to anything else; but that this could not have happened, as I said above, is precisely the root of the principle of sufficient reason' occurs in § 47 of A.

138 'Any image that is suddenly presented in our imagination, and any judgement that does not follow from a ground that was previously present, must be evoked through an act of will that has a motive, although the motive (because it is trifling) and the act of will (because its satisfaction is so easy that it is simultaneous with the act of will) are frequently not perceived' occurs in § 47 of A.

139 § 45 in B corresponds to § 48 in A, bearing the same title.

140 In B, 'For just this reason . . . ' through to ' . . . by which means he will retain possession of them' is added, replacing in A: 'In the *Symposium* (pp. 240–1), Plato says something to some extent quite similar'. [Perhaps Schopenhauer had in mind 210–212a.]

141 The three sentences from 'And we do not want to forget that . . . ' through to ' . . . and the greater the second, the greater too must be the other' are added in B.

142 The three sentences from 'Moreover, the whole thing is still subject to the corrective . . . ' through to ' . . . and for what is significant in itself', followed by a paragraph break, are added in B.

143 A brief paragraph was inserted at the conclusion of § 45 in Schopenhauer's author's copy. The identical paragraph was also found in the author's copy of *Parerga and Paralipomena*, Vol. 2. Hübscher assigns this to *Parerga and Paralipomena*, Vol. 2, § 350a [*SW* 6, 643ff., MS 492]. The paragraph is as follows, 'As far as possible, one should attempt to refer that which one wants to incorporate in memory to an intuitive image, whether it is now immediate, as an example of the thing, or as a mere simile or analogue, or whatever else because everything intuitive is more quickly retained than that which is mere thought in the abstract [*in abstracto*] or just words. For this reason we more readily retain that which we experience than that which we have read'.

In addition, B entirely omits § 49 in A, the whole of which reads as follows:

§ 49

FEELINGS, ETC.

Since they are perceived by us, our feelings, affects, passions, etc., are without a doubt objects for the subject and must, as such, either be subsumed under the classes cited here or comprise their own class. I find that they all can be reduced to 1) a physical feeling, the two extremes of which are pain and

sensual delight [*Wollust*], and between the two there are endless modifications [*Modifikationen*]. They are states of the immediate object and, as such, are subject to the law of causality. The subject of willing, however, by means of its causality on the subject of cognition, is able to direct this subject of cognition to objects different from the immediate object and its states. – 2) acts of will, among which I reckon lust, fear, hate, anger, sorrow, joy and the like, because they all are a fervent willing that something happen or not happen, the causality of which is either inhibited through external hindrances or through the same subject's opposing willing, an inhibition that just raises the willing to even greater degree. This is similar to the way electricity is intensified through resistance. Joy is a willing suddenly released and satisfied following such an inhibition. Sadness is the enduring willing for something recognized as impossible to achieve, thus a rational person says, 'I have enough motive to be sad, but I will not be'. As acts of will they are subject to the law of motivation. The immediate object of willing, like that of cognition, the body, is almost always affected by them, and physical feelings accompany them and intermix with them. That they are acts of will is already attested by the general demand that one control, even suppress them, i.e., that one raise opposing wishes to willing so that finally through persistent suppression, they no longer arise. However, if the opposite occurs, if the empirical character shows itself to be so completely determined by such fervent wishes that it appears as if no opposing wishes could arise and as if human beings in this regard are put in the same position as animals, with their use of reason suspended, then they are called *passions*. Finally, third, feelings can be traced back to combinations of bodily states and acts of will: when an unclearly cognized, unpleasant bodily affection [*Affektion*] excites [*erregt*] a will to extinguish it whose object is therefore not clear, then the cognitive faculty seeks another object for it: this is hypochondria. The sudden cessation of such bodily affections and of their accompanying inhibited will that has no clear object, are called a pleasant feeling, a sense of well-being, etc.

People also talk about moral feeling, religious feeling, aesthetic feeling. Yet I must explain that, not to render my own classification immune to attack, but on other, adequate grounds, I find these terms objectionable, and I absolutely cannot accept them as valid. Having proceeded from completely inessential determinations, these terms have come about through a blind *synchronism*,* which subsumes the best in humankind – to which indeed the rest of the world bears a relation as does a shadow in a dream to real, solid bodies – under a category with all sorts of things very different from it – with that which is completely animalistic in our nature, indeed even with that which is worse than animalistic – and so has called all of this *feeling*. On account of my plan, mentioned above, not to set foot in the realm of ethics and

* By this I understand the opposite of *criticism* [*Kriticismus*] in the original sense of the word, i.e., differentiation carried out to completion. Thus, synchronism is intermingling things which are different.

aesthetics in this treatise, I cannot proceed any further with this topic. As in a preparation of a single part of the anatomy, in a monograph, too, one must always note the places where the part is cut off from the other parts of the whole it necessarily belongs to and where a natural connection is arbitrarily and forcefully destroyed.

144 §§ 50 and 51 are eliminated in B, so that § 52 of A corresponds to § 46 of B, which opens chapter 8. § § 50 and 51 in A, are as follows:

§ 50

TRANSITION

In the last four chapters, the four meanings of the principle of sufficient reason and the four laws of our cognitive faculty from which they arise are presented in detail; however, these laws in turn appear to be connected and to be modifications of a single law. Now there remains nothing further for us to undertake than some observations concerning the principle of sufficient reason in general and its four forms.

§ 51

OTHER PRINCIPLES OF THE DIVISION OF THE FOUR TYPES OF GROUNDS

It is obvious that instead of attempting the one investigation, I set myself the task of attempting two: instead of distinguishing and dividing the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason according to the four classes of the possible objects of our faculty of representation, I could just have used Kantian principles to support each of my divisions of the grounds of the four powers of mind and consequently have said: the principle of the reason of becoming, as the law of causality, lies in our *understanding*; the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, as the faculty for drawing inferences, lies in our *reason*; the principle of the reason of being lies in our *pure sensibility*; and finally, the law of motivation governs our *will*. I could also have based my division on the disciplines that Kant presented, so that the principle of causality could have been derived from the *Transcendental Logic*, the principle of reason of cognition from the *General Logic*, that of the ground of being from the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, and finally the law of motivation from the *Ethics* [*Sittenlehre*]. Meanwhile the division I preferred may be justified on the one hand through the presentation itself, for through this presentation the division has involved investigations that were perhaps of more interest, but certainly just as much interest, as the investigation made for the purpose itself (and then again, this investigation would not have been so thorough); and on the other hand it appears to me that through this division our investigation

brought to light an essential result – namely that these four laws of all of our cognition have not simply an expression in common in the principle of sufficient reason, but that they are originally just *one* law, taking on different forms in accordance with the differences among objects of our cognitive faculty.

145 § 46 in B corresponds to § 52 in A, bearing the same title.

146 'applications' in A.

147 In B 'according to Aristotle's rule . . . *Metaphysics*, IV, 1' replaces in A 'even so, this goal is not entirely achieved, and because of the interrelatedness of all the parts, anyone who would completely understand this treatise, must read it twice'.

148 This second paragraph is added in B.

149 § 47 in B corresponds to § 53 in A, bearing the same title.

150 B adds the reference to *The World as Will and Representation* and adds the reference to the first edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

151 'chain of alterations' is added in B.

152 In B, one sentence, 'But from this example . . . was unclear', replaces in A 'It is the same with the law of motivation: the motive always precedes the decision and the latter, as a mere point in time (the point of contact between the subject and the object) has no duration'.

153 § 48 in B corresponds to § 54 in A, bearing the same title.

154 In B 'just as any hypothetical judgement ultimately is based on it' replaces in A '(although, as has been said, if this is founded on the law of motivation, it never has complete certainty)'.

155 This second paragraph is added in B.

156 § 49 in B is added, having no corresponding section in A.

157 § 50 in B corresponds to § 55 in A, bearing the same title.

158 'arbitrarily' is added in B.

159 'thus, time can have neither beginning nor end' replaces in A: 'but not through one following it, although it provides reliable indication of this.'

160 'transcendental' replaces 'metaphysical' in A.

161 'that is, an empirical truth, is the ground of the major premise to which one has been led' is added in B.

162 'what one demands is no longer a ground of cognition, but' replaces 'what one wants' in A.

163 In B,'But now if one once does the opposite . . . ' through to '. . . like an eye, which sees everything except itself' replaces the following in A, § 55 at: 'In contrast, in the two last instances, for the question "why" there is no answer'.

164 In B 'where the motive that originally had the capacity to set this individual will in motion is to be found. That it could do this' replaces in A: 'That now from these some determined representation becomes a motive'.

165 In B, 'but why the empirical character was moved . . . ' through to the end of § 50, replaces in A, § 55: '. . . but why it becomes it [a motive] cannot be answered because the intelligible character lies outside of time and never becomes an object. Thus the series of motives finds an end in such a

representation'. In A, § 56 follows immediately, but is completely eliminated from B. § 56 in A is as follows:

§ 56

CONFIRMATION FROM LANGUAGES

Perhaps the various types of grounds may also be found in languages, indicated by special terms, which could be ascertained through linguistic research. Just to give an example, I note that when consequents are immediately derived from grounds, words which indicate consequence appear to carry traces of such a distinction, though the distinction can often be difficult to observe precisely in written works, because this requires a very fine sensitivity and close attention. So it appears to me, e.g., that the words *ergo*, *folglich*, *sintemal,* indicate consequence from the ground of cognition or of being – *inde*, *quare*, *daher*, consequence from the ground of becoming – and finally, *igitur*, *quamobrem, also,* consequence from the ground of acting.

166 § 51 in B corresponds to § 57 in A, bearing the same title.

167 This last sentence of § 51 is added in B. In A, § 58 follows immediately, but is completely eliminated from B. § 58 in A is as follows:

§ 58

APOLOGY [APOLOGIE] CONCERNING IMAGINATION AND REASON

It seems to me that before I conclude this treatise, it may be necessary to come to an understanding on two points. Specifically, in § 22, I have provided an explanation of the imagination which will displease all who hold the imagination to be what is noblest in humankind, and what generally makes poets and artists. Furthermore in §§ 27 and 33, I have described and designated reason in a way that likely will not satisfy those who regard *reason* to be what is best in humankind because they regard reason, with the predicate *practical*, to be what makes for virtuousness and saintliness, and I will even less satisfy those who call reason an 'absolute cognitive faculty' and who attribute an apotheosis to it which is in no way consistent with my description of it. Both opinions, concerning imagination as well as reason, are not only quite common, but also the opinions of very estimable and thoughtful men. In order to offer at least the possibility of appeasing them, I provide the following explanation. I take it that the imagination is not the essential, not the innermost power, by which the poet and any artist is what he is; but it is a necessary though somewhat accessory and somewhat extraneous condition for the artist; indeed, it is even the condition of great madness [*Narrheit*]. As a result it is in itself only a tool and generally as I have presented it in § 22. Secondly, as for reason, according to my judgement, on the basis of my account, it is not itself the

source of virtue or saintliness (as Kant's theory, and every one arising since then – indeed generally almost any philosophy since Descartes – will have it); rather, as the faculty of concepts and consequently of action following concepts, it is only a necessary condition for virtue and saintliness. But also it is only a tool, since it is a condition for the complete villain [*Bösewicht*] too, for what Plato called the tyrant and so masterfully depicted in the 8th and 9th Books of the *Republic*. But what, then, is the innermost essence of the artist, the innermost essence of the saint, if this essence be one and the same – I will not concern myself with this, for to do so would be inconsistent with my intent not to touch upon ethics and aesthetics in this treatise. Perhaps, however, at some time this could become the subject of a larger work for me, the subject of which would be related to the present work as waking is to dreaming. We will counter misinterpretation of this last expression in criticism of our account that is now coming to an end, with Seneca's words: 'to narrate dreams is for the wakeful' ['*Somnia narrare vigilantis est*' *Epistles* 53, 8, 2].

168 § 52 in B corresponds to § 59 in A, bearing the same title.

169 Four sentences, from 'After all, the general sense of the principle of sufficient reason' to the end of the paragraph, are added in B.

170 'transcendent' in A.

171 In A, this paragraph continues with 'I would rather have taken my examples from Kant's own writings, even if these examples were less glaring, because it is not my intent to criticize, but only to clarify my opinion through examples'.

172 'consciousness' in A.

173 'show itself' [*sich zeigen*] in A.

174 Note on the last blank sheet in A [Hübscher *SW* 7, 136]:

CONTRADICTION

The principle of reason presupposes the four classes of objects (p. 148), and yet objects first result from the application of the principle of reason

A second note in the same place: 'To give the world a *cause* means that it did not exist previously or *otherwise*; consequently, it is to regard it only as a *state,* within an *alteration*, and consequently only as a *modification* of a being that alters, since the concept of cause is derived only from alterations. That which has a cause did not exist previously or was not *so*. To give the world a *cause* and to explain it as *eternal* is a contradiction. Spinoza commits this contradiction. Attributes are just as eternal as substance; consequently, thinking and extension cannot be created. That which is supposed to be cannot be just as eternal as that which supposes it'.

Note on a loose sheet of paper inserted in A [Hübscher *SW* 7, 136]:

'1. An object that contradicts all conditions of thinking and cognizing cannot be thought and cognized.

'2. Certainly things appear to us only as we *represent* them. But that our representations do not *deceive* us, but correspond to the will, is their *reality*. This agreement of our representing with our will, with the *thing in itself*, must have a deeper ground, one binding the two. How is it that my representations do not, in fact, show me the thing in itself, but still relate to the thing in itself?

'3. The distinction between representations in a waking state and representations in a dream state is not that the former show us things in themselves, rather they relate to things in themselves, whereas the latter do not.'